* [PATCH][dunfell 2/3] python3: fix CVE-2020-26116
2020-10-19 12:59 [PATCH][dunfell 1/3] libproxy: fix CVE-2020-25219 Lee Chee Yang
@ 2020-10-19 12:59 ` Lee Chee Yang
2020-10-19 12:59 ` [PATCH][dunfell 3/3] grub2: fix CVE-2020-10713 Lee Chee Yang
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Lee Chee Yang @ 2020-10-19 12:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
---
.../python/python3/CVE-2020-26116.patch | 104 ++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.2.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 105 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2020-26116.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2020-26116.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2020-26116.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c019db2a76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2020-26116.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+From 668d321476d974c4f51476b33aaca870272523bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
+ <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2020 13:39:12 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] bpo-39603: Prevent header injection in http methods
+ (GH-18485)
+
+reject control chars in http method in http.client.putrequest to prevent http header injection
+(cherry picked from commit 8ca8a2e8fb068863c1138f07e3098478ef8be12e)
+
+Co-authored-by: AMIR <31338382+amiremohamadi@users.noreply.github.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/668d321476d974c4f51476b33aaca870272523bf]
+CVE: CVE-2020-26116
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+
+---
+ Lib/http/client.py | 15 +++++++++++++
+ Lib/test/test_httplib.py | 22 +++++++++++++++++++
+ .../2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst | 2 ++
+ 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py
+index 019380a720318..c2ad0471bfee5 100644
+--- a/Lib/http/client.py
++++ b/Lib/http/client.py
+@@ -147,6 +147,10 @@
+ # _is_allowed_url_pchars_re = re.compile(r"^[/!$&'()*+,;=:@%a-zA-Z0-9._~-]+$")
+ # We are more lenient for assumed real world compatibility purposes.
+
++# These characters are not allowed within HTTP method names
++# to prevent http header injection.
++_contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x1f]')
++
+ # We always set the Content-Length header for these methods because some
+ # servers will otherwise respond with a 411
+ _METHODS_EXPECTING_BODY = {'PATCH', 'POST', 'PUT'}
+@@ -1087,6 +1091,8 @@ def putrequest(self, method, url, skip_host=False,
+ else:
+ raise CannotSendRequest(self.__state)
+
++ self._validate_method(method)
++
+ # Save the method for use later in the response phase
+ self._method = method
+
+@@ -1177,6 +1183,15 @@ def _encode_request(self, request):
+ # ASCII also helps prevent CVE-2019-9740.
+ return request.encode('ascii')
+
++ def _validate_method(self, method):
++ """Validate a method name for putrequest."""
++ # prevent http header injection
++ match = _contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re.search(method)
++ if match:
++ raise ValueError(
++ f"method can't contain control characters. {method!r} "
++ f"(found at least {match.group()!r})")
++
+ def _validate_path(self, url):
+ """Validate a url for putrequest."""
+ # Prevent CVE-2019-9740.
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+index 8f0e27a1fb836..5a5fcecbc9c15 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+@@ -364,6 +364,28 @@ def test_headers_debuglevel(self):
+ self.assertEqual(lines[3], "header: Second: val2")
+
+
++class HttpMethodTests(TestCase):
++ def test_invalid_method_names(self):
++ methods = (
++ 'GET\r',
++ 'POST\n',
++ 'PUT\n\r',
++ 'POST\nValue',
++ 'POST\nHOST:abc',
++ 'GET\nrHost:abc\n',
++ 'POST\rRemainder:\r',
++ 'GET\rHOST:\n',
++ '\nPUT'
++ )
++
++ for method in methods:
++ with self.assertRaisesRegex(
++ ValueError, "method can't contain control characters"):
++ conn = client.HTTPConnection('example.com')
++ conn.sock = FakeSocket(None)
++ conn.request(method=method, url="/")
++
++
+ class TransferEncodingTest(TestCase):
+ expected_body = b"It's just a flesh wound"
+
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000000..990affc3edd9d
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
++Prevent http header injection by rejecting control characters in
++http.client.putrequest(...).
