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* [PATCH] net: prevent receive header offset overflow during decapsulation
@ 2026-11-18 14:32 Chris J Arges
  2026-11-18 14:38 ` netdev-bot+sinfo
  2026-11-18 17:39 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Chris J Arges @ 2026-11-18 14:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni,
	Simon Horman, David Ahern, Ido Schimmel
  Cc: June Slater, Dan Jones, Jesse Brandeburg, Josef Bacik,
	Chris Mason, kernel-team, netdev, linux-kernel, stable,
	Chris J Arges

Repeated decapsulation can leave skb->data far from skb->head while
the remaining packet data is still valid. Since the skb header positions
are 16-bit offsets, a later header update can truncate and make header
access use unrelated bytes and eventually crash.

Limit receive headroom to 32 KiB. This is well beyond the headroom of
normal packets while allowing the networking stack to pull enough
headers in a single pass without overflowing 16-bit header offsets.

Tunnel decapsulation re-enters __netif_receive_skb_core(), so its check
protects nested IPIP and GRE. FOU and GUE bypass receive core, so check
their IPv4 and IPv6 resubmission paths too. Together, these checks
prevent 16-bit header-offset truncation in cases of repeated
decapsulation.

Report these rejections with the SKB_RX_HEADROOM drop reason.

Fixes: 1a37e412a022 ("net: Use 16bits for *_headers fields of struct skbuff")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chris J Arges <carges@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
---
 include/linux/skbuff.h        | 1 +
 include/net/dropreason-core.h | 6 ++++++
 net/core/dev.c                | 4 ++++
 net/ipv4/ip_input.c           | 6 ++++++
 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c          | 4 ++++
 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h
index 6787fcf6ac3e..adc61f5e3e85 100644
--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
+++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
@@ -268,6 +268,7 @@
 	SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD((PAGE_SIZE << (ORDER)) - (X))
 #define SKB_MAX_HEAD(X)		(SKB_MAX_ORDER((X), 0))
 #define SKB_MAX_ALLOC		(SKB_MAX_ORDER(0, 2))
+#define SKB_MAX_RX_HEADROOM	(U16_MAX / 2)
 
 /* return minimum truesize of one skb containing X bytes of data */
 #define SKB_TRUESIZE(X) ((X) +						\
diff --git a/include/net/dropreason-core.h b/include/net/dropreason-core.h
index fa2fe8990557..903d6a3a0ff1 100644
--- a/include/net/dropreason-core.h
+++ b/include/net/dropreason-core.h
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@
 	FN(PSP_INPUT)			\
 	FN(PSP_OUTPUT)			\
 	FN(RECURSION_LIMIT)		\
+	FN(SKB_RX_HEADROOM)		\
 	FNe(MAX)
 
 /**
@@ -612,6 +613,11 @@ enum skb_drop_reason {
 	 * itself.
 	 */
 	SKB_DROP_REASON_RECURSION_LIMIT,
+	/**
+	 * @SKB_DROP_REASON_SKB_RX_HEADROOM: accumulated receive headroom
+	 * exceeds the header-offset budget.
+	 */
+	SKB_DROP_REASON_SKB_RX_HEADROOM,
 	/**
 	 * @SKB_DROP_REASON_MAX: the maximum of core drop reasons, which
 	 * shouldn't be used as a real 'reason' - only for tracing code gen
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index 3c58db732761..6140fd9d11cd 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -6223,6 +6223,10 @@ static int __netif_receive_skb_core(struct sk_buff **pskb, bool pfmemalloc,
 	trace_netif_receive_skb(skb);
 
 	orig_dev = skb->dev;
+	if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) > SKB_MAX_RX_HEADROOM)) {
+		drop_reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_SKB_RX_HEADROOM;
+		goto drop;
+	}
 
 	skb_reset_network_header(skb);
 #if !defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_NET)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_input.c b/net/ipv4/ip_input.c
index 9860178752b8..c74886b1f445 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_input.c
@@ -207,6 +207,12 @@ void ip_protocol_deliver_rcu(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, int protocol)
 		ret = INDIRECT_CALL_2(ipprot->handler, tcp_v4_rcv, udp_rcv,
 				      skb);
 		if (ret < 0) {
+			if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) > SKB_MAX_RX_HEADROOM)) {
+				__IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_INDISCARDS);
+				kfree_skb_reason(skb,
+						 SKB_DROP_REASON_SKB_RX_HEADROOM);
+				return;
+			}
 			protocol = -ret;
 			goto resubmit;
 		}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
index d332ec60f915..6dc1211eade6 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
@@ -479,6 +479,10 @@ void ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr,
 		ret = INDIRECT_CALL_2(ipprot->handler, tcp_v6_rcv, udpv6_rcv,
 				      skb);
 		if (ret > 0) {
+			if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) > SKB_MAX_RX_HEADROOM)) {
+				SKB_DR_SET(reason, SKB_RX_HEADROOM);
+				goto discard;
+			}
 			if (ipprot->flags & INET6_PROTO_FINAL) {
 				/* Not an extension header, most likely UDP
 				 * encapsulation. Use return value as nexthdr

---
base-commit: 2a324a58a084c5cfd7e5a2f55e0786bee170a4a5
change-id: 20261118-prevent_rx_header_offset_overflow-45e24a2686d2

Best regards,
--  
Chris J Arges <carges@cloudflare.com>


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] net: prevent receive header offset overflow during decapsulation
  2026-11-18 14:32 [PATCH] net: prevent receive header offset overflow during decapsulation Chris J Arges
@ 2026-11-18 14:38 ` netdev-bot+sinfo
  2026-11-18 17:39 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: netdev-bot+sinfo @ 2026-11-18 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Chris J Arges
  Cc: David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni,
	Simon Horman, David Ahern, Ido Schimmel, June Slater, Dan Jones,
	Jesse Brandeburg, Josef Bacik, Chris Mason, kernel-team, netdev,
	linux-kernel, stable

Hi!

This is an automated message. This series looks like a fix, but its
commit messages seem to be missing some information:

 - How the issue was discovered, e.g. hit in production, hit during
   development, syzbot report, manual code inspection, LLM or static
   analysis tool scan.

 - Whether the issue was actually triggered, or is only theoretical
   (e.g. found by LLM and not proven at runtime). If it was triggered
   please include the symptoms, like the stack trace or kernel messages.

Please do not repost the series just to address the above. Instead,
reply to this email with the missing information, so that reviewers
can take it into account.

*IMPORTANT*: If you do repost (for other reasons) - please include
the relevant info in the cover letter or commit messages.
-- 
The evaluation is done by an LLM so it may be wrong, if you think
that is the case please reply and explain.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] net: prevent receive header offset overflow during decapsulation
  2026-11-18 14:32 [PATCH] net: prevent receive header offset overflow during decapsulation Chris J Arges
  2026-11-18 14:38 ` netdev-bot+sinfo
@ 2026-11-18 17:39 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: netdev-bot+sashiko @ 2026-11-18 17:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: carges
  Cc: davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, horms, dsahern, idosch, june,
	danjones, jbrandeburg, josef, mason, kernel-team, netdev,
	linux-kernel, stable

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential
issue(s) to consider.

Critical: 0 · High: 1 · Medium: 0 · Low: 0

If you believe none of the issues are legitimate, please reply to each
issue of Medium severity or higher and explain why the AI is wrong.
If any of them are legitimate and you plan to respin, please let patchwork
know by including "pw-bot: cr" as a separate line at the end of your reply
(one such reply per series is enough).

