Landlock: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP bypass via TCP Fast Open

Landlock: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP bypass via TCP Fast Open

[Bryam Vargas]

Hello Mickaël, and Landlock folks,

A task confined by a Landlock ruleset that handles
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP and is denied connecting to a given port can
still establish a TCP connection to that port by using TCP Fast Open, i.e.
sendto(fd, ..., MSG_FASTOPEN, &dst, dstlen) on a fresh stream socket. The
network-egress confinement for TCP connect is silently bypassed.

Affected
--------
Any kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y and Landlock enabled that supports
the TCP network access rights (Landlock ABI >= 4, since Linux 6.7). Confirmed by
source inspection on mainline (v7.1-rc7) and reproduced on Linux 7.0.11
(Landlock ABI 8). No CONFIG beyond Landlock + IPv4/IPv6 TCP; TCP Fast Open client
is enabled by the per-netns default (net.ipv4.tcp_fastopen has TFO_CLIENT_ENABLE
set), so no sysctl change and no setsockopt are required.

Root cause
----------
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP is enforced only by the socket_connect LSM hook
(hook_socket_connect -> current_check_access_socket). security_socket_connect()
has exactly one call site in the tree, net/socket.c (the connect(2) syscall).

TCP Fast Open performs an implicit connect inside sendmsg:

  tcp_sendmsg_locked()            net/ipv4/tcp.c  (MSG_FASTOPEN branch)
   -> tcp_sendmsg_fastopen()      net/ipv4/tcp.c
   -> __inet_stream_connect(..., is_sendmsg=1)  net/ipv4/af_inet.c
   -> sk->sk_prot->connect()      net/ipv4/af_inet.c  -> tcp_v4_connect()

This path establishes the connection to the address taken from msg_name but
never calls security_socket_connect(). The only LSM hook fired on the sendmsg
path is security_socket_sendmsg(), and Landlock registers no socket_sendmsg
hook, so LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP is never re-checked. __inet_stream_connect()
itself carries no LSM hook (only the cgroup-BPF pre_connect, a different
mechanism).

Notably the kernel already mediates the analogous AF_UNIX implicit-connect on the
send path via the unix_may_send hook, which Landlock does register
(hook_unix_may_send) -- so the sendmsg-implies-connect pattern is recognized, but
the TCP Fast Open case has no equivalent coverage. The MPTCP fast-open path
(mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen -> __inet_stream_connect) is a second producer of the
same unmediated connect (by source inspection; not separately reproduced).

Reproducer
----------
A self-contained, fully unprivileged PoC is available on request. It forks an
unconfined TFO-capable loopback listener, then in a child applies a Landlock
ruleset handling LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP with no allow rule
(landlock_create_ruleset() with handled_access_net =
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP, no landlock_add_rule(), then
landlock_restrict_self(); every TCP connect is denied) and tries the forbidden
port two ways:

  (1) connect(fd, &dst)                 -> -EACCES   (Landlock enforces CONNECT_TCP)
  (2) sendto(fd2, buf, len, MSG_FASTOPEN, &dst, dstlen)
                                        -> succeeds; the listener accepts the
                                           connection and reads the payload.

Observed on Linux 7.0.11 (Landlock ABI 8):

  [1] connect(2)            -> ret=-1 errno=13 (Permission denied)
  [2] sendto(MSG_FASTOPEN)  -> ret=14 errno=0 (OK/queued)
  [+] listener ACCEPTED the confined child's connection; payload="..."

connect(2) to the port is denied while sendto(MSG_FASTOPEN) reaches the identical
port and delivers data.

Impact
------
A sandbox that uses LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP to restrict outbound TCP
(e.g. to keep a confined component from reaching an internal service or a
metadata endpoint) can be escaped by an unprivileged, self-confined task with no
CAP and no namespace transition -- for any destination port, since the
implicit-connect path never consults the connect hook regardless of address (the
run above shows one port). It is an integrity
bypass of the network-confinement property; no memory safety is involved.
I score it CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N (6.5 Medium) -- the
confined task escapes the policy authority that defined its sandbox, a scope
change; 5.5 if you treat the Landlock boundary as the same authority (S:U).

Note on the in-flight UDP series
--------------------------------
The "landlock: Add UDP access control support" series (v5, Matthieu Buffet,
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260611162107.49278-3-matthieu@buffet.re) adds a
socket_sendmsg hook, hook_socket_sendmsg(), but it returns 0 for non-UDP
sockets:

    if (sk_is_udp(sock->sk))
            access_request = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_SEND_UDP;
    else
            return 0;

so a TCP socket using MSG_FASTOPEN still bypasses LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
even after that series lands. It may be most convenient to fix this there.

Suggested direction
-------------------
Re-check LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP on the implicit-connect path: either have
the socket_sendmsg hook evaluate CONNECT_TCP for stream sockets when the call
performs an implicit connect (mirroring the AF_UNIX unix_may_send handling), or
place the check inside __inet_stream_connect() so a single chokepoint covers
connect(2), TCP Fast Open, and the MPTCP fast-open sibling.

I am happy to send a patch for this if you would like me to.

Best regards,

Bryam Vargas
Independent security researcher, HEXLAB S.A.S., Cali, Colombia
hexlabsecurity@proton.me