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From: Kai Zen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, edumazet@google.com, davem@davemloft.net,
	kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, horms@kernel.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Subject: [PATCH net v3] net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo
Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2026 18:26:48 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3c506e8f936e52b57620269b55c348af05d413a2.1777557228.git.kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALynFi54eQj7SOmF6QNG0eqhLw7AuURzo6tSYQavvM3ZP74ikw@mail.gmail.com>

rtnl_fill_vfinfo() declares struct ifla_vf_broadcast on the stack
without initialisation:

	struct ifla_vf_broadcast vf_broadcast;

The struct contains a single fixed 32-byte field:

	/* include/uapi/linux/if_link.h */
	struct ifla_vf_broadcast {
		__u8 broadcast[32];
	};

The function then copies dev->broadcast into it using dev->addr_len
as the length:

	memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);

On Ethernet devices (the overwhelming majority of SR-IOV NICs)
dev->addr_len is 6, so only the first 6 bytes of broadcast[] are
written. The remaining 26 bytes retain whatever was previously on
the kernel stack. The full struct is then handed to userspace via:

	nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_BROADCAST,
		sizeof(vf_broadcast), &vf_broadcast)

leaking up to 26 bytes of uninitialised kernel stack per VF per
RTM_GETLINK request, repeatable.

The other vf_* structs in the same function are explicitly zeroed
for exactly this reason - see the memset() calls for ivi,
vf_vlan_info, node_guid and port_guid a few lines above.
vf_broadcast was simply missed when it was added.

Reachability: any unprivileged local process can open AF_NETLINK /
NETLINK_ROUTE without capabilities and send RTM_GETLINK with an
IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute carrying RTEXT_FILTER_VF. The kernel walks
each VF and emits IFLA_VF_BROADCAST, leaking 26 bytes of stack per
VF per request. Stack residue at this call site can include return
addresses and transient sensitive data; KASAN with stack
instrumentation, or KMSAN, will flag the nla_put() when reproduced.

Zero the on-stack struct before the partial memcpy, matching the
existing pattern used for the other vf_* structs in the same
function.

Fixes: 75345f888f70 ("ipoib: show VF broadcast address")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kai Zen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com>
---
 net/core/rtnetlink.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
index b613bb6e0..df042da42 100644
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -1572,6 +1572,7 @@ static noinline_for_stack int rtnl_fill_vfinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		port_guid.vf = ivi.vf;
 
 	memcpy(vf_mac.mac, ivi.mac, sizeof(ivi.mac));
+	memset(&vf_broadcast, 0, sizeof(vf_broadcast));
 	memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);
 	vf_vlan.vlan = ivi.vlan;
 	vf_vlan.qos = ivi.qos;
-- 
2.43.0


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kai Zen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, edumazet@google.com, davem@davemloft.net,
	kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, horms@kernel.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Subject: [PATCH net v3] net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo
Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2026 18:40:44 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3c506e8f936e52b57620269b55c348af05d413a2.1777557228.git.kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20260430154044.EmH3-ZiXVu-b71Ro45ymXrp-NkTYYz3jpDGE0KE7V24@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALynFi54eQj7SOmF6QNG0eqhLw7AuURzo6tSYQavvM3ZP74ikw@mail.gmail.com>

rtnl_fill_vfinfo() declares struct ifla_vf_broadcast on the stack
without initialisation:

	struct ifla_vf_broadcast vf_broadcast;

The struct contains a single fixed 32-byte field:

	/* include/uapi/linux/if_link.h */
	struct ifla_vf_broadcast {
		__u8 broadcast[32];
	};

The function then copies dev->broadcast into it using dev->addr_len
as the length:

	memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);

On Ethernet devices (the overwhelming majority of SR-IOV NICs)
dev->addr_len is 6, so only the first 6 bytes of broadcast[] are
written. The remaining 26 bytes retain whatever was previously on
the kernel stack. The full struct is then handed to userspace via:

	nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_BROADCAST,
		sizeof(vf_broadcast), &vf_broadcast)

leaking up to 26 bytes of uninitialised kernel stack per VF per
RTM_GETLINK request, repeatable.

The other vf_* structs in the same function are explicitly zeroed
for exactly this reason - see the memset() calls for ivi,
vf_vlan_info, node_guid and port_guid a few lines above.
vf_broadcast was simply missed when it was added.

