[PATCH 1/3] systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16864

[PATCH 1/3] systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16864

[Marcus Cooper]

Affects < v240

Signed-off-by: Marcus Cooper <marcusc@axis.com>
---
 ...-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch | 204 +++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb           |   1 +
 2 files changed, 205 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c3009545b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+From fe19f5a9d0d8b9977e9507a9b66c3cc66744cd38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 18:38:39 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] journald: do not store the iovec entry for process
+ commandline on stack
+
+This fixes a crash where we would read the commandline, whose length is under
+control of the sending program, and then crash when trying to create a stack
+allocation for it.
+
+CVE-2018-16864
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653855
+
+The message actually doesn't get written to disk, because
+journal_file_append_entry() returns -E2BIG.
+
+Patch backported from systemd master at
+084eeb865ca63887098e0945fb4e93c852b91b0f.
+---
+ src/basic/io-util.c           | 10 ++++++++++
+ src/basic/io-util.h           |  2 ++
+ src/coredump/coredump.c       | 31 +++++++++++--------------------
+ src/journal/journald-server.c | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
+ 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/io-util.c b/src/basic/io-util.c
+index 1f64cc933b..575398fbe6 100644
+--- a/src/basic/io-util.c
++++ b/src/basic/io-util.c
+@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ #include "io-util.h"
++#include "string-util.h"
+ #include "time-util.h"
+ 
+ int flush_fd(int fd) {
+@@ -252,3 +253,12 @@ ssize_t sparse_write(int fd, const void *p, size_t sz, size_t run_length) {
+ 
+         return q - (const uint8_t*) p;
+ }
++
++char* set_iovec_string_field(struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, const char *value) {
++        char *x;
++
++        x = strappend(field, value);
++        if (x)
++                iovec[(*n_iovec)++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(x);
++        return x;
++}
+diff --git a/src/basic/io-util.h b/src/basic/io-util.h
+index ed189b5820..792a64ad5e 100644
+--- a/src/basic/io-util.h
++++ b/src/basic/io-util.h
+@@ -71,3 +71,5 @@ static inline bool FILE_SIZE_VALID_OR_INFINITY(uint64_t l) {
+ #define IOVEC_MAKE(base, len) (struct iovec) IOVEC_INIT(base, len)
+ #define IOVEC_INIT_STRING(string) IOVEC_INIT((char*) string, strlen(string))
+ #define IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(string) (struct iovec) IOVEC_INIT_STRING(string)
++
++char* set_iovec_string_field(struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, const char *value);
+diff --git a/src/coredump/coredump.c b/src/coredump/coredump.c
+index 20a1cbdd45..18e4f61d72 100644
+--- a/src/coredump/coredump.c
++++ b/src/coredump/coredump.c
+@@ -1053,19 +1053,10 @@ static int send_iovec(const struct iovec iovec[], size_t n_iovec, int input_fd)
+         return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-static char* set_iovec_field(struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, const char *value) {
+-        char *x;
+-
+-        x = strappend(field, value);
+-        if (x)
+-                iovec[(*n_iovec)++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(x);
+-        return x;
+-}
+-
+ static char* set_iovec_field_free(struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n_iovec, const char *field, char *value) {
+         char *x;
+ 
+-        x = set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, field, value);
++        x = set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, field, value);
+         free(value);
+         return x;
+ }
+@@ -1115,36 +1106,36 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata(
+                         disable_coredumps();
+                 }
+ 
+-                set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UNIT=", context[CONTEXT_UNIT]);
++                set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UNIT=", context[CONTEXT_UNIT]);
+         }
+ 
+         if (cg_pid_get_user_unit(pid, &t) >= 0)
+                 set_iovec_field_free(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_USER_UNIT=", t);
+ 
+         /* The next few are mandatory */
+-        if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_PID=", context[CONTEXT_PID]))
++        if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_PID=", context[CONTEXT_PID]))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+-        if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UID=", context[CONTEXT_UID]))
++        if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_UID=", context[CONTEXT_UID]))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+-        if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_GID=", context[CONTEXT_GID]))
++        if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_GID=", context[CONTEXT_GID]))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+-        if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL=", context[CONTEXT_SIGNAL]))
++        if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL=", context[CONTEXT_SIGNAL]))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+-        if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_RLIMIT=", context[CONTEXT_RLIMIT]))
++        if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_RLIMIT=", context[CONTEXT_RLIMIT]))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+-        if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_HOSTNAME=", context[CONTEXT_HOSTNAME]))
++        if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_HOSTNAME=", context[CONTEXT_HOSTNAME]))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+-        if (!set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_COMM=", context[CONTEXT_COMM]))