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.2.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.2.bb
index 99d9f6748f..169bc87988 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.2.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.8.2.bb
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.python.org/ftp/python/${PV}/Python-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://0020-configure.ac-setup.py-do-not-add-a-curses-include-pa.patch \
file://0001-bpo-39503-CVE-2020-8492-Fix-AbstractBasicAuthHandler.patch \
file://CVE-2020-14422.patch \
+ file://CVE-2020-26116.patch \
"
SRC_URI_append_class-native = " \
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* [PATCH][dunfell 3/3] grub2: fix CVE-2020-10713
2020-10-19 12:59 [PATCH][dunfell 1/3] libproxy: fix CVE-2020-25219 Lee Chee Yang
2020-10-19 12:59 ` [PATCH][dunfell 2/3] python3: fix CVE-2020-26116 Lee Chee Yang
@ 2020-10-19 12:59 ` Lee Chee Yang
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Lee Chee Yang @ 2020-10-19 12:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
---
.../grub/files/CVE-2020-10713.patch | 73 +++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 +
2 files changed, 74 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-10713.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-10713.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-10713.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c507ed3ea8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/CVE-2020-10713.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From a4d3fbdff1e3ca8f87642af2ac8752c30c617a3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 15:45:02 -0400
+Subject: yylex: Make lexer fatal errors actually be fatal
+
+When presented with a command that can't be tokenized to anything
+smaller than YYLMAX characters, the parser calls YY_FATAL_ERROR(errmsg),
+expecting that will stop further processing, as such:
+
+ #define YY_DO_BEFORE_ACTION \
+ yyg->yytext_ptr = yy_bp; \
+ yyleng = (int) (yy_cp - yy_bp); \
+ yyg->yy_hold_char = *yy_cp; \
+ *yy_cp = '\0'; \
+ if ( yyleng >= YYLMAX ) \
+ YY_FATAL_ERROR( "token too large, exceeds YYLMAX" ); \
+ yy_flex_strncpy( yytext, yyg->yytext_ptr, yyleng + 1 , yyscanner); \
+ yyg->yy_c_buf_p = yy_cp;
+
+The code flex generates expects that YY_FATAL_ERROR() will either return
+for it or do some form of longjmp(), or handle the error in some way at
+least, and so the strncpy() call isn't in an "else" clause, and thus if
+YY_FATAL_ERROR() is *not* actually fatal, it does the call with the
+questionable limit, and predictable results ensue.
+
+Unfortunately, our implementation of YY_FATAL_ERROR() is:
+
+ #define YY_FATAL_ERROR(msg) \
+ do { \
+ grub_printf (_("fatal error: %s\n"), _(msg)); \
+ } while (0)
+
+The same pattern exists in yyless(), and similar problems exist in users
+of YY_INPUT(), several places in the main parsing loop,
+yy_get_next_buffer(), yy_load_buffer_state(), yyensure_buffer_stack,
+yy_scan_buffer(), etc.
+
+All of these callers expect YY_FATAL_ERROR() to actually be fatal, and
+the things they do if it returns after calling it are wildly unsafe.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2020-10713
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=a4d3fbdff1e3ca8f87642af2ac8752c30c617a3e]
+CVE: CVE-2020-10713
+Signed-off-by: Chee Yang Lee <chee.yang.lee@intel.com>
+---
+ grub-core/script/yylex.l | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/script/yylex.l b/grub-core/script/yylex.l
+index 7b44c37b7..b7203c823 100644
+--- a/grub-core/script/yylex.l
++++ b/grub-core/script/yylex.l
+@@ -37,11 +37,11 @@
+
+ /*
+ * As we don't have access to yyscanner, we cannot do much except to
+- * print the fatal error.
++ * print the fatal error and exit.
+ */
+ #define YY_FATAL_ERROR(msg) \
+ do { \
+- grub_printf (_("fatal error: %s\n"), _(msg)); \
++ grub_fatal (_("fatal error: %s\n"), _(msg));\
+ } while (0)
+
+ #define COPY(str, hint) \
+--
+cgit v1.2.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc
index e796904f5b..e3d929a824 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
file://autogen.sh-exclude-pc.patch \
file://grub-module-explicitly-keeps-symbole-.module_license.patch \
file://0001-grub.d-10_linux.in-add-oe-s-kernel-name.patch \
+ file://CVE-2020-10713.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread