From: Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@gmail.com>
To: alex.aring@gmail.com, stefan@datenfreihafen.org,
miquel.raynal@bootlin.com, linux-wpan@vger.kernel.org
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@kernel.org, kuba@kernel.org,
pabeni@redhat.com, horms@kernel.org,
phoebe.buckheister@itwm.fraunhofer.de, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 net] mac802154: fix uninit-value in ieee802154_header_create()
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 15:45:37 +0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261120084537.31991-1-petrvaganoff@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261116065235.27348-1-petrvaganoff@gmail.com>
During fuzz testing, the following issue was discovered:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:54 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa62/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:54 [inline]
ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa62/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
ieee802154_header_create+0xa83/0xd20 net/mac802154/iface.c:396
wpan_dev_hard_header include/net/cfg802154.h:525 [inline]
dgram_sendmsg+0xc6d/0x15d0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:677
ieee802154_sock_sendmsg+0x8f/0xd0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:96
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x2f3/0x360 net/socket.c:726
____sys_sendmsg+0x960/0xc30 net/socket.c:2581
___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2635
__sys_sendmmsg+0x33c/0x950 net/socket.c:2724
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2751 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2748 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xc6/0x150 net/socket.c:2748
x64_sys_call+0x12a8/0x3cf0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Uninit was stored to memory at:
ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:51 [inline]
ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa5b/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
ieee802154_header_create+0xa83/0xd20 net/mac802154/iface.c:396
wpan_dev_hard_header include/net/cfg802154.h:525 [inline]
dgram_sendmsg+0xc6d/0x15d0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:677
ieee802154_sock_sendmsg+0x8f/0xd0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:96
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x2f3/0x360 net/socket.c:726
____sys_sendmsg+0x960/0xc30 net/socket.c:2581
___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2635
__sys_sendmmsg+0x33c/0x950 net/socket.c:2724
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2751 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2748 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xc6/0x150 net/socket.c:2748
x64_sys_call+0x12a8/0x3cf0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:310
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Both ieee802154_header_create() and mac802154_header_create() declare
struct ieee802154_hdr hdr on the stack and clear only hdr.fc via
memset. This leaves hdr.sec uninitialized.
There are two ways uninitialized hdr.sec fields can be read:
1. ieee802154_header_create() had a pre-existing assignment:
hdr.fc.security_enabled = cb->secen;
This could set security_enabled = 1 from a stale cb->secen (e.g.,
after WPAN_SECURITY_ON followed by WPAN_SECURITY_DEFAULT), even when
mac802154_set_header_security() returns without initializing hdr.sec.
ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr() would then read uninitialized hdr.sec.
2. mac802154_set_header_security() never writes sec.frame_counter.
ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr() copies it from the stack into the skb
before mac802154_llsec_encrypt() sets the real value. If encryption
fails, or via AF_PACKET taps in dev_queue_xmit_nit(), the
uninitialized bytes are exposed to userspace.
Fix both issues by replacing memset(&hdr.fc, ...) with
memset(&hdr, ...) in both functions, which zeros hdr.sec entirely
before mac802154_set_header_security() is called. The stale
hdr.fc.security_enabled assignment is also removed as it is now
superseded by the full zero-initialization.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=60a66d44892b66b56545
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=23f21e76e9d2d1ed587cb5e71515260d6d025b63
Fixes: f30be4d53cad ("mac802154: integrate llsec with wpan devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Replace memset(&hdr.fc, ...) with memset(&hdr, ...) in both
ieee802154_header_create() and mac802154_header_create() to also
zero hdr.sec, closing the pre-existing uninitialized sec.frame_counter
read on the normal TX path (noted by Sashiko AI review).
- Rename subject to reflect this is a bug fix, not a cleanup.
net/mac802154/iface.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/mac802154/iface.c b/net/mac802154/iface.c
index f437b8daa00d..36bdd7558810 100644
--- a/net/mac802154/iface.c
+++ b/net/mac802154/iface.c
@@ -366,9 +366,8 @@ static int ieee802154_header_create(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (!daddr)
return -EINVAL;
- memset(&hdr.fc, 0, sizeof(hdr.fc));
+ memset(&hdr, 0, sizeof(hdr));
hdr.fc.type = cb->type;
- hdr.fc.security_enabled = cb->secen;
hdr.fc.ack_request = cb->ackreq;
hdr.seq = atomic_inc_return(&dev->ieee802154_ptr->dsn) & 0xFF;
@@ -433,7 +432,7 @@ static int mac802154_header_create(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (!daddr)
return -EINVAL;
- memset(&hdr.fc, 0, sizeof(hdr.fc));
+ memset(&hdr, 0, sizeof(hdr));
hdr.fc.type = IEEE802154_FC_TYPE_DATA;
hdr.fc.ack_request = wpan_dev->ackreq;
hdr.seq = atomic_inc_return(&dev->ieee802154_ptr->dsn) & 0xFF;
--
2.55.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-20 8:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-16 6:52 [PATCH net] mac802154: remove redundant security_enabled assignment Petr Vaganov
2026-11-17 11:06 ` Miquel Raynal
2026-11-18 2:04 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-11-20 8:45 ` Petr Vaganov [this message]
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