* [PATCH net-next 1/5] tls: reject the combination of TLS and sockmap
2026-06-14 1:40 [PATCH net-next 0/5] tls: reject the combination of TLS and sockmap Jakub Kicinski
@ 2026-06-14 1:40 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-06-14 1:40 ` [PATCH net-next 2/5] tls: remove dead sockmap (psock) handling from the SW path Jakub Kicinski
` (3 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jakub Kicinski @ 2026-06-14 1:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: davem
Cc: netdev, edumazet, pabeni, andrew+netdev, horms, bpf, jakub,
john.fastabend, sd, Jakub Kicinski
TLS and sockmap (BPF psock) integration hides a lot of latent bugs.
Bugs which may be more or less relevant for real users but they
are definitely exploitable.
We could not find anyone actively using this integration so let's
reject this config. Adding a TLS socket to a sockmap was already
rejected by sk_psock_init() through the inet_csk_has_ulp() check.
We need to reject the attempts to configure the TLS keys (rather
than adding the ULP itself) because checking prior to the ULP
installation is tricky without risking a race with sockmap getting
added in parallel (sockmap does not hold the socket lock).
This patch is a minimal rejection of the feature. Subsequent patch
in the series will do a light dead code removal. Full cleanup would
require a major rewrite of the Tx path, we don't need skmsg any more.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
---
net/tls/tls_main.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c
index 13c88a7b8787..8e7ba018988d 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
@@ -643,6 +643,17 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
int rc = 0;
int conf;
+ /* TLS and sockmap are mutually exclusive. A socket already in a
+ * sockmap (i.e. with a psock attached) cannot be upgraded to TLS.
+ * sockmap rejects TLS sockets already (see sk_psock_init()).
+ */
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (sk_psock(sk)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
if (sockptr_is_null(optval) || (optlen < sizeof(*crypto_info)))
return -EINVAL;
--
2.54.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH net-next 2/5] tls: remove dead sockmap (psock) handling from the SW path
2026-06-14 1:40 [PATCH net-next 0/5] tls: reject the combination of TLS and sockmap Jakub Kicinski
2026-06-14 1:40 ` [PATCH net-next 1/5] " Jakub Kicinski
@ 2026-06-14 1:40 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-06-14 1:40 ` [PATCH net-next 3/5] selftests/bpf: remove sockmap + ktls tests Jakub Kicinski
` (2 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jakub Kicinski @ 2026-06-14 1:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: davem
Cc: netdev, edumazet, pabeni, andrew+netdev, horms, bpf, jakub,
john.fastabend, sd, Jakub Kicinski
TLS and sockmap are now mutually exclusive. Try to delete the code
from sendmsg and recvmsg path which is now obviously dead.
The main goal is to delete enough code for AI security scanners
to no longer bother us with sockmap related bugs. At the same
time retain the code in case someone has the cycles to fix
all of this and make the integration work, again.
If the integration does not get restored we can wipe the rest
of the skmsg code from TLS in two or three releases.
The changes on the Tx side are deeper since that's where most
of the bugs are, Rx side simply takes the data from sockmap
and gives it to the user. On Tx split record handling and
rolling back the iterator were the two problem areas.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/skmsg.h | 9 -
net/core/skmsg.c | 52 +-----
net/tls/tls_main.c | 8 +-
net/tls/tls_sw.c | 399 +++---------------------------------------
4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 437 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h
index 19f4f253b4f9..ca0ec9c8608e 100644
--- a/include/linux/skmsg.h
+++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h
@@ -544,15 +544,6 @@ static inline void psock_progs_drop(struct sk_psock_progs *progs)
psock_set_prog(&progs->skb_verdict, NULL);
}
-int sk_psock_tls_strp_read(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb);
-
-static inline bool sk_psock_strp_enabled(struct sk_psock *psock)
-{
- if (!psock)
- return false;
- return !!psock->saved_data_ready;
-}
-
/* for tcp only, sk is locked */
static inline ssize_t sk_psock_msg_inq(struct sock *sk)
{
diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c
index e1850caf1a71..73ae12f25940 100644
--- a/net/core/skmsg.c
+++ b/net/core/skmsg.c
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
-#include <net/tls.h>
#include <trace/events/sock.h>
static bool sk_msg_try_coalesce_ok(struct sk_msg *msg, int elem_first_coalesce)
@@ -992,41 +991,6 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_redirect(struct sk_psock *from, struct sk_buff *skb)
return 0;
}
-static void sk_psock_tls_verdict_apply(struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct sk_psock *from, int verdict)
-{
- switch (verdict) {
- case __SK_REDIRECT:
- sk_psock_skb_redirect(from, skb);
- break;
- case __SK_PASS:
- case __SK_DROP:
- default:
- break;
- }
-}
-
-int sk_psock_tls_strp_read(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- struct bpf_prog *prog;
- int ret = __SK_PASS;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- prog = READ_ONCE(psock->progs.stream_verdict);
- if (likely(prog)) {
- skb->sk = psock->sk;
- skb_dst_drop(skb);
- skb_bpf_redirect_clear(skb);
- ret = bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu(prog, skb);
- ret = sk_psock_map_verd(ret, skb_bpf_redirect_fetch(skb));
- skb->sk = NULL;
- }
- sk_psock_tls_verdict_apply(skb, psock, ret);
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sk_psock_tls_strp_read);
-
static int sk_psock_verdict_apply(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb,
int verdict)
{
@@ -1167,13 +1131,9 @@ static void sk_psock_strp_data_ready(struct sock *sk)
rcu_read_lock();
psock = sk_psock(sk);
if (likely(psock)) {
- if (tls_sw_has_ctx_rx(sk)) {
- psock->saved_data_ready(sk);
- } else {
- read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- strp_data_ready(&psock->strp);
- read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- }
+ read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ strp_data_ready(&psock->strp);
+ read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
@@ -1275,12 +1235,6 @@ static void sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(struct sock *sk)
trace_sk_data_ready(sk);
rcu_read_lock();
- psock = sk_psock(sk);
- if (psock && tls_sw_has_ctx_rx(sk)) {
- psock->saved_data_ready(sk);
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return;
- }
sock = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_socket);
if (likely(sock))
ops = READ_ONCE(sock->ops);
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c
index 8e7ba018988d..8c588cdab733 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
@@ -402,7 +402,6 @@ static __poll_t tls_sk_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx;
struct tls_context *tls_ctx;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
- struct sk_psock *psock;
__poll_t mask = 0;
u8 shutdown;
int state;
@@ -416,17 +415,12 @@ static __poll_t tls_sk_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
- psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
if ((skb_queue_empty_lockless(&ctx->rx_list) &&
- !tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx) &&
- sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) ||
+ !tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) ||
READ_ONCE(ctx->key_update_pending))
mask &= ~(EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM);
- if (psock)
- sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
-
return mask;
}
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 5a4300c943a1..9324e4ed20a3 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -614,136 +614,17 @@ static int tls_do_encryption(struct sock *sk,
return rc;
}
-static int tls_split_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *from,
- struct tls_rec **to, struct sk_msg *msg_opl,
- struct sk_msg *msg_oen, u32 split_point,
- u32 tx_overhead_size, u32 *orig_end)
-{
- u32 i, j, bytes = 0, apply = msg_opl->apply_bytes;
- struct scatterlist *sge, *osge, *nsge;
- u32 orig_size = msg_opl->sg.size;
