* [PATCH 1/1] ghostscript: CVE-2017-9727, -9835, -11714
2017-08-22 21:14 [PATCH 0/1] ghostscript: CVE-2017-9727, -9835, -11714 Joe Slater
@ 2017-08-22 21:14 ` Joe Slater
2017-08-22 21:35 ` ✗ patchtest: failure for " Patchwork
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Joe Slater @ 2017-08-22 21:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
CVE-2017-9727: make bounds check in gx_ttfReader__Read more robust
CVE-2017-9835: bounds check the array allocations methods
CVE-2017-11714: prevent trying to reloc a freed object
Signed-off-by: Joe Slater <jslater@windriver.com>
---
.../ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2017-11714.patch | 61 ++++++++++
.../ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2017-9727.patch | 35 ++++++
.../ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2017-9835.patch | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++
.../ghostscript/ghostscript_9.21.bb | 3 +
4 files changed, 224 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2017-11714.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2017-9727.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2017-9835.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2017-11714.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2017-11714.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84983c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2017-11714.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 671fd59eb657743aa86fbc1895cb15872a317caa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Liddell <chris.liddell@artifex.com>
+Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 14:54:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Bug 698158: prevent trying to reloc a freed object
+
+In the token reader, we pass the scanner state structure around as a
+t_struct ref on the Postscript operand stack.
+
+But we explicitly free the scanner state when we're done, which leaves a
+dangling reference on the operand stack and, unless that reference gets
+overwritten before the next garbager run, we can end up with the garbager
+trying to deal with an already freed object - that can cause a crash, or
+memory corruption.
+---
+ psi/ztoken.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- end of original header
+
+CVE: CVE-2017-11714
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [git://git.ghostscript.com/ghostpdl.git]
+
+Signed-off-by: Joe Slater <joe.slater@windriver.com>
+
+diff --git a/psi/ztoken.c b/psi/ztoken.c
+index 4dba7c5..af1ceeb 100644
+--- a/psi/ztoken.c
++++ b/psi/ztoken.c
+@@ -107,6 +107,12 @@ token_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, scanner_state * pstate, bool save)
+ int code;
+ ref token;
+
++ /* Since we might free pstate below, and we're dealing with
++ * gc memory referenced by the stack, we need to explicitly
++ * remove the reference to pstate from the stack, otherwise
++ * the garbager will fall over
++ */
++ make_null(osp);
+ /* Note that gs_scan_token may change osp! */
+ pop(1); /* remove the file or scanner state */
+ again:
+@@ -183,8 +189,14 @@ ztokenexec_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
+ static int
+ tokenexec_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, scanner_state * pstate, bool save)
+ {
+- os_ptr op;
++ os_ptr op = osp;
+ int code;
++ /* Since we might free pstate below, and we're dealing with
++ * gc memory referenced by the stack, we need to explicitly
++ * remove the reference to pstate from the stack, otherwise
++ * the garbager will fall over
++ */
++ make_null(osp);
+ /* Note that gs_scan_token may change osp! */
+ pop(1);
+ again:
+--
+1.7.9.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2017-9727.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2017-9727.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a2f7bfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2017-9727.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 937ccd17ac65935633b2ebc06cb7089b91e17e6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Liddell <chris.liddell@artifex.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2017 09:05:20 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Bug 698056: make bounds check in gx_ttfReader__Read more
+ robust
+
+---
+ base/gxttfb.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- end of original header
+
+CVE: CVE-2017-9727
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [git://git.ghostscript.com/ghostpdl.git]
+
+Signed-off-by: Joe Slater <joe.slater@windriver.com>
+
+diff --git a/base/gxttfb.c b/base/gxttfb.c
+index 0e9a444..e1561af 100644
+--- a/base/gxttfb.c
++++ b/base/gxttfb.c
+@@ -79,7 +79,8 @@ static void gx_ttfReader__Read(ttfReader *self, void *p, int n)
+ if (!r->error) {
+ if (r->extra_glyph_index != -1) {
+ q = r->glyph_data.bits.data + r->pos;
+- r->error = (r->glyph_data.bits.size - r->pos < n ?
++ r->error = ((r->pos >= r->glyph_data.bits.size ||
++ r->glyph_data.bits.size - r->pos < n) ?
+ gs_note_error(gs_error_invalidfont) : 0);
+ if (r->error == 0)
+ memcpy(p, q, n);
+--
+1.7.9.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2017-9835.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2017-9835.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c65690
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript/CVE-2017-9835.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From cfde94be1d4286bc47633c6e6eaf4e659bd78066 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Liddell <chris.liddell@artifex.com>
+Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2017 14:55:12 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Bug 697985: bounds check the array allocations methods
+
+The clump allocator has four allocation functions that use 'number of elements'
+and 'size of elements' parameters (rather than a simple 'number of bytes').
+
+Those need specific bounds checking.
+---
+ base/gsalloc.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+--- end of original header
+
+CVE: CVE-2017-9835
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [git://git.ghostscript.com/ghostpdl.git]
+
+Signed-off-by: Joe Slater <joe.slater@windriver.com>
+
+diff --git a/base/gsalloc.c b/base/gsalloc.c
+index 741ba00..10c04dd 100644
+--- a/base/gsalloc.c
++++ b/base/gsalloc.c
+@@ -1248,19 +1248,32 @@ i_alloc_struct_immovable(gs_memory_t * mem, gs_memory_type_ptr_t pstype,
+ alloc_trace("|+<.", imem, cname, pstype, size, obj);
+ return obj;
+ }
++
++static inline bool
++alloc_array_check_size(ulong num_elements, ulong elt_size, ulong *lsize)
++{
++ int64_t s = (int64_t)num_elements * elt_size;
++ if (s > max_uint) {
++ return false;
++ }
++ *lsize = (ulong)s;
++ return true;
++}
++
+ static byte *
+ i_alloc_byte_array(gs_memory_t * mem, uint num_elements, uint elt_size,
+ client_name_t cname)
+ {
+ gs_ref_memory_t * const imem = (gs_ref_memory_t *)mem;
+ obj_header_t *obj;
+-
++ ulong lsize;
+ #ifdef MEMENTO
+ if (Memento_failThisEvent())
+ return NULL;
+ #endif
+-
+- obj = alloc_obj(imem, (ulong) num_elements * elt_size,
++ if (alloc_array_check_size(num_elements, elt_size, &lsize) == false)
++ return NULL;
++ obj = alloc_obj(imem, lsize,
+ &st_bytes, ALLOC_DIRECT, cname);
+
+ if_debug6m('A', mem, "[a%d:+b.]%s -bytes-*(%lu=%u*%u) = 0x%lx\n",
+@@ -1275,13 +1288,14 @@ i_alloc_byte_array_immovable(gs_memory_t * mem, uint num_elements,
+ {
+ gs_ref_memory_t * const imem = (gs_ref_memory_t *)mem;
+ obj_header_t *obj;
+-
++ ulong lsize;
+ #ifdef MEMENTO
+ if (Memento_failThisEvent())
+ return NULL;
+ #endif
+-
+- obj = alloc_obj(imem, (ulong) num_elements * elt_size,
++ if (alloc_array_check_size(num_elements, elt_size, &lsize) == false)
++ return NULL;
++ obj = alloc_obj(imem, lsize,
+ &st_bytes, ALLOC_IMMOVABLE | ALLOC_DIRECT,
+ cname);
+
+@@ -1297,7 +1311,7 @@ i_alloc_struct_array(gs_memory_t * mem, uint num_elements,
+ {
+ gs_ref_memory_t * const imem = (gs_ref_memory_t *)mem;
+ obj_header_t *obj;
+-
++ ulong lsize;
+ #ifdef MEMENTO
+ if (Memento_failThisEvent())
+ return NULL;
+@@ -1311,9 +1325,9 @@ i_alloc_struct_array(gs_memory_t * mem, uint num_elements,
+ return NULL; /* fail */
+ }
+ #endif
+- obj = alloc_obj(imem,
+- (ulong) num_elements * pstype->ssize,
+- pstype, ALLOC_DIRECT, cname);
++ if (alloc_array_check_size(num_elements, pstype->ssize, &lsize) == false)
++ return NULL;
++ obj = alloc_obj(imem, lsize, pstype, ALLOC_DIRECT, cname);
+ if_debug7m('A', mem, "[a%d:+<.]%s %s*(%lu=%u*%u) = 0x%lx\n",
+ alloc_trace_space(imem), client_name_string(cname),
+ struct_type_name_string(pstype),
+@@ -1327,16 +1341,16 @@ i_alloc_struct_array_immovable(gs_memory_t * mem, uint num_elements,
+ {
+ gs_ref_memory_t * const imem = (gs_ref_memory_t *)mem;
+ obj_header_t *obj;
+-
++ ulong lsize;
+ #ifdef MEMENTO
+ if (Memento_failThisEvent())
+ return NULL;
+ #endif
+
+ ALLOC_CHECK_SIZE(mem,pstype);
+- obj = alloc_obj(imem,
+- (ulong) num_elements * pstype->ssize,
+- pstype, ALLOC_IMMOVABLE | ALLOC_DIRECT, cname);
++ if (alloc_array_check_size(num_elements, pstype->ssize, &lsize) == false)
++ return NULL;
++ obj = alloc_obj(imem, lsize, pstype, ALLOC_IMMOVABLE | ALLOC_DIRECT, cname);
+ if_debug7m('A', mem, "[a%d|+<.]%s %s*(%lu=%u*%u) = 0x%lx\n",
+ alloc_trace_space(imem), client_name_string(cname),
+ struct_type_name_string(pstype),
+--
+1.7.9.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.21.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.21.bb
index 93589cc..bf985c4 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.21.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/ghostscript/ghostscript_9.21.bb
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ SRC_URI = "${SRC_URI_BASE} \
file://CVE-2017-9612.patch \
file://CVE-2017-9739.patch \
file://CVE-2017-9726.patch \
+ file://CVE-2017-9727.patch \
+ file://CVE-2017-9835.patch \
+ file://CVE-2017-11714.patch \
"
SRC_URI_class-native = "${SRC_URI_BASE} \
--
2.7.4
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