++        if (!set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_COMM=", context[CONTEXT_COMM]))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+         if (context[CONTEXT_EXE] &&
+-            !set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_EXE=", context[CONTEXT_EXE]))
++            !set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_EXE=", context[CONTEXT_EXE]))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+         if (sd_pid_get_session(pid, &t) >= 0)
+@@ -1212,7 +1203,7 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata(
+                 iovec[(*n_iovec)++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(t);
+ 
+         if (safe_atoi(context[CONTEXT_SIGNAL], &signo) >= 0 && SIGNAL_VALID(signo))
+-                set_iovec_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL_NAME=SIG", signal_to_string(signo));
++                set_iovec_string_field(iovec, n_iovec, "COREDUMP_SIGNAL_NAME=SIG", signal_to_string(signo));
+ 
+         return 0; /* we successfully acquired all metadata */
+ }
+diff --git a/src/journal/journald-server.c b/src/journal/journald-server.c
+index 4f1550ec5b..31be085c6b 100644
+--- a/src/journal/journald-server.c
++++ b/src/journal/journald-server.c
+@@ -753,6 +753,7 @@ static void dispatch_message_real(
+                 pid_t object_pid) {
+ 
+         char source_time[sizeof("_SOURCE_REALTIME_TIMESTAMP=") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(usec_t)];
++        _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline1 = NULL, *cmdline2 = NULL;
+         uid_t journal_uid;
+         ClientContext *o;
+ 
+@@ -769,20 +770,23 @@ static void dispatch_message_real(
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->uid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "_UID");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->gid, gid_t, gid_is_valid, GID_FMT, "_GID");
+ 
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->comm, "_COMM");
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->exe, "_EXE");
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->cmdline, "_CMDLINE");
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->capeff, "_CAP_EFFECTIVE");
++                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->comm, "_COMM"); /* At most TASK_COMM_LENGTH (16 bytes) */
++                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->exe, "_EXE"); /* A path, so at most PATH_MAX (4096 bytes) */
+ 
+-                IOVEC_ADD_SIZED_FIELD(iovec, n, c->label, c->label_size, "_SELINUX_CONTEXT");
++                if (c->cmdline)
++                        /* At most _SC_ARG_MAX (2MB usually), which is too much to put on stack.
++                         * Let's use a heap allocation for this one. */
++                        cmdline1 = set_iovec_string_field(iovec, &n, "_CMDLINE=", c->cmdline);
+ 
++                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->capeff, "_CAP_EFFECTIVE"); /* Read from /proc/.../status */
++                IOVEC_ADD_SIZED_FIELD(iovec, n, c->label, c->label_size, "_SELINUX_CONTEXT");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->auditid, uint32_t, audit_session_is_valid, "%" PRIu32, "_AUDIT_SESSION");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->loginuid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "_AUDIT_LOGINUID");
+ 
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->cgroup, "_SYSTEMD_CGROUP");
++                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->cgroup, "_SYSTEMD_CGROUP"); /* A path */
+                 IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->session, "_SYSTEMD_SESSION");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, c->owner_uid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "_SYSTEMD_OWNER_UID");
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->unit, "_SYSTEMD_UNIT");
++                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->unit, "_SYSTEMD_UNIT"); /* Unit names are bounded by UNIT_NAME_MAX */
+                 IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->user_unit, "_SYSTEMD_USER_UNIT");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->slice, "_SYSTEMD_SLICE");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, c->user_slice, "_SYSTEMD_USER_SLICE");
+@@ -803,13 +807,14 @@ static void dispatch_message_real(
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->uid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "OBJECT_UID");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->gid, gid_t, gid_is_valid, GID_FMT, "OBJECT_GID");
+ 
++                /* See above for size limits, only ->cmdline may be large, so use a heap allocation for it. */
+                 IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->comm, "OBJECT_COMM");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->exe, "OBJECT_EXE");
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->cmdline, "OBJECT_CMDLINE");
+-                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->capeff, "OBJECT_CAP_EFFECTIVE");
++                if (o->cmdline)
++                        cmdline2 = set_iovec_string_field(iovec, &n, "OBJECT_CMDLINE=", o->cmdline);
+ 
++                IOVEC_ADD_STRING_FIELD(iovec, n, o->capeff, "OBJECT_CAP_EFFECTIVE");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_SIZED_FIELD(iovec, n, o->label, o->label_size, "OBJECT_SELINUX_CONTEXT");
+-
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->auditid, uint32_t, audit_session_is_valid, "%" PRIu32, "OBJECT_AUDIT_SESSION");
+                 IOVEC_ADD_NUMERIC_FIELD(iovec, n, o->loginuid, uid_t, uid_is_valid, UID_FMT, "OBJECT_AUDIT_LOGINUID");
+ 
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb
index c146897508..94729a6a39 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
            file://0001-sysctl-Don-t-pass-null-directive-argument-to-s.patch \
            file://0002-core-Fix-use-after-free-case-in-load_from_path.patch \
            file://0001-meson-rename-Ddebug-to-Ddebug-extra.patch \
+           file://0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch \
            "
 
