[PATCH net 0/5] rxrpc: Miscellaneous fixes

[PATCH net 0/5] rxrpc: Miscellaneous fixes

[David Howells]

Here are some miscellaneous AF_RXRPC fixes for more stuff found by Sashiko[1]:

 (1) Reject ACKALL packets for calls not in Tx or immediate post-Tx state.

 (2) Fix connection leak from AF_RXRPC recvmsg userspace OOB handling.

 (3) Fix double unlock in AF_RXRPC recvmsg userspace OOB handling.

 (4) Fix AFS preallocate charge to flush the waitqueue after unlistening
     the socket so that any charging thread that does manage to get started
     will be waited for before socket destruction.

 (5) Fix AFS OOB notify handling to cancel in-progress OOB notification
     handling and then to flush the workqueue it's on.

David

The patches can be found here also:

	http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=rxrpc-fixes

[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260609140911.838677-1-dhowells%40redhat.com

David Howells (4):
  rxrpc: Fix leak of connection from OOB challenge
  rxrpc: Fix double unlock in rxrpc_recvmsg()
  afs: Fix further netns teardown to cancel the preallocation charger
  afs: Fix uncancelled rxrpc OOB message handler

Wyatt Feng (1):
  rxrpc: input: reject ACKALL outside transmit phase

 fs/afs/cm_security.c |  3 ++-
 fs/afs/rxrpc.c       |  5 ++++-
 net/rxrpc/input.c    | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 net/rxrpc/oob.c      |  5 +++++
 net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c  |  2 +-
 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

[PATCH net 1/5] rxrpc: input: reject ACKALL outside transmit phase

[David Howells]

From: Wyatt Feng <bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com>

rxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether
the call is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit
buffers.  A forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in
RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been
queued.

In that state call->tx_top is zero and call->tx_queue is NULL, so
rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a
null-pointer dereference.

Fix rxrpc_input_ackall() to mirror the transmit-state gating already
used for normal ACK processing, and ignore ACKALL when there is no
outstanding transmit window to rotate.

Fixes: b341a0263b1b ("rxrpc: Implement progressive transmission queue struct")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
Signed-off-by: Wyatt Feng <bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
---
 net/rxrpc/input.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/rxrpc/input.c b/net/rxrpc/input.c
index ce761466b02d..37881dffa898 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/input.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/input.c
@@ -1214,8 +1214,22 @@ static void rxrpc_input_ack(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb)
 static void rxrpc_input_ackall(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct rxrpc_ack_summary summary = { 0 };
+	rxrpc_seq_t top = READ_ONCE(call->tx_top);
+
+	switch (__rxrpc_call_state(call)) {
+	case RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST:
+	case RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY:
+	case RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_SEND_REPLY:
+	case RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_AWAIT_ACK:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (call->tx_bottom == top)
+		return;
 
-	if (rxrpc_rotate_tx_window(call, call->tx_top, &summary))
+	if (rxrpc_rotate_tx_window(call, top, &summary))
 		rxrpc_end_tx_phase(call, false, rxrpc_eproto_unexpected_ackall);
 }
 

[PATCH net 2/5] rxrpc: Fix leak of connection from OOB challenge

[David Howells]

Fix leak of connection object from OOB challenge queue when response is
provided by userspace.

Fixes: 5800b1cf3fd8 ("rxrpc: Allow CHALLENGEs to the passed to the app for a RESPONSE")
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260609140911.838677-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
---
 net/rxrpc/oob.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/rxrpc/oob.c b/net/rxrpc/oob.c
index 05ca9c1faa57..3318c8bd82ad 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/oob.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/oob.c
@@ -210,6 +210,11 @@ static int rxrpc_respond_to_oob(struct rxrpc_sock *rx,
 		break;
 	}
 
+	switch (skb->mark) {
+	case RXRPC_OOB_CHALLENGE:
+		rxrpc_put_connection(sp->chall.conn, rxrpc_conn_put_oob);
+		break;
+	}
 	rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_put_oob);
 	return ret;
 }

[PATCH net 3/5] rxrpc: Fix double unlock in rxrpc_recvmsg()

[David Howells]

Fix a double unlock in rxrpc_recvmsg() when dealing with OOB messages.

Fixes: 5800b1cf3fd8 ("rxrpc: Allow CHALLENGEs to the passed to the app for a RESPONSE")
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260609140911.838677-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
---
 net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
index 82614cbdb60f..39a03684432d 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ int rxrpc_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
 		release_sock(&rx->sk);
 		if (ret == -EAGAIN)
 			goto try_again;
-		goto error_no_call;
+		goto error_trace;
 	}
 
 	/* Find the next call and dequeue it if we're not just peeking.  If we

[PATCH net 4/5] afs: Fix further netns teardown to cancel the preallocation charger

[David Howells]

When an afs network namespace is torn down, it cancels and waits for the
work item that keeps the preallocated rxrpc call/conn/peer queue charged
before disabling incoming (i.e. listen 0), but there's a small window in
which it can be requeued by an incoming call wending through the I/O
thread.

