[OE-core][dunfell 00/11] Patch review

[OE-core][dunfell 00/11] Patch review

[Steve Sakoman]

Please review this set of patches for dunfell and have comments back by end
of day Tuesday.

Passed a-full on autobuilder:

https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/typhoon/#/builders/83/builds/3537

with the exception of a known issue with meta-intel due to the zlib CVE fix, see:

https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/163793

The intent is to fix meta-intel after this patch set is merged to dunfell.

The following changes since commit aa762b7ca2417b80dd114a4ab263d69074912f82:

  tzdata: update to 2022a (2022-04-04 04:22:32 -1000)

are available in the Git repository at:

  git://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/dunfell-nut
  http://cgit.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/dunfell-nut

Alexandre Belloni (1):
  pseudo: Fix handling of absolute links

Martin Jansa (1):
  license_image.bbclass: close package.manifest file

Peter Kjellerstedt (1):
  metadata_scm.bbclass: Use immediate expansion for the METADATA_*
    variables

Ralph Siemsen (3):
  gzip: fix CVE-2022-1271
  xz: fix CVE-2022-1271
  apt: add -fno-strict-aliasing to CXXFLAGS to fix SHA256 bug

Richard Purdie (4):
  vim: Upgrade 8.2.4524 -> 8.2.4681
  git: Ignore CVE-2022-24975
  pseudo: Add patch to workaround paths with crazy lengths
  libxshmfence: Correct LICENSE to HPND

Ross Burton (1):
  zlib: backport the fix for CVE-2018-25032

 .../recipeutils/recipeutils-test_1.2.bb       |   2 +-
 meta/classes/license_image.bbclass            |   4 +-
 meta/classes/metadata_scm.bbclass             |  10 +-
 .../zlib/zlib/CVE-2018-25032.patch            | 347 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/zlib/zlib_1.2.11.bb         |   1 +
 meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt.inc             |   4 +
 meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc             |   5 +
 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb    |   2 +-
 .../gzip/gzip-1.10/CVE-2022-1271.patch        |  45 +++
 meta/recipes-extended/gzip/gzip_1.10.bb       |   1 +
 .../xz/xz/CVE-2022-1271.patch                 |  96 +++++
 meta/recipes-extended/xz/xz_5.2.4.bb          |   4 +-
 .../xorg-lib/libxshmfence_1.3.bb              |   2 +-
 meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc              |   6 +-
 14 files changed, 515 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/zlib/zlib/CVE-2018-25032.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gzip/gzip-1.10/CVE-2022-1271.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/xz/xz/CVE-2022-1271.patch

-- 
2.25.1

[OE-core][dunfell 01/11] vim: Upgrade 8.2.4524 -> 8.2.4681

[Steve Sakoman]

From: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

License change is a date in the license file only.

This includes a fix for CVE-2022-0943.

Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 69bc2f37d6ca7fa4823237b45dd698b8debca0a9)
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
---
 meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc
index b3c471225e..5f01fc3bca 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ RSUGGESTS_${PN} = "diffutils"
 
 LICENSE = "vim"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=6b30ea4fa660c483b619924bc709ef99 \
-                    file://runtime/doc/uganda.txt;md5=a3f193c20c6faff93c69185d5d070535"
+                    file://runtime/doc/uganda.txt;md5=daf48235bb824c77fe8ae88d5f575f74"
 
 SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
            file://disable_acl_header_check.patch \
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
            file://racefix.patch \
            "
 
-PV .= ".4524"
-SRCREV = "d8f8629b1bf566e1dada7515e9b146c69e5d9757"
+PV .= ".4681"
+SRCREV = "15f74fab653a784548d5d966644926b47ba2cfa7"
 
 # Remove when 8.3 is out
 UPSTREAM_VERSION_UNKNOWN = "1"
-- 
2.25.1

[OE-core][dunfell 02/11] gzip: fix CVE-2022-1271

[Steve Sakoman]

From: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org>

zgrep applied to a crafted file name with two or more newlines
can no longer overwrite an arbitrary, attacker-selected file.

Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gzip.git/commit/?id=dc9740df61e575e8c3148b7bd3c147a81ea00c7c]
CVE: CVE-2022-1271

Signed-off-by: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
---
 .../gzip/gzip-1.10/CVE-2022-1271.patch        | 45 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-extended/gzip/gzip_1.10.bb       |  1 +
 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gzip/gzip-1.10/CVE-2022-1271.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/gzip/gzip-1.10/CVE-2022-1271.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/gzip/gzip-1.10/CVE-2022-1271.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..046c95df47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/gzip/gzip-1.10/CVE-2022-1271.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 7073a366ee71639a1902eefb7500e14acb920f64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>
+Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 23:52:49 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] zgrep: avoid exploit via multi-newline file names
+
+* zgrep.in: The issue with the old code is that with multiple
+newlines, the N-command will read the second line of input,
+then the s-commands will be skipped because it's not the end
+of the file yet, then a new sed cycle starts and the pattern
+space is printed and emptied. So only the last line or two get
+escaped. This patch makes sed read all lines into the pattern
+space and then do the escaping.
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+cleemy desu wayo working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/gzip.git/commit/?id=dc9740df61e575e8c3148b7bd3c147a81ea00c7c]
+CVE: CVE-2022-1271
+
+Signed-off-by: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org>
+---
+ zgrep.in | 10 +++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/zgrep.in b/zgrep.in
+index 3efdb52..d391291 100644
+--- a/zgrep.in
++++ b/zgrep.in
+@@ -222,9 +222,13 @@ do
+ '* | *'&'* | *'\'* | *'|'*)
+         i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" |
+             sed '
+-              $!N
+-              $s/[&\|]/\\&/g
+-              $s/\n/\\n/g
++              :start
++              $!{
++                N
++                b start
++              }
++              s/[&\|]/\\&/g
++              s/\n/\\n/g
+             ');;
+       esac
+       sed_script="s|^|$i:|"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/gzip/gzip_1.10.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/gzip/gzip_1.10.bb
index 9778e687e1..c558c21f10 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/gzip/gzip_1.10.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/gzip/gzip_1.10.bb
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ LICENSE = "GPLv3+"
 
 SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/gzip/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://run-ptest \
+           file://CVE-2022-1271.patch \
           "
 SRC_URI_append_class-target = " file://wrong-path-fix.patch"
 
-- 
2.25.1

[OE-core][dunfell 03/11] zlib: backport the fix for CVE-2018-25032

[Steve Sakoman]

From: Ross Burton <ross@burtonini.com>

Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
---
 .../zlib/zlib/CVE-2018-25032.patch            | 347 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/zlib/zlib_1.2.11.bb         |   1 +
 2 files changed, 348 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/zlib/zlib/CVE-2018-25032.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/zlib/zlib/CVE-2018-25032.patch b/meta/recipes-core/zlib/zlib/CVE-2018-25032.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5cb6183641
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/zlib/zlib/CVE-2018-25032.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
+CVE: CVE-2018-25032
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
+
+From 5c44459c3b28a9bd3283aaceab7c615f8020c531 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mark Adler <madler@alumni.caltech.edu>
+Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 22:09:22 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix a bug that can crash deflate on some input when using
+ Z_FIXED.
+
+This bug was reported by Danilo Ramos of Eideticom, Inc. It has
+lain in wait 13 years before being found! The bug was introduced
+in zlib 1.2.2.2, with the addition of the Z_FIXED option. That
+option forces the use of fixed Huffman codes. For rare inputs with
+a large number of distant matches, the pending buffer into which
+the compressed data is written can overwrite the distance symbol
+table which it overlays. That results in corrupted output due to
+invalid distances, and can result in out-of-bound accesses,
+crashing the application.
+
+The fix here combines the distance buffer and literal/length
+buffers into a single symbol buffer. Now three bytes of pending
+buffer space are opened up for each literal or length/distance
+pair consumed, instead of the previous two bytes. This assures
+that the pending buffer cannot overwrite the symbol table, since
+the maximum fixed code compressed length/distance is 31 bits, and
+since there are four bytes of pending space for every three bytes
+of symbol space.
+---
+ deflate.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ deflate.h | 25 +++++++++----------
+ trees.c   | 50 +++++++++++--------------------------
+ 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/deflate.c b/deflate.c
+index 425babc00..19cba873a 100644
+--- a/deflate.c
++++ b/deflate.c
+@@ -255,11 +255,6 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateInit2_(strm, level, method, windowBits, memLevel, strategy,
+     int wrap = 1;
+     static const char my_version[] = ZLIB_VERSION;
+ 
+-    ushf *overlay;
+-    /* We overlay pending_buf and d_buf+l_buf. This works since the average
+-     * output size for (length,distance) codes is <= 24 bits.
+-     */
+-
+     if (version == Z_NULL || version[0] != my_version[0] ||
+         stream_size != sizeof(z_stream)) {
+         return Z_VERSION_ERROR;
+@@ -329,9 +324,47 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateInit2_(strm, level, method, windowBits, memLevel, strategy,
+ 
+     s->lit_bufsize = 1 << (memLevel + 6); /* 16K elements by default */
+ 
+-    overlay = (ushf *) ZALLOC(strm, s->lit_bufsize, sizeof(ush)+2);
+-    s->pending_buf = (uchf *) overlay;
+-    s->pending_buf_size = (ulg)s->lit_bufsize * (sizeof(ush)+2L);
++    /* We overlay pending_buf and sym_buf. This works since the average size
++     * for length/distance pairs over any compressed block is assured to be 31
++     * bits or less.
++     *
++     * Analysis: The longest fixed codes are a length code of 8 bits plus 5
++     * extra bits, for lengths 131 to 257. The longest fixed distance codes are
++     * 5 bits plus 13 extra bits, for distances 16385 to 32768. The longest
++     * possible fixed-codes length/distance pair is then 31 bits total.
++     *
++     * sym_buf starts one-fourth of the way into pending_buf. So there are
++     * three bytes in sym_buf for every four bytes in pending_buf. Each symbol
++     * in sym_buf is three bytes -- two for the distance and one for the
++     * literal/length. As each symbol is consumed, the pointer to the next
++     * sym_buf value to read moves forward three bytes. From that symbol, up to
++     * 31 bits are written to pending_buf. The closest the written pending_buf
++     * bits gets to the next sym_buf symbol to read is just before the last
++     * code is written. At that time, 31*(n-2) bits have been written, just
++     * after 24*(n-2) bits have been consumed from sym_buf. sym_buf starts at
++     * 8*n bits into pending_buf. (Note that the symbol buffer fills when n-1
++     * symbols are written.) The closest the writing gets to what is unread is
++     * then n+14 bits. Here n is lit_bufsize, which is 16384 by default, and
++     * can range from 128 to 32768.
++     *
++     * Therefore, at a minimum, there are 142 bits of space between what is
++     * written and what is read in the overlain buffers, so the symbols cannot
++     * be overwritten by the compressed data. That space is actually 139 bits,
++     * due to the three-bit fixed-code block header.
++     *
++     * That covers the case where either Z_FIXED is specified, forcing fixed
++     * codes, or when the use of fixed codes is chosen, because that choice
++     * results in a smaller compressed block than dynamic codes. That latter
++     * condition then assures that the above analysis also covers all dynamic
++     * blocks. A dynamic-code block will only be chosen to be emitted if it has
++     * fewer bits than a fixed-code block would for the same set of symbols.
++     * Therefore its average symbol length is assured to be less than 31. So
++     * the compressed data for a dynamic block also cannot overwrite the
++     * symbols from which it is being constructed.
++     */
++
++    s->pending_buf = (uchf *) ZALLOC(strm, s->lit_bufsize, 4);
++    s->pending_buf_size = (ulg)s->lit_bufsize * 4;
+ 
+     if (s->window == Z_NULL || s->prev == Z_NULL || s->head == Z_NULL ||
+         s->pending_buf == Z_NULL) {
+@@ -340,8 +373,12 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateInit2_(strm, level, method, windowBits, memLevel, strategy,
+         deflateEnd (strm);
+         return Z_MEM_ERROR;
+     }
+-    s->d_buf = overlay + s->lit_bufsize/sizeof(ush);
+-    s->l_buf = s->pending_buf + (1+sizeof(ush))*s->lit_bufsize;
++    s->sym_buf = s->pending_buf + s->lit_bufsize;
++    s->sym_end = (s->lit_bufsize - 1) * 3;
++    /* We avoid equality with lit_bufsize*3 because of wraparound at 64K
++     * on 16 bit machines and because stored blocks are restricted to
++     * 64K-1 bytes.
++     */
+ 
+     s->level = level;
+     s->strategy = strategy;
+@@ -552,7 +589,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflatePrime (strm, bits, value)
+ 
+     if (deflateStateCheck(strm)) return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
+     s = strm->state;
+-    if ((Bytef *)(s->d_buf) < s->pending_out + ((Buf_size + 7) >> 3))
++    if (s->sym_buf < s->pending_out + ((Buf_size + 7) >> 3))
+         return Z_BUF_ERROR;
+     do {
+         put = Buf_size - s->bi_valid;
+@@ -1113,7 +1150,6 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateCopy (dest, source)
+ #else
+     deflate_state *ds;
+     deflate_state *ss;
+-    ushf *overlay;
+ 
+ 
+     if (deflateStateCheck(source) || dest == Z_NULL) {
+@@ -1133,8 +1169,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateCopy (dest, source)
+     ds->window = (Bytef *) ZALLOC(dest, ds->w_size, 2*sizeof(Byte));
+     ds->prev   = (Posf *)  ZALLOC(dest, ds->w_size, sizeof(Pos));
+     ds->head   = (Posf *)  ZALLOC(dest, ds->hash_size, sizeof(Pos));
+-    overlay = (ushf *) ZALLOC(dest, ds->lit_bufsize, sizeof(ush)+2);
+-    ds->pending_buf = (uchf *) overlay;
++    ds->pending_buf = (uchf *) ZALLOC(dest, ds->lit_bufsize, 4);
+ 
+     if (ds->window == Z_NULL || ds->prev == Z_NULL || ds->head == Z_NULL ||
+         ds->pending_buf == Z_NULL) {
+@@ -1148,8 +1183,7 @@ int ZEXPORT deflateCopy (dest, source)
+     zmemcpy(ds->pending_buf, ss->pending_buf, (uInt)ds->pending_buf_size);
+ 
+     ds->pending_out = ds->pending_buf + (ss->pending_out - ss->pending_buf);
+-    ds->d_buf = overlay + ds->lit_bufsize/sizeof(ush);
+-    ds->l_buf = ds->pending_buf + (1+sizeof(ush))*ds->lit_bufsize;
++    ds->sym_buf = ds->pending_buf + ds->lit_bufsize;
+ 
+     ds->l_desc.dyn_tree = ds->dyn_ltree;
+     ds->d_desc.dyn_tree = ds->dyn_dtree;
+@@ -1925,7 +1959,7 @@ local block_state deflate_fast(s, flush)
+         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 1);
+         return finish_done;
+     }
+-    if (s->last_lit)
++    if (s->sym_next)
+         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 0);
+     return block_done;
+ }
+@@ -2056,7 +2090,7 @@ local block_state deflate_slow(s, flush)
+         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 1);
+         return finish_done;
+     }
+-    if (s->last_lit)
++    if (s->sym_next)
+         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 0);
+     return block_done;
+ }
+@@ -2131,7 +2165,7 @@ local block_state deflate_rle(s, flush)
+         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 1);
+         return finish_done;
+     }
+-    if (s->last_lit)
++    if (s->sym_next)
+         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 0);
+     return block_done;
+ }
+@@ -2170,7 +2204,7 @@ local block_state deflate_huff(s, flush)
+         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 1);
+         return finish_done;
+     }
+-    if (s->last_lit)
++    if (s->sym_next)
+         FLUSH_BLOCK(s, 0);
+     return block_done;
+ }
+diff --git a/deflate.h b/deflate.h
+index 23ecdd312..d4cf1a98b 100644
+--- a/deflate.h
++++ b/deflate.h
+@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ typedef struct internal_state {
+     /* Depth of each subtree used as tie breaker for trees of equal frequency
+      */
+ 
+-    uchf *l_buf;          /* buffer for literals or lengths */
++    uchf *sym_buf;        /* buffer for distances and literals/lengths */
+ 
+     uInt  lit_bufsize;
+     /* Size of match buffer for literals/lengths.  There are 4 reasons for
+@@ -239,13 +239,8 @@ typedef struct internal_state {
+      *   - I can't count above 4
+      */
+ 
+-    uInt last_lit;      /* running index in l_buf */
+-
+-    ushf *d_buf;
+-    /* Buffer for distances. To simplify the code, d_buf and l_buf have
+-     * the same number of elements. To use different lengths, an extra flag
+-     * array would be necessary.
+-     */
++    uInt sym_next;      /* running index in sym_buf */
++    uInt sym_end;       /* symbol table full when sym_next reaches this */
+ 
+     ulg opt_len;        /* bit length of current block with optimal trees */
+     ulg static_len;     /* bit length of current block with static trees */
+@@ -325,20 +320,22 @@ void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_stored_block OF((deflate_state *s, charf *buf,
+ 
+ # define _tr_tally_lit(s, c, flush) \
+   { uch cc = (c); \
+-    s->d_buf[s->last_lit] = 0; \
+-    s->l_buf[s->last_lit++] = cc; \
++    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = 0; \
++    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = 0; \
++    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = cc; \
+     s->dyn_ltree[cc].Freq++; \
+-    flush = (s->last_lit == s->lit_bufsize-1); \
++    flush = (s->sym_next == s->sym_end); \
+    }
+ # define _tr_tally_dist(s, distance, length, flush) \
+   { uch len = (uch)(length); \
+     ush dist = (ush)(distance); \
+-    s->d_buf[s->last_lit] = dist; \
+-    s->l_buf[s->last_lit++] = len; \
++    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = dist; \
++    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = dist >> 8; \
++    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = len; \
+     dist--; \
+     s->dyn_ltree[_length_code[len]+LITERALS+1].Freq++; \
+     s->dyn_dtree[d_code(dist)].Freq++; \
+-    flush = (s->last_lit == s->lit_bufsize-1); \
++    flush = (s->sym_next == s->sym_end); \
+   }
+ #else
+ # define _tr_tally_lit(s, c, flush) flush = _tr_tally(s, 0, c)
+diff --git a/trees.c b/trees.c
+index 4f4a65011..decaeb7c3 100644
+--- a/trees.c
++++ b/trees.c
+@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ local void init_block(s)
+ 
+     s->dyn_ltree[END_BLOCK].Freq = 1;
+     s->opt_len = s->static_len = 0L;
+-    s->last_lit = s->matches = 0;
++    s->sym_next = s->matches = 0;
+ }
+ 
+ #define SMALLEST 1
+@@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ void ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_flush_block(s, buf, stored_len, last)
+ 
+         Tracev((stderr, "\nopt %lu(%lu) stat %lu(%lu) stored %lu lit %u ",
+                 opt_lenb, s->opt_len, static_lenb, s->static_len, stored_len,
+-                s->last_lit));
++                s->sym_next / 3));
+ 
+         if (static_lenb <= opt_lenb) opt_lenb = static_lenb;
+ 
+@@ -1017,8 +1017,9 @@ int ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_tally (s, dist, lc)
+     unsigned dist;  /* distance of matched string */
+     unsigned lc;    /* match length-MIN_MATCH or unmatched char (if dist==0) */
+ {
+-    s->d_buf[s->last_lit] = (ush)dist;
+-    s->l_buf[s->last_lit++] = (uch)lc;
++    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = dist;
++    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = dist >> 8;
++    s->sym_buf[s->sym_next++] = lc;
+     if (dist == 0) {
+         /* lc is the unmatched char */
+         s->dyn_ltree[lc].Freq++;
+@@ -1033,30 +1034,7 @@ int ZLIB_INTERNAL _tr_tally (s, dist, lc)
+         s->dyn_ltree[_length_code[lc]+LITERALS+1].Freq++;
+         s->dyn_dtree[d_code(dist)].Freq++;
+     }
+-
+-#ifdef TRUNCATE_BLOCK
+-    /* Try to guess if it is profitable to stop the current block here */
+-    if ((s->last_lit & 0x1fff) == 0 && s->level > 2) {
+-        /* Compute an upper bound for the compressed length */
+-        ulg out_length = (ulg)s->last_lit*8L;
+-        ulg in_length = (ulg)((long)s->strstart - s->block_start);
+-        int dcode;
+-        for (dcode = 0; dcode < D_CODES; dcode++) {
+-            out_length += (ulg)s->dyn_dtree[dcode].Freq *
+-                (5L+extra_dbits[dcode]);
+-        }
+-        out_length >>= 3;
+-        Tracev((stderr,"\nlast_lit %u, in %ld, out ~%ld(%ld%%) ",
+-               s->last_lit, in_length, out_length,
+-               100L - out_length*100L/in_length));
+-        if (s->matches < s->last_lit/2 && out_length < in_length/2) return 1;
+-    }
+-#endif
+-    return (s->last_lit == s->lit_bufsize-1);
+-    /* We avoid equality with lit_bufsize because of wraparound at 64K
+-     * on 16 bit machines and because stored blocks are restricted to
+-     * 64K-1 bytes.
+-     */
++    return (s->sym_next == s->sym_end);
+ }
+ 
+ /* ===========================================================================
+@@ -1069,13 +1047,14 @@ local void compress_block(s, ltree, dtree)
+ {
+     unsigned dist;      /* distance of matched string */
+     int lc;             /* match length or unmatched char (if dist == 0) */
+-    unsigned lx = 0;    /* running index in l_buf */
++    unsigned sx = 0;    /* running index in sym_buf */
+     unsigned code;      /* the code to send */
+     int extra;          /* number of extra bits to send */
+ 
+-    if (s->last_lit != 0) do {
+-        dist = s->d_buf[lx];
+-        lc = s->l_buf[lx++];
++    if (s->sym_next != 0) do {
++        dist = s->sym_buf[sx++] & 0xff;
++        dist += (unsigned)(s->sym_buf[sx++] & 0xff) << 8;
++        lc = s->sym_buf[sx++];
+         if (dist == 0) {
+             send_code(s, lc, ltree); /* send a literal byte */
+             Tracecv(isgraph(lc), (stderr," '%c' ", lc));
+@@ -1100,11 +1079,10 @@ local void compress_block(s, ltree, dtree)
+             }
+         } /* literal or match pair ? */
+ 
+-        /* Check that the overlay between pending_buf and d_buf+l_buf is ok: */
+-        Assert((uInt)(s->pending) < s->lit_bufsize + 2*lx,
+-               "pendingBuf overflow");
++        /* Check that the overlay between pending_buf and sym_buf is ok: */
++        Assert(s->pending < s->lit_bufsize + sx, "pendingBuf overflow");
+ 
+-    } while (lx < s->last_lit);
++    } while (sx < s->sym_next);
+ 
+     send_code(s, END_BLOCK, ltree);
+ }
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/zlib/zlib_1.2.11.bb b/meta/recipes-core/zlib/zlib_1.2.11.bb
index ef9431ae47..bc42cd64e9 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/zlib/zlib_1.2.11.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/zlib/zlib_1.2.11.bb
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://zlib.h;beginline=6;endline=23;md5=5377232268e952e9ef6
 
 SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/libpng/${BPN}/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://ldflags-tests.patch \
+           file://CVE-2018-25032.patch \
            file://run-ptest \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://zlib.net/"
-- 
2.25.1

[OE-core][dunfell 04/11] xz: fix CVE-2022-1271

[Steve Sakoman]

From: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org>

Malicious filenames can make xzgrep to write to arbitrary files
or (with a GNU sed extension) lead to arbitrary code execution.

Upstream-Status: Backport [https://tukaani.org/xz/xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch]
CVE: CVE-2022-1271

Signed-off-by: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
---
 .../xz/xz/CVE-2022-1271.patch                 | 96 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-extended/xz/xz_5.2.4.bb          |  4 +-
 2 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/xz/xz/CVE-2022-1271.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/xz/xz/CVE-2022-1271.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/xz/xz/CVE-2022-1271.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7841a534d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/xz/xz/CVE-2022-1271.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+From 6bb2369742f9ff0451c245e8ca9b9dfac0cc88ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>
+Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 19:19:12 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] xzgrep: Fix escaping of malicious filenames (ZDI-CAN-16587).
+
+Malicious filenames can make xzgrep to write to arbitrary files
+or (with a GNU sed extension) lead to arbitrary code execution.
+
+xzgrep from XZ Utils versions up to and including 5.2.5 are
+affected. 5.3.1alpha and 5.3.2alpha are affected as well.
+This patch works for all of them.
+
+This bug was inherited from gzip's zgrep. gzip 1.12 includes
+a fix for zgrep.
+
+The issue with the old sed script is that with multiple newlines,
+the N-command will read the second line of input, then the
+s-commands will be skipped because it's not the end of the
+file yet, then a new sed cycle starts and the pattern space
+is printed and emptied. So only the last line or two get escaped.
+
+One way to fix this would be to read all lines into the pattern
+space first. However, the included fix is even simpler: All lines
+except the last line get a backslash appended at the end. To ensure
+that shell command substitution doesn't eat a possible trailing
+newline, a colon is appended to the filename before escaping.
+The colon is later used to separate the filename from the grep
+output so it is fine to add it here instead of a few lines later.
+
+The old code also wasn't POSIX compliant as it used \n in the
+replacement section of the s-command. Using \<newline> is the
+POSIX compatible method.
+
+LC_ALL=C was added to the two critical sed commands. POSIX sed
+manual recommends it when using sed to manipulate pathnames
+because in other locales invalid multibyte sequences might
+cause issues with some sed implementations. In case of GNU sed,
+these particular sed scripts wouldn't have such problems but some
+other scripts could have, see:
+
+    info '(sed)Locale Considerations'
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+cleemy desu wayo working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
+
+Thanks to Jim Meyering and Paul Eggert discussing the different
+ways to fix this and for coordinating the patch release schedule
+with gzip.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://tukaani.org/xz/xzgrep-ZDI-CAN-16587.patch]
+CVE: CVE-2022-1271
+
+Signed-off-by: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org>
+---
+ src/scripts/xzgrep.in | 20 ++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/scripts/xzgrep.in b/src/scripts/xzgrep.in
+index a1fd19c..da1e65b 100644
+--- a/src/scripts/xzgrep.in
++++ b/src/scripts/xzgrep.in
+@@ -178,22 +178,26 @@ for i; do
+          { test $# -eq 1 || test $no_filename -eq 1; }; then
+       eval "$grep"
+     else
++      # Append a colon so that the last character will never be a newline
++      # which would otherwise get lost in shell command substitution.
++      i="$i:"
++
++      # Escape & \ | and newlines only if such characters are present
++      # (speed optimization).
+       case $i in
+       (*'
+ '* | *'&'* | *'\'* | *'|'*)
+-        i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" |
+-            sed '
+-              $!N
+-              $s/[&\|]/\\&/g
+-              $s/\n/\\n/g
+-            ');;
++        i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" | LC_ALL=C sed 's/[&\|]/\\&/g; $!s/$/\\/');;
+       esac
+-      sed_script="s|^|$i:|"
++
++      # $i already ends with a colon so don't add it here.
++      sed_script="s|^|$i|"
+ 
+       # Fail if grep or sed fails.
+       r=$(
+         exec 4>&1
+-        (eval "$grep" 4>&-; echo $? >&4) 3>&- | sed "$sed_script" >&3 4>&-
++        (eval "$grep" 4>&-; echo $? >&4) 3>&- |
++            LC_ALL=C sed "$sed_script" >&3 4>&-
+       ) || r=2
+       exit $r
+     fi >&3 5>&-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/xz/xz_5.2.4.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/xz/xz_5.2.4.bb
index 67a6cbd569..6d80a4f2e9 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/xz/xz_5.2.4.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/xz/xz_5.2.4.bb
@@ -23,7 +23,9 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=97d554a32881fee0aa283d96e47cb24a \
                     file://lib/getopt.c;endline=23;md5=2069b0ee710572c03bb3114e4532cd84 \
                     "
 
-SRC_URI = "https://tukaani.org/xz/xz-${PV}.tar.gz"
+SRC_URI = "https://tukaani.org/xz/xz-${PV}.tar.gz \
+           file://CVE-2022-1271.patch \
+           "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ace3264bdd00c65eeec2891346f65e6"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "b512f3b726d3b37b6dc4c8570e137b9311e7552e8ccbab4d39d47ce5f4177145"
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "xz-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
-- 
2.25.1

[OE-core][dunfell 05/11] git: Ignore CVE-2022-24975

[Steve Sakoman]

From: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

Everyone I've talked to doesn't see this as a major issue. The CVE
asks for a documentation improvement on the --mirror option to
git clone as deleted content could be leaked into a mirror. For OE's
general users/use cases, we wouldn't build or ship docs so this wouldn't
affect us.

Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5dfe2dd5482c9a446f8e722fe51903d205e6770d)
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
---
 meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc
index a89dd42e8b..ffbae145cf 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/git/git.inc
@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=7c0d7ef03a7eb04ce795b0f60e68e7e1"
 
 CVE_PRODUCT = "git-scm:git"
 
+# This is about a manpage not mentioning --mirror may "leak" information
+# in mirrored git repos. Most OE users wouldn't build the docs and
+# we don't see this as a major issue for our general users/usecases.
+CVE_CHECK_IGNORE += "CVE-2022-24975"
+
 PACKAGECONFIG ??= ""
 PACKAGECONFIG[cvsserver] = ""
 PACKAGECONFIG[svn] = ""
-- 
2.25.1

[OE-core][dunfell 06/11] pseudo: Add patch to workaround paths with crazy lengths

[Steve Sakoman]

From: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

Update to a version of pseudo which includes a workaround for crazy
long paths, as shown by the libfm failures from the libtool upgrade.

Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 67dfa32d82b8862e6e543c37315f211aba3ec28b)
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
---
 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb
index 1a5d230c69..35240f1616 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
     file://older-glibc-symbols.patch"
 SRC_URI[prebuilt.sha256sum] = "ed9f456856e9d86359f169f46a70ad7be4190d6040282b84c8d97b99072485aa"
 
-SRCREV = "d34f2f6cedccf8488730001bcbde6bb7499f8814"
+SRCREV = "df1d1321fb093283485c387e3c933d2d264e509c"
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 PV = "1.9.0+git${SRCPV}"
 
-- 
2.25.1

[OE-core][dunfell 07/11] pseudo: Fix handling of absolute links

[Steve Sakoman]

From: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>

Update to a version of pseudo which has a fix for absolute links,
evaluating them from the chroot path.

Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 33147b89bc3c9e9bdd53a942a5551d8a1d06130c)
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
---
 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb
index 35240f1616..b5da3f0e29 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
     file://older-glibc-symbols.patch"
 SRC_URI[prebuilt.sha256sum] = "ed9f456856e9d86359f169f46a70ad7be4190d6040282b84c8d97b99072485aa"
 
-SRCREV = "df1d1321fb093283485c387e3c933d2d264e509c"
+SRCREV = "2b4b88eb513335b0ece55fe51854693d9b20de35"
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
 PV = "1.9.0+git${SRCPV}"
 
-- 
2.25.1

[OE-core][dunfell 08/11] license_image.bbclass: close package.manifest file

[Steve Sakoman]

From: Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa@gmail.com>

* fixes:
  NOTE: Executing write_package_manifest ...
  DEBUG: Executing python function write_package_manifest
  /OE/build/oe-core/openembedded-core/meta/classes/license_image.bbclass:23: ResourceWarning: unclosed file <_io.TextIOWrapper name='/OE/build/oe-core/tmp-glibc/deploy/licenses/core-image-minimal-qemux86-64/package.manifest' mode='w+' encoding='UTF-8'>
    'w+').write(output)
  ResourceWarning: Enable tracemalloc to get the object allocation traceback
  DEBUG: Python function write_package_manifest finished

[YOCTO #14772]

Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit b3114d5d438b7a63a276b4e825b62f3b1ebceed6)
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
---
 meta/classes/license_image.bbclass | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/meta/classes/license_image.bbclass b/meta/classes/license_image.bbclass
index 1396a95f47..9f3a0c3727 100644
--- a/meta/classes/license_image.bbclass
+++ b/meta/classes/license_image.bbclass
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ python write_package_manifest() {
 
     pkgs = image_list_installed_packages(d)
     output = format_pkg_list(pkgs)
-    open(os.path.join(license_image_dir, 'package.manifest'),
-        'w+').write(output)
+    with open(os.path.join(license_image_dir, 'package.manifest'), "w+") as package_manifest:
+        package_manifest.write(output)
 }
 
 python license_create_manifest() {
-- 
2.25.1

[OE-core][dunfell 09/11] apt: add -fno-strict-aliasing to CXXFLAGS to fix SHA256 bug

[Steve Sakoman]

From: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org>

Recently we've begun seeing issues with apt SHA256 generation/checking on some
distros (fedora 35, alma 8). The version of apt in dunfell uses its own
SHA256 code, not a standard library.

Investigation reveals that the issue is related to -fstrict-aliasing enabled by
-O2 optimization, so turn it off with -fno-strict-aliasing

Signed-off-by: Ralph Siemsen <ralph.siemsen@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
---
 meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt.inc | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt.inc
index ba827848a7..251795eeca 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/apt/apt.inc
@@ -37,5 +37,9 @@ do_configure_prepend() {
     rm -rf ${S}/buildlib/config.guess
 }
 
+# there are code generation issues with some compilers in the SHA256 implementation
+# turn off strict-aliasing to avoid these issues
+CXXFLAGS:append = " -fno-strict-aliasing"
+
 USERADD_PACKAGES = "${PN}"
 USERADD_PARAM_${PN} = "--system --no-create-home --home-dir /nonexistent --shell /bin/false --user-group _apt"
-- 
2.25.1

[OE-core][dunfell 10/11] metadata_scm.bbclass: Use immediate expansion for the METADATA_* variables

[Steve Sakoman]

From: Peter Kjellerstedt <peter.kjellerstedt@axis.com>

Define METADATA_BRANCH and METADATA_REVISION using immediate expansion.
This avoids running `git rev-parse HEAD` multiple times during recipe
parsing.

Signed-off-by: Peter Kjellerstedt <peter.kjellerstedt@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 34e1841ec14c545c73fbe03a9f946d43d65ab326)
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
---
 meta/classes/metadata_scm.bbclass | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/meta/classes/metadata_scm.bbclass b/meta/classes/metadata_scm.bbclass
index 2608a7ef7b..47cb969b8d 100644
--- a/meta/classes/metadata_scm.bbclass
+++ b/meta/classes/metadata_scm.bbclass
@@ -1,8 +1,3 @@
-METADATA_BRANCH ?= "${@base_detect_branch(d)}"
-METADATA_BRANCH[vardepvalue] = "${METADATA_BRANCH}"
-METADATA_REVISION ?= "${@base_detect_revision(d)}"
-METADATA_REVISION[vardepvalue] = "${METADATA_REVISION}"
-
 def base_detect_revision(d):
     path = base_get_scmbasepath(d)
     return base_get_metadata_git_revision(path, d)
@@ -42,3 +37,8 @@ def base_get_metadata_git_revision(path, d):
     except bb.process.ExecutionError:
         rev = '<unknown>'
     return rev.strip()
+
+METADATA_BRANCH := "${@base_detect_branch(d)}"
+METADATA_BRANCH[vardepvalue] = "${METADATA_BRANCH}"
+METADATA_REVISION := "${@base_detect_revision(d)}"
+METADATA_REVISION[vardepvalue] = "${METADATA_REVISION}"
-- 
2.25.1

[OE-core][dunfell 11/11] libxshmfence: Correct LICENSE to HPND

[Steve Sakoman]

From: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

The license in this code is listed as MIT and whilst it is compatible with and
usable as MIT, it actually looks like HPND. Clarify the license field accordingly.

(From OE-Core master rev: 922b645f443c33060a8990d32e6b7b62ea5497c3)

Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Robert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
---
 meta-selftest/recipes-test/recipeutils/recipeutils-test_1.2.bb | 2 +-
 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxshmfence_1.3.bb             | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/meta-selftest/recipes-test/recipeutils/recipeutils-test_1.2.bb b/meta-selftest/recipes-test/recipeutils/recipeutils-test_1.2.bb
index 0cd0494da8..fd113b5ec5 100644
--- a/meta-selftest/recipes-test/recipeutils/recipeutils-test_1.2.bb
+++ b/meta-selftest/recipes-test/recipeutils/recipeutils-test_1.2.bb
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ SUMMARY = "Test recipe for recipeutils.patch_recipe()"
 
 require recipeutils-test.inc
 
-LICENSE = "Proprietary"
+LICENSE = "HPND"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${WORKDIR}/somefile;md5=d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e"
 DEPENDS += "zlib"
 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxshmfence_1.3.bb b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxshmfence_1.3.bb
index cc45696530..38cab99bbe 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxshmfence_1.3.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxshmfence_1.3.bb
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ using file descriptor passing."
 
 require xorg-lib-common.inc
 
-LICENSE = "MIT-style"
+LICENSE = "HPND"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=47e508ca280fde97906eacb77892c3ac"
 
 DEPENDS += "virtual/libx11"
-- 
2.25.1

Re: [dunfell 05/11] git: Ignore CVE-2022-24975

[Ranjitsinh Rathod]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 283 bytes --]

On Sat, Apr 16, 2022 at 12:15 PM, Steve Sakoman wrote:

> 
> CVE_CHECK_IGNORE

Hi Steve,

Is this variable CVE_CHECK_IGNORE valid in dunfell branch too?
Because when I check with "bitbake -c cve_check git" it is still showing as Unpatched only.

Thanks, Ranjitsinh Rathod

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 373 bytes --]

Re: [OE-core] [dunfell 05/11] git: Ignore CVE-2022-24975

[Steve Sakoman]

On Tue, May 17, 2022 at 1:09 AM Ranjitsinh Rathod
<ranjitsinhrathod1991@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Sat, Apr 16, 2022 at 12:15 PM, Steve Sakoman wrote:
>
> CVE_CHECK_IGNORE
>
> Is this variable CVE_CHECK_IGNORE valid in dunfell branch too?
> Because when I check with "bitbake -c cve_check git" it is still showing as Unpatched only.

Arghh!  I'm so sorry I missed this.  Thanks for the "fix it" patch!

Steve