 # patches made for musl are only applied on TCLIBC is musl
-- 
2.11.0

[PATCH 2/3] systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16865

[Marcus Cooper]

Affects < v240

Signed-off-by: Marcus Cooper <marcusc@axis.com>
---
 ...ld-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch | 56 +++++++++++++++
 ...ote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb           |  2 +
 3 files changed, 142 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..50a01efe8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From 4566aaf97f5b4143b930d75628f3abc905249dcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 22:45:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] journald: set a limit on the number of fields (1k)
+
+We allocate a iovec entry for each field, so with many short entries,
+our memory usage and processing time can be large, even with a relatively
+small message size. Let's refuse overly long entries.
+
+CVE-2018-16865
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861
+
+What from I can see, the problem is not from an alloca, despite what the CVE
+description says, but from the attack multiplication that comes from creating
+many very small iovecs: (void* + size_t) for each three bytes of input message.
+
+Patch backported from systemd master at
+052c57f132f04a3cf4148f87561618da1a6908b4.
+---
+ src/basic/journal-importer.h  | 3 +++
+ src/journal/journald-native.c | 5 +++++
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/journal-importer.h b/src/basic/journal-importer.h
+index f49ce734a1..c4ae45d32d 100644
+--- a/src/basic/journal-importer.h
++++ b/src/basic/journal-importer.h
+@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
+ #define DATA_SIZE_MAX (1024*1024*768u)
+ #define LINE_CHUNK 8*1024u
+ 
++/* The maximum number of fields in an entry */
++#define ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX 1024
++
+ struct iovec_wrapper {
+         struct iovec *iovec;
+         size_t size_bytes;
+diff --git a/src/journal/journald-native.c b/src/journal/journald-native.c
+index 5ff22a10af..951d092053 100644
+--- a/src/journal/journald-native.c
++++ b/src/journal/journald-native.c
+@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static int server_process_entry(
+                 }
+ 
+                 /* A property follows */
++                if (n > ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) {
++                        log_debug("Received an entry that has more than " STRINGIFY(ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) " fields, ignoring entry.");
++                        r = 1;
++                        goto finish;
++                }
+ 
+                 /* n existing properties, 1 new, +1 for _TRANSPORT */
+                 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovec, m,
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..104945cc25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From 4183ec3a135663128834ca8b35d50a60999343a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+Date: Fri, 7 Dec 2018 10:48:10 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] journal-remote: set a limit on the number of fields in a
+ message
+
+Existing use of E2BIG is replaced with ENOBUFS (entry too long), and E2BIG is
+reused for the new error condition (too many fields).
+
+This matches the change done for systemd-journald, hence forming the second
+part of the fix for CVE-2018-16865
+(https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861).
+
+Patch backported from systemd master at
+ef4d6abe7c7fab6cbff975b32e76b09feee56074.
+---
+ src/basic/journal-importer.c             |  5 ++++-
+ src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c | 10 ++++++----
+ src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c      |  5 ++++-
+ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/basic/journal-importer.c b/src/basic/journal-importer.c
+index ca203bbbfc..3ac55a66d9 100644
+--- a/src/basic/journal-importer.c
++++ b/src/basic/journal-importer.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ enum {
+ };
+ 
+ static int iovw_put(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, void* data, size_t len) {
++        if (iovw->count >= ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX)
++                return -E2BIG;
++
+         if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovw->iovec, iovw->size_bytes, iovw->count + 1))
+                 return log_oom();
+ 
+@@ -98,7 +101,7 @@ static int get_line(JournalImporter *imp, char **line, size_t *size) {
+                 imp->scanned = imp->filled;
+                 if (imp->scanned >= DATA_SIZE_MAX) {
+                         log_error("Entry is bigger than %u bytes.", DATA_SIZE_MAX);
+-                        return -E2BIG;
++                        return -ENOBUFS;
+                 }
+ 
+                 if (imp->passive_fd)
+diff --git a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
+index 8fda9d1499..f52618fb7b 100644
+--- a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
++++ b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
+@@ -212,10 +212,12 @@ static int process_http_upload(
+                         break;
+                 else if (r < 0) {
+                         log_warning("Failed to process data for connection %p", connection);
+-                        if (r == -E2BIG)
+-                                return mhd_respondf(connection,
+-                                                    r, MHD_HTTP_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,
+-                                                    "Entry is too large, maximum is " STRINGIFY(DATA_SIZE_MAX) " bytes.");
++                        if (r == -ENOBUFS)
++                                log_warning_errno(r, "Entry is above the maximum of %u, aborting connection %p.",
++                                                  DATA_SIZE_MAX, connection);
++                        else if (r == -E2BIG)
++                                log_warning_errno(r, "Entry with more fields than the maximum of %u, aborting connection %p.",
++                                                  ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX, connection);
+                         else
+                                 return mhd_respondf(connection,
+                                                     r, MHD_HTTP_UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
+diff --git a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
+index beb75a1cb4..67e3a70c06 100644
+--- a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
++++ b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
+@@ -408,7 +408,10 @@ int journal_remote_handle_raw_source(
+                 log_debug("%zu active sources remaining", s->active);
+                 return 0;
+         } else if (r == -E2BIG) {
+-                log_notice_errno(E2BIG, "Entry too big, skipped");
++                log_notice("Entry with too many fields, skipped");
++                return 1;
++        } else if (r == -ENOBUFS) {
++                log_notice("Entry too big, skipped");
+                 return 1;
+         } else if (r == -EAGAIN) {
+                 return 0;
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb
index 94729a6a39..cc498a7da4 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
            file://0002-core-Fix-use-after-free-case-in-load_from_path.patch \
            file://0001-meson-rename-Ddebug-to-Ddebug-extra.patch \
            file://0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch \
+           file://0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch \
+           file://0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch \
            "
 
 # patches made for musl are only applied on TCLIBC is musl
-- 
2.11.0

[PATCH 3/3] systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16866

[Marcus Cooper]

