* [PATCH 0/1] nss: CVE-2014-1568
@ 2014-11-06 7:50 Chong Lu
2014-11-06 7:50 ` [PATCH 1/1] " Chong Lu
2014-11-08 0:34 ` [PATCH 0/1] " Burton, Ross
0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Chong Lu @ 2014-11-06 7:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
The following changes since commit 0add8abc12b850e38a6ec7dcf2856fab2c0107b6:
buildtools-tarball: package all of Python (2014-11-05 23:30:49 +0000)
are available in the git repository at:
git://git.pokylinux.org/poky-contrib chonglu/nss
http://git.pokylinux.org/cgit.cgi/poky-contrib/log/?h=chonglu/nss
Chong Lu (1):
nss: CVE-2014-1568
.../nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1568.patch | 670 +++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc | 1 +
2 files changed, 671 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1568.patch
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/1] nss: CVE-2014-1568
2014-11-06 7:50 [PATCH 0/1] nss: CVE-2014-1568 Chong Lu
@ 2014-11-06 7:50 ` Chong Lu
2014-11-08 0:34 ` [PATCH 0/1] " Burton, Ross
1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Chong Lu @ 2014-11-06 7:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
the patch comes from:
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-1568
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1064636
nss ng log:
=====
changeset: 11252:ad411fb64046
user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
date: Tue Sep 23 19:28:34 2014 +0200
summary: Fix bug 1064636, patch part 2, r=rrelyea
=====
changeset: 11253:4e90910ad2f9
user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
date: Tue Sep 23 19:28:45 2014 +0200
summary: Fix bug 1064636, patch part 3, r=rrelyea
=====
changeset: 11254:fb7208e91ae8
user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
date: Tue Sep 23 19:28:52 2014 +0200
summary: Fix bug 1064636, patch part 1, r=rrelyea
=====
changeset: 11255:8dd6c6ac977d
user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
date: Tue Sep 23 19:39:40 2014 +0200
summary: Bug 1064636, follow up commit to fix Windows build bustage
Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Chong Lu <Chong.Lu@windriver.com>
---
.../nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1568.patch | 670 +++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc | 1 +
2 files changed, 671 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1568.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1568.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1568.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbdb00c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1568.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,670 @@
+nss: CVE-2014-1568
+
+the patch comes from:
+http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-1568
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1064636
+nss ng log:
+=====
+changeset: 11252:ad411fb64046
+user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
+date: Tue Sep 23 19:28:34 2014 +0200
+summary: Fix bug 1064636, patch part 2, r=rrelyea
+=====
+changeset: 11253:4e90910ad2f9
+user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
+date: Tue Sep 23 19:28:45 2014 +0200
+summary: Fix bug 1064636, patch part 3, r=rrelyea
+=====
+changeset: 11254:fb7208e91ae8
+user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
+date: Tue Sep 23 19:28:52 2014 +0200
+summary: Fix bug 1064636, patch part 1, r=rrelyea
+=====
+changeset: 11255:8dd6c6ac977d
+user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
+date: Tue Sep 23 19:39:40 2014 +0200
+summary: Bug 1064636, follow up commit to fix Windows build bustage
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang@windriver.com>
+---
+ nss/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c | 202 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c | 69 +++++++--------
+ nss/lib/util/manifest.mn | 2 +
+ nss/lib/util/nssutil.def | 6 ++
+ nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.h | 30 +++++++
+ 6 files changed, 360 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.c
+ create mode 100644 nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.h
+
+diff --git a/nss/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c b/nss/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
+index c1ac39b..0a20672 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
++++ b/nss/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
+@@ -12,78 +12,111 @@
+ #include "secasn1.h"
+ #include "secoid.h"
+ #include "pk11func.h"
++#include "pkcs1sig.h"
+ #include "secdig.h"
+ #include "secerr.h"
+ #include "keyi.h"
+
+ /*
+-** Decrypt signature block using public key
+-** Store the hash algorithm oid tag in *tagp
+-** Store the digest in the digest buffer
+-** Store the digest length in *digestlen
++** Recover the DigestInfo from an RSA PKCS#1 signature.
++**
++** If givenDigestAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, copy givenDigestAlg to digestAlgOut.
++** Otherwise, parse the DigestInfo structure and store the decoded digest
++** algorithm into digestAlgOut.
++**
++** Store the encoded DigestInfo into digestInfo.
++** Store the DigestInfo length into digestInfoLen.
++**
++** This function does *not* verify that the AlgorithmIdentifier in the
++** DigestInfo identifies givenDigestAlg or that the DigestInfo is encoded
++** correctly; verifyPKCS1DigestInfo does that.
++**
+ ** XXX this is assuming that the signature algorithm has WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION
+ */
+ static SECStatus
+-DecryptSigBlock(SECOidTag *tagp, unsigned char *digest,
+- unsigned int *digestlen, unsigned int maxdigestlen,
+- SECKEYPublicKey *key, const SECItem *sig, char *wincx)
++recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(SECOidTag givenDigestAlg,
++ /*out*/ SECOidTag* digestAlgOut,
++ /*out*/ unsigned char** digestInfo,
++ /*out*/ unsigned int* digestInfoLen,
++ SECKEYPublicKey* key,
++ const SECItem* sig, void* wincx)
+ {
+- SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL;
+- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+- SECStatus rv;
+- SECOidTag tag;
+- SECItem it;
+-
+- if (key == NULL) goto loser;
+-
++ SGNDigestInfo* di = NULL;
++ SECItem it;
++ PRBool rv = SECSuccess;
++
++ PORT_Assert(digestAlgOut);
++ PORT_Assert(digestInfo);
++ PORT_Assert(digestInfoLen);
++ PORT_Assert(key);
++ PORT_Assert(key->keyType == rsaKey);
++ PORT_Assert(sig);
++
++ it.data = NULL;
+ it.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(key);
+- if (!it.len) goto loser;
+- it.data = buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(it.len);
+- if (!buf) goto loser;
++ if (it.len != 0) {
++ it.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(it.len);
++ }
++ if (it.len == 0 || it.data == NULL ) {
++ rv = SECFailure;
++ }
+
+- /* decrypt the block */
+- rv = PK11_VerifyRecover(key, (SECItem *)sig, &it, wincx);
+- if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
++ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++ /* decrypt the block */
++ rv = PK11_VerifyRecover(key, sig, &it, wincx);
++ }
+
+- di = SGN_DecodeDigestInfo(&it);
+- if (di == NULL) goto sigloser;
++ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++ if (givenDigestAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
++ /* We don't need to parse the DigestInfo if the caller gave us the
++ * digest algorithm to use. Later verifyPKCS1DigestInfo will verify
++ * that the DigestInfo identifies the given digest algorithm and
++ * that the DigestInfo is encoded absolutely correctly.
++ */
++ *digestInfoLen = it.len;
++ *digestInfo = (unsigned char*)it.data;
++ *digestAlgOut = givenDigestAlg;
++ return SECSuccess;
++ }
++ }
+
+- /*
+- ** Finally we have the digest info; now we can extract the algorithm
+- ** ID and the signature block
+- */
+- tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&di->digestAlgorithm);
+- /* Check that tag is an appropriate algorithm */
+- if (tag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
+- goto sigloser;
+- }
+- /* make sure the "parameters" are not too bogus. */
+- if (di->digestAlgorithm.parameters.len > 2) {
+- goto sigloser;
+- }
+- if (di->digest.len > maxdigestlen) {
+- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
+- goto loser;
++ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++ /* The caller didn't specify a digest algorithm to use, so choose the
++ * digest algorithm by parsing the AlgorithmIdentifier within the
++ * DigestInfo.
++ */
++ di = SGN_DecodeDigestInfo(&it);
++ if (!di) {
++ rv = SECFailure;
++ }
+ }
+- PORT_Memcpy(digest, di->digest.data, di->digest.len);
+- *tagp = tag;
+- *digestlen = di->digest.len;
+- goto done;
+
+- sigloser:
+- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
++ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++ *digestAlgOut = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&di->digestAlgorithm);
++ if (*digestAlgOut == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
++ rv = SECFailure;
++ }
++ }
+
+- loser:
+- rv = SECFailure;
++ if (di) {
++ SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
++ }
++
++ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++ *digestInfoLen = it.len;
++ *digestInfo = (unsigned char*)it.data;
++ } else {
++ if (it.data) {
++ PORT_Free(it.data);
++ }
++ *digestInfo = NULL;
++ *digestInfoLen = 0;
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
++ }
+
+- done:
+- if (di != NULL) SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
+- if (buf != NULL) PORT_Free(buf);
+-
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+-
+ struct VFYContextStr {
+ SECOidTag hashAlg; /* the hash algorithm */
+ SECKEYPublicKey *key;
+@@ -99,14 +132,14 @@ struct VFYContextStr {
+ union {
+ unsigned char buffer[1];
+
+- /* the digest in the decrypted RSA signature */
+- unsigned char rsadigest[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ /* the full DSA signature... 40 bytes */
+ unsigned char dsasig[DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN];
+ /* the full ECDSA signature */
+ unsigned char ecdsasig[2 * MAX_ECKEY_LEN];
+ } u;
+- unsigned int rsadigestlen;
++ unsigned int pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen;
++ /* the encoded DigestInfo from a RSA PKCS#1 signature */
++ unsigned char *pkcs1RSADigestInfo;
+ void * wincx;
+ void *hashcx;
+ const SECHashObject *hashobj;
+@@ -117,6 +150,17 @@ struct VFYContextStr {
+ * VFY_EndWithSignature call. */
+ };
+
++static SECStatus
++verifyPKCS1DigestInfo(const VFYContext* cx, const SECItem* digest)
++{
++ SECItem pkcs1DigestInfo;
++ pkcs1DigestInfo.data = cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo;
++ pkcs1DigestInfo.len = cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen;
++ return _SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo(
++ cx->hashAlg, digest, &pkcs1DigestInfo,
++ PR_TRUE /*XXX: unsafeAllowMissingParameters*/);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * decode the ECDSA or DSA signature from it's DER wrapping.
+ * The unwrapped/raw signature is placed in the buffer pointed
+@@ -376,16 +420,16 @@ vfy_CreateContext(const SECKEYPublicKey *key, const SECItem *sig,
+ cx->encAlg = encAlg;
+ cx->hashAlg = hashAlg;
+ cx->key = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(key);
++ cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo = NULL;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ if (sig) {
+ switch (type) {
+ case rsaKey:
+- rv = DecryptSigBlock(&cx->hashAlg, cx->u.buffer, &cx->rsadigestlen,
+- HASH_LENGTH_MAX, cx->key, sig, (char*)wincx);
+- if (cx->hashAlg != hashAlg && hashAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
+- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+- rv = SECFailure;
+- }
++ rv = recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(hashAlg, &cx->hashAlg,
++ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo,
++ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen,
++ cx->key,
++ sig, wincx);
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ case ecKey:
+@@ -469,6 +513,9 @@ VFY_DestroyContext(VFYContext *cx, PRBool freeit)
+ if (cx->key) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(cx->key);
+ }
++ if (cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo) {
++ PORT_Free(cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo);
++ }
+ if (freeit) {
+ PORT_ZFree(cx, sizeof(VFYContext));
+ }
+@@ -548,21 +595,25 @@ VFY_EndWithSignature(VFYContext *cx, SECItem *sig)
