* [PATCH 1/6] xfrm: iptfs: preserve shared-frag marker in iptfs_consume_frags()
2026-06-10 14:07 [PATCH 0/6] pull request (net): ipsec 2026-06-10 Steffen Klassert
@ 2026-06-10 14:07 ` Steffen Klassert
2026-06-10 14:07 ` [PATCH 2/6] xfrm: iptfs: fix use-after-free on first_skb in __input_process_payload Steffen Klassert
` (4 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2026-06-10 14:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller, Jakub Kicinski; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Takao Sato <takaosato1997@gmail.com>
iptfs_consume_frags() transfers paged fragments from one socket buffer
to another but fails to propagate the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG flag. This is
the same class of bug that was fixed in skb_try_coalesce() for
CVE-2026-46300: when fragments backed by read-only page-cache pages are
merged, the marker indicating their shared nature must be preserved so
that ESP can decide correctly whether in-place encryption is safe.
Apply the same two-line fix used in skb_try_coalesce() to
iptfs_consume_frags().
Fixes: b96ba312e21c ("xfrm: iptfs: share page fragments of inner packets")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.14+
Signed-off-by: Takao Sato <takaosato1997@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
index 6c6bbc040517..62ba828632f1 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
@@ -2168,6 +2168,8 @@ static void iptfs_consume_frags(struct sk_buff *to, struct sk_buff *from)
memcpy(&toi->frags[toi->nr_frags], fromi->frags,
sizeof(fromi->frags[0]) * fromi->nr_frags);
toi->nr_frags += fromi->nr_frags;
+ if (fromi->nr_frags)
+ toi->flags |= fromi->flags & SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG;
fromi->nr_frags = 0;
from->data_len = 0;
from->len = 0;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [PATCH 2/6] xfrm: iptfs: fix use-after-free on first_skb in __input_process_payload
2026-06-10 14:07 [PATCH 0/6] pull request (net): ipsec 2026-06-10 Steffen Klassert
2026-06-10 14:07 ` [PATCH 1/6] xfrm: iptfs: preserve shared-frag marker in iptfs_consume_frags() Steffen Klassert
@ 2026-06-10 14:07 ` Steffen Klassert
2026-06-10 14:07 ` [PATCH 3/6] xfrm: policy: fix use-after-free on inexact bin in xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx() Steffen Klassert
` (3 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2026-06-10 14:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller, Jakub Kicinski; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Zhenghang Xiao <kipreyyy@gmail.com>
__input_process_payload() stores first_skb into xtfs->ra_newskb under
drop_lock when starting partial reassembly, then unlocks and breaks out
of the processing loop. The post-loop check reads xtfs->ra_newskb
without the lock to decide whether first_skb is still owned:
if (first_skb && first_iplen && !defer && first_skb != xtfs->ra_newskb)
Between spin_unlock and this read, a concurrent CPU running
iptfs_reassem_cont() (or the drop_timer hrtimer) can complete
reassembly, NULL xtfs->ra_newskb, and free the skb. The check then
evaluates first_skb != NULL as true, and pskb_trim/ip_summed/consume_skb
operate on the freed skb — a use-after-free in skbuff_head_cache.
Replace the unlocked read with a local bool that records whether
first_skb was handed to the reassembly state in the current call. The
flag is set after the existing spin_unlock, before the break, using the
pointer equality that is stable at that point (first_skb == skb iff
first_skb was stored in ra_newskb).
Fixes: 3f3339885fb3 ("xfrm: iptfs: add reusing received skb for the tunnel egress packet")
Signed-off-by: Zhenghang Xiao <kipreyyy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
index 62ba828632f1..aea63a000d1d 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
@@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ static bool __input_process_payload(struct xfrm_state *x, u32 data,
u32 first_iplen, iphlen, iplen, remaining, tail;
u32 capturelen;
u64 seq;
+ bool first_skb_partial = false;
xtfs = x->mode_data;
net = xs_net(x);
@@ -1161,6 +1162,7 @@ static bool __input_process_payload(struct xfrm_state *x, u32 data,
spin_unlock(&xtfs->drop_lock);
+ first_skb_partial = (first_skb == skb);
break;
}
@@ -1172,7 +1174,7 @@ static bool __input_process_payload(struct xfrm_state *x, u32 data,
/* this should not happen from the above code */
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINIPTFSERROR);
- if (first_skb && first_iplen && !defer && first_skb != xtfs->ra_newskb) {
+ if (first_skb && first_iplen && !defer && !first_skb_partial) {
/* first_skb is queued b/c !defer and not partial */
if (pskb_trim(first_skb, first_iplen)) {
/* error trimming */
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3/6] xfrm: policy: fix use-after-free on inexact bin in xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx()
2026-06-10 14:07 [PATCH 0/6] pull request (net): ipsec 2026-06-10 Steffen Klassert
2026-06-10 14:07 ` [PATCH 1/6] xfrm: iptfs: preserve shared-frag marker in iptfs_consume_frags() Steffen Klassert
2026-06-10 14:07 ` [PATCH 2/6] xfrm: iptfs: fix use-after-free on first_skb in __input_process_payload Steffen Klassert
@ 2026-06-10 14:07 ` Steffen Klassert
2026-06-10 14:07 ` [PATCH 4/6] xfrm: iptfs: fix ABBA deadlock in iptfs_destroy_state() Steffen Klassert
` (2 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2026-06-10 14:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller, Jakub Kicinski; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Sanghyun Park <sanghyun.park.cnu@gmail.com>
Fix the race by pruning the bin while still holding xfrm_policy_lock,
before dropping it. Use __xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin() directly since
the lock is already held. The wrapper xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin()
becomes unused and is removed.
Race:
CPU0 (XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY) CPU1 (XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO)
========================== ==========================
xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx():
spin_lock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
bin = xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup()
__xfrm_policy_unlink(pol)
spin_unlock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
xfrm_policy_kill(ret)
// wide window, lock not held
xfrm_hash_rebuild():
spin_lock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
__xfrm_policy_inexact_flush():
kfree_rcu(bin) // bin freed
spin_unlock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(bin)
// UAF: bin is freed
Fixes: 6be3b0db6db8 ("xfrm: policy: add inexact policy search tree infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Sanghyun Park <sanghyun.park.cnu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 13 ++-----------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index dd09d2063da2..959544425692 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -1156,15 +1156,6 @@ static void __xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *b, bool
}
}
-static void xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *b)
-{
- struct net *net = read_pnet(&b->k.net);
-
- spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
- __xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(b, false);
- spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
-}
-
static void __xfrm_policy_inexact_flush(struct net *net)
{
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *bin, *t;
@@ -1707,12 +1698,12 @@ xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark, u32 if_id,
}
ret = pol;
}
+ if (bin && delete)
+ __xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(bin, false);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
if (ret && delete)
xfrm_policy_kill(ret);
- if (bin && delete)
- xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(bin);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4/6] xfrm: iptfs: fix ABBA deadlock in iptfs_destroy_state()
2026-06-10 14:07 [PATCH 0/6] pull request (net): ipsec 2026-06-10 Steffen Klassert
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2026-06-10 14:07 ` [PATCH 3/6] xfrm: policy: fix use-after-free on inexact bin in xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx() Steffen Klassert
@ 2026-06-10 14:07 ` Steffen Klassert
2026-06-10 14:07 ` [PATCH 5/6] xfrm: espintcp: do not reuse an in-progress partial send Steffen Klassert
2026-06-10 14:07 ` [PATCH 6/6] esp: fix page frag reference leak on skb_to_sgvec failure Steffen Klassert
5 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2026-06-10 14:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller, Jakub Kicinski; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Tristan Madani <tristmd@gmail.com>
iptfs_destroy_state() calls hrtimer_cancel() while holding a spinlock
that the timer callback also acquires, leading to an ABBA deadlock on
SMP systems.
For the output timer (iptfs_timer):
- iptfs_destroy_state() holds x->lock, calls hrtimer_cancel()
- iptfs_delay_timer() callback takes x->lock
For the drop timer (drop_timer):
- iptfs_destroy_state() holds drop_lock, calls hrtimer_cancel()
- iptfs_drop_timer() callback takes drop_lock
Both timers use HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT, so their callbacks run in softirq
context. When hrtimer_cancel() is called for a soft timer that is
currently executing on another CPU, hrtimer_cancel_wait_running() spins
on softirq_expiry_lock -- the same lock held by the softirq running the
callback. If the callback is blocked waiting for the spinlock held by
the caller of hrtimer_cancel(), a circular dependency forms:
CPU 0: holds lock_A -> waits for softirq_expiry_lock
CPU 1: holds softirq_expiry_lock -> waits for lock_A
Fix by calling hrtimer_cancel() before acquiring the respective locks.
hrtimer_cancel() is safe to call without holding any lock and will wait
for any in-progress callback to complete. For the output timer, the
lock is still acquired afterwards to drain the packet queue. For the
drop timer, the lock/unlock pair is removed entirely since it only
existed to serialize with the timer callback, which hrtimer_cancel()
already guarantees.
Found by source code audit.