- struct scatterlist tmp = { };
- struct sk_msg *msg_npl;
- struct tls_rec *new;
- int ret;
-
- new = tls_get_rec(sk);
- if (!new)
- return -ENOMEM;
- ret = sk_msg_alloc(sk, &new->msg_encrypted, msg_opl->sg.size +
- tx_overhead_size, 0);
- if (ret < 0) {
- tls_free_rec(sk, new);
- return ret;
- }
-
- *orig_end = msg_opl->sg.end;
- i = msg_opl->sg.start;
- sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
- while (apply && sge->length) {
- if (sge->length > apply) {
- u32 len = sge->length - apply;
-
- get_page(sg_page(sge));
- sg_set_page(&tmp, sg_page(sge), len,
- sge->offset + apply);
- sge->length = apply;
- bytes += apply;
- apply = 0;
- } else {
- apply -= sge->length;
- bytes += sge->length;
- }
-
- sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
- if (i == msg_opl->sg.end)
- break;
- sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
- }
-
- msg_opl->sg.end = i;
- msg_opl->sg.curr = i;
- msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0;
- msg_opl->apply_bytes = 0;
- msg_opl->sg.size = bytes;
-
- msg_npl = &new->msg_plaintext;
- msg_npl->apply_bytes = apply;
- msg_npl->sg.size = orig_size - bytes;
-
- j = msg_npl->sg.start;
- nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
- if (tmp.length) {
- memcpy(nsge, &tmp, sizeof(*nsge));
- sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
- nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
- }
-
- osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
- while (osge->length) {
- memcpy(nsge, osge, sizeof(*nsge));
- sg_unmark_end(nsge);
- sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
- sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
- if (i == *orig_end)
- break;
- osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
- nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
- }
-
- msg_npl->sg.end = j;
- msg_npl->sg.curr = j;
- msg_npl->sg.copybreak = 0;
-
- *to = new;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void tls_merge_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *to,
- struct tls_rec *from, u32 orig_end)
-{
- struct sk_msg *msg_npl = &from->msg_plaintext;
- struct sk_msg *msg_opl = &to->msg_plaintext;
- struct scatterlist *osge, *nsge;
- u32 i, j;
-
- i = msg_opl->sg.end;
- sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
- j = msg_npl->sg.start;
-
- osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
- nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
-
- if (sg_page(osge) == sg_page(nsge) &&
- osge->offset + osge->length == nsge->offset) {
- osge->length += nsge->length;
- put_page(sg_page(nsge));
- }
-
- msg_opl->sg.end = orig_end;
- msg_opl->sg.curr = orig_end;
- msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0;
- msg_opl->apply_bytes = msg_opl->sg.size + msg_npl->sg.size;
- msg_opl->sg.size += msg_npl->sg.size;
-
- sk_msg_free(sk, &to->msg_encrypted);
- sk_msg_xfer_full(&to->msg_encrypted, &from->msg_encrypted);
-
- kfree(from);
-}
-
static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags,
unsigned char record_type)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
- struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec, *tmp = NULL;
- u32 i, split_point, orig_end;
+ struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
struct aead_request *req;
- bool split;
int rc;
+ u32 i;
if (!rec)
return 0;
@@ -751,38 +632,6 @@ static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags,
msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
- split_point = msg_pl->apply_bytes;
- split = split_point && split_point < msg_pl->sg.size;
- if (unlikely((!split &&
- msg_pl->sg.size +
- prot->overhead_size > msg_en->sg.size) ||
- (split &&
- split_point +
- prot->overhead_size > msg_en->sg.size))) {
- split = true;
- split_point = msg_en->sg.size;
- }
- if (split) {
- rc = tls_split_open_record(sk, rec, &tmp, msg_pl, msg_en,
- split_point, prot->overhead_size,
- &orig_end);
- if (rc < 0)
- return rc;
- /* This can happen if above tls_split_open_record allocates
- * a single large encryption buffer instead of two smaller
- * ones. In this case adjust pointers and continue without
- * split.
- */
- if (!msg_pl->sg.size) {
- tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end);
- msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
- msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
- split = false;
- }
- sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size +
- prot->overhead_size);
- }
-
rec->tx_flags = flags;
req = &rec->aead_req;
@@ -840,155 +689,26 @@ static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags,
rc = tls_do_encryption(sk, tls_ctx, ctx, req,
msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size, i);
if (rc < 0) {
- if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
+ if (rc != -EINPROGRESS)
tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
- if (split) {
- tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
- tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end);
- }
- }
ctx->async_capable = 1;
return rc;
- } else if (split) {
- msg_pl = &tmp->msg_plaintext;
- msg_en = &tmp->msg_encrypted;
- sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size);
- tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
- ctx->open_rec = tmp;
}
return tls_tx_records(sk, flags);
}
static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,
- bool full_record, u8 record_type,
- ssize_t *copied, int flags)
+ u8 record_type, ssize_t *copied, int flags)
{
- struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
- struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
- struct sk_msg msg_redir = { };
- struct sk_psock *psock;
- struct sock *sk_redir;
- struct tls_rec *rec;
- bool enospc, policy, redir_ingress;
- int err = 0, send;
- u32 delta = 0;
+ int err;
- policy = !(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY);
- psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
- if (!psock || !policy) {
- err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
- if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
- *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
- tls_free_open_rec(sk);
- err = -sk->sk_err;
- }
- if (psock)
- sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
- return err;
+ err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
+ if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
+ *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
+ tls_free_open_rec(sk);
+ err = -sk->sk_err;
}
-more_data:
- enospc = sk_msg_full(msg);
- if (psock->eval == __SK_NONE) {
- delta = msg->sg.size;
- psock->eval = sk_psock_msg_verdict(sk, psock, msg);
- delta -= msg->sg.size;
-
- if ((s32)delta > 0) {
- /* It indicates that we executed bpf_msg_pop_data(),
- * causing the plaintext data size to decrease.
- * Therefore the encrypted data size also needs to
- * correspondingly decrease. We only need to subtract
- * delta to calculate the new ciphertext length since
- * ktls does not support block encryption.
- */
- struct sk_msg *enc = &ctx->open_rec->msg_encrypted;
-
- sk_msg_trim(sk, enc, enc->sg.size - delta);
- }
- }
- if (msg->cork_bytes && msg->cork_bytes > msg->sg.size &&
- !enospc && !full_record) {
- err = -ENOSPC;
- goto out_err;
- }
- msg->cork_bytes = 0;
- send = msg->sg.size;
- if (msg->apply_bytes && msg->apply_bytes < send)
- send = msg->apply_bytes;
-
- switch (psock->eval) {
- case __SK_PASS:
- err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
- if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
- *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
- tls_free_open_rec(sk);
- err = -sk->sk_err;
- goto out_err;
- }
- break;
- case __SK_REDIRECT:
- redir_ingress = psock->redir_ingress;
- sk_redir = psock->sk_redir;
- memcpy(&msg_redir, msg, sizeof(*msg));
- if (msg->apply_bytes < send)
- msg->apply_bytes = 0;
- else
- msg->apply_bytes -= send;
- sk_msg_return_zero(sk, msg, send);
- msg->sg.size -= send;
- release_sock(sk);
- err = tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(sk_redir, redir_ingress,
- &msg_redir, send, flags);
- lock_sock(sk);
- if (err < 0) {
- /* Regardless of whether the data represented by
- * msg_redir is sent successfully, we have already
- * uncharged it via sk_msg_return_zero(). The
- * msg->sg.size represents the remaining unprocessed
- * data, which needs to be uncharged here.