+ }
+ break;
+ case rsaKey:
++ {
++ SECItem digest;
++ digest.data = final;
++ digest.len = part;
+ if (sig) {
+- SECOidTag hashid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+- rv = DecryptSigBlock(&hashid, cx->u.buffer, &cx->rsadigestlen,
+- HASH_LENGTH_MAX, cx->key, sig, (char*)cx->wincx);
+- if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (hashid != cx->hashAlg)) {
+- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
++ SECOidTag hashid;
++ PORT_Assert(cx->hashAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN);
++ rv = recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(cx->hashAlg, &hashid,
++ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo,
++ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen,
++ cx->key,
++ sig, cx->wincx);
++ PORT_Assert(cx->hashAlg == hashid);
++ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+- if ((part != cx->rsadigestlen) ||
+- PORT_Memcmp(final, cx->u.buffer, part)) {
+- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+- return SECFailure;
+- }
+- break;
++ return verifyPKCS1DigestInfo(cx, &digest);
++ }
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ return SECFailure; /* shouldn't happen */
+@@ -595,12 +646,7 @@ vfy_VerifyDigest(const SECItem *digest, const SECKEYPublicKey *key,
+ if (cx != NULL) {
+ switch (key->keyType) {
+ case rsaKey:
+- if ((digest->len != cx->rsadigestlen) ||
+- PORT_Memcmp(digest->data, cx->u.buffer, digest->len)) {
+- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+- } else {
+- rv = SECSuccess;
+- }
++ rv = verifyPKCS1DigestInfo(cx, digest);
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ case ecKey:
+diff --git a/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+index 89b5bd8..ba6dcfa 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
++++ b/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include "blapi.h"
+ #include "pkcs11.h"
+ #include "pkcs11i.h"
++#include "pkcs1sig.h"
+ #include "lowkeyi.h"
+ #include "secder.h"
+ #include "secdig.h"
+@@ -2580,54 +2581,42 @@ sftk_hashCheckSign(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
+ }
+
+ SECStatus
+-RSA_HashCheckSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key,
++RSA_HashCheckSign(SECOidTag digestOid, NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key,
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen,
+- unsigned char *digest, unsigned int digestLen)
++ unsigned char *digestData, unsigned int digestLen)
+ {
++ unsigned char *pkcs1DigestInfoData;
++ SECItem pkcs1DigestInfo;
++ SECItem digest;
++ unsigned int bufferSize;
++ SECStatus rv;
+
+- SECItem it;
+- SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL;
+- SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+-
+- it.data = NULL;
+-
+- if (key == NULL) goto loser;
+-
+- it.len = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(key);
+- if (!it.len) goto loser;
++ /* pkcs1DigestInfo.data must be less than key->u.rsa.modulus.len */
++ bufferSize = key->u.rsa.modulus.len;
++ pkcs1DigestInfoData = PORT_ZAlloc(bufferSize);
++ if (!pkcs1DigestInfoData) {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
++ return SECFailure;
++ }
+
+- it.data = (unsigned char *) PORT_Alloc(it.len);
+- if (it.data == NULL) goto loser;
++ pkcs1DigestInfo.data = pkcs1DigestInfoData;
++ pkcs1DigestInfo.len = bufferSize;
+
+ /* decrypt the block */
+- rv = RSA_CheckSignRecover(key, it.data, &it.len, it.len, sig, sigLen);
+- if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
+-
+- di = SGN_DecodeDigestInfo(&it);
+- if (di == NULL) goto loser;
+- if (di->digest.len != digestLen) goto loser;
+-
+- /* make sure the tag is OK */
+- if (SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&di->digestAlgorithm) != hashOid) {
+- goto loser;
+- }
+- /* make sure the "parameters" are not too bogus. */
+- if (di->digestAlgorithm.parameters.len > 2) {
+- goto loser;
+- }
+- /* Now check the signature */
+- if (PORT_Memcmp(digest, di->digest.data, di->digest.len) == 0) {