Fix this by flushing the workqueue on which the charger runs after reducing
the listen backlog to zero.

Fixes: 47694fbc9d24 ("afs: Fix netns teardown to cancel the preallocation charger")
Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260609140911.838677-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
cc: Li Daming <d4n.for.sec@gmail.com>
cc: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
---
 fs/afs/rxrpc.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/fs/afs/rxrpc.c b/fs/afs/rxrpc.c
index d5cfd24e815b..fd2d260fb25f 100644
--- a/fs/afs/rxrpc.c
+++ b/fs/afs/rxrpc.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ void afs_close_socket(struct afs_net *net)
 	cancel_work_sync(&net->charge_preallocation_work);
 	kernel_listen(net->socket, 0);
 	flush_workqueue(afs_async_calls);
+	flush_workqueue(afs_wq);
 
 	if (net->spare_incoming_call) {
 		afs_put_call(net->spare_incoming_call);

[PATCH net 5/5] afs: Fix uncancelled rxrpc OOB message handler

[David Howells]

Fix AFS to cancel its OOB message processing (typically to respond to
security challenges).  Also move OOB message processing to afs_wq so that
it's also waited for and make the OOB handler just return if the net
namespace is no longer live.

Fixes: 5800b1cf3fd8 ("rxrpc: Allow CHALLENGEs to the passed to the app for a RESPONSE")
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260609140911.838677-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Li Daming <d4n.for.sec@gmail.com>
cc: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
---
 fs/afs/cm_security.c | 3 ++-
 fs/afs/rxrpc.c       | 4 +++-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/afs/cm_security.c b/fs/afs/cm_security.c
index edcbd249d202..103168c70dd4 100644
--- a/fs/afs/cm_security.c
+++ b/fs/afs/cm_security.c
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ void afs_process_oob_queue(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct sk_buff *oob;
 	enum rxrpc_oob_type type;
 
-	while ((oob = rxrpc_kernel_dequeue_oob(net->socket, &type))) {
+	while (READ_ONCE(net->live) &&
+	       (oob = rxrpc_kernel_dequeue_oob(net->socket, &type))) {
 		switch (type) {
 		case RXRPC_OOB_CHALLENGE:
 			afs_respond_to_challenge(oob);
diff --git a/fs/afs/rxrpc.c b/fs/afs/rxrpc.c
index fd2d260fb25f..6241f9349f6b 100644
--- a/fs/afs/rxrpc.c
+++ b/fs/afs/rxrpc.c
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ void afs_close_socket(struct afs_net *net)
 	_enter("");
 
 	cancel_work_sync(&net->charge_preallocation_work);
+	cancel_work_sync(&net->rx_oob_work);
 	kernel_listen(net->socket, 0);
 	flush_workqueue(afs_async_calls);
 	flush_workqueue(afs_wq);
@@ -985,5 +986,6 @@ static void afs_rx_notify_oob(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *oob)
 {
 	struct afs_net *net = sk->sk_user_data;
 
-	schedule_work(&net->rx_oob_work);
+	if (net->live)
+		queue_work(afs_wq, &net->rx_oob_work);
 }

Re: [PATCH net 1/5] rxrpc: input: reject ACKALL outside transmit phase

[Simon Horman]

This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this
email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible.
Full review at: https://sashiko.dev
---
rxrpc: input: reject ACKALL outside transmit phase

rxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether
the call is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit
buffers. A forged ACKALL can reach a new service call and trigger a null
pointer dereference.

> diff --git a/net/rxrpc/input.c b/net/rxrpc/input.c
> index ce761466b02d6..37881dffa898b 100644
> --- a/net/rxrpc/input.c
> +++ b/net/rxrpc/input.c

[ ... ]

> @@ -1214,8 +1214,22 @@ static void rxrpc_input_ack(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  static void rxrpc_input_ackall(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
>  	struct rxrpc_ack_summary summary = { 0 };
> +	rxrpc_seq_t top = READ_ONCE(call->tx_top);
> +
> +	switch (__rxrpc_call_state(call)) {
> +	case RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST:
> +	case RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY:
> +	case RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_SEND_REPLY:
> +	case RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_AWAIT_ACK:
> +		break;
> +	default:
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (call->tx_bottom == top)
> +		return;
>  
> -	if (rxrpc_rotate_tx_window(call, call->tx_top, &summary))
> +	if (rxrpc_rotate_tx_window(call, top, &summary))

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but it appears the fix might be
incomplete. The patch prevents a NULL pointer dereference in
rxrpc_input_ackall() by checking if call->tx_bottom == top before calling
rxrpc_rotate_tx_window().

However, does the same vulnerability remain in rxrpc_receiving_reply()?