Fixes: 4b3faf610cc6 ("xfrm: iptfs: add new iptfs xfrm mode impl")
Cc: Christian Hopps <chopps@labn.net>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
index aea63a000d1d..ad810d1f97c0 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
@@ -2730,8 +2730,9 @@ static void iptfs_destroy_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
if (!xtfs)
return;
- spin_lock_bh(&xtfs->x->lock);
hrtimer_cancel(&xtfs->iptfs_timer);
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&xtfs->x->lock);
__skb_queue_head_init(&list);
skb_queue_splice_init(&xtfs->queue, &list);
spin_unlock_bh(&xtfs->x->lock);
@@ -2739,9 +2740,7 @@ static void iptfs_destroy_state(struct xfrm_state *x)
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&list)))
kfree_skb(skb);
- spin_lock_bh(&xtfs->drop_lock);
hrtimer_cancel(&xtfs->drop_timer);
- spin_unlock_bh(&xtfs->drop_lock);
if (xtfs->ra_newskb)
kfree_skb(xtfs->ra_newskb);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5/6] xfrm: espintcp: do not reuse an in-progress partial send
2026-06-10 14:07 [PATCH 0/6] pull request (net): ipsec 2026-06-10 Steffen Klassert
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2026-06-10 14:07 ` [PATCH 4/6] xfrm: iptfs: fix ABBA deadlock in iptfs_destroy_state() Steffen Klassert
@ 2026-06-10 14:07 ` Steffen Klassert
2026-06-10 14:07 ` [PATCH 6/6] esp: fix page frag reference leak on skb_to_sgvec failure Steffen Klassert
5 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2026-06-10 14:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller, Jakub Kicinski; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Wyatt Feng <bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com>
espintcp keeps a single in-flight transmit in ctx->partial.
Before building a new sk_msg, espintcp_sendmsg() first tries to flush
that state through espintcp_push_msgs().
For blocking callers, espintcp_push_msgs() may return success even when
the previous partial send is still pending. espintcp_sendmsg() would
then reinitialize emsg->skmsg and reuse ctx->partial while the old
transfer still owns that state.
Do not rebuild the send message when ctx->partial is still in progress.
If espintcp_push_msgs() returns with emsg->len still set, fail the new
send instead of overwriting the live partial state.
This is a memory-safety fix: reusing the live partial-send state can
leave a stale offset attached to a new sk_msg and lead to an out-of-
bounds read in the send path.
tcp_sendmsg_locked() already handles waiting for send buffer memory, so
the fix here is just to preserve espintcp's one-message-at-a-time
transmit state.
Fixes: e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
Signed-off-by: Wyatt Feng <bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
net/xfrm/espintcp.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/espintcp.c b/net/xfrm/espintcp.c
index a2756186e13a..d9035546375e 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/espintcp.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/espintcp.c
@@ -346,6 +346,10 @@ static int espintcp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto unlock;
}
+ if (emsg->len) {
+ err = -ENOBUFS;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
sk_msg_init(&emsg->skmsg);
while (1) {
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6/6] esp: fix page frag reference leak on skb_to_sgvec failure
2026-06-10 14:07 [PATCH 0/6] pull request (net): ipsec 2026-06-10 Steffen Klassert
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2026-06-10 14:07 ` [PATCH 5/6] xfrm: espintcp: do not reuse an in-progress partial send Steffen Klassert
@ 2026-06-10 14:07 ` Steffen Klassert
5 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2026-06-10 14:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller, Jakub Kicinski; +Cc: Herbert Xu, Steffen Klassert, netdev
From: Alessandro Schino <7991aleschino@gmail.com>
In esp_output_tail(), when esp->inplace is false, the old skb page frags
are replaced with a new page from the xfrm page_frag cache The source
scatterlist (sg) is built from the old frags before the replacement, and
esp_ssg_unref() is responsible for releasing the old page references
after the crypto operation completes
However, if the second skb_to_sgvec() call (which builds the destination
scatterlist from the new page) fails, the code jumps to error_free which
only calls kfree(tmp). The old page frag references captured in the
source scatterlist are never released:
1 sg[] is built from old frags via skb_to_sgvec() (no extra get_page)
2 nr_frags is set to 1 and frag[0] is replaced with the new page
3 Second skb_to_sgvec() fails -> goto error_free
Fix this by adding a bool parameter to esp_ssg_unref() that, when true,
unconditionally unrefs the source scatterlist frags. Since req->src is
not yet initialized by aead_request_set_crypt() at the point of the
error, the source scatterlist is obtained directly via esp_req_sg()
Existing callers pass false to preserve the original behavior
The same issue exists in both esp4 and esp6 as the code is identical
Fixes: cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Signed-off-by: Alessandro Schino <7991aleschino@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
---
net/ipv4/esp4.c | 17 +++++++++++------
net/ipv6/esp6.c | 17 +++++++++++------
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/esp4.c b/net/ipv4/esp4.c
index 513c8215c947..dfc81ee969ae 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/esp4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/esp4.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static inline struct scatterlist *esp_req_sg(struct crypto_aead *aead,
__alignof__(struct scatterlist));
}
-static void esp_ssg_unref(struct xfrm_state *x, void *tmp, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static void esp_ssg_unref(struct xfrm_state *x, void *tmp, struct sk_buff *skb, bool already_unref)
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = x->data;
int extralen = 0;
@@ -113,10 +113,13 @@ static void esp_ssg_unref(struct xfrm_state *x, void *tmp, struct sk_buff *skb)
/* Unref skb_frag_pages in the src scatterlist if necessary.
