[PATCH net 0/2] nsh: limit recursion in nsh_gso_segment()

[PATCH net 0/2] nsh: limit recursion in nsh_gso_segment()

[Eric Dumazet]

Sashiko found that nsh_gso_segment() can call itself, through
skb_mac_gso_segment(), once per stacked NSH header. Nothing limits the
depth, and a 64KB GSO packet made of 8-byte NSH headers overflows the
kernel stack. It was reported while reviewing an unrelated virtio
series [1].

Such a packet can be sent with a packet socket using PACKET_VNET_HDR,
when the nsh module is loaded.

Patch 1 uses the recursion counter added in commit 006c8b834aed ("net:
gso: limit recursive IP-in-IP segmentation"), with the same limit as
IPv4 and IPv6.

Patch 2 adds a selftest: it panics an unfixed kernel, and passes with
patch 1.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/179443691180.2199510.148246238688217560@kernel.org/

Eric Dumazet (2):
  nsh: limit recursion in nsh_gso_segment()
  selftests: net: add a test for NSH GSO

 include/net/gso.h                      |   2 +-
 net/nsh/nsh.c                          |   7 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile   |   2 +
 tools/testing/selftests/net/config     |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/net/nsh_gso.c  | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/net/nsh_gso.sh |  71 ++++++++++++++
 7 files changed, 209 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/net/nsh_gso.c
 create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/net/nsh_gso.sh


base-commit: 145480b28ca82e9fae789427cc4569e596515a32
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH net 1/2] nsh: limit recursion in nsh_gso_segment()

[Eric Dumazet]

nsh_gso_segment() calls skb_mac_gso_segment() for the inner packet,
which calls nsh_gso_segment() again when the next protocol is NSH,
either directly or behind an inner Ethernet header (ETH_P_TEB).

Nothing limits the depth: a GSO packet made of stacked 8-byte NSH
headers recurses once per header, and a 64KB packet can hold about
8000 of them, overflowing the kernel stack.

Such a packet can be injected with a packet socket using
PACKET_VNET_HDR, or with tun/tap or virtio_net, as nothing checks
that a GSO packet with VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM carries the
protocol it claims. It is then segmented in software if the output
device does not support the GSO type:

BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffcad5c0ab3ff8 (stack is ffffcad5c0ab4000..ffffcad5c0ab8000)
Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 337 Comm: nsh_gso Tainted: G            E       7.4.0-rc1+ #118 PREEMPT(lazy)
RIP: 0010:lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5902)
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 skb_mac_gso_segment (include/linux/rcupdate.h:309 include/linux/rcupdate.h:849 net/core/gso.c:50)
 nsh_gso_segment (net/nsh/nsh.c:110) nsh
 skb_mac_gso_segment (net/core/gso.c:53)
 nsh_gso_segment (net/nsh/nsh.c:110) nsh
 [...]
 skb_mac_gso_segment (net/core/gso.c:53)
 __skb_gso_segment (net/core/gso.c:129)
 validate_xmit_skb (net/core/dev.c:4238)
 __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:5087)
 packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3157 net/packet/af_packet.c:3189)
 __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:800 net/socket.c:818 net/socket.c:2283)
 __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2290 net/socket.c:2286 net/socket.c:2286)
 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84)
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)

Use gso_recursion_inc_test(), added in commit 006c8b834aed ("net: gso:
limit recursive IP-in-IP segmentation"), with the same limit as IPv4
and IPv6. The counter is shared with them: a packet with four NSH
headers in front of an IPv4 header is still segmented, one more NSH
header and it is dropped.

The NSH -> ETH_P_TEB -> NSH route is covered as well, as each round
goes through nsh_gso_segment().

