* [PATCH v2] openvswitch: allow management from inside user namespaces
@ 2016-02-02 0:31 Tycho Andersen
[not found] ` <1454373073-12530-1-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Tycho Andersen @ 2016-02-02 0:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pravin Shelar, David S. Miller
Cc: netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, Eric Biederman,
Justin Pettit
Operations with the GENL_ADMIN_PERM flag fail permissions checks because
this flag means we call netlink_capable, which uses the init user ns.
Instead, let's introduce a new flag, GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM for operations
which should be allowed inside a user namespace.
The motivation for this is to be able to run openvswitch in unprivileged
containers. I've tested this and it seems to work, but I really have no
idea about the security consequences of this patch, so thoughts would be
much appreciated.
v2: use the GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM flag instead of a check in each function
Reported-by: James Page <james.page-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
CC: Eric Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
CC: Pravin Shelar <pshelar-LZ6Gd1LRuIk@public.gmane.org>
CC: Justin Pettit <jpettit-l0M0P4e3n4LQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q@public.gmane.org>
---
include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h | 1 +
net/netlink/genetlink.c | 6 ++++--
net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h
index c3363ba..5512c90 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct genlmsghdr {
#define GENL_CMD_CAP_DO 0x02
#define GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP 0x04
#define GENL_CMD_CAP_HASPOL 0x08
+#define GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM 0x10
/*
* List of reserved static generic netlink identifiers:
diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
index f830326..6bbb3eb 100644
--- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
@@ -576,8 +576,10 @@ static int genl_family_rcv_msg(struct genl_family *family,
if (ops == NULL)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) &&
- !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) &&
+ !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) ||
+ ((ops->flags & GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM) &&
+ !netlink_ns_capable(skb, net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)))
return -EPERM;
if ((nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) == NLM_F_DUMP) {
diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
index deadfda..d6f7fe9 100644
--- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
+++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
@@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy packet_policy[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
static const struct genl_ops dp_packet_genl_ops[] = {
{ .cmd = OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = packet_policy,
.doit = ovs_packet_cmd_execute
}
@@ -1391,12 +1391,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy flow_policy[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
static const struct genl_ops dp_flow_genl_ops[] = {
{ .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_NEW,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = flow_policy,
.doit = ovs_flow_cmd_new
},
{ .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_DEL,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = flow_policy,
.doit = ovs_flow_cmd_del
},
@@ -1407,7 +1407,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_flow_genl_ops[] = {
.dumpit = ovs_flow_cmd_dump
},
{ .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_SET,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = flow_policy,
.doit = ovs_flow_cmd_set,
},
@@ -1777,12 +1777,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy datapath_policy[OVS_DP_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
static const struct genl_ops dp_datapath_genl_ops[] = {
{ .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_NEW,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = datapath_policy,
.doit = ovs_dp_cmd_new
},
{ .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_DEL,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = datapath_policy,
.doit = ovs_dp_cmd_del
},
@@ -1793,7 +1793,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_datapath_genl_ops[] = {
.dumpit = ovs_dp_cmd_dump
},
{ .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_SET,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = datapath_policy,
.doit = ovs_dp_cmd_set,
},
@@ -2158,12 +2158,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy vport_policy[OVS_VPORT_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
static const struct genl_ops dp_vport_genl_ops[] = {
{ .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_NEW,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = vport_policy,
.doit = ovs_vport_cmd_new
},
{ .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_DEL,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = vport_policy,
.doit = ovs_vport_cmd_del
},
@@ -2174,7 +2174,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_vport_genl_ops[] = {
.dumpit = ovs_vport_cmd_dump
},
{ .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_SET,
- .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
+ .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */
.policy = vport_policy,
.doit = ovs_vport_cmd_set,
},
--
2.5.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread[parent not found: <1454373073-12530-1-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>]
