From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
To: "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>, David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>,
Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, edumazet@kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>,
Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Subject: [PATCH v2 net] inet: frags: limit the truesize of a reassembly queue
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2026 09:12:25 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261030081225.2575462-1-edumazet@kernel.org> (raw)
The truesize of fragments in a reassembly queue is only bounded by
the per netns ipfrag_high_thresh sysctl, which has no upper limit.
inet_frag_reasm_finish() sums the truesize of all fragments in an int.
If this sum reaches 2^32, it wraps, and the final sk_wmem_alloc
adjustment of the socket owning the reassembled skb can cancel its own
reference, leading to a use-after-free of this socket.
This can be triggered from an unprivileged user/network namespace,
raising ipfrag_high_thresh and using padded TUN packets, which keep
a large truesize after being trimmed by ip_rcv_core().
Track the sum of the truesize of fragments in each queue, and refuse
a fragment that would make it bigger than INT_MAX / 2. Callers kill
the queue on this error. This bound is far above the needs of
legitimate traffic.
Fixes: 18685451fc4e ("inet: inet_defrag: prevent sk release while still in use")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
---
v2: reset q->truesize in inet_frag_queue_flush(), as ip_frag_reinit()
can keep a queue alive after flushing its fragments (Wang Zhan, Sashiko).
Document @truesize in struct inet_frag_queue kernel-doc (Sashiko).
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20261028182934.2236310-1-edumazet@kernel.org/
Kyle Zeng provided a more complicated patch, I wrote something much simpler.
LLM was used to discover the bug, build a repro, and test the fix.
---
include/net/inet_frag.h | 9 +++++++++
net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/net/inet_frag.h b/include/net/inet_frag.h
index b02d2472b003ec6e7b8e391d56115e8f0578ca61..c1fb419a9cf03a346edd0424ca0ba5b06b6a20f0 100644
--- a/include/net/inet_frag.h
+++ b/include/net/inet_frag.h
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ struct frag_v6_compare_key {
* @tstamp_type: stamp has a mono delivery time (EDT)
* @flags: fragment queue flags
* @max_size: maximum received fragment size
+ * @truesize: sum of the truesize of queued fragments
* @fqdir: pointer to struct fqdir
* @rcu: rcu head for freeing deferall
*/
@@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ struct inet_frag_queue {
u8 tstamp_type;
__u8 flags;
u16 max_size;
+ unsigned int truesize;
struct fqdir *fqdir;
struct rcu_head rcu;
};
@@ -172,6 +174,13 @@ extern const u8 ip_frag_ecn_table[16];
#define IPFRAG_DUP 1
#define IPFRAG_OVERLAP 2
#define IPFRAG_MIXED_SECPATH 3
+#define IPFRAG_TOOBIG 4
+
+/* Max sum of the truesize of fragments in a queue. This keeps the sums
+ * done in inet_frag_reasm_prepare() and inet_frag_reasm_finish() well
+ * below INT_MAX. Legitimate traffic stays far below this limit.
+ */
+#define INET_FRAG_MAX_TRUESIZE (INT_MAX / 2)
int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
int offset, int end);
void *inet_frag_reasm_prepare(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c b/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c
index c18da91c1f031ee0b97f9e072837d053380da2f2..0b8d22ffafca69b2bccd98eca3d4bda93ebb816a 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c
@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ void inet_frag_queue_flush(struct inet_frag_queue *q,
q->rb_fragments = RB_ROOT;
q->fragments_tail = NULL;
q->last_run_head = NULL;
+ q->truesize = 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_frag_queue_flush);
@@ -446,6 +447,9 @@ int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (last && !secpath_equal(last, skb))
return IPFRAG_MIXED_SECPATH;
+ if (skb->truesize > INET_FRAG_MAX_TRUESIZE - q->truesize)
+ return IPFRAG_TOOBIG;
+
/* An IP fragment is never a GSO packet, but an untrusted source
* (virtio_net_hdr) may have attached GSO metadata to it. Do not let
* that reach the reassembled skb, whose head keeps the first
@@ -510,6 +514,7 @@ int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (offset)
nf_reset_ct(skb);
+ q->truesize += skb->truesize;
return IPFRAG_OK;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_frag_queue_insert);
--
2.53.0
reply other threads:[~2026-10-30 8:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20261030081225.2575462-1-edumazet@kernel.org \
--to=edumazet@kernel.org \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=dsahern@kernel.org \
--cc=fw@strlen.de \
--cc=horms@kernel.org \
--cc=idosch@nvidia.com \
--cc=kuba@kernel.org \
--cc=kylebot@openai.com \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox