[PATCH net v3 0/2] Guard against gso_segs overflows

[PATCH net v3 0/2] Guard against gso_segs overflows

[Alice Mikityanska]

From: Alice Mikityanska <alice@isovalent.com>

This series is a follow-up on the discussion:

https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAD0BsJWzSr2zduf5v3mVC4zd=Lj6ZAoC+V42-VBdg42aDY8XXw@mail.gmail.com/T/#m1e22fca273c36cc8844e516505d3251cc1418fea

skb_segment is patched to avoid possible overflows in partial GSO. The
primary possible source of too many GSO segments is also addressed:
virtio-net clamps gso_size to >=8 in TCP, as suggested by Eric.

v3 changes: Reordered the patches, added WARN to skb_segment.

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260813174613.2920246-1-alice.kernel@fastmail.im/

v2 changes: dropped new checks in fastpath from skb_gro_receive and
__virtio_net_hdr_to_skb, replaced the latter with a silent clamp for
gso_size, kept the cheap guard in skb_segment.

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260723155145.158572-1-alice.kernel@fastmail.im/

Alice Mikityanska (2):
  virtio-net: Ensure that TCP packets don't overflow gso_segs
  net: Guard for gso_segs overflow in skb_segment

 include/linux/virtio_net.h | 4 ++++
 net/core/skbuff.c          | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

-- 
2.55.0

[PATCH net v3 1/2] virtio-net: Ensure that TCP packets don't overflow gso_segs

[Alice Mikityanska]

From: Alice Mikityanska <alice@isovalent.com>

The user can specify any gso_size in a packet crafted with an AF_PACKET
PACKET_VNET_HDR socket, even smaller than TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. At the
same time, GSO_MAX_SIZE = 8 * GSO_MAX_SEGS = 8 * 65535. When the user
crafts a packet with gso_size < 8, there is a risk for partial GSO to
overflow the 16-bit gso_segs field when dividing the SKB length by
gso_size.

Adjust gso_size of TCP packets to be at least TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. Keep
gso_size of UDP GSO packets, as gso_size=1 is valid and explicitly
tested at tools/testing/selftests/net/tun.c:649.

Fixes: 7c6d2ecbda83 ("net: be more gentle about silly gso requests coming from user")
Signed-off-by: Alice Mikityanska <alice@isovalent.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
---
 include/linux/virtio_net.h | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h
index f36d21b5bc19..c381b916c1b5 100644
--- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h
+++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/ip.h>
 #include <linux/ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <net/tcp.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/tcp.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/virtio_net.h>
 
@@ -179,6 +180,9 @@ static inline int __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL &&
 			    skb->csum_offset != offsetof(struct tcphdr, check))
 				return -EINVAL;
+
+			BUILD_BUG_ON(TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE * GSO_MAX_SEGS < GSO_MAX_SIZE);
+			gso_size = max(gso_size, TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE);
 			break;
 		}
 
-- 
2.55.0

[PATCH net v3 2/2] net: Guard for gso_segs overflow in skb_segment

[Alice Mikityanska]

From: Alice Mikityanska <alice@isovalent.com>

skb_segment calculates 32-bit partial_segs as len / gso_size, and then
assigns it to the 16-bit gso_segs field. The division might overflow in
some edge cases where the SKB is BIG TCP (65536 <= len <= 8*65535), and
gso_size < TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. While normally this can't happen due to
TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE, an AF_PACKET PACKET_VNET_HDR socket could generate
such a malformed packet until the previous patch.

Blocking malformed virtio_net packets was implemented in the previous
patch, but this patch clamps partial_segs in skb_segment itself for more
generic robustness. Should len / gso_size happen to be bigger than
65535 in partial GSO, skb_segment will now just produce more than two
output SKBs, all of which will be valid with gso_segs <= 65535.

In order to catch possible other cases of too many partial_segs, add a
DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE when len / gso_size happens to be too big.

Signed-off-by: Alice Mikityanska <alice@isovalent.com>
---
 net/core/skbuff.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
index d4382b68d56e..ceac295bb63d 100644
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -4871,7 +4871,8 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
 		 * doesn't fit into an MSS sized block, so take care of that
 		 * now.
 		 */
-		partial_segs = len / mss;
+		DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(len / mss > GSO_MAX_SEGS);
+		partial_segs = min(len / mss, GSO_MAX_SEGS);
 		if (partial_segs > 1)
 			mss *= partial_segs;
 		else
-- 
2.55.0

Re: [PATCH net v3 0/2] Guard against gso_segs overflows

[patchwork-bot+netdevbpf]

Hello:

This series was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>:

On Sat, 22 Aug 2026 15:01:15 +0300 you wrote:
> From: Alice Mikityanska <alice@isovalent.com>
> 
> This series is a follow-up on the discussion:
> 
> https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAD0BsJWzSr2zduf5v3mVC4zd=Lj6ZAoC+V42-VBdg42aDY8XXw@mail.gmail.com/T/#m1e22fca273c36cc8844e516505d3251cc1418fea
> 
> skb_segment is patched to avoid possible overflows in partial GSO. The
> primary possible source of too many GSO segments is also addressed:
> virtio-net clamps gso_size to >=8 in TCP, as suggested by Eric.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [net,v3,1/2] virtio-net: Ensure that TCP packets don't overflow gso_segs
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/c27c449d455a
  - [net,v3,2/2] net: Guard for gso_segs overflow in skb_segment
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/0b13256ce37b

You are awesome, thank you!
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