- */
- sk_mem_uncharge(sk, msg->sg.size);
- *copied -= sk_msg_free_nocharge(sk, &msg_redir);
- msg->sg.size = 0;
- }
- if (msg->sg.size == 0)
- tls_free_open_rec(sk);
- break;
- case __SK_DROP:
- default:
- sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, send);
- if (msg->apply_bytes < send)
- msg->apply_bytes = 0;
- else
- msg->apply_bytes -= send;
- if (msg->sg.size == 0)
- tls_free_open_rec(sk);
- *copied -= (send + delta);
- err = -EACCES;
- }
-
- if (likely(!err)) {
- bool reset_eval = !ctx->open_rec;
-
- rec = ctx->open_rec;
- if (rec) {
- msg = &rec->msg_plaintext;
- if (!msg->apply_bytes)
- reset_eval = true;
- }
- if (reset_eval) {
- psock->eval = __SK_NONE;
- if (psock->sk_redir) {
- sock_put(psock->sk_redir);
- psock->sk_redir = NULL;
- }
- }
- if (rec)
- goto more_data;
- }
- out_err:
- sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
return err;
}
@@ -1008,7 +728,7 @@ static int tls_sw_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags)
if (!copied)
return 0;
- return bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, true, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA,
+ return bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA,
&copied, flags);
}
@@ -1156,7 +876,7 @@ static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
copied += try_to_copy;
sk_msg_sg_copy_set(msg_pl, first);
- ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
+ ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk,
record_type, &copied,
msg->msg_flags);
if (ret) {
@@ -1164,13 +884,7 @@ static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
num_async++;
else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
goto wait_for_memory;
- else if (ctx->open_rec && ret == -ENOSPC) {
- if (msg_pl->cork_bytes) {
- ret = 0;
- goto send_end;
- }
- goto rollback_iter;
- } else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
+ else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
goto send_end;
}
@@ -1181,11 +895,6 @@ static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
}
continue;
-rollback_iter:
- copied -= try_to_copy;
- sk_msg_sg_copy_clear(msg_pl, first);
- iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter,
- msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size);
fallback_to_reg_send:
sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_pl, orig_size);
}
@@ -1221,7 +930,7 @@ static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
copied += try_to_copy;
copied:
if (full_record || eor) {
- ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
+ ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk,
record_type, &copied,
msg->msg_flags);
if (ret) {
@@ -1229,11 +938,8 @@ static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
num_async++;
else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
goto wait_for_memory;
- else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
- if (ret == -ENOSPC)
- ret = 0;
+ else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
goto send_end;
- }
}
/* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */
@@ -1335,8 +1041,8 @@ void tls_sw_splice_eof(struct socket *sock)
if (msg_pl->sg.size == 0)
goto unlock;
- /* Check the BPF advisor and perform transmission. */
- ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, false, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA,
+ /* Perform transmission. */
+ ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA,
&copied, 0);
switch (ret) {
case 0:
@@ -1372,8 +1078,7 @@ void tls_sw_splice_eof(struct socket *sock)
* consumed via sock_error().
*/
static int
-tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock,
- bool released, bool has_copied)
+tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
@@ -1388,9 +1093,6 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock,
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
while (!tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) {
- if (!sk_psock_queue_empty(psock))
- return 0;
-
if (sk->sk_err) {
if (has_copied)
return -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
@@ -1434,9 +1136,7 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock,
add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
ret = sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo,
- tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx) ||
- !sk_psock_queue_empty(psock),
- &wait);
+ tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx), &wait);
sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
@@ -1446,7 +1146,7 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock, bool nonblock,
}
if (unlikely(!tls_strp_msg_load(&ctx->strp, released)))
- return tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, nonblock, false, has_copied);
+ return tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, nonblock, false, has_copied);
return 1;
}
@@ -2096,7 +1796,6 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
ssize_t decrypted = 0, async_copy_bytes = 0;
- struct sk_psock *psock;
unsigned char control = 0;
size_t flushed_at = 0;
struct strp_msg *rxm;
@@ -2109,7 +1808,6 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
bool is_peek = flags & MSG_PEEK;
bool rx_more = false;
bool released = true;
- bool bpf_strp_enabled;
bool zc_capable;
if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE))
@@ -2118,8 +1816,6 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
err = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (err < 0)
return err;
- psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
- bpf_strp_enabled = sk_psock_strp_enabled(psock);
/* If crypto failed the connection is broken */
err = ctx->async_wait.err;
@@ -2140,27 +1836,16 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len);
len = len - copied;
- zc_capable = !bpf_strp_enabled && !is_kvec && !is_peek &&
- ctx->zc_capable;
+ zc_capable = !is_kvec && !is_peek && ctx->zc_capable;
decrypted = 0;
while (len && (decrypted + copied < target || tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx))) {
struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
int to_decrypt, chunk;
- err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, psock, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
+ err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
released, !!(decrypted + copied));
- if (err <= 0) {
- if (psock) {
- chunk = sk_msg_recvmsg(sk, psock, msg, len,
- flags);
- if (chunk > 0) {
- decrypted += chunk;
- len -= chunk;
- continue;
- }
- }
+ if (err <= 0)
goto recv_end;
- }
memset(&darg.inargs, 0, sizeof(darg.inargs));
@@ -2174,7 +1859,7 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
darg.zc = true;
/* Do not use async mode if record is non-data */
- if (tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA && !bpf_strp_enabled)
+ if (tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
darg.async = ctx->async_capable;
else
darg.async = false;
@@ -2230,18 +1915,6 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
continue;
}
- if (bpf_strp_enabled) {
- released = true;
- err = sk_psock_tls_strp_read(psock, skb);
- if (err != __SK_PASS) {
- rxm->offset = rxm->offset + rxm->full_len;
- rxm->full_len = 0;
- if (err == __SK_DROP)
- consume_skb(skb);
- continue;
- }
- }
-
if (partially_consumed)
chunk = len;
@@ -2304,8 +1977,6 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
end:
tls_rx_reader_unlock(sk, ctx);
- if (psock)
- sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
return copied ? : err;
}
@@ -2332,7 +2003,7 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
} else {
struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
- err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK,
+ err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK,
true, false);
if (err <= 0)
goto splice_read_end;
@@ -2417,7 +2088,7 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
} else {
struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
- err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, NULL, true, released, !!copied);
+ err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, true, released, !!copied);
if (err <= 0)
goto read_sock_end;
@@ -2473,16 +2144,8 @@ bool tls_sw_sock_is_readable(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
- bool ingress_empty = true;
- struct sk_psock *psock;
- rcu_read_lock();
- psock = sk_psock(sk);
- if (psock)
- ingress_empty = list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg);
- rcu_read_unlock();
-
- return !ingress_empty || tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx) ||
+ return tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx) ||
!skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list);
}
@@ -2565,7 +2228,6 @@ static void tls_data_ready(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
- struct sk_psock *psock;
gfp_t alloc_save;
trace_sk_data_ready(sk);
@@ -2574,13 +2236,6 @@ static void tls_data_ready(struct sock *sk)
sk->sk_allocation = GFP_ATOMIC;
tls_strp_data_ready(&ctx->strp);
sk->sk_allocation = alloc_save;
-
- psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
- if (psock) {
- if (!list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg))
- ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
- sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
- }
}
void tls_sw_cancel_work_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
--
2.54.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH net-next 3/5] selftests/bpf: remove sockmap + ktls tests
2026-06-14 1:40 [PATCH net-next 0/5] tls: reject the combination of TLS and sockmap Jakub Kicinski
2026-06-14 1:40 ` [PATCH net-next 1/5] " Jakub Kicinski
2026-06-14 1:40 ` [PATCH net-next 2/5] tls: remove dead sockmap (psock) handling from the SW path Jakub Kicinski
@ 2026-06-14 1:40 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-06-14 1:40 ` [PATCH net-next 4/5] selftests/bpf: drop the unused kTLS program from test_sockmap Jakub Kicinski
2026-06-14 1:41 ` [PATCH net-next 5/5] selftests/bpf: test that TLS crypto is rejected on a sockmap socket Jakub Kicinski
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jakub Kicinski @ 2026-06-14 1:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: davem
Cc: netdev, edumazet, pabeni, andrew+netdev, horms, bpf, jakub,
john.fastabend, sd, Jakub Kicinski
The combination of sockmap and TLS is no longer supported - installing
the TLS ULP on a sockmap socket (and vice versa) is now rejected. Remove
the tests that exercise the combination along with their BPF program;
the file covered nothing but sockmap sockets holding kTLS contexts.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
---
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_ktls.c | 355 ------------------
.../selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_ktls.c | 61 ---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c | 227 +----------
3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 642 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_ktls.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_ktls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_ktls.c
index 6ed8e149e3d5..cda6b22cf759 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_ktls.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_ktls.c
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
#include "test_progs.h"
#include "sockmap_helpers.h"
#include "test_skmsg_load_helpers.skel.h"
-#include "test_sockmap_ktls.skel.h"
#define MAX_TEST_NAME 80
#define TCP_ULP 31
@@ -160,249 +159,6 @@ static void test_sockmap_ktls_offload(int family, int sotype)
close(p);
}
-static void test_sockmap_ktls_tx_cork(int family, int sotype, bool push)
-{
- int err, off;
- int i, j;
- int start_push = 0, push_len = 0;
- int c = 0, p = 0, one = 1, sent, recvd;
- int prog_fd, map_fd;
- char msg[12] = "hello world\0";
- char rcv[20] = {0};
- struct test_sockmap_ktls *skel;
-
- skel = test_sockmap_ktls__open_and_load();
- if (!ASSERT_TRUE(skel, "open ktls skel"))
- return;
-
- err = create_pair(family, sotype, &c, &p);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "create_pair()"))
- goto out;
-
- prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.prog_sk_policy);
- map_fd = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.sock_map);
-
- err = bpf_prog_attach(prog_fd, map_fd, BPF_SK_MSG_VERDICT, 0);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_prog_attach sk msg"))
- goto out;
-
- err = bpf_map_update_elem(map_fd, &one, &c, BPF_NOEXIST);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_map_update_elem(c)"))
- goto out;
-
- err = init_ktls_pairs(c, p);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "init_ktls_pairs(c, p)"))
- goto out;
-
- skel->bss->cork_byte = sizeof(msg);
- if (push) {
- start_push = 1;
- push_len = 2;
- }
- skel->bss->push_start = start_push;
- skel->bss->push_end = push_len;
-
- off = sizeof(msg) / 2;
- sent = send(c, msg, off, 0);
- if (!ASSERT_EQ(sent, off, "send(msg)"))
- goto out;
-
- recvd = recv_timeout(p, rcv, sizeof(rcv), MSG_DONTWAIT, 1);
- if (!ASSERT_EQ(-1, recvd, "expected no data"))
- goto out;
-
- /* send remaining msg */
- sent = send(c, msg + off, sizeof(msg) - off, 0);
- if (!ASSERT_EQ(sent, sizeof(msg) - off, "send remaining data"))
- goto out;
-
- recvd = recv_timeout(p, rcv, sizeof(rcv), MSG_DONTWAIT, 1);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "recv(msg)") ||
- !ASSERT_EQ(recvd, sizeof(msg) + push_len, "check length mismatch"))
- goto out;
-
- for (i = 0, j = 0; i < recvd;) {
- /* skip checking the data that has been pushed in */
- if (i >= start_push && i <= start_push + push_len - 1) {
- i++;
- continue;
- }
- if (!ASSERT_EQ(rcv[i], msg[j], "data mismatch"))
- goto out;
- i++;
- j++;
- }
-out:
- if (c)
- close(c);
- if (p)
- close(p);
- test_sockmap_ktls__destroy(skel);
-}
-
-static void test_sockmap_ktls_tx_no_buf(int family, int sotype, bool push)
-{
- int c = -1, p = -1, one = 1, two = 2;
- struct test_sockmap_ktls *skel;
- unsigned char *data = NULL;
- struct msghdr msg = {0};
- struct iovec iov[2];
- int prog_fd, map_fd;
- int txrx_buf = 1024;
- int iov_length = 8192;
- int err;
-
- skel = test_sockmap_ktls__open_and_load();
- if (!ASSERT_TRUE(skel, "open ktls skel"))
- return;
-
- err = create_pair(family, sotype, &c, &p);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "create_pair()"))
- goto out;
-
- err = setsockopt(c, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUFFORCE, &txrx_buf, sizeof(int));
- err |= setsockopt(p, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUFFORCE, &txrx_buf, sizeof(int));
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "set buf limit"))
- goto out;
-
- prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.prog_sk_policy_redir);
- map_fd = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.sock_map);
-
- err = bpf_prog_attach(prog_fd, map_fd, BPF_SK_MSG_VERDICT, 0);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_prog_attach sk msg"))
- goto out;
-
- err = bpf_map_update_elem(map_fd, &one, &c, BPF_NOEXIST);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_map_update_elem(c)"))
- goto out;
-
- err = bpf_map_update_elem(map_fd, &two, &p, BPF_NOEXIST);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_map_update_elem(p)"))
- goto out;
-
- skel->bss->apply_bytes = 1024;
-
- err = init_ktls_pairs(c, p);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "init_ktls_pairs(c, p)"))
- goto out;
-
- data = calloc(iov_length, sizeof(char));
- if (!data)
- goto out;
-
- iov[0].iov_base = data;
- iov[0].iov_len = iov_length;
- iov[1].iov_base = data;
- iov[1].iov_len = iov_length;
- msg.msg_iov = iov;
- msg.msg_iovlen = 2;
-
- for (;;) {
- err = sendmsg(c, &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT);
- if (err <= 0)
- break;
- }
-
-out:
- if (data)
- free(data);
- if (c != -1)
- close(c);
- if (p != -1)
- close(p);
-
- test_sockmap_ktls__destroy(skel);
-}
-
-static void test_sockmap_ktls_tx_pop(int family, int sotype)
-{
- char msg[37] = "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz\0";
- int c = 0, p = 0, one = 1, sent, recvd;
- struct test_sockmap_ktls *skel;
- int prog_fd, map_fd;
- char rcv[50] = {0};
- int err;
- int i, m, r;
-
- skel = test_sockmap_ktls__open_and_load();
- if (!ASSERT_TRUE(skel, "open ktls skel"))
- return;
-
- err = create_pair(family, sotype, &c, &p);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "create_pair()"))
- goto out;
-
- prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.prog_sk_policy);
- map_fd = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.sock_map);
-
- err = bpf_prog_attach(prog_fd, map_fd, BPF_SK_MSG_VERDICT, 0);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_prog_attach sk msg"))
- goto out;
-
- err = bpf_map_update_elem(map_fd, &one, &c, BPF_NOEXIST);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_map_update_elem(c)"))
- goto out;
-
- err = init_ktls_pairs(c, p);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "init_ktls_pairs(c, p)"))
- goto out;
-
- struct {
- int pop_start;
- int pop_len;
- } pop_policy[] = {
- /* trim the start */
- {0, 2},
- {0, 10},
- {1, 2},
- {1, 10},
- /* trim the end */
- {35, 2},
- /* New entries should be added before this line */
- {-1, -1},
- };
-
- i = 0;
- while (pop_policy[i].pop_start >= 0) {
- skel->bss->pop_start = pop_policy[i].pop_start;
- skel->bss->pop_end = pop_policy[i].pop_len;
-
- sent = send(c, msg, sizeof(msg), 0);
- if (!ASSERT_EQ(sent, sizeof(msg), "send(msg)"))
- goto out;
-
- recvd = recv_timeout(p, rcv, sizeof(rcv), MSG_DONTWAIT, 1);
- if (!ASSERT_EQ(recvd, sizeof(msg) - pop_policy[i].pop_len, "pop len mismatch"))
- goto out;
-
- /* verify the data
- * msg: 0123456789a bcdefghij klmnopqrstuvwxyz
- * | |
- * popped data
- */
- for (m = 0, r = 0; m < sizeof(msg);) {
- /* skip checking the data that has been popped */
- if (m >= pop_policy[i].pop_start &&
- m <= pop_policy[i].pop_start + pop_policy[i].pop_len - 1) {
- m++;
- continue;
- }
-
- if (!ASSERT_EQ(msg[m], rcv[r], "data mismatch"))
- goto out;
- m++;
- r++;
- }
- i++;
- }
-out:
- if (c)
- close(c);
- if (p)
- close(p);
- test_sockmap_ktls__destroy(skel);
-}
-
static void run_tests(int family, enum bpf_map_type map_type)
{
int map;
@@ -417,121 +173,10 @@ static void run_tests(int family, enum bpf_map_type map_type)
close(map);
}
-/*
- * Regression test for the KTLS + sockmap (verdict) reverse-order UAF.
