[OE-core][scarthgap][patch v2 1/4] libxfont: Drop obsolete md5sum checksum

[OE-core][scarthgap][patch v2 1/4] libxfont: Drop obsolete md5sum checksum

[Vijay Anusuri]

Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb
index fa6585d6dc..9ec7cc30f5 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ XORG_EXT = "tar.bz2"
 
 BBCLASSEXTEND = "native"
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "16eaf156edd79b68038b6a7c44aa9e9b"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1a7f7490774c87f2052d146d1e0e64518d32e6848184a18654e8d0bb57883242"
 
 PACKAGECONFIG ??= "${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'ipv6', d)}"
-- 
2.43.0

[OE-core][scarthgap][patch v2 2/4] libxfont: Fix CVE-2026-56001

[Vijay Anusuri]

Pick patch according to [2]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56001
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-56001

Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
 .../xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56001.patch    | 87 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb                |  3 +
 2 files changed, 90 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56001.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56001.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56001.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1de7f3e037
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56001.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From be0b08e2d354138d3222b4490e2a77c6ee42f778 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 16:46:10 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] bitscale: fix integer overflow in BitmapScaleBitmaps
+ bytestoalloc
+
+bytestoalloc is declared as unsigned int (32-bit). When the sum of
+per-glyph byte counts exceeds 2^32, the value wraps around and calloc()
+allocates a buffer that is too small. The subsequent ScaleBitmap loop
+then writes past the end of the allocated buffer.
+
+Change bytestoalloc from unsigned int to size_t to match the actual
+allocation size type, and add an explicit overflow check in the
+accumulation loop to bail out if the total would exceed SIZE_MAX.
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Anonymous working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative
+
+CVE-2026-56001/ZDI-CAN-30558
+
+Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/merge_requests/34>
+
+Note: 'SIZE_MAX' is defined in header '<stdint.h>'. Add '#include
+<stdint.h>' to fix build failure.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian libxfont1 1.5.2-4+deb9u1
+Upstream commit https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/commit/be0b08e2d354138d3222b4490e2a77c6ee42f778]
+CVE: CVE-2026-56001
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/bitmap/bitscale.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/bitmap/bitscale.c b/src/bitmap/bitscale.c
+index 13ed924..32144d6 100644
+--- a/src/bitmap/bitscale.c
++++ b/src/bitmap/bitscale.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ from The Open Group.
+ #include <X11/fonts/bitmap.h>
+ #include <X11/fonts/fontutil.h>
+ #include <math.h>
++#include <stdint.h>
+ 
+ #ifndef MAX
+ #define   MAX(a,b)    (((a)>(b)) ? a : b)
+@@ -1459,7 +1460,7 @@ BitmapScaleBitmaps(FontPtr pf,          /* scaled font */
+ 		opci;
+     FontInfoPtr pfi;
+     int         glyph;
+-    unsigned    bytestoalloc = 0;
++    size_t      bytestoalloc = 0;
+     int		firstCol, lastCol, firstRow, lastRow;
+ 
+     double	xform[4], inv_xform[4];
+@@ -1486,8 +1487,25 @@ BitmapScaleBitmaps(FontPtr pf,          /* scaled font */
+     glyph = pf->glyph;
+     for (i = 0; i < nchars; i++)
+     {
+-	if ((pci = ACCESSENCODING(bitmapFont->encoding, i)))
+-	    bytestoalloc += BYTES_FOR_GLYPH(pci, glyph);
++	if ((pci = ACCESSENCODING(bitmapFont->encoding, i))) {
++	    size_t glyphsize = BYTES_FOR_GLYPH(pci, glyph);
++	    if (bytestoalloc > SIZE_MAX - glyphsize) {
++		fprintf(stderr,
++			"Error: bitmap allocation overflow for scaled font\n");
++		goto bail;
++	    }
++	    bytestoalloc += glyphsize;
++	}
++    }
++
++    /* Reject unreasonably large bitmap allocations that could result
++     * from malicious fonts with extreme scale factors.  256 MiB is
++     * far beyond any legitimate scaled bitmap font. */
++#define BITMAP_SCALE_MAX_ALLOC	(256 * 1024 * 1024)
++    if (bytestoalloc > BITMAP_SCALE_MAX_ALLOC) {
++	fprintf(stderr,
++		"Error: scaled bitmap size %zu exceeds limit\n", bytestoalloc);
++	goto bail;
+     }
+ 
+     /* Do we add the font malloc stuff for VALUE ADDED ? */
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb
index 9ec7cc30f5..59c489b785 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ XORG_EXT = "tar.bz2"
 
 BBCLASSEXTEND = "native"
 
+SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-56001.patch \
+           "
+
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1a7f7490774c87f2052d146d1e0e64518d32e6848184a18654e8d0bb57883242"
 
 PACKAGECONFIG ??= "${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'ipv6', d)}"
-- 
2.43.0

[OE-core][scarthgap][patch v2 3/4] libxfont: Fix CVE-2026-56002

[Vijay Anusuri]

Pick patch according to [2]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56002
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-56002

Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
 .../xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56002.patch    | 150 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb                |   1 +
 2 files changed, 151 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56002.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56002.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56002.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cef8a06a68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56002.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+From b4389e0b1d84a690b819bb27b1439968811a3674 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 16:48:40 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] pcfread: validate bitmap sizes and offsets against per-glyph
+ metrics
+
+pcfReadFont() uses bitmapSizes[] read directly from the PCF file to
+allocate the repadded bitmap buffer. However, per-glyph metrics (also
+from the file) control how much data RepadBitmap() writes. A malicious
+PCF font can declare a small bitmapSizes[] value while having per-glyph
+metrics that require more space, causing a heap buffer overflow.
+
+A similar issue happens with the encoding offsets: pcfReadFont reads
+encoding offsets from the PCF file and uses them to index into the
+metrics array without bounds checking.  A crafted font can set an
+encoding offset larger than nmetrics, causing an out-of-bounds pointer
+that is later dereferenced when glyphs are accessed through the encoding
+table.
+
+And the no-repad bitmap path (when PCF_GLYPH_PAD matches the requested
+glyph pad) only validated that each glyph's offset was within the bitmap
+buffer, but did not check that the full glyph extent (offset +
+BYTES_PER_ROW * height) fits within the buffer.  A crafted font with a
+glyph offset near the end of a small bitmap buffer but large glyph
+metrics causes a heap buffer over-read when the glyph is later rendered.
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+  Anonymous working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative
+
+CVE-2026-56002/ZDI-CAN-30559
+
+Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/merge_requests/34>
+
+Note: 'INT_MAX' is defined in header '<limits.h>'. Add '#include
+<limits.h>' to fix build failure.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [import from debian libxfont1 1.5.2-4+deb9u1
+Upstream commit https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/commit/b4389e0b1d84a690b819bb27b1439968811a3674]
+CVE: CVE-2026-56002
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/bitmap/pcfread.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/bitmap/pcfread.c b/src/bitmap/pcfread.c
+index 4a372c5..0cc9777 100644
+--- a/src/bitmap/pcfread.c
++++ b/src/bitmap/pcfread.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ from The Open Group.
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdint.h>
+ #include <string.h>
++#include <limits.h>
+ 
+ void
+ pcfError(const char* message, ...)
+@@ -529,25 +530,74 @@ pcfReadFont(FontPtr pFont, FontFilePtr file,
+ 	int         old,
+ 	            new;
+ 	xCharInfo  *metric;
++	int         srcPad = PCF_GLYPH_PAD(format);
+ 
+-	sizepadbitmaps = bitmapSizes[PCF_SIZE_TO_INDEX(glyph)];
+-	padbitmaps = malloc(sizepadbitmaps);
++	/* Compute the actual required size from per-glyph metrics instead
++	 * of trusting the file's bitmapSizes[] value, which may be smaller
++	 * than the actual data written by RepadBitmap. */
++	sizepadbitmaps = 0;
++	for (i = 0; i < nbitmaps; i++) {
++	    int w, h, glyphBytes;
++	    metric = &metrics[i].metrics;
++	    w = metric->rightSideBearing - metric->leftSideBearing;
++	    h = metric->ascent + metric->descent;
++	    glyphBytes = BYTES_PER_ROW(w, glyph) * h;
++	    if (glyphBytes < 0 || (glyphBytes > 0 && sizepadbitmaps > INT_MAX - glyphBytes)) {
++		pcfError("pcfReadFont(): bitmap size overflow\n");
++		goto Bail;
++	    }
++	    sizepadbitmaps += glyphBytes;
++	}
++	padbitmaps = malloc(sizepadbitmaps ? sizepadbitmaps : 1);
+ 	if (!padbitmaps) {
+           pcfError("pcfReadFont(): Couldn't allocate padbitmaps (%d)\n", sizepadbitmaps);
+ 	    goto Bail;
+ 	}
+ 	new = 0;
+ 	for (i = 0; i < nbitmaps; i++) {
++	    int srcGlyphBytes;
++
+ 	    old = offsets[i];
+ 	    metric = &metrics[i].metrics;
++
++	    /* Validate source offset and source glyph size against the
++	     * source bitmap buffer to prevent out-of-bounds reads. */
++	    srcGlyphBytes = BYTES_PER_ROW(
++		metric->rightSideBearing - metric->leftSideBearing,
++		srcPad) * (metric->ascent + metric->descent);
++	    if (old < 0 || old > sizebitmaps ||
++		srcGlyphBytes < 0 || srcGlyphBytes > sizebitmaps - old) {
++		pcfError("pcfReadFont(): bitmap offset/size out of bounds\n");
++		free(padbitmaps);
++		goto Bail;
++	    }
++
+ 	    offsets[i] = new;
+ 	    new += RepadBitmap(bitmaps + old, padbitmaps + new,
+-			       PCF_GLYPH_PAD(format), glyph,
++			       srcPad, glyph,
+ 			  metric->rightSideBearing - metric->leftSideBearing,
+ 			       metric->ascent + metric->descent);
+ 	}
+ 	free(bitmaps);
+ 	bitmaps = padbitmaps;
++    } else {
++	/* Validate offsets and full glyph extents against bitmap buffer */
++	for (i = 0; i < nbitmaps; i++) {
++	    int glyphBytes;
++	    xCharInfo *metric = &metrics[i].metrics;
++
++	    glyphBytes = BYTES_PER_ROW(
++		metric->rightSideBearing - metric->leftSideBearing,
++		glyph) * (metric->ascent + metric->descent);
++	    if (offsets[i] >= (CARD32)sizebitmaps ||
++		glyphBytes < 0 ||
++		glyphBytes > sizebitmaps - (int)offsets[i]) {
++		pcfError("pcfReadFont(): bitmap offset/size out of bounds "
++			 "(offset %u, size %d, total %d)\n",
++			 offsets[i], glyphBytes, sizebitmaps);
++		goto Bail;
++	    }
++	}
+     }
+     for (i = 0; i < nbitmaps; i++)
+ 	metrics[i].bits = bitmaps + offsets[i];
+@@ -622,6 +672,10 @@ pcfReadFont(FontPtr pFont, FontFilePtr file,
+ 	if (IS_EOF(file)) goto Bail;
+ 	if (encodingOffset == 0xFFFF) {
+ 	    pFont->info.allExist = FALSE;
++	} else if (encodingOffset >= nmetrics) {
++	    pcfError("pcfReadFont(): encoding offset %d out of range (nmetrics=%d)\n",
++		     encodingOffset, nmetrics);
++	    goto Bail;
+ 	} else {
+             if(!encoding[SEGMENT_MAJOR(i)]) {
+                 encoding[SEGMENT_MAJOR(i)]=
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb
index 59c489b785..08c96fdac8 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ XORG_EXT = "tar.bz2"
 BBCLASSEXTEND = "native"
 
 SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-56001.patch \
+            file://CVE-2026-56002.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1a7f7490774c87f2052d146d1e0e64518d32e6848184a18654e8d0bb57883242"
-- 
2.43.0

[OE-core][scarthgap][patch v2 4/4] libxfont: Fix CVE-2026-56003

[Vijay Anusuri]

Pick patch according to [2]

[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56003
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-56003

Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
---
 .../xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56003.patch    | 114 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb                |   1 +
 2 files changed, 115 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56003.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56003.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56003.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0092c712d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont/CVE-2026-56003.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+From dff957a5158da038a282a59a31fe736702732939 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 16:49:55 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] bitscale: add bounds check to computeProps for property
+ buffer
+
+ComputeScaledProperties allocates a fixed-size property buffer of 70
+slots. computeProps iterates the source font's properties and writes 1
+slot for unscaled properties or 2 slots for scaledX/scaledY properties,
+with no bounds check. A malicious font with many duplicate properties
+matching fontPropTable entries can overflow the allocated buffer.
+
+Fix this by passing the remaining buffer capacity to computeProps and
+checking it before each write. Properties that would exceed the buffer
+are silently skipped.
+
+The function is also restructured to handle the buffer writes for
+scaledX/scaledY inside the switch cases directly, rather than in a
+separate block after the switch. This makes the control flow clearer and
+ensures the bounds check covers all writes.
+
+This vulnerability was discovered by:
+Anonymous working with TrendAI Zero Day Initiative
+
+CVE-2026-56003/ZDI-CAN-30560
+
+Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
+Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/merge_requests/34>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxfont/-/commit/dff957a5158da038a282a59a31fe736702732939]
+CVE: CVE-2026-56003
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
+---
+ src/bitmap/bitscale.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/bitmap/bitscale.c b/src/bitmap/bitscale.c
+index 32144d6..2affc11 100644
+--- a/src/bitmap/bitscale.c
++++ b/src/bitmap/bitscale.c
+@@ -513,7 +513,8 @@ static int
+ computeProps(FontPropPtr pf, char *wasStringProp,
+ 	     FontPropPtr npf, char *isStringProp,
+ 	     unsigned int nprops, double xfactor, double yfactor,
+-	     double sXfactor, double sYfactor)
++	     double sXfactor, double sYfactor,
++	     int maxprops)
+ {
+     int         n;
+     int         count;
+@@ -528,14 +529,26 @@ computeProps(FontPropPtr pf, char *wasStringProp,
+ 
+ 	switch (t->type) {
+ 	case scaledX:
+-	    npf->value = doround(xfactor * (double)pf->value);
+-	    rawfactor = sXfactor;
+-	    break;
+ 	case scaledY:
+-	    npf->value = doround(yfactor * (double)pf->value);
+-	    rawfactor = sYfactor;
++	    if (count + 2 > maxprops)
++		continue;
++	    npf->value = (t->type == scaledX)
++		? doround(xfactor * (double)pf->value)
++		: doround(yfactor * (double)pf->value);
++	    rawfactor = (t->type == scaledX) ? sXfactor : sYfactor;
++	    npf->name = pf->name;
++	    npf++;
++	    count++;
++	    npf->value = doround(rawfactor * (double)pf->value);
++	    npf->name = rawFontPropTable[t - fontPropTable].atom;
++	    npf++;
++	    count++;
++	    *isStringProp++ = *wasStringProp;
++	    *isStringProp++ = *wasStringProp;
+ 	    break;
+ 	case unscaled:
++	    if (count + 1 > maxprops)
++		continue;
+ 	    npf->value = pf->value;
+ 	    npf->name = pf->name;
+ 	    npf++;
+@@ -545,18 +558,6 @@ computeProps(FontPropPtr pf, char *wasStringProp,
+ 	default:
+ 	    break;
+ 	}
+-	if (t->type != unscaled)
+-	{
+-	    npf->name = pf->name;
+-	    npf++;
+-	    count++;
+-	    npf->value = doround(rawfactor * (double)pf->value);
+-	    npf->name = rawFontPropTable[t - fontPropTable].atom;
+-	    npf++;
+-	    count++;
+-	    *isStringProp++ = *wasStringProp;
+-	    *isStringProp++ = *wasStringProp;
+-	}
+     }
+     return count;
+ }
+@@ -671,7 +672,7 @@ ComputeScaledProperties(FontInfoPtr sourceFontInfo, /* the font to be scaled */
+     n = NPROPS;
+     n += computeProps(sourceFontInfo->props, sourceFontInfo->isStringProp,
+ 		      fp, isStringProp, sourceFontInfo->nprops, dx, dy,
+-		      sdx, sdy);
++		      sdx, sdy, nProps - NPROPS);
+     return n;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb
index 08c96fdac8..e254516fcf 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ BBCLASSEXTEND = "native"
 
 SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2026-56001.patch \
             file://CVE-2026-56002.patch \
+            file://CVE-2026-56003.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1a7f7490774c87f2052d146d1e0e64518d32e6848184a18654e8d0bb57883242"
-- 
2.43.0

Patchtest results for [OE-core][scarthgap][patch v2 1/4] libxfont: Drop obsolete md5sum checksum

[patchtest]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3267 bytes --]

Thank you for your submission. Patchtest identified one
or more issues with the patch. Please see the log below for
more information:

---
Testing patch /home/patchtest/share/mboxes/scarthgap-v2-1-4-libxfont-Drop-obsolete-md5sum-checksum.patch

FAIL: test commit message presence: Please include a commit message on your patch explaining the change (test_mbox.TestMbox.test_commit_message_presence)

PASS: test Signed-off-by presence (test_mbox.TestMbox.test_signed_off_by_presence)
PASS: test auh changelog truncation notice (test_mbox.TestMbox.test_auh_changelog_truncation_notice)
PASS: test author valid (test_mbox.TestMbox.test_author_valid)
PASS: test commit message user tags (test_mbox.TestMbox.test_commit_message_user_tags)
PASS: test max line length (test_metadata.TestMetadata.test_max_line_length)
PASS: test mbox format (test_mbox.TestMbox.test_mbox_format)
PASS: test non-AUH upgrade (test_mbox.TestMbox.test_non_auh_upgrade)
PASS: test shortlog format (test_mbox.TestMbox.test_shortlog_format)
PASS: test shortlog length (test_mbox.TestMbox.test_shortlog_length)
PASS: test target mailing list (test_mbox.TestMbox.test_target_mailing_list)

SKIP: pretest pylint: No python related patches, skipping test (test_python_pylint.PyLint.pretest_pylint)
SKIP: pretest src uri left files: Patch cannot be merged (test_metadata.TestMetadata.pretest_src_uri_left_files)
SKIP: test CVE check ignore: No modified recipes or older target branch, skipping test (test_metadata.TestMetadata.test_cve_check_ignore)
SKIP: test CVE tag format: No new source patches introduced (test_patch.TestPatch.test_cve_tag_format)
SKIP: test Signed-off-by presence: No new source patches introduced (test_patch.TestPatch.test_signed_off_by_presence)
SKIP: test Upstream-Status presence: No new source patches introduced (test_patch.TestPatch.test_upstream_status_presence_format)
SKIP: test bugzilla entry format: No bug ID found (test_mbox.TestMbox.test_bugzilla_entry_format)
SKIP: test lic files chksum modified not mentioned: No modified recipes, skipping test (test_metadata.TestMetadata.test_lic_files_chksum_modified_not_mentioned)
SKIP: test lic files chksum presence: No added recipes, skipping test (test_metadata.TestMetadata.test_lic_files_chksum_presence)
SKIP: test license presence: No added recipes, skipping test (test_metadata.TestMetadata.test_license_presence)
SKIP: test pylint: No python related patches, skipping test (test_python_pylint.PyLint.test_pylint)
SKIP: test series merge on head: Merge test is disabled for now (test_mbox.TestMbox.test_series_merge_on_head)
SKIP: test src uri left files: Patch cannot be merged (test_metadata.TestMetadata.test_src_uri_left_files)
SKIP: test summary presence: No added recipes, skipping test (test_metadata.TestMetadata.test_summary_presence)

---

Please address the issues identified and
submit a new revision of the patch, or alternatively, reply to this
email with an explanation of why the patch should be accepted. If you
believe these results are due to an error in patchtest, please submit a
bug at https://bugzilla.yoctoproject.org/ (use the 'Patchtest' category
under 'Yocto Project Subprojects'). For more information on specific
failures, see: https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Patchtest. Thank
you!

Re: [OE-core][scarthgap][patch v2 1/4] libxfont: Drop obsolete md5sum checksum

[Yoann Congal]

On Sat Sep 12, 2026 at 1:44 PM CEST, Vijay Anusuri via lists.openembedded.org wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <vanusuri@mvista.com>
> ---
>  meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb | 1 -
>  1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb
> index fa6585d6dc..9ec7cc30f5 100644
> --- a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb
> +++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-lib/libxfont_1.5.4.bb
> @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ XORG_EXT = "tar.bz2"
>  
>  BBCLASSEXTEND = "native"
>  
> -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "16eaf156edd79b68038b6a7c44aa9e9b"
>  SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1a7f7490774c87f2052d146d1e0e64518d32e6848184a18654e8d0bb57883242"
>  
>  PACKAGECONFIG ??= "${@bb.utils.filter('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'ipv6', d)}"

Hello,

This is a cleanup and this is not usually accepted under stable policy.
Unless this fixes a real problem, I have to reject it.

FYI, I merged patches 2-4/4 of this series.

Thanks!
-- 
Yoann Congal
Smile ECS