Fixes: c411ed854584 ("nsh: add GSO support")
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/179443691180.2199510.148246238688217560@kernel.org/
Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
---
 include/net/gso.h | 2 +-
 net/nsh/nsh.c     | 7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/net/gso.h b/include/net/gso.h
index fe3260b381d4..119fc4c170e1 100644
--- a/include/net/gso.h
+++ b/include/net/gso.h
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ struct skb_gso_cb {
 	int	encap_level;
 	__wsum	csum;
 	__u16	csum_start;
-	/* Number of IPv4/IPv6 GSO handler entries for this packet. */
+	/* Number of IPv4/IPv6/NSH GSO handler entries for this packet. */
 	u8	recursion_counter;
 	/* Max MSS segs per output skb, 0 = no limit */
 	u8	max_segs;
diff --git a/net/nsh/nsh.c b/net/nsh/nsh.c
index bfb7758063f3..dd4de50fc38c 100644
--- a/net/nsh/nsh.c
+++ b/net/nsh/nsh.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <net/gso.h>
+#include <net/ip_tunnels.h>
 #include <net/nsh.h>
 #include <net/tun_proto.h>
 
@@ -84,6 +85,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *nsh_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 	skb_reset_network_header(skb);
 
+	/* NSH can carry NSH (directly, or in an inner Ethernet frame):
+	 * limit the recursion, as IPv4 and IPv6 do.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(gso_recursion_inc_test(skb, IP_TUNNEL_RECURSION_LIMIT)))
+		goto out;
+
 	outer_proto = skb->protocol;
 	outer_hlen = skb_mac_header_len(skb);
 	mac_len = skb->mac_len;
-- 
2.53.0

Re: [PATCH net 1/2] nsh: limit recursion in nsh_gso_segment()

[Jiri Benc]

On Thu, 12 Nov 2026 11:20:00 +0100, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> Use gso_recursion_inc_test(), added in commit 006c8b834aed ("net: gso:
> limit recursive IP-in-IP segmentation"), with the same limit as IPv4
> and IPv6. The counter is shared with them: a packet with four NSH
> headers in front of an IPv4 header is still segmented, one more NSH
> header and it is dropped.
> 
> The NSH -> ETH_P_TEB -> NSH route is covered as well, as each round
> goes through nsh_gso_segment().
> 
> Fixes: c411ed854584 ("nsh: add GSO support")
> Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/179443691180.2199510.148246238688217560@kernel.org/
> Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>

Reviewed-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>

Thanks for the fix!

 Jiri

Re: [PATCH net 1/2] nsh: limit recursion in nsh_gso_segment()

[David Laight]

On Thu, 12 Nov 2026 11:20:00 +0100
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org> wrote:

> nsh_gso_segment() calls skb_mac_gso_segment() for the inner packet,
> which calls nsh_gso_segment() again when the next protocol is NSH,
> either directly or behind an inner Ethernet header (ETH_P_TEB).
> 
> Nothing limits the depth: a GSO packet made of stacked 8-byte NSH
> headers recurses once per header, and a 64KB packet can hold about
> 8000 of them, overflowing the kernel stack.
> 
> Such a packet can be injected with a packet socket using
> PACKET_VNET_HDR, or with tun/tap or virtio_net, as nothing checks
> that a GSO packet with VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM carries the
> protocol it claims. It is then segmented in software if the output
> device does not support the GSO type:
> 
> BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffcad5c0ab3ff8 (stack is ffffcad5c0ab4000..ffffcad5c0ab8000)
> Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
> CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 337 Comm: nsh_gso Tainted: G            E       7.4.0-rc1+ #118 PREEMPT(lazy)
> RIP: 0010:lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5902)
> Call Trace:
>  <TASK>
>  skb_mac_gso_segment (include/linux/rcupdate.h:309 include/linux/rcupdate.h:849 net/core/gso.c:50)
>  nsh_gso_segment (net/nsh/nsh.c:110) nsh
>  skb_mac_gso_segment (net/core/gso.c:53)
>  nsh_gso_segment (net/nsh/nsh.c:110) nsh
>  [...]
>  skb_mac_gso_segment (net/core/gso.c:53)
>  __skb_gso_segment (net/core/gso.c:129)
>  validate_xmit_skb (net/core/dev.c:4238)
>  __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:5087)
>  packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3157 net/packet/af_packet.c:3189)
>  __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:800 net/socket.c:818 net/socket.c:2283)
>  __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2290 net/socket.c:2286 net/socket.c:2286)
>  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84)
>  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
> 
> Use gso_recursion_inc_test(), added in commit 006c8b834aed ("net: gso:
> limit recursive IP-in-IP segmentation"), with the same limit as IPv4
> and IPv6. The counter is shared with them: a packet with four NSH
> headers in front of an IPv4 header is still segmented, one more NSH
> header and it is dropped.

Might it make sense to get the amount of space left on the kernel
stack and compare to some architecture defined limit rather than
hardcoding a count?

In particular sparc64 is much more likely to run out of stack (even with
its massive stack size) than anything else.

David 

> 
> The NSH -> ETH_P_TEB -> NSH route is covered as well, as each round
> goes through nsh_gso_segment().
> 
> Fixes: c411ed854584 ("nsh: add GSO support")
> Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/179443691180.2199510.148246238688217560@kernel.org/
> Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
> ---
>  include/net/gso.h | 2 +-
>  net/nsh/nsh.c     | 7 +++++++
>  2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/net/gso.h b/include/net/gso.h
> index fe3260b381d4..119fc4c170e1 100644
> --- a/include/net/gso.h
> +++ b/include/net/gso.h
> @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ struct skb_gso_cb {
>  	int	encap_level;
>  	__wsum	csum;
>  	__u16	csum_start;
> -	/* Number of IPv4/IPv6 GSO handler entries for this packet. */
> +	/* Number of IPv4/IPv6/NSH GSO handler entries for this packet. */
>  	u8	recursion_counter;
>  	/* Max MSS segs per output skb, 0 = no limit */
>  	u8	max_segs;
> diff --git a/net/nsh/nsh.c b/net/nsh/nsh.c
> index bfb7758063f3..dd4de50fc38c 100644
> --- a/net/nsh/nsh.c
> +++ b/net/nsh/nsh.c
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
>  #include <linux/netdevice.h>
>  #include <linux/skbuff.h>
>  #include <net/gso.h>
> +#include <net/ip_tunnels.h>
>  #include <net/nsh.h>
>  #include <net/tun_proto.h>
>  
> @@ -84,6 +85,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *nsh_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
>  
>  	skb_reset_network_header(skb);
>  
> +	/* NSH can carry NSH (directly, or in an inner Ethernet frame):
> +	 * limit the recursion, as IPv4 and IPv6 do.
> +	 */
> +	if (unlikely(gso_recursion_inc_test(skb, IP_TUNNEL_RECURSION_LIMIT)))
> +		goto out;
> +
>  	outer_proto = skb->protocol;
>  	outer_hlen = skb_mac_header_len(skb);
>  	mac_len = skb->mac_len;

Re: [PATCH net 1/2] nsh: limit recursion in nsh_gso_segment()

[Willem de Bruijn]

Eric Dumazet wrote:
> nsh_gso_segment() calls skb_mac_gso_segment() for the inner packet,
> which calls nsh_gso_segment() again when the next protocol is NSH,
> either directly or behind an inner Ethernet header (ETH_P_TEB).
> 
> Nothing limits the depth: a GSO packet made of stacked 8-byte NSH
> headers recurses once per header, and a 64KB packet can hold about
> 8000 of them, overflowing the kernel stack.
> 
> Such a packet can be injected with a packet socket using
> PACKET_VNET_HDR, or with tun/tap or virtio_net, as nothing checks
> that a GSO packet with VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM carries the
> protocol it claims. It is then segmented in software if the output
> device does not support the GSO type:
> 
> BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffcad5c0ab3ff8 (stack is ffffcad5c0ab4000..ffffcad5c0ab8000)
> Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
> CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 337 Comm: nsh_gso Tainted: G            E       7.4.0-rc1+ #118 PREEMPT(lazy)
> RIP: 0010:lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5902)
> Call Trace:
>  <TASK>
>  skb_mac_gso_segment (include/linux/rcupdate.h:309 include/linux/rcupdate.h:849 net/core/gso.c:50)
>  nsh_gso_segment (net/nsh/nsh.c:110) nsh
>  skb_mac_gso_segment (net/core/gso.c:53)
>  nsh_gso_segment (net/nsh/nsh.c:110) nsh
>  [...]
>  skb_mac_gso_segment (net/core/gso.c:53)
>  __skb_gso_segment (net/core/gso.c:129)
>  validate_xmit_skb (net/core/dev.c:4238)
>  __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:5087)
>  packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3157 net/packet/af_packet.c:3189)
>  __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:800 net/socket.c:818 net/socket.c:2283)
>  __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2290 net/socket.c:2286 net/socket.c:2286)
>  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84)
>  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
> 
> Use gso_recursion_inc_test(), added in commit 006c8b834aed ("net: gso:
> limit recursive IP-in-IP segmentation"), with the same limit as IPv4
> and IPv6. The counter is shared with them: a packet with four NSH
> headers in front of an IPv4 header is still segmented, one more NSH
> header and it is dropped.
> 
> The NSH -> ETH_P_TEB -> NSH route is covered as well, as each round
> goes through nsh_gso_segment().
> 
> Fixes: c411ed854584 ("nsh: add GSO support")
> Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/179443691180.2199510.148246238688217560@kernel.org/
> Cc: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>

Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>

[PATCH net 2/2] selftests: net: add a test for NSH GSO

[Eric Dumazet]

Send TCPv4 GSO packets encapsulated in a stack of NSH headers to a
dummy device which has TSO disabled, using a packet socket with
PACKET_VNET_HDR, and count the packets the device transmits.

Packets with one or four NSH headers must be segmented. Packets with
5, 64 or 8000 NSH headers must be dropped: they exceed the recursion
limit of the GSO handlers. Without the limit in nsh_gso_segment(),
the last one overflows the kernel stack.

 # ./nsh_gso.sh
 PASS: 1 NSH headers: 4 packets sent
 PASS: 4 NSH headers: 4 packets sent
 PASS: 5 NSH headers: 0 packets sent
 PASS: 64 NSH headers: 0 packets sent
 PASS: 8000 NSH headers: 0 packets sent

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile   |   2 +
 tools/testing/selftests/net/config     |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/net/nsh_gso.c  | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/net/nsh_gso.sh |  71 ++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 201 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/net/nsh_gso.c
 create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/net/nsh_gso.sh

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore
index ca451bfeda75..27761239d069 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/.gitignore
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ log.txt
 msg_zerocopy
 netlink-dumps
 nettest
+nsh_gso
 proc_net_pktgen
 psock_fanout
 psock_snd
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile
index 85f51a30c6a1..baea3e7f0f8f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ TEST_PROGS := \
 	nk_qlease.py \
 	nl_netdev.py \
 	nl_nlctrl.py \
+	nsh_gso.sh \
 	pmtu.sh \
 	protodown.sh \
 	psock_snd.sh \
@@ -157,6 +158,7 @@ TEST_GEN_FILES := \
 	ipv6_flowlabel \
 	msg_zerocopy \
 	nettest \
+	nsh_gso \
 	psock_fanout \
 	psock_snd \
 	psock_tpacket \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/config b/tools/testing/selftests/net/config
index d4416f8bdcfd..3e7ce41bd64d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/config
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ CONFIG_NET_IPVTI=y
 CONFIG_NETKIT=y
 CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV=y
 CONFIG_NET_NS=y
+CONFIG_NET_NSH=m
 CONFIG_NET_PKTGEN=m
 CONFIG_NET_SCH_ETF=m
 CONFIG_NET_SCH_FQ=m
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/nsh_gso.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/nsh_gso.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9acd3f755723
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/nsh_gso.c
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Send one TCPv4 GSO packet encapsulated in a stack of NSH headers,
+ * through a packet socket with PACKET_VNET_HDR.
+ *
+ * Usage: nsh_gso <ifname> <number of NSH headers>
+ *
+ * The packet is made of 4 segments. The send() result is not checked:
+ * the caller looks at the device counters.
+ */
+
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <error.h>
+#include <linux/if_ether.h>
+#include <linux/if_packet.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/virtio_net.h>
+#include <net/if.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifndef ETH_P_NSH
+#define ETH_P_NSH	0x894F
+#endif
+
+#define NSH_HLEN	8	/* base header + service path header */
+#define NSH_MD_TYPE2	2	/* no mandatory context header */
+#define NSH_NP_IPV4	1
+#define NSH_NP_NSH	4
+
+#define GSO_SIZE	500
+#define NR_SEGS		4
+
+struct nsh_base {
+	__be16	ver_flags_ttl_len;
+	__u8	mdtype;
+	__u8	np;
+	__be32	path_hdr;
+};
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	unsigned int depth, hlen, len, i;
+	struct sockaddr_ll addr = {};
+	struct virtio_net_hdr *vnet;
+	struct nsh_base *nsh;
+	struct ethhdr *eth;
+	struct tcphdr *tcp;
+	int fd, one = 1;
+	struct iphdr *ip;
+	char *buf;
+
+	if (argc != 3)
+		error(1, 0, "usage: %s <ifname> <depth>", argv[0]);
+
+	depth = strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0);
+	hlen = sizeof(*eth) + depth * NSH_HLEN + sizeof(*ip) + sizeof(*tcp);
+	if (!depth || hlen > UINT16_MAX)
+		error(1, 0, "invalid depth %u", depth);
+	len = sizeof(*vnet) + hlen + NR_SEGS * GSO_SIZE;
+
+	buf = calloc(1, len);
+	if (!buf)
+		error(1, errno, "calloc");
+
+	vnet = (void *)buf;
+	vnet->flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
+	vnet->gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4;
+	vnet->hdr_len = hlen;
+	vnet->gso_size = GSO_SIZE;
+	vnet->csum_start = hlen - sizeof(*tcp);
+	vnet->csum_offset = __builtin_offsetof(struct tcphdr, check);
+
+	eth = (void *)(vnet + 1);
+	memset(eth->h_dest, 0xff, ETH_ALEN);
+	eth->h_source[0] = 0x02;
+	eth->h_proto = htons(ETH_P_NSH);
+
+	nsh = (void *)(eth + 1);
+	for (i = 0; i < depth; i++, nsh++) {
+		/* version 0, ttl 63, length in 4 byte words */
+		nsh->ver_flags_ttl_len = htons(63 << 6 | NSH_HLEN / 4);
+		nsh->mdtype = NSH_MD_TYPE2;
+		nsh->np = i == depth - 1 ? NSH_NP_IPV4 : NSH_NP_NSH;
+		nsh->path_hdr = htonl(1 << 8 | 255);
+	}
+
+	ip = (void *)nsh;
+	ip->version = 4;
+	ip->ihl = 5;
+	ip->ttl = 64;
+	ip->protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
+	ip->saddr = htonl(0xc0000201);	/* 192.0.2.1 */
+	ip->daddr = htonl(0xc0000202);	/* 192.0.2.2 */
+
+	tcp = (void *)(ip + 1);
+	tcp->source = htons(1234);
+	tcp->dest = htons(5678);
+	tcp->doff = 5;
+	tcp->ack = 1;
+
+	fd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, 0);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		error(1, errno, "socket");
+	if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_VNET_HDR, &one, sizeof(one)))
+		error(1, errno, "setsockopt PACKET_VNET_HDR");
+
+	addr.sll_family = AF_PACKET;
+	addr.sll_protocol = htons(ETH_P_NSH);
+	addr.sll_ifindex = if_nametoindex(argv[1]);
+	if (!addr.sll_ifindex)
+		error(1, errno, "if_nametoindex %s", argv[1]);
+
+	/* A packet dropped at segmentation time is reported as an error,
+	 * this is expected for deep stacks.
+	 */
+	sendto(fd, buf, len, 0, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
+
+	close(fd);
+	free(buf);
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/nsh_gso.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/nsh_gso.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..d0746cf1d528
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/nsh_gso.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Check software GSO of NSH packets: a TCP GSO packet behind a few NSH
+# headers is segmented, and a deep stack of NSH headers is dropped
+# instead of recursing in nsh_gso_segment() for each of them.
+
+source lib.sh
+
+NR_SEGS=4
+ret=0
+
+cleanup()
+{
+	cleanup_ns $ns1
+}
+
+tx_packets()
+{
+	ip netns exec $ns1 cat /sys/class/net/dummy0/statistics/tx_packets
+}
+
+# $1: number of NSH headers, $2: expected number of transmitted packets
+check_nsh_gso()
+{
+	local depth=$1
+	local expected=$2
+	local before
+	local sent
+
+	before=$(tx_packets)
+	ip netns exec $ns1 ./nsh_gso dummy0 $depth
+	sent=$(($(tx_packets) - before))
+
+	if [ $sent -eq $expected ]; then
+		echo "PASS: $depth NSH headers: $sent packets sent"
+	else
+		echo "FAIL: $depth NSH headers: $sent packets sent, expected $expected"
+		ret=1
+	fi
+}
+
+modprobe -q nsh
+nsh_loaded=$?
+
+trap cleanup EXIT
+setup_ns ns1 || exit $ksft_skip
+
+ip -netns $ns1 link add dummy0 type dummy
+ip -netns $ns1 link set dummy0 up
+# No IPv6 autoconf traffic on the device, to get stable counters.
+ip netns exec $ns1 sysctl -qw net.ipv6.conf.dummy0.disable_ipv6=1
+# Force software segmentation in validate_xmit_skb().
+ip netns exec $ns1 ethtool -K dummy0 tso off >/dev/null || exit $ksft_skip
+
+before=$(tx_packets)
+ip netns exec $ns1 ./nsh_gso dummy0 1
+if [ $(($(tx_packets) - before)) -eq 0 ] && [ $nsh_loaded -ne 0 ]; then
+	echo "SKIP: NSH GSO not available"
+	exit $ksft_skip
+fi
+
+check_nsh_gso 1 $NR_SEGS
+# The recursion limit is shared with the inner IPv4 header.
+check_nsh_gso 4 $NR_SEGS
+check_nsh_gso 5 0
+check_nsh_gso 64 0
+# The largest stack that fits in a 64KB header.
+check_nsh_gso 8000 0
+
+exit $ret
-- 
2.53.0

Re: [PATCH net 0/2] nsh: limit recursion in nsh_gso_segment()

[patchwork-bot+netdevbpf]

Hello:

This series was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>:

On Thu, 12 Nov 2026 11:19:59 +0100 you wrote:
> Sashiko found that nsh_gso_segment() can call itself, through
> skb_mac_gso_segment(), once per stacked NSH header. Nothing limits the
> depth, and a 64KB GSO packet made of 8-byte NSH headers overflows the
> kernel stack. It was reported while reviewing an unrelated virtio
> series [1].
> 
> Such a packet can be sent with a packet socket using PACKET_VNET_HDR,
> when the nsh module is loaded.
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [net,1/2] nsh: limit recursion in nsh_gso_segment()
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/3921fb102d78
  - [net,2/2] selftests: net: add a test for NSH GSO
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/53e7352d65f7

You are awesome, thank you!
-- 
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