If a client in the RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST state receives a forged or
early DATA packet (acting as a reply) before it has queued any transmit data,
call->tx_top and call->tx_bottom will both be 0, and call->tx_queue will be
NULL.

rxrpc_receiving_reply() will then unconditionally call:

    if (!rxrpc_rotate_tx_window(call, top, &summary)) {

Because rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() uses a do { ... } while (before_eq(seq, to))
loop, it executes exactly once for seq = 1 and to = 0, which dereferences
the NULL tq:

    if (tq->bufs[ix]->flags & RXRPC_LAST_PACKET) {

Should the empty window check be placed at the top of rxrpc_rotate_tx_window()
instead, or mirrored in rxrpc_receiving_reply() to protect against early
replies?

>  		rxrpc_end_tx_phase(call, false, rxrpc_eproto_unexpected_ackall);
>  }

Re: [PATCH net 4/5] afs: Fix further netns teardown to cancel the preallocation charger

[Simon Horman]

This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this
email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible.
Full review at: https://sashiko.dev
---
afs: Fix further netns teardown to cancel the preallocation charger

This commit modifies the afs network namespace teardown process to wait for
the preallocation charger work item. It addresses a small window where the
work item could be requeued after being cancelled by flushing the workqueue
on which the charger runs.

Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260609140911.838677-1-dhowells%40redhat.com

> diff --git a/fs/afs/rxrpc.c b/fs/afs/rxrpc.c
> --- a/fs/afs/rxrpc.c
> +++ b/fs/afs/rxrpc.c
> @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ void afs_close_socket(struct afs_net *net)
>  	cancel_work_sync(&net->charge_preallocation_work);
>  	kernel_listen(net->socket, 0);
>  	flush_workqueue(afs_async_calls);
> +	flush_workqueue(afs_wq);

[Severity: High]
Will flushing the system-wide global workqueue here cause cross-namespace
stalls during teardown?

It appears afs_wq is allocated once in afs_init() as a system-wide workqueue
shared by all AFS network namespaces:

fs/afs/main.c:afs_init() {
    ...
    afs_wq = alloc_workqueue("afs", WQ_PERCPU, 0);
    ...
}

Other namespaces use afs_wq for operations like cell management, which can
block for tens of seconds waiting for userspace DNS lookups via the
request_key mechanism.

Since afs_close_socket() runs in the context of the global cleanup_net
worker thread, does this stall the destruction of all network namespaces
system-wide until unrelated AFS work across the entire system finishes?

Would it be safer to explicitly call
cancel_work_sync(&net->charge_preallocation_work) a second time here instead
of flushing the shared queue?

Re: [PATCH net 5/5] afs: Fix uncancelled rxrpc OOB message handler

[Simon Horman]

This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this
email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible.
Full review at: https://sashiko.dev
---
afs: Fix uncancelled rxrpc OOB message handler

This commit cancels AFS OOB message processing during shutdown and moves it
to afs_wq. It also prevents queuing if the net namespace is no longer live.

Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260609140911.838677-1-dhowells%40redhat.com

> diff --git a/fs/afs/rxrpc.c b/fs/afs/rxrpc.c
> index fd2d260fb25f9..6241f9349f6b6 100644
> --- a/fs/afs/rxrpc.c
> +++ b/fs/afs/rxrpc.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ void afs_close_socket(struct afs_net *net)
>  	_enter("");
>  
>  	cancel_work_sync(&net->charge_preallocation_work);
> +	cancel_work_sync(&net->rx_oob_work);
>  	kernel_listen(net->socket, 0);
>  	flush_workqueue(afs_async_calls);
>  	flush_workqueue(afs_wq);

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does placing the cancellation and flush
before kernel_sock_shutdown() leave a window open for the work to be queued
afterwards?

If kernel_sock_shutdown() is what synchronously disables the notify_oob
callback from firing, couldn't a delayed callback still queue work on afs_wq
after we've already flushed it here?

[ ... ]
> @@ -985,5 +986,6 @@ static void afs_rx_notify_oob(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *oob)
>  {
>  	struct afs_net *net = sk->sk_user_data;
>  
> -	schedule_work(&net->rx_oob_work);
> +	if (net->live)
> +		queue_work(afs_wq, &net->rx_oob_work);
>  }

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this lockless check of net->live allow
a race condition that leads to a use-after-free?

Consider this sequence:

CPU1 (teardown)
afs_net_exit()
    net->live = false;
    afs_close_socket()
        cancel_work_sync(&net->rx_oob_work);
        flush_workqueue(afs_wq);
        kernel_sock_shutdown()  // blocks waiting for recvmsg_lock

CPU2 (incoming OOB)
rxrpc_notify_socket_oob()
    spin_lock_irq(&rx->recvmsg_lock);
    afs_rx_notify_oob()
        // Reads net->live == true (stale read, or delayed execution)
        queue_work(afs_wq, &net->rx_oob_work);
    spin_unlock_irq(&rx->recvmsg_lock);

CPU1 then finishes kernel_sock_shutdown() and frees the net namespace, but
afs_wq is never flushed again.

Would moving cancel_work_sync() and flush_workqueue() to the end of
afs_close_socket(), after kernel_sock_shutdown() completes, prevent this race?