- [High] The new SKB_MAX_RX_HEADROOM (32 KiB) checks run in only three
  places: when __netif_receive_skb_core() is entered…

--

net: prevent receive header offset overflow during decapsulation

This patch limits receive headroom to 32 KiB (SKB_MAX_RX_HEADROOM). The
goal is to keep the 16-bit skb header offsets from being truncated after
repeated decapsulation. The check runs on entry to
__netif_receive_skb_core() and at the resubmit points of
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu() and ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu(), and drops
packets with the new SKB_RX_HEADROOM drop reason.

[ ... ]

> diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
> index 3c58db732761a..6140fd9d11cd0 100644
> --- a/net/core/dev.c
> +++ b/net/core/dev.c
> @@ -6223,6 +6223,10 @@ static int __netif_receive_skb_core(struct sk_buff **pskb, bool pfmemalloc,
>  	trace_netif_receive_skb(skb);
>  
>  	orig_dev = skb->dev;
> +	if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) > SKB_MAX_RX_HEADROOM)) {
> +		drop_reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_SKB_RX_HEADROOM;
> +		goto drop;
> +	}

[Severity: High]

This check runs once, when __netif_receive_skb_core() is entered. That is
before the another_round label, sch_handle_ingress(), vlan_do_receive()
and the rx_handler call.

Can headers stripped later in the same receive pass still push the 16-bit
header offsets past U16_MAX?

For example, tc act_mpls with TCA_MPLS_ACT_POP calls skb_mpls_pop() once
per action. Each call stores the current headroom into the u16 header
fields:

net/core/skbuff.c:skb_mpls_pop() {
    ...
	__skb_pull(skb, MPLS_HLEN);
	skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
	skb_set_network_header(skb, mac_len);
    ...
}

Outside CONFIG_DEBUG_NET, the only guard in those helpers is
DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(), so the value gets truncated silently.

The number of pops per pass doesn't look bounded:

  - a filter can hold up to 32 actions
  - a filter whose action control is continue returns a negative result,
    and __tcf_classify() moves on to the next tcf_proto without counting
    it toward max_reclassify_loop (that limit only covers the
    TC_ACT_RECLASSIFY / TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN reset path)
  - about 512 matchall or flower filters with 32 pops each comes to
    roughly 16K pops in one pass

veth_setup() sets dev->max_mtu = ETH_MAX_MTU. A frame of about 65.5 KB
carrying about 16K MPLS labels, sent with AF_PACKET on one veth end, would
reach __netif_receive_skb_core() on the peer with about 30 bytes of
headroom and pass this check.

tc ingress could then pop the labels while skb_ensure_writable() keeps
pulling data from the frags into the linear head. At some point
mac_header and network_header would wrap past U16_MAX.

After the wrap, the remaining skb_mpls_pop() calls would run memmove(),
skb_postpull_rcsum() and skb_mod_eth_type() at the truncated offsets.
ip_rcv_core() would then read ip_hdr() from stale bytes and set
transport_header from that position. L4 code could then misparse the
packet, for example in tcp_data_queue():

	__skb_pull(skb, tcp_hdr(skb)->doff * 4);

Here doff comes from the wrong bytes, so could this wrap skb->len or hit
the BUG() in __skb_pull()?

This setup needs only CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_NET_RAW in a netns owned by a
user namespace.

Similar in-pass header strips look possible elsewhere:

  - openvswitch pop_mpls with recirculation, where
    ovs_dp_process_packet() runs again without re-entering
    __netif_receive_skb_core()
  - bpf_skb_adjust_room() shrinking, which adds len directly to
    mac_header and network_header

The commit message says:

    Together, these checks
    prevent 16-bit header-offset truncation in cases of repeated
    decapsulation.

Is that still accurate given these paths?

Would it be more robust to bound the offset where it is stored, either in
the skb_set_*_header() / skb_reset_*_header() helpers or in the pop/shrink
helpers, instead of only at the chosen re-entry points?

[ ... ]

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20261118-prevent_rx_header_offset_overflow-v1-1-92a5be55f994%40cloudflare.com

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

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2026-11-18 14:38 ` netdev-bot+sinfo
2026-11-18 17:39 ` netdev-bot+sashiko

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