Reachability: any unprivileged local process can open AF_NETLINK /
NETLINK_ROUTE without capabilities and send RTM_GETLINK with an
IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute carrying RTEXT_FILTER_VF. The kernel walks
each VF and emits IFLA_VF_BROADCAST, leaking 26 bytes of stack per
VF per request. Stack residue at this call site can include return
addresses and transient sensitive data; KASAN with stack
instrumentation, or KMSAN, will flag the nla_put() when reproduced.

Zero the on-stack struct before the partial memcpy, matching the
existing pattern used for the other vf_* structs in the same
function.

Fixes: 75345f888f70 ("ipoib: show VF broadcast address")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kai Zen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com>
---
 net/core/rtnetlink.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
index b613bb6e0..df042da42 100644
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -1572,6 +1572,7 @@ static noinline_for_stack int rtnl_fill_vfinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		port_guid.vf = ivi.vf;
 
 	memcpy(vf_mac.mac, ivi.mac, sizeof(ivi.mac));
+	memset(&vf_broadcast, 0, sizeof(vf_broadcast));
 	memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);
 	vf_vlan.vlan = ivi.vlan;
 	vf_vlan.qos = ivi.qos;
-- 
2.43.0


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kai Zen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, edumazet@google.com, davem@davemloft.net,
	kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, horms@kernel.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Subject: [PATCH net v3] net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo
Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2026 18:41:35 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3c506e8f936e52b57620269b55c348af05d413a2.1777557228.git.kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20260430154135.htPzHX3cymuH_RQLVSUKVBWbq5mc2f0eRrrDCowvqL0@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALynFi54eQj7SOmF6QNG0eqhLw7AuURzo6tSYQavvM3ZP74ikw@mail.gmail.com>

rtnl_fill_vfinfo() declares struct ifla_vf_broadcast on the stack
without initialisation:

	struct ifla_vf_broadcast vf_broadcast;

The struct contains a single fixed 32-byte field:

	/* include/uapi/linux/if_link.h */
	struct ifla_vf_broadcast {
		__u8 broadcast[32];
	};

The function then copies dev->broadcast into it using dev->addr_len
as the length:

	memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);

On Ethernet devices (the overwhelming majority of SR-IOV NICs)
dev->addr_len is 6, so only the first 6 bytes of broadcast[] are
written. The remaining 26 bytes retain whatever was previously on
the kernel stack. The full struct is then handed to userspace via:

	nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_BROADCAST,
		sizeof(vf_broadcast), &vf_broadcast)

leaking up to 26 bytes of uninitialised kernel stack per VF per
RTM_GETLINK request, repeatable.

The other vf_* structs in the same function are explicitly zeroed
for exactly this reason - see the memset() calls for ivi,
vf_vlan_info, node_guid and port_guid a few lines above.
vf_broadcast was simply missed when it was added.

Reachability: any unprivileged local process can open AF_NETLINK /
NETLINK_ROUTE without capabilities and send RTM_GETLINK with an
IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute carrying RTEXT_FILTER_VF. The kernel walks
each VF and emits IFLA_VF_BROADCAST, leaking 26 bytes of stack per
VF per request. Stack residue at this call site can include return
addresses and transient sensitive data; KASAN with stack
instrumentation, or KMSAN, will flag the nla_put() when reproduced.

Zero the on-stack struct before the partial memcpy, matching the
existing pattern used for the other vf_* structs in the same
function.

Fixes: 75345f888f70 ("ipoib: show VF broadcast address")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kai Zen <kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com>
---
 net/core/rtnetlink.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
index b613bb6e0..df042da42 100644
--- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c
+++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c
@@ -1572,6 +1572,7 @@ static noinline_for_stack int rtnl_fill_vfinfo(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		port_guid.vf = ivi.vf;
 
 	memcpy(vf_mac.mac, ivi.mac, sizeof(ivi.mac));
+	memset(&vf_broadcast, 0, sizeof(vf_broadcast));
 	memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len);
 	vf_vlan.vlan = ivi.vlan;
 	vf_vlan.qos = ivi.qos;
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-04-30 15:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-04-07 11:31 [PATCH net] net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo Kai Zen
2026-04-07 11:39 ` Eric Dumazet
2026-04-30 15:26 ` Kai Zen [this message]
2026-04-30 15:40   ` [PATCH net v3] " Kai Zen
2026-04-30 15:41   ` Kai Zen
2026-05-02  0:10   ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf

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