Affects < v240

Signed-off-by: Marcus Cooper <marcusc@axis.com>
---
 .../0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++
 ...not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb           |  2 +
 3 files changed, 163 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d4df0e12fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+From 8ccebb04e07628f7fe10131d6cd4f19d6a0d8f45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yu Watanabe <watanabe.yu+github@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 8 Aug 2018 15:06:36 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] journal: fix syslog_parse_identifier()
+
+Fixes #9829.
+
+An out of bounds read was discovered in systemd-journald in the way it
+parses log messages that terminate with a colon ':'. A local attacker
+can use this flaw to disclose process memory data.
+
+Patch backported from systemd master at
+a6aadf4ae0bae185dc4c414d492a4a781c80ffe5.
+
+This matches the change done for systemd-journald, hence forming the first
+part of the fix for CVE-2018-16866.
+---
+ src/journal/journald-syslog.c     |  6 +++---
+ src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c | 10 ++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
+index 9dea116722..97711ac7a3 100644
+--- a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
++++ b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
+@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid)
+         e = l;
+         l--;
+ 
+-        if (p[l-1] == ']') {
++        if (l > 0 && p[l-1] == ']') {
+                 size_t k = l-1;
+ 
+                 for (;;) {
+@@ -219,8 +219,8 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid)
+         if (t)
+                 *identifier = t;
+ 
+-        if (strchr(WHITESPACE, p[e]))
+-                e++;
++        e += strspn(p + e, WHITESPACE);
++
+         *buf = p + e;
+         return e;
+ }
+diff --git a/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c b/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
+index 9ba86f6c8a..05f759817e 100644
+--- a/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
++++ b/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
+@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
+ #include "macro.h"
+ #include "string-util.h"
+ 
+-static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char* str,
+-                                         const char *ident, const char*pid, int ret) {
++static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char *str,
++                                         const char *ident, const char *pid, int ret) {
+         const char *buf = str;
+         _cleanup_free_ char *ident2 = NULL, *pid2 = NULL;
+         int ret2;
+@@ -21,7 +21,13 @@ static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char* str,
+ int main(void) {
+         test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu[111]: xxx", "pidu", "111", 11);
+         test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: xxx", "pidu", NULL, 6);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:  xxx", "pidu", NULL, 7);
+         test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu xxx", NULL, NULL, 0);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier(":", "", NULL, 1);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier(":  ", "", NULL, 3);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:", "pidu", NULL, 5);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: ", "pidu", NULL, 6);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu : ", NULL, NULL, 0);
+ 
+         return 0;
+ }
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fa2c01034b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From c3a7da1bbb6d2df8ab7ea1c7ce34ded37a21959f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yu Watanabe <watanabe.yu+github@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 10 Aug 2018 11:07:54 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH] journal: do not remove multiple spaces after identifier in
+ syslog message
+
+Single space is used as separator.
+C.f. discussions in #156.
+
+Fixes #9839 introduced by a6aadf4ae0bae185dc4c414d492a4a781c80ffe5.
+
+Patch backported from systemd master at
+8595102d3ddde6d25c282f965573a6de34ab4421.
+
+This matches the change done for systemd-journald, hence forming the second
+part of the fix for CVE-2018-16866
+---
+ src/journal/journald-syslog.c     |  4 +++-
+ src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c | 24 ++++++++++++++----------
+ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
+index 97711ac7a3..e0b55cc566 100644
+--- a/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
++++ b/src/journal/journald-syslog.c
+@@ -219,7 +219,9 @@ size_t syslog_parse_identifier(const char **buf, char **identifier, char **pid)
+         if (t)
+                 *identifier = t;
+ 
+-        e += strspn(p + e, WHITESPACE);
++        /* Single space is used as separator */
++        if (p[e] != '\0' && strchr(WHITESPACE, p[e]))
++                e++;
+ 
+         *buf = p + e;
+         return e;
+diff --git a/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c b/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
+index 05f759817e..7294cde032 100644
+--- a/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
++++ b/src/journal/test-journal-syslog.c
+@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
+ #include "string-util.h"
+ 
+ static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char *str,
+-                                         const char *ident, const char *pid, int ret) {
++                                         const char *ident, const char *pid, const char *rest, int ret) {
+         const char *buf = str;
+         _cleanup_free_ char *ident2 = NULL, *pid2 = NULL;
+         int ret2;
+@@ -16,18 +16,22 @@ static void test_syslog_parse_identifier(const char *str,
+         assert_se(ret == ret2);
+         assert_se(ident == ident2 || streq_ptr(ident, ident2));
+         assert_se(pid == pid2 || streq_ptr(pid, pid2));
++        assert_se(streq(buf, rest));
+ }
+ 
+ int main(void) {
+-        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu[111]: xxx", "pidu", "111", 11);
+-        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: xxx", "pidu", NULL, 6);
+-        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:  xxx", "pidu", NULL, 7);
+-        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu xxx", NULL, NULL, 0);
+-        test_syslog_parse_identifier(":", "", NULL, 1);
+-        test_syslog_parse_identifier(":  ", "", NULL, 3);
+-        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:", "pidu", NULL, 5);
+-        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: ", "pidu", NULL, 6);
+-        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu : ", NULL, NULL, 0);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu[111]: xxx", "pidu", "111", "xxx", 11);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: xxx", "pidu", NULL, "xxx", 6);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:  xxx", "pidu", NULL, " xxx", 6);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu xxx", NULL, NULL, "pidu xxx", 0);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier("   pidu xxx", NULL, NULL, "   pidu xxx", 0);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier("", NULL, NULL, "", 0);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier("  ", NULL, NULL, "  ", 0);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier(":", "", NULL, "", 1);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier(":  ", "", NULL, " ", 2);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu:", "pidu", NULL, "", 5);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu: ", "pidu", NULL, "", 6);
++        test_syslog_parse_identifier("pidu : ", NULL, NULL, "pidu : ", 0);
+ 
+         return 0;
+ }
+-- 
+2.11.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb
index cc498a7da4..7efc1e5828 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_239.bb
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
            file://0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch \
            file://0025-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch \
            file://0026-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch \
+           file://0027-journal-fix-syslog_parse_identifier.patch \
+           file://0028-journal-do-not-remove-multiple-spaces-after-identifi.patch \
            "
 
 # patches made for musl are only applied on TCLIBC is musl
-- 
2.11.0

Re: [PATCH 1/3] systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16864

[Burton, Ross]

On Thu, 24 Jan 2019 at 12:44, Marcus Cooper <marcus.cooper@axis.com> wrote:
> +++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
> +From fe19f5a9d0d8b9977e9507a9b66c3cc66744cd38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
> +Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 18:38:39 +0100
> +Subject: [PATCH] journald: do not store the iovec entry for process
> + commandline on stack
> +
> +This fixes a crash where we would read the commandline, whose length is under
> +control of the sending program, and then crash when trying to create a stack
> +allocation for it.
> +
> +CVE-2018-16864
> +https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653855
> +
> +The message actually doesn't get written to disk, because
> +journal_file_append_entry() returns -E2BIG.
> +
> +Patch backported from systemd master at
> +084eeb865ca63887098e0945fb4e93c852b91b0f.

These patches need a CVE tag (CVE: CVE-2018-16864), and
Upstream-Status tag (Backport), and your Signed-off-by.

Ross

Re: [PATCH 1/3] systemd: Security fix CVE-2018-16864

[Richard Purdie]

On Thu, 2019-01-24 at 15:55 +0000, Burton, Ross wrote:
> On Thu, 24 Jan 2019 at 12:44, Marcus Cooper <marcus.cooper@axis.com>
> wrote:
> > +++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0024-journald-do-not-store-
> > the-iovec-entry-for-process-co.patch
> > @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
> > +From fe19f5a9d0d8b9977e9507a9b66c3cc66744cd38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> > 2001
> > +From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <
> > zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
> > +Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 18:38:39 +0100
> > +Subject: [PATCH] journald: do not store the iovec entry for
> > process
> > + commandline on stack
> > +
> > +This fixes a crash where we would read the commandline, whose
> > length is under
> > +control of the sending program, and then crash when trying to
> > create a stack
> > +allocation for it.
> > +
> > +CVE-2018-16864
> > +https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653855
> > +
> > +The message actually doesn't get written to disk, because
> > +journal_file_append_entry() returns -E2BIG.
> > +
> > +Patch backported from systemd master at
> > +084eeb865ca63887098e0945fb4e93c852b91b0f.
> 
> These patches need a CVE tag (CVE: CVE-2018-16864), and
> Upstream-Status tag (Backport), and your Signed-off-by.

This managed to sneak past me, can you send a follow up patch to fix
this please?

Cheers,

Richard