* [PATCH net] nfc: llcp: avoid userspace overflow on invalid optlen
@ 2026-05-13 10:57 Breno Leitao
2026-05-18 9:11 ` Simon Horman
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2026-05-13 10:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni,
Simon Horman, Shuah Khan, David Heidelberg, Samuel Ortiz
Cc: linux-kernel, netdev, linux-kselftest, oe-linux-nfc, kernel-team,
Breno Leitao
nfc_llcp_getsockopt() returns each of its option values via:
put_user(value, (u32 __user *) optval);
The (u32 __user *) cast tells put_user() to store sizeof(u32) = 4
bytes, regardless of what optlen the caller supplied. The earlier
clamp
len = min_t(u32, len, sizeof(u32));
only affects the optlen value that is later reported back to user
space; it does not constrain the put_user() store itself.
If a caller invokes getsockopt(NFC_LLCP_RW/MIUX/REMOTE_*) with
optlen < 4 (for example optlen = 1 against a single-byte buffer),
the kernel still writes 4 bytes into optval, scribbling up to 3
bytes of the caller's adjacent memory.
That violates the getsockopt(2) contract that the kernel must not write
more than *optlen bytes into the user buffer.
All five supported optnames (NFC_LLCP_RW, NFC_LLCP_MIUX,
NFC_LLCP_REMOTE_MIU, NFC_LLCP_REMOTE_LTO, NFC_LLCP_REMOTE_RW)
are affected because they share the same put_user() pattern.
Reject any call with optlen < sizeof(u32) up front so the
put_user() stores always have enough room. This formalises the
implicit u32 ABI these options have always returned.o
Maybe it is possible to change nfc_llcp_getsockopt() to accept optlen
< 4, but this might be a riskier operation than just keep the current
approach and guarantee that users are doing the right thing.
Fixes: 26fd76cab2e6 ("NFC: llcp: Implement socket options")
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
net/nfc/llcp_sock.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c b/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c
index f1be1e84f6653..dc74e725ddd05 100644
--- a/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c
+++ b/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c
@@ -319,6 +319,9 @@ static int nfc_llcp_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
+ if (len < sizeof(u32))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
local = llcp_sock->local;
if (!local)
return -ENODEV;
---
base-commit: 1d5dcaa3bd65f2e8c9baa14a393d3a2dc5db7524
change-id: 20260513-fix_llc-27f483568135
Best regards,
--
Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net] nfc: llcp: avoid userspace overflow on invalid optlen
2026-05-13 10:57 [PATCH net] nfc: llcp: avoid userspace overflow on invalid optlen Breno Leitao
@ 2026-05-18 9:11 ` Simon Horman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Simon Horman @ 2026-05-18 9:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: leitao
Cc: 'Simon Horman', davem, edumazet, kuba, pabeni, shuah,
david+nfc, sameo, linux-kernel, netdev, linux-kselftest,
oe-linux-nfc, kernel-team
From: 'Simon Horman' <horms@kernel.org>
This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this
email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible.
Full review at: https://sashiko.dev
---
nfc: llcp: avoid userspace overflow on invalid optlen
This commit attempts to fix a userspace buffer overflow in
nfc_llcp_getsockopt() by rejecting calls where the provided optlen is less
than the size of a u32.
> diff --git a/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c b/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c
> index f1be1e84f6653..dc74e725ddd05 100644
> --- a/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c
> +++ b/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c
> @@ -319,6 +319,9 @@ static int nfc_llcp_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
> if (get_user(len, optlen))
> return -EFAULT;
>
> + if (len < sizeof(u32))
> + return -EINVAL;
Since len is a signed int and sizeof(u32) is an unsigned size_t, does C
integer promotion cause negative lengths to bypass this check?
If a user provides an optlen of -1, it appears it would be promoted to a
large positive number, making this condition false.
It would then be explicitly cast to u32 in the min_t() call below, allowing
the code to continue and overflow the userspace buffer exactly as this
patch was attempting to prevent.
> +
> local = llcp_sock->local;
> if (!local)
> return -ENODEV;
While looking at this, is there a potential use-after-free regression here
if llcp_sock->local is read outside of the socket lock?
If another thread calls llcp_sock_bind() on the same socket, it might
successfully set llcp_sock->local, but then hit an error path. In that
error path, bind() would drop the reference and set llcp_sock->local
to NULL.
If the getsockopt() thread reads local here, gets the valid pointer, and
then blocks waiting for lock_sock(sk):
getsockopt() thread:
local = llcp_sock->local;
// blocks on lock_sock(sk)
bind() thread:
// hits error path
nfc_llcp_local_put(llcp_sock->local);
llcp_sock->local = NULL;
release_sock(sk);
Will the getsockopt() thread wake up, acquire the lock, and then
dereference the now-freed local pointer in the switch statement below?
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