- *
- * Vulnerable sequence:
- * 1. Insert receiver socket into sockmap with BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT program.
- * sk->sk_data_ready becomes sk_psock_verdict_data_ready.
- * 2. Configure TLS RX: tls_sw_strparser_arm() saves
- * sk_psock_verdict_data_ready as rx_ctx->saved_data_ready.
- *
- * When data arrives, tls_rx_msg_ready() calls saved_data_ready() =
- * sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(), which calls tcp_read_skb() and drains
- * sk_receive_queue via __skb_unlink() without advancing copied_seq.
- * tls_strp_msg_load() then finds the queue empty while tcp_inq() is still
- * non-zero, hits WARN_ON_ONCE(!first), and leaves a dangling frag_list
- * pointer that tls_decrypt_sg() walks — a use-after-free.
- *
- * The fix adds a tls_sw_has_ctx_rx() check to sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(),
- * mirroring what sk_psock_strp_data_ready() already does: when a TLS RX
- * context is present, defer to psock->saved_data_ready (sock_def_readable)
- * instead of calling tcp_read_skb(), so TLS retains sole ownership of the
- * receive queue. Data is then decrypted and returned correctly by
- * tls_sw_recvmsg().
- */
-static void test_sockmap_ktls_verdict_with_tls_rx(int family, int sotype)
-{
- struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 crypto_info = {};
- char send_buf[] = "hello ktls sockmap reverse order";
- char recv_buf[sizeof(send_buf)] = {};
- struct test_sockmap_ktls *skel;
- int c = -1, p = -1, zero = 0;
- int prog_fd, map_fd;
- ssize_t n;
- int err;
-
- skel = test_sockmap_ktls__open_and_load();
- if (!ASSERT_TRUE(skel, "open_and_load"))
- return;
-
- err = create_pair(family, sotype, &c, &p);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "create_pair"))
- goto out;
-
- prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.prog_skb_verdict_pass);
- map_fd = bpf_map__fd(skel->maps.sock_map_verdict);
-
- err = bpf_prog_attach(prog_fd, map_fd, BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT, 0);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_prog_attach sk_skb verdict"))
- goto out;
-
- /* Step 1: configure TLS TX on sender (no sockmap involvement) */
- err = setsockopt(c, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ULP, "tls", strlen("tls"));
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "setsockopt(TCP_ULP) client"))
- goto out;
-
- crypto_info.info.version = TLS_1_2_VERSION;
- crypto_info.info.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128;
- memset(crypto_info.key, 0x01, sizeof(crypto_info.key));
- memset(crypto_info.salt, 0x02, sizeof(crypto_info.salt));
-
- err = setsockopt(c, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &crypto_info, sizeof(crypto_info));
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "setsockopt(TLS_TX)"))
- goto out;
-
- /* Step 2: insert receiver into sockmap BEFORE TLS RX */
- err = bpf_map_update_elem(map_fd, &zero, &p, BPF_NOEXIST);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_map_update_elem"))
- goto out;
-
- /* Step 3: configure TLS RX AFTER sockmap insertion */
- err = setsockopt(p, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ULP, "tls", strlen("tls"));
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "setsockopt(TCP_ULP) server"))
- goto out;
-
- err = setsockopt(p, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &crypto_info, sizeof(crypto_info));
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "setsockopt(TLS_RX)"))
- goto out;
-
- /*
- * A buggy kernel hits WARN_ON_ONCE in tls_strp_load_anchor_with_queue
- * and may UAF in tls_decrypt_sg here. With the fix,
- * sk_psock_verdict_data_ready defers to sock_def_readable and TLS
- * decrypts the record normally.
- */
- n = send(c, send_buf, sizeof(send_buf), 0);
- if (!ASSERT_EQ(n, (ssize_t)sizeof(send_buf), "send"))
- goto out;
-
- n = recv_timeout(p, recv_buf, sizeof(recv_buf), 0, 5);
- if (!ASSERT_EQ(n, (ssize_t)sizeof(send_buf), "recv"))
- goto out;
-
- ASSERT_OK(memcmp(send_buf, recv_buf, sizeof(send_buf)), "data integrity");
-
-out:
- if (c != -1)
- close(c);
- if (p != -1)
- close(p);
- test_sockmap_ktls__destroy(skel);
-}
-
static void run_ktls_test(int family, int sotype)
{
if (test__start_subtest("tls simple offload"))
test_sockmap_ktls_offload(family, sotype);
- if (test__start_subtest("tls tx cork"))
- test_sockmap_ktls_tx_cork(family, sotype, false);
- if (test__start_subtest("tls tx cork with push"))
- test_sockmap_ktls_tx_cork(family, sotype, true);
- if (test__start_subtest("tls tx egress with no buf"))
- test_sockmap_ktls_tx_no_buf(family, sotype, true);
- if (test__start_subtest("tls tx with pop"))
- test_sockmap_ktls_tx_pop(family, sotype);
- if (test__start_subtest("tls verdict with tls rx"))
- test_sockmap_ktls_verdict_with_tls_rx(family, sotype);
}
void test_sockmap_ktls(void)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_ktls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_ktls.c
deleted file mode 100644
index facafeaf4620..000000000000
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_ktls.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-#include <linux/bpf.h>
-#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
-#include <bpf/bpf_endian.h>
-
-int cork_byte;
-int push_start;
-int push_end;
-int apply_bytes;
-int pop_start;
-int pop_end;
-
-struct {
- __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP);
- __uint(max_entries, 20);
- __type(key, int);
- __type(value, int);
-} sock_map SEC(".maps");
-
-struct {
- __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP);
- __uint(max_entries, 2);
- __type(key, int);
- __type(value, int);
-} sock_map_verdict SEC(".maps");
-
-SEC("sk_msg")
-int prog_sk_policy(struct sk_msg_md *msg)
-{
- if (cork_byte > 0)
- bpf_msg_cork_bytes(msg, cork_byte);
- if (push_start > 0 && push_end > 0)
- bpf_msg_push_data(msg, push_start, push_end, 0);
- if (pop_start >= 0 && pop_end > 0)
- bpf_msg_pop_data(msg, pop_start, pop_end, 0);
-
- return SK_PASS;
-}
-
-SEC("sk_msg")
-int prog_sk_policy_redir(struct sk_msg_md *msg)
-{
- int two = 2;
-
- bpf_msg_apply_bytes(msg, apply_bytes);
- return bpf_msg_redirect_map(msg, &sock_map, two, 0);
-}
-
-/*
- * Verdict program for the reverse-order TLS/sockmap regression test.
