[PATCH 2/6] net/ipv6: use constant time memory comparison for mac

["Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>]

Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
 net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c
index f950cb53d5e3..54213c83b44e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_hmac.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
 
 #include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/sha.h>
 #include <net/seg6.h>
@@ -274,7 +275,7 @@ bool seg6_hmac_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (seg6_hmac_compute(hinfo, srh, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, hmac_output))
 		return false;
 
-	if (memcmp(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN) != 0)
+	if (crypto_memneq(hmac_output, tlv->hmac, SEG6_HMAC_FIELD_LEN))
 		return false;
 
 	return true;
-- 
2.13.1