* Skip the first sg which comes from skb->data.
*/
- if (req->src != req->dst)
- for (sg = sg_next(req->src); sg; sg = sg_next(sg))
+ if (already_unref || req->src != req->dst) {
+ struct scatterlist *src = already_unref ? esp_req_sg(aead, req) : req->src;
+
+ for (sg = sg_next(src); sg; sg = sg_next(sg))
skb_page_unref(page_to_netmem(sg_page(sg)),
skb->pp_recycle);
+ }
}
#ifdef CONFIG_INET_ESPINTCP
@@ -220,7 +223,7 @@ static void esp_output_done(void *data, int err)
}
tmp = ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp;
- esp_ssg_unref(x, tmp, skb);
+ esp_ssg_unref(x, tmp, skb, false);
kfree(tmp);
if (xo && (xo->flags & XFRM_DEV_RESUME)) {
@@ -569,8 +572,10 @@ int esp_output_tail(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info *
err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, dsg,
(unsigned char *)esph - skb->data,
assoclen + ivlen + esp->clen + alen);
- if (unlikely(err < 0))
+ if (unlikely(err < 0)) {
+ esp_ssg_unref(x, tmp, skb, true);
goto error_free;
+ }
}
if ((x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN))
@@ -602,7 +607,7 @@ int esp_output_tail(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info *
}
if (sg != dsg)
- esp_ssg_unref(x, tmp, skb);
+ esp_ssg_unref(x, tmp, skb, false);
if (!err && x->encap && x->encap->encap_type == TCP_ENCAP_ESPINTCP)
err = esp_output_tail_tcp(x, skb);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
index 57481e423e59..296b57926abb 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static inline struct scatterlist *esp_req_sg(struct crypto_aead *aead,
__alignof__(struct scatterlist));
}
-static void esp_ssg_unref(struct xfrm_state *x, void *tmp, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static void esp_ssg_unref(struct xfrm_state *x, void *tmp, struct sk_buff *skb, bool already_unref)
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = x->data;
int extralen = 0;
@@ -130,10 +130,13 @@ static void esp_ssg_unref(struct xfrm_state *x, void *tmp, struct sk_buff *skb)
/* Unref skb_frag_pages in the src scatterlist if necessary.
* Skip the first sg which comes from skb->data.
*/
- if (req->src != req->dst)
- for (sg = sg_next(req->src); sg; sg = sg_next(sg))
+ if (already_unref || req->src != req->dst) {
+ struct scatterlist *src = already_unref ? esp_req_sg(aead, req) : req->src;
+
+ for (sg = sg_next(src); sg; sg = sg_next(sg))
skb_page_unref(page_to_netmem(sg_page(sg)),
skb->pp_recycle);
+ }
}
#ifdef CONFIG_INET6_ESPINTCP
@@ -254,7 +257,7 @@ static void esp_output_done(void *data, int err)
}
tmp = ESP_SKB_CB(skb)->tmp;
- esp_ssg_unref(x, tmp, skb);
+ esp_ssg_unref(x, tmp, skb, false);
kfree(tmp);
esp_output_encap_csum(skb);
@@ -600,8 +603,10 @@ int esp6_output_tail(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info
err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, dsg,
(unsigned char *)esph - skb->data,
assoclen + ivlen + esp->clen + alen);
- if (unlikely(err < 0))
+ if (unlikely(err < 0)) {
+ esp_ssg_unref(x, tmp, skb, true);
goto error_free;
+ }
}
if ((x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN))
@@ -634,7 +639,7 @@ int esp6_output_tail(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info
}
if (sg != dsg)
- esp_ssg_unref(x, tmp, skb);
+ esp_ssg_unref(x, tmp, skb, false);
if (!err && x->encap && x->encap->encap_type == TCP_ENCAP_ESPINTCP)
err = esp_output_tail_tcp(x, skb);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread