Re: [PATCH] crypto: af_alg - Document the deprecation of AF_ALG

[Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>]

On Wed, Apr 29, 2026 at 06:15:44PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> AF_ALG is almost completely unnecessary, and it exposes a massive attack
> surface that hasn't been standing up to modern vulnerability discovery
> tools.  The latest one even has its own website, providing a small
> Python script that reliably roots most Linux distros: https://copy.fail/
> 
> This isn't sustainable, especially as LLMs have accelerated the rate the
> vulnerabilities are coming in.  The effort that is being put into this
> thing is vastly disproportional to the few programs that actually use
> it, and those programs would be better served by userspace code anyway.
> 
> These issues have been noted in many mailing list discussions already.
> But until now they haven't been reflected in the documentation or
> kconfig menu itself, and the vulnerabilities are still coming in.
> 
> Let's go ahead and document the deprecation.
> 
> This isn't intended to change anything overnight.  After all, most Linux
> distros won't be able to disable the kconfig options quite yet, mainly
> because of iwd.  But this should create a bit more impetus for these
> userspace programs to be fixed, and the documentation update should also
> help prevent more users from appearing.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>

What about the exposure of akcipher through security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c?

There isn't even a Kconfig option to disable that user-space API.
If module signatures are enabled then this automatically gets added
to the kernel:

MODULE_SIG -> MODULE_SIG_FORMAT -> SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION ->
KEYS + ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE

Cheers,
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
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