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From: netdev-bot+sashiko@kernel.org
To: carges@cloudflare.com
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@kernel.org, kuba@kernel.org,
	pabeni@redhat.com, horms@kernel.org, dsahern@kernel.org,
	idosch@nvidia.com, june@cloudflare.com, danjones@cloudflare.com,
	jbrandeburg@cloudflare.com, josef@toxicpanda.com,
	mason@kernel.org, kernel-team@cloudflare.com,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	stable@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: prevent receive header offset overflow during decapsulation
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:39:27 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <179502356763.3136.15330216541876894208@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118-prevent_rx_header_offset_overflow-v1-1-92a5be55f994@cloudflare.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential
issue(s) to consider.

Critical: 0 · High: 1 · Medium: 0 · Low: 0

If you believe none of the issues are legitimate, please reply to each
issue of Medium severity or higher and explain why the AI is wrong.
If any of them are legitimate and you plan to respin, please let patchwork
know by including "pw-bot: cr" as a separate line at the end of your reply
(one such reply per series is enough).

- [High] The new SKB_MAX_RX_HEADROOM (32 KiB) checks run in only three
  places: when __netif_receive_skb_core() is entered…

--

net: prevent receive header offset overflow during decapsulation

This patch limits receive headroom to 32 KiB (SKB_MAX_RX_HEADROOM). The
goal is to keep the 16-bit skb header offsets from being truncated after
repeated decapsulation. The check runs on entry to
__netif_receive_skb_core() and at the resubmit points of
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu() and ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu(), and drops
packets with the new SKB_RX_HEADROOM drop reason.

[ ... ]

> diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
> index 3c58db732761a..6140fd9d11cd0 100644
> --- a/net/core/dev.c
> +++ b/net/core/dev.c
> @@ -6223,6 +6223,10 @@ static int __netif_receive_skb_core(struct sk_buff **pskb, bool pfmemalloc,
>  	trace_netif_receive_skb(skb);
>  
>  	orig_dev = skb->dev;
> +	if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) > SKB_MAX_RX_HEADROOM)) {
> +		drop_reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_SKB_RX_HEADROOM;
> +		goto drop;
> +	}

[Severity: High]

This check runs once, when __netif_receive_skb_core() is entered. That is
before the another_round label, sch_handle_ingress(), vlan_do_receive()
and the rx_handler call.

Can headers stripped later in the same receive pass still push the 16-bit
header offsets past U16_MAX?

For example, tc act_mpls with TCA_MPLS_ACT_POP calls skb_mpls_pop() once
per action. Each call stores the current headroom into the u16 header
fields:

net/core/skbuff.c:skb_mpls_pop() {
    ...
	__skb_pull(skb, MPLS_HLEN);
	skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
	skb_set_network_header(skb, mac_len);
    ...
}

Outside CONFIG_DEBUG_NET, the only guard in those helpers is
DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(), so the value gets truncated silently.

The number of pops per pass doesn't look bounded:

  - a filter can hold up to 32 actions
  - a filter whose action control is continue returns a negative result,
    and __tcf_classify() moves on to the next tcf_proto without counting
    it toward max_reclassify_loop (that limit only covers the
    TC_ACT_RECLASSIFY / TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN reset path)
  - about 512 matchall or flower filters with 32 pops each comes to
    roughly 16K pops in one pass

veth_setup() sets dev->max_mtu = ETH_MAX_MTU. A frame of about 65.5 KB
carrying about 16K MPLS labels, sent with AF_PACKET on one veth end, would
reach __netif_receive_skb_core() on the peer with about 30 bytes of
headroom and pass this check.

tc ingress could then pop the labels while skb_ensure_writable() keeps
pulling data from the frags into the linear head. At some point
mac_header and network_header would wrap past U16_MAX.

After the wrap, the remaining skb_mpls_pop() calls would run memmove(),
skb_postpull_rcsum() and skb_mod_eth_type() at the truncated offsets.
ip_rcv_core() would then read ip_hdr() from stale bytes and set
transport_header from that position. L4 code could then misparse the
packet, for example in tcp_data_queue():

	__skb_pull(skb, tcp_hdr(skb)->doff * 4);

Here doff comes from the wrong bytes, so could this wrap skb->len or hit
the BUG() in __skb_pull()?

This setup needs only CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_NET_RAW in a netns owned by a
user namespace.

Similar in-pass header strips look possible elsewhere:

  - openvswitch pop_mpls with recirculation, where
    ovs_dp_process_packet() runs again without re-entering
    __netif_receive_skb_core()
  - bpf_skb_adjust_room() shrinking, which adds len directly to
    mac_header and network_header

The commit message says:

    Together, these checks
    prevent 16-bit header-offset truncation in cases of repeated
    decapsulation.

Is that still accurate given these paths?

Would it be more robust to bound the offset where it is stored, either in
the skb_set_*_header() / skb_reset_*_header() helpers or in the pop/shrink
helpers, instead of only at the chosen re-entry points?

[ ... ]

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20261118-prevent_rx_header_offset_overflow-v1-1-92a5be55f994%40cloudflare.com

      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-18 17:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-18 14:32 [PATCH] net: prevent receive header offset overflow during decapsulation Chris J Arges
2026-11-18 14:38 ` netdev-bot+sinfo
2026-11-18 17:39 ` netdev-bot+sashiko [this message]

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