* Re: [PATCH v2] openvswitch: allow management from inside user namespaces [not found] ` <1454373073-12530-1-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org> @ 2016-02-02 18:34 ` Serge Hallyn 0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread From: Serge Hallyn @ 2016-02-02 18:34 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Tycho Andersen Cc: netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, Pravin Shelar, Eric Biederman, Justin Pettit, David S. Miller Quoting Tycho Andersen (tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org): > Operations with the GENL_ADMIN_PERM flag fail permissions checks because > this flag means we call netlink_capable, which uses the init user ns. > > Instead, let's introduce a new flag, GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM for operations > which should be allowed inside a user namespace. > > The motivation for this is to be able to run openvswitch in unprivileged > containers. I've tested this and it seems to work, but I really have no > idea about the security consequences of this patch, so thoughts would be > much appreciated. > > v2: use the GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM flag instead of a check in each function > > Reported-by: James Page <james.page-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org> > Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org> > CC: Eric Biederman <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> > CC: Pravin Shelar <pshelar-LZ6Gd1LRuIk@public.gmane.org> > CC: Justin Pettit <jpettit-l0M0P4e3n4LQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> > CC: "David S. Miller" <davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q@public.gmane.org> > --- > include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h | 1 + > net/netlink/genetlink.c | 6 ++++-- > net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- > 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h b/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h > index c3363ba..5512c90 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/genetlink.h > @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct genlmsghdr { > #define GENL_CMD_CAP_DO 0x02 > #define GENL_CMD_CAP_DUMP 0x04 > #define GENL_CMD_CAP_HASPOL 0x08 > +#define GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM 0x10 > > /* > * List of reserved static generic netlink identifiers: > diff --git a/net/netlink/genetlink.c b/net/netlink/genetlink.c > index f830326..6bbb3eb 100644 > --- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c > +++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c > @@ -576,8 +576,10 @@ static int genl_family_rcv_msg(struct genl_family *family, > if (ops == NULL) > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > > - if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) && > - !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) > + if (((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) && > + !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) || Seems like this would be a lot clearer if you split it up, i.e.: /* CAP_NET_ADMIN required against initial user_ns */ if ((ops->flags & GENL_ADMIN_PERM) && !netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; /* CAP_NET_ADMIN required against device user_ns */ if ((ops->flags & GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM) && !netlink_ns_capable(skb, net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; > + ((ops->flags & GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM) && > + !netlink_ns_capable(skb, net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))) > return -EPERM; > > if ((nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) == NLM_F_DUMP) { > diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c > index deadfda..d6f7fe9 100644 > --- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c > +++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c > @@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy packet_policy[OVS_PACKET_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { > > static const struct genl_ops dp_packet_genl_ops[] = { > { .cmd = OVS_PACKET_CMD_EXECUTE, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ Hm, I'd like to suggest adding 'over netns', but I guess that breaks 80 cols... > .policy = packet_policy, > .doit = ovs_packet_cmd_execute > } > @@ -1391,12 +1391,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy flow_policy[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { > > static const struct genl_ops dp_flow_genl_ops[] = { > { .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_NEW, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = flow_policy, > .doit = ovs_flow_cmd_new > }, > { .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_DEL, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = flow_policy, > .doit = ovs_flow_cmd_del > }, > @@ -1407,7 +1407,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_flow_genl_ops[] = { > .dumpit = ovs_flow_cmd_dump > }, > { .cmd = OVS_FLOW_CMD_SET, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = flow_policy, > .doit = ovs_flow_cmd_set, > }, > @@ -1777,12 +1777,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy datapath_policy[OVS_DP_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { > > static const struct genl_ops dp_datapath_genl_ops[] = { > { .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_NEW, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = datapath_policy, > .doit = ovs_dp_cmd_new > }, > { .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_DEL, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = datapath_policy, > .doit = ovs_dp_cmd_del > }, > @@ -1793,7 +1793,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_datapath_genl_ops[] = { > .dumpit = ovs_dp_cmd_dump > }, > { .cmd = OVS_DP_CMD_SET, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = datapath_policy, > .doit = ovs_dp_cmd_set, > }, > @@ -2158,12 +2158,12 @@ static const struct nla_policy vport_policy[OVS_VPORT_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { > > static const struct genl_ops dp_vport_genl_ops[] = { > { .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_NEW, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = vport_policy, > .doit = ovs_vport_cmd_new > }, > { .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_DEL, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = vport_policy, > .doit = ovs_vport_cmd_del > }, > @@ -2174,7 +2174,7 @@ static const struct genl_ops dp_vport_genl_ops[] = { > .dumpit = ovs_vport_cmd_dump > }, > { .cmd = OVS_VPORT_CMD_SET, > - .flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > + .flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. */ > .policy = vport_policy, > .doit = ovs_vport_cmd_set, > }, > -- > 2.5.0 > > _______________________________________________ > Containers mailing list > Containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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2016-02-02 0:31 [PATCH v2] openvswitch: allow management from inside user namespaces Tycho Andersen
[not found] ` <1454373073-12530-1-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2016-02-02 18:34 ` Serge Hallyn
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