- * Returns SK_PASS so tcp_read_skb() drains the receive queue via
- * sk_psock_verdict_recv() without calling tcp_eat_skb(), which is
- * the precondition for the KTLS strparser frag_list UAF.
- */
-SEC("sk_skb/verdict")
-int prog_skb_verdict_pass(struct __sk_buff *skb)
-{
- return SK_PASS;
-}
-
-char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c
index 76568db7a664..32d6068df4b3 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
#include <linux/sock_diag.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/if_link.h>
-#include <linux/tls.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <libgen.h>
@@ -41,13 +40,6 @@
int running;
static void running_handler(int a);
-#ifndef TCP_ULP
-# define TCP_ULP 31
-#endif
-#ifndef SOL_TLS
-# define SOL_TLS 282
-#endif
-
/* randomly selected ports for testing on lo */
#define S1_PORT 10000
#define S2_PORT 10001
@@ -81,10 +73,6 @@ int txmsg_start_pop;
int txmsg_pop;
int txmsg_ingress;
int txmsg_redir_skb;
-int txmsg_ktls_skb;
-int txmsg_ktls_skb_drop;
-int txmsg_ktls_skb_redir;
-int ktls;
int peek_flag;
int skb_use_parser;
int txmsg_omit_skb_parser;
@@ -115,7 +103,6 @@ static const struct option long_options[] = {
{"txmsg_pop", required_argument, NULL, 'x'},
{"txmsg_ingress", no_argument, &txmsg_ingress, 1 },
{"txmsg_redir_skb", no_argument, &txmsg_redir_skb, 1 },
- {"ktls", no_argument, &ktls, 1 },
{"peek", no_argument, &peek_flag, 1 },
{"txmsg_omit_skb_parser", no_argument, &txmsg_omit_skb_parser, 1},
{"whitelist", required_argument, NULL, 'n' },
@@ -183,7 +170,6 @@ static void test_reset(void)
txmsg_pass = txmsg_drop = txmsg_redir = 0;
txmsg_apply = txmsg_cork = 0;
txmsg_ingress = txmsg_redir_skb = 0;
- txmsg_ktls_skb = txmsg_ktls_skb_drop = txmsg_ktls_skb_redir = 0;
txmsg_omit_skb_parser = 0;
skb_use_parser = 0;
}
@@ -238,71 +224,6 @@ static void usage(char *argv[])
printf("\n");
}
-char *sock_to_string(int s)
-{
- if (s == c1)
- return "client1";
- else if (s == c2)
- return "client2";
- else if (s == s1)
- return "server1";
- else if (s == s2)
- return "server2";
- else if (s == p1)
- return "peer1";
- else if (s == p2)
- return "peer2";
- else
- return "unknown";
-}
-
-static int sockmap_init_ktls(int verbose, int s)
-{
- struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 tls_tx = {
- .info = {
- .version = TLS_1_2_VERSION,
- .cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128,
- },
- };
- struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 tls_rx = {
- .info = {
- .version = TLS_1_2_VERSION,
- .cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128,
- },
- };
- int so_buf = 6553500;
- int err;
-
- err = setsockopt(s, 6, TCP_ULP, "tls", sizeof("tls"));
- if (err) {
- fprintf(stderr, "setsockopt: TCP_ULP(%s) failed with error %i\n", sock_to_string(s), err);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- err = setsockopt(s, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, (void *)&tls_tx, sizeof(tls_tx));
- if (err) {
- fprintf(stderr, "setsockopt: TLS_TX(%s) failed with error %i\n", sock_to_string(s), err);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- err = setsockopt(s, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, (void *)&tls_rx, sizeof(tls_rx));
- if (err) {
- fprintf(stderr, "setsockopt: TLS_RX(%s) failed with error %i\n", sock_to_string(s), err);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- err = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, &so_buf, sizeof(so_buf));
- if (err) {
- fprintf(stderr, "setsockopt: (%s) failed sndbuf with error %i\n", sock_to_string(s), err);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- err = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &so_buf, sizeof(so_buf));
- if (err) {
- fprintf(stderr, "setsockopt: (%s) failed rcvbuf with error %i\n", sock_to_string(s), err);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (verbose)
- fprintf(stdout, "socket(%s) kTLS enabled\n", sock_to_string(s));
- return 0;
-}
static int sockmap_init_sockets(int verbose)
{
int i, err, one = 1;
@@ -557,19 +478,6 @@ static int msg_verify_data(struct msghdr *msg, int size, int chunk_sz,
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < msg->msg_iovlen && size; i++, j = 0) {
unsigned char *d = msg->msg_iov[i].iov_base;
- /* Special case test for skb ingress + ktls */
- if (i == 0 && txmsg_ktls_skb) {
- if (msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len < 4)
- return -EDATAINTEGRITY;
- if (memcmp(d, "PASS", 4) != 0) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "detected skb data error with skb ingress update @iov[%i]:%i \"%02x %02x %02x %02x\" != \"PASS\"\n",
- i, 0, d[0], d[1], d[2], d[3]);
- return -EDATAINTEGRITY;
- }
- j = 4; /* advance index past PASS header */
- }
-
for (; j < msg->msg_iov[i].iov_len && size; j++) {
if (push > 0 &&
check_cnt == verify_push_start + verify_push_len - push) {
@@ -849,21 +757,6 @@ static int sendmsg_test(struct sockmap_options *opt)
else
rx_fd = p2;
- if (ktls) {
- /* Redirecting into non-TLS socket which sends into a TLS
- * socket is not a valid test. So in this case lets not
- * enable kTLS but still run the test.