+- goto done;
++ rv = RSA_CheckSignRecover(key, pkcs1DigestInfo.data,
++ &pkcs1DigestInfo.len, pkcs1DigestInfo.len,
++ sig, sigLen);
++ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
++ } else {
++ digest.data = (PRUint8*) digestData;
++ digest.len = digestLen;
++ rv = _SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo(
++ digestOid, &digest, &pkcs1DigestInfo,
++ PR_TRUE /*XXX: unsafeAllowMissingParameters*/);
+ }
+
+- loser:
+- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+- rv = SECFailure;
+-
+- done:
+- if (it.data != NULL) PORT_Free(it.data);
+- if (di != NULL) SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
+-
++ PORT_Free(pkcs1DigestInfoData);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/nss/lib/util/manifest.mn b/nss/lib/util/manifest.mn
+index ed54a16..9ff3758 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/util/manifest.mn
++++ b/nss/lib/util/manifest.mn
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ EXPORTS = \
+ pkcs11t.h \
+ pkcs11n.h \
+ pkcs11u.h \
++ pkcs1sig.h \
+ portreg.h \
+ secasn1.h \
+ secasn1t.h \
+@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ CSRCS = \
+ nssrwlk.c \
+ nssilock.c \
+ oidstring.c \
++ pkcs1sig.c \
+ portreg.c \
+ secalgid.c \
+ secasn1d.c \
+diff --git a/nss/lib/util/nssutil.def b/nss/lib/util/nssutil.def
+index 86a0ad7..9d98df2 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/util/nssutil.def
++++ b/nss/lib/util/nssutil.def
+@@ -271,3 +271,9 @@ SECITEM_ZfreeArray;
+ ;+ local:
+ ;+ *;
+ ;+};
++;+NSSUTIL_3.17.1 { # NSS Utilities 3.17.1 release
++;+ global:
++_SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo;
++;+ local:
++;+ *;
++;+};
+diff --git a/nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.c b/nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..03b16f5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
++/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
++ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
++ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
++ */
++
++#include "pkcs1sig.h"
++#include "hasht.h"
++#include "secerr.h"
++#include "secasn1t.h"
++#include "secoid.h"
++
++typedef struct pkcs1PrefixStr pkcs1Prefix;
++struct pkcs1PrefixStr {
++ unsigned int len;
++ PRUint8 *data;
++};
++
++typedef struct pkcs1PrefixesStr pkcs1Prefixes;
++struct pkcs1PrefixesStr {
++ unsigned int digestLen;
++ pkcs1Prefix prefixWithParams;
++ pkcs1Prefix prefixWithoutParams;
++};
++
++/* The value for SGN_PKCS1_DIGESTINFO_MAX_PREFIX_LEN_EXCLUDING_OID is based on
++ * the possible prefix encodings as explained below.
++ */
++#define MAX_PREFIX_LEN_EXCLUDING_OID 10
++
++static SECStatus
++encodePrefix(const SECOidData *hashOid, unsigned int digestLen,
++ pkcs1Prefix *prefix, PRBool withParams)
++{
++ /* with params coding is:
++ * Sequence (2 bytes) {
++ * Sequence (2 bytes) {
++ * Oid (2 bytes) {
++ * Oid value (derOid->oid.len)
++ * }
++ * NULL (2 bytes)
++ * }
++ * OCTECT (2 bytes);
++ *
++ * without params coding is:
++ * Sequence (2 bytes) {
++ * Sequence (2 bytes) {
++ * Oid (2 bytes) {
++ * Oid value (derOid->oid.len)
++ * }
++ * }
++ * OCTECT (2 bytes);
++ */
++
++ unsigned int innerSeqLen = 2 + hashOid->oid.len;
++ unsigned int outerSeqLen = 2 + innerSeqLen + 2 + digestLen;
++ unsigned int extra = 0;
++
++ if (withParams) {
++ innerSeqLen += 2;
++ outerSeqLen += 2;
++ extra = 2;
++ }
++
++ if (innerSeqLen >= 128 ||
++ outerSeqLen >= 128 ||
++ (outerSeqLen + 2 - digestLen) >
++ (MAX_PREFIX_LEN_EXCLUDING_OID + hashOid->oid.len)) {
++ /* this is actually a library failure, It shouldn't happen */
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
++ return SECFailure;
++ }
++
++ prefix->len = 6 + hashOid->oid.len + extra + 2;
++ prefix->data = PORT_Alloc(prefix->len);
++ if (!prefix->data) {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
++ return SECFailure;
++ }
++
++ prefix->data[0] = SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE|SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
++ prefix->data[1] = outerSeqLen;
++ prefix->data[2] = SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE|SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
++ prefix->data[3] = innerSeqLen;
++ prefix->data[4] = SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID;
++ prefix->data[5] = hashOid->oid.len;
++ PORT_Memcpy(&prefix->data[6], hashOid->oid.data, hashOid->oid.len);
++ if (withParams) {
++ prefix->data[6 + hashOid->oid.len] = SEC_ASN1_NULL;
++ prefix->data[6 + hashOid->oid.len + 1] = 0;
++ }
++ prefix->data[6 + hashOid->oid.len + extra] = SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
++ prefix->data[6 + hashOid->oid.len + extra + 1] = digestLen;
++
++ return SECSuccess;
++}
++
++SECStatus
++_SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo(SECOidTag digestAlg,
++ const SECItem* digest,
++ const SECItem* dataRecoveredFromSignature,
++ PRBool unsafeAllowMissingParameters)
++{
++ SECOidData *hashOid;
++ pkcs1Prefixes pp;
++ const pkcs1Prefix* expectedPrefix;
++ SECStatus rv, rv2, rv3;
++
++ if (!digest || !digest->data ||
++ !dataRecoveredFromSignature || !dataRecoveredFromSignature->data) {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
++ return SECFailure;
++ }
++
++ hashOid = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(digestAlg);
++ if (hashOid == NULL) {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
++ return SECFailure;
++ }
++
++ pp.digestLen = digest->len;
++ pp.prefixWithParams.data = NULL;
++ pp.prefixWithoutParams.data = NULL;
++
++ rv2 = encodePrefix(hashOid, pp.digestLen, &pp.prefixWithParams, PR_TRUE);
++ rv3 = encodePrefix(hashOid, pp.digestLen, &pp.prefixWithoutParams, PR_FALSE);
++
++ rv = SECSuccess;
++ if (rv2 != SECSuccess || rv3 != SECSuccess) {
++ rv = SECFailure;
++ }
++
++ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++ /* We don't attempt to avoid timing attacks on these comparisons because
++ * signature verification is a public key operation, not a private key
++ * operation.
++ */
++
++ if (dataRecoveredFromSignature->len ==
++ pp.prefixWithParams.len + pp.digestLen) {
++ expectedPrefix = &pp.prefixWithParams;
++ } else if (unsafeAllowMissingParameters &&
++ dataRecoveredFromSignature->len ==
++ pp.prefixWithoutParams.len + pp.digestLen) {
++ expectedPrefix = &pp.prefixWithoutParams;
++ } else {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
++ rv = SECFailure;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++ if (memcmp(dataRecoveredFromSignature->data, expectedPrefix->data,
++ expectedPrefix->len) ||
++ memcmp(dataRecoveredFromSignature->data + expectedPrefix->len,
++ digest->data, digest->len)) {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
++ rv = SECFailure;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (pp.prefixWithParams.data) {
++ PORT_Free(pp.prefixWithParams.data);
++ }
++ if (pp.prefixWithoutParams.data) {
++ PORT_Free(pp.prefixWithoutParams.data);
++ }
++
++ return rv;
++}
+diff --git a/nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.h b/nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7c52b15
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
++/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
++ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
++ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
++ */
++
++#ifndef _PKCS1SIG_H_
++#define _PKCS1SIG_H_
++
++#include "hasht.h"
++#include "seccomon.h"
++#include "secoidt.h"
++
++/* SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo verifies that the length of the digest is correct
++ * for the given algorithm, then verifies that the recovered data from the
++ * PKCS#1 signature is a properly-formatted DigestInfo that identifies the
++ * given digest algorithm, then verifies that the digest in the DigestInfo
++ * matches the given digest.
++ *
++ * dataRecoveredFromSignature must be the result of calling PK11_VerifyRecover
++ * or equivalent.
++ *
++ * If unsafeAllowMissingParameters is true (not recommