From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
To: "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>,
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>,
David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>,
Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuni1840@gmail.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>,
Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>, Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1 net-next 1/2] tcp: Do not allow buggy transitions between ehash and lhash2.
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 03:35:28 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260904033543.2635540-2-kuniyu@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260904033543.2635540-1-kuniyu@google.com>
The following state transitions have long been a playground for
syzbot, and recently AI joined in, reporting a lot more bugs.
* listen() + shutdown() + connect()
* connect() + connect(AF_UNSPEC) + listen()
All the fix attempts would add more code to the fast path, which
is not worth it.
Instead of playing whack-a-mole with these edge-case bugs,
let's disallow these transitions.
Note that unhashed_state is placed in the 4-byte hole after
icsk_pmtu_cookie.
$ pahole -C inet_connection_sock vmlinux
struct inet_connection_sock {
...
__u32 icsk_pmtu_cookie; /* 1208 4 */
unsigned char unhashed_state; /* 1212 1 */
/* XXX 3 bytes hole, try to pack */
Reported-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260731140512.566464-1-david.lee@trailofbits.com/
Reported-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@rbox.co>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260803-sockmap-lookup-tcp-leak-v2-0-306e025bfe66@rbox.co/
Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260824033331.1084971-1-imv4bel@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
---
include/net/inet_connection_sock.h | 1 +
net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 1 +
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 11 +++++++++++
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h b/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h
index 433c2df23076..903499581db7 100644
--- a/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h
+++ b/include/net/inet_connection_sock.h
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ struct inet_connection_sock {
u32 icsk_rto_max;
__u32 icsk_delack_max;
__u32 icsk_pmtu_cookie;
+ unsigned char unhashed_state;
const struct tcp_congestion_ops *icsk_ca_ops;
const struct inet_connection_sock_af_ops *icsk_af_ops;
const struct tcp_ulp_ops *icsk_ulp_ops;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
index 6257459bcee2..560ca861b6d0 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
@@ -1253,6 +1253,7 @@ struct sock *inet_csk_clone_lock(const struct sock *sk,
memset(&newicsk->icsk_accept_queue, 0,
sizeof(newicsk->icsk_accept_queue));
+ newicsk->unhashed_state = 0;
inet_sk_set_state(newsk, TCP_SYN_RECV);
inet_clone_ulp(req, newsk, priority);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
index ba0faa9ae2bb..5abcb0debb27 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -803,6 +803,11 @@ int inet_hash(struct sock *sk)
inet_init_ehash_secret();
WARN_ON(!sk_unhashed(sk));
+
+ if (unlikely(inet_csk(sk)->unhashed_state &&
+ inet_csk(sk)->unhashed_state != TCP_LISTEN))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
ilb2 = inet_lhash2_bucket_sk(hashinfo, sk);
spin_lock(&ilb2->lock);
@@ -832,6 +837,9 @@ void inet_unhash(struct sock *sk)
return;
sock_rps_delete_flow(sk);
+
+ inet_csk(sk)->unhashed_state = sk->sk_state;
+
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
struct inet_listen_hashbucket *ilb2;
@@ -1058,6 +1066,9 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
int ret, i, low, high;
bool local_ports;
+ if (unlikely(inet_csk(sk)->unhashed_state == TCP_LISTEN))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (port) {
local_bh_disable();
ret = check_established(death_row, sk, port, NULL, false,
--
2.55.0.1003.g10538fe699-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-04 3:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-04 3:35 [PATCH v1 net-next 0/2] net: Disallow buggy TCP transitions and IPV6_ADDRFORM Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-09-04 3:35 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima [this message]
2026-09-04 11:32 ` [PATCH v1 net-next 1/2] tcp: Do not allow buggy transitions between ehash and lhash2 Jakub Sitnicki
2026-09-04 3:35 ` [PATCH v1 net-next 2/2] ipv6: Remove IPV6_ADDRFORM Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-09-04 9:10 ` Paolo Abeni
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