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* [PATCH net 4/4] netlabel: validate CIPSO option against skb tail in netlbl_skbuff_getattr
@ 2026-05-14 16:51 Qi Tang
  0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: Qi Tang @ 2026-05-14 16:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: davem, kuba, pabeni, edumazet
  Cc: netdev, lyutoon, stable, Qi Tang, Paul Moore, Simon Horman,
	linux-security-module

netlbl_skbuff_getattr() locates the CIPSO option in the IPv4 IP header
via cipso_v4_optptr() and hands the bare pointer to cipso_v4_getattr().
The consumer re-reads cipso[1] (option length), cipso[6] (tag type),
and then cipso_v4_parsetag_*() re-reads further bytes from the skb.

__ip_options_compile() validates these bytes only at parse time.  An
nftables LOCAL_IN payload write reachable from an unprivileged user
namespace can rewrite them after parse and before the SELinux/Smack
peer-label consume path (selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat ->
selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb -> netlbl_skbuff_getattr).  This is the
IPv4 analogue of the CALIPSO IPv6 trust-after-modification fixed in
the previous patch: the tag parsers walk the option using attacker-
controlled length bytes, producing slab-out-of-bounds reads whose
contents feed into the MLS access decision.

Validate the option fits within skb_tail_pointer(skb) before invoking
cipso_v4_getattr().

Runtime confirmation (Smack peer-label policy + nft LOCAL_IN
mutation of tag_len): UdpInDatagrams increments to 1 and recvfrom
returns the payload, showing netlbl_skbuff_getattr ->
cipso_v4_getattr -> cipso_v4_parsetag_rbm -> netlbl_bitmap_walk runs
end-to-end past the option's true bound; with this patch the
consume path short-circuits at the bounds check and the counter
stays 0.

Reported-by: Qi Tang <tpluszz77@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Tong Liu <lyutoon@gmail.com>
Fixes: 04f81f0154e4 ("cipso: don't use IPCB() to locate the CIPSO IP option")
Signed-off-by: Qi Tang <tpluszz77@gmail.com>
---
 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
index 4af8ab76964e0..ace561a2904a4 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c
@@ -1393,11 +1393,21 @@ int netlbl_skbuff_getattr(const struct sk_buff *skb,
 	unsigned char *ptr;
 
 	switch (family) {
-	case AF_INET:
+	case AF_INET: {
+		const unsigned char *tail = skb_tail_pointer(skb);
+		u8 opt_len, tag_len;
+
 		ptr = cipso_v4_optptr(skb);
-		if (ptr && cipso_v4_getattr(ptr, secattr) == 0)
+		if (!ptr || ptr + 8 > tail)
+			break;
+		opt_len = ptr[1];	/* total CIPSO option length */
+		tag_len = ptr[7];	/* first tag length */
+		if (ptr + opt_len > tail || ptr + 6 + tag_len > tail)
+			break;
+		if (cipso_v4_getattr(ptr, secattr) == 0)
 			return 0;
 		break;
+	}
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 	case AF_INET6: {
 		const unsigned char *tail = skb_tail_pointer(skb);
-- 
2.47.3


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