- */
- if (!txmsg_redir || txmsg_ingress) {
- err = sockmap_init_ktls(opt->verbose, rx_fd);
- if (err)
- return err;
- }
- err = sockmap_init_ktls(opt->verbose, c1);
- if (err)
- return err;
- }
-
if (opt->tx_wait_mem) {
struct timeval timeout;
int rxtx_buf_len = 1024;
@@ -882,7 +775,7 @@ static int sendmsg_test(struct sockmap_options *opt)
rxpid = fork();
if (rxpid == 0) {
- if (opt->drop_expected || txmsg_ktls_skb_drop)
+ if (opt->drop_expected)
_exit(0);
if (!iov_buf) /* zero bytes sent case */
@@ -1073,26 +966,6 @@ static int run_options(struct sockmap_options *options, int cg_fd, int test)
return -1;
}
- /* Attach programs to TLS sockmap */
- if (txmsg_ktls_skb) {
- if (!txmsg_omit_skb_parser) {
- links[2] = bpf_program__attach_sockmap(progs[0], map_fd[8]);
- if (!links[2]) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "ERROR: bpf_program__attach_sockmap (TLS sockmap %i->%i): (%s)\n",
- bpf_program__fd(progs[0]), map_fd[8], strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- links[3] = bpf_program__attach_sockmap(progs[2], map_fd[8]);
- if (!links[3]) {
- fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: bpf_program__attach_sockmap (TLS sockmap): (%s)\n",
- strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
/* Attach to cgroups */
err = bpf_prog_attach(bpf_program__fd(progs[3]), cg_fd, BPF_CGROUP_SOCK_OPS, 0);
if (err) {
@@ -1291,34 +1164,6 @@ static int run_options(struct sockmap_options *options, int cg_fd, int test)
}
}
- if (txmsg_ktls_skb) {
- int ingress = BPF_F_INGRESS;
-
- i = 0;
- err = bpf_map_update_elem(map_fd[8], &i, &p2, BPF_ANY);
- if (err) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "ERROR: bpf_map_update_elem (c1 sockmap): %d (%s)\n",
- err, strerror(errno));
- }
-
- if (txmsg_ktls_skb_redir) {
- i = 1;
- err = bpf_map_update_elem(map_fd[7],
- &i, &ingress, BPF_ANY);
- if (err) {
- fprintf(stderr,
- "ERROR: bpf_map_update_elem (txmsg_ingress): %d (%s)\n",
- err, strerror(errno));
- }
- }
-
- if (txmsg_ktls_skb_drop) {
- i = 1;
- err = bpf_map_update_elem(map_fd[7], &i, &i, BPF_ANY);
- }
- }
-
if (txmsg_redir_skb) {
int skb_fd = (test == SENDMSG || test == SENDPAGE) ?
p2 : p1;
@@ -1457,10 +1302,6 @@ static void test_options(char *options)
append_str(options, "ingress,", OPTSTRING);
if (txmsg_redir_skb)
append_str(options, "redir_skb,", OPTSTRING);
- if (txmsg_ktls_skb)
- append_str(options, "ktls_skb,", OPTSTRING);
- if (ktls)
- append_str(options, "ktls,", OPTSTRING);
if (peek_flag)
append_str(options, "peek,", OPTSTRING);
}
@@ -1602,57 +1443,6 @@ static void test_txmsg_ingress_redir(int cgrp, struct sockmap_options *opt)
test_send(opt, cgrp);
}
-static void test_txmsg_skb(int cgrp, struct sockmap_options *opt)
-{
- bool data = opt->data_test;
- int k = ktls;
-
- opt->data_test = true;
- ktls = 1;
-
- txmsg_pass = txmsg_drop = 0;
- txmsg_ingress = txmsg_redir = 0;
- txmsg_ktls_skb = 1;
- txmsg_pass = 1;
-
- /* Using data verification so ensure iov layout is
- * expected from test receiver side. e.g. has enough
- * bytes to write test code.
- */
- opt->iov_length = 100;
- opt->iov_count = 1;
- opt->rate = 1;
- test_exec(cgrp, opt);
-
- txmsg_ktls_skb_drop = 1;
- test_exec(cgrp, opt);
-
- txmsg_ktls_skb_drop = 0;
- txmsg_ktls_skb_redir = 1;
- test_exec(cgrp, opt);
- txmsg_ktls_skb_redir = 0;
-
- /* Tests that omit skb_parser */
- txmsg_omit_skb_parser = 1;
- ktls = 0;
- txmsg_ktls_skb = 0;
- test_exec(cgrp, opt);
-
- txmsg_ktls_skb_drop = 1;
- test_exec(cgrp, opt);
- txmsg_ktls_skb_drop = 0;
-
- txmsg_ktls_skb_redir = 1;
- test_exec(cgrp, opt);
-
- ktls = 1;
- test_exec(cgrp, opt);
- txmsg_omit_skb_parser = 0;
-
- opt->data_test = data;
- ktls = k;
-}
-
/* Test cork with hung data. This tests poor usage patterns where
* cork can leave data on the ring if user program is buggy and
* doesn't flush them somehow. They do take some time however
@@ -1908,8 +1698,6 @@ static void test_txmsg_ingress_parser(int cgrp, struct sockmap_options *opt)
{
txmsg_pass = 1;
skb_use_parser = 512;
- if (ktls == 1)
- skb_use_parser = 570;
opt->iov_length = 256;
opt->iov_count = 1;
opt->rate = 2;
@@ -1918,8 +1706,6 @@ static void test_txmsg_ingress_parser(int cgrp, struct sockmap_options *opt)
static void test_txmsg_ingress_parser2(int cgrp, struct sockmap_options *opt)
{
- if (ktls == 1)
- return;
skb_use_parser = 10;
opt->iov_length = 20;
opt->iov_count = 1;
@@ -1988,7 +1774,6 @@ struct _test test[] = {
{"txmsg test redirect wait send mem", test_txmsg_redir_wait_sndmem},
{"txmsg test drop", test_txmsg_drop},
{"txmsg test ingress redirect", test_txmsg_ingress_redir},
- {"txmsg test skb", test_txmsg_skb},
{"txmsg test apply", test_txmsg_apply},
{"txmsg test cork", test_txmsg_cork},
{"txmsg test hanging corks", test_txmsg_cork_hangs},
@@ -2085,20 +1870,10 @@ static void test_selftests_sockhash(int cg_fd, struct sockmap_options *opt)
__test_selftests(cg_fd, opt);
}
-static void test_selftests_ktls(int cg_fd, struct sockmap_options *opt)
-{
- opt->map = BPF_SOCKHASH_FILENAME;
- opt->prepend = "ktls";
- ktls = 1;
- __test_selftests(cg_fd, opt);
- ktls = 0;
-}
-
static int test_selftest(int cg_fd, struct sockmap_options *opt)
{
test_selftests_sockmap(cg_fd, opt);
test_selftests_sockhash(cg_fd, opt);
- test_selftests_ktls(cg_fd, opt);
test_print_results();
return 0;
}
--
2.54.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH net-next 4/5] selftests/bpf: drop the unused kTLS program from test_sockmap
2026-06-14 1:40 [PATCH net-next 0/5] tls: reject the combination of TLS and sockmap Jakub Kicinski
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2026-06-14 1:40 ` [PATCH net-next 3/5] selftests/bpf: remove sockmap + ktls tests Jakub Kicinski
@ 2026-06-14 1:40 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-06-14 1:41 ` [PATCH net-next 5/5] selftests/bpf: test that TLS crypto is rejected on a sockmap socket Jakub Kicinski
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jakub Kicinski @ 2026-06-14 1:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: davem
Cc: netdev, edumazet, pabeni, andrew+netdev, horms, bpf, jakub,
john.fastabend, sd, Jakub Kicinski
With the sockmap + kTLS tests gone, the BPF-side support in test_sockmap
is dead: the tls_sock_map map and bpf_prog3 (which redirected skbs into
it) are no longer referenced. Remove them, along with the now-unused
bpf_write_pass() helper.
bpf_prog3 was progs[2], so renumber the progs[] users in test_sockmap.c:
the sockops program drops to progs[2] and the sk_msg tx programs to
progs[3..7]. Shrink the map/prog arrays from 9 to 8 and drop the
tls_sock_map entry (the last one) from map_names[] to match.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
---
.../selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_kern.h | 56 -------------------
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c | 23 ++++----
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_kern.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_kern.h
index f48f85f1bd70..284a2f2e50cf 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_kern.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sockmap_kern.h
@@ -85,13 +85,6 @@ struct {
__type(value, int);
} sock_skb_opts SEC(".maps");
-struct {
- __uint(type, TEST_MAP_TYPE);
- __uint(max_entries, 20);
- __uint(key_size, sizeof(int));
- __uint(value_size, sizeof(int));
-} tls_sock_map SEC(".maps");
-
SEC("sk_skb/stream_parser")
int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
@@ -135,55 +128,6 @@ int bpf_prog2(struct __sk_buff *skb)
}
-static inline void bpf_write_pass(struct __sk_buff *skb, int offset)
-{
- int err = bpf_skb_pull_data(skb, 6 + offset);
- void *data_end;
- char *c;
-
- if (err)
- return;
-
- c = (char *)(long)skb->data;
- data_end = (void *)(long)skb->data_end;
-
- if (c + 5 + offset < data_end)
- memcpy(c + offset, "PASS", 4);
-}
-
-SEC("sk_skb/stream_verdict")
-int bpf_prog3(struct __sk_buff *skb)
-{
- int err, *f, ret = SK_PASS;
- const int one = 1;
-
- f = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&sock_skb_opts, &one);
- if (f && *f) {
- __u64 flags = 0;
-
- ret = 0;
- flags = *f;
-
- err = bpf_skb_adjust_room(skb, -13, 0, 0);
- if (err)
- return SK_DROP;
- err = bpf_skb_adjust_room(skb, 4, 0, 0);
- if (err)
- return SK_DROP;
- bpf_write_pass(skb, 0);
-#ifdef SOCKMAP
- return bpf_sk_redirect_map(skb, &tls_sock_map, ret, flags);
-#else
- return bpf_sk_redirect_hash(skb, &tls_sock_map, &ret, flags);
-#endif
- }
- err = bpf_skb_adjust_room(skb, 4, 0, 0);
- if (err)
- return SK_DROP;
- bpf_write_pass(skb, 13);
- return ret;
-}
-
SEC("sockops")
int bpf_sockmap(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops)
{
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c
index 32d6068df4b3..ac814eb63edb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_sockmap.c
@@ -55,10 +55,10 @@ int s1, s2, c1, c2, p1, p2;
int test_cnt;
int passed;
int failed;
-int map_fd[9];
-struct bpf_map *maps[9];
-struct bpf_program *progs[9];
-struct bpf_link *links[9];
+int map_fd[8];
+struct bpf_map *maps[8];
+struct bpf_program *progs[8];
+struct bpf_link *links[8];
int txmsg_pass;
int txmsg_redir;
@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ static int run_options(struct sockmap_options *options, int cg_fd, int test)
}
/* Attach to cgroups */
- err = bpf_prog_attach(bpf_program__fd(progs[3]), cg_fd, BPF_CGROUP_SOCK_OPS, 0);
+ err = bpf_prog_attach(bpf_program__fd(progs[2]), cg_fd, BPF_CGROUP_SOCK_OPS, 0);
if (err) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: bpf_prog_attach (groups): %d (%s)\n",
err, strerror(errno));
@@ -983,15 +983,15 @@ static int run_options(struct sockmap_options *options, int cg_fd, int test)
/* Attach txmsg program to sockmap */
if (txmsg_pass)
- tx_prog = progs[4];
+ tx_prog = progs[3];
else if (txmsg_redir)
- tx_prog = progs[5];
+ tx_prog = progs[4];
else if (txmsg_apply)
- tx_prog = progs[6];
+ tx_prog = progs[5];
else if (txmsg_cork)
- tx_prog = progs[7];
+ tx_prog = progs[6];
else if (txmsg_drop)
- tx_prog = progs[8];
+ tx_prog = progs[7];
else
tx_prog = NULL;
@@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ static int run_options(struct sockmap_options *options, int cg_fd, int test)
fprintf(stderr, "unknown test\n");
out:
/* Detach and zero all the maps */
- bpf_prog_detach2(bpf_program__fd(progs[3]), cg_fd, BPF_CGROUP_SOCK_OPS);
+ bpf_prog_detach2(bpf_program__fd(progs[2]), cg_fd, BPF_CGROUP_SOCK_OPS);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(links); i++) {
if (links[i])
@@ -1724,7 +1724,6 @@ char *map_names[] = {
"sock_bytes",
"sock_redir_flags",
"sock_skb_opts",
- "tls_sock_map",
};
static int populate_progs(char *bpf_file)
--
2.54.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH net-next 5/5] selftests/bpf: test that TLS crypto is rejected on a sockmap socket
2026-06-14 1:40 [PATCH net-next 0/5] tls: reject the combination of TLS and sockmap Jakub Kicinski
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2026-06-14 1:40 ` [PATCH net-next 4/5] selftests/bpf: drop the unused kTLS program from test_sockmap Jakub Kicinski
@ 2026-06-14 1:41 ` Jakub Kicinski
4 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jakub Kicinski @ 2026-06-14 1:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: davem
Cc: netdev, edumazet, pabeni, andrew+netdev, horms, bpf, jakub,
john.fastabend, sd, Jakub Kicinski
TLS and sockmap are mutually exclusive. We already have a test
for the sockmap side rejecting kTLS, add the inverse test matching
patch 1 of this series.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
---
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_ktls.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 65 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_ktls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_ktls.c
index cda6b22cf759..34737e8df6ea 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_ktls.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_ktls.c
@@ -116,6 +116,68 @@ static void test_sockmap_ktls_update_fails_when_sock_has_ulp(int family, int map
close(s);
}
+static void test_sockmap_ktls_enable_fails_when_in_sockmap(int family, int map)
+{
+ struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 crypto = {
+ .info = {
+ .version = TLS_1_2_VERSION,
+ .cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128,
+ },
+ };
+ struct sockaddr_storage addr = {};
+ socklen_t len = sizeof(addr);
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *v6;
+ struct sockaddr_in *v4;
+ int err, s, zero = 0;
+
+ switch (family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ v4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
+ v4->sin_family = AF_INET;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ v6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addr;
+ v6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PRINT_FAIL("unsupported socket family %d", family);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ s = socket(family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (!ASSERT_GE(s, 0, "socket"))
+ return;
+
+ err = bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, len);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bind"))
+ goto close;
+
+ err = getsockname(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &len);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "getsockname"))
+ goto close;
+
+ err = connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, len);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "connect"))
+ goto close;
+
+ /* Add the socket to the sockmap, attaching a psock. */
+ err = bpf_map_update_elem(map, &zero, &s, BPF_ANY);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "sockmap update elem"))
+ goto close;
+
+ /* Installing the TLS ULP is allowed, it does not touch the datapath. */
+ err = setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ULP, "tls", strlen("tls"));
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "setsockopt(TCP_ULP)"))
+ goto close;
+
+ /* Enabling the TLS crypto datapath must be rejected. */
+ err = setsockopt(s, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &crypto, sizeof(crypto));
+ ASSERT_ERR(err, "setsockopt(TLS_TX)");
+
+close:
+ close(s);
+}
+
static const char *fmt_test_name(const char *subtest_name, int family,
enum bpf_map_type map_type)
{
@@ -170,6 +232,9 @@ static void run_tests(int family, enum bpf_map_type map_type)
if (test__start_subtest(fmt_test_name("update_fails_when_sock_has_ulp", family, map_type)))
test_sockmap_ktls_update_fails_when_sock_has_ulp(family, map);
+ if (test__start_subtest(fmt_test_name("enable_fails_when_in_sockmap", family, map_type)))
+ test_sockmap_ktls_enable_fails_when_in_sockmap(family, map);
+
close(map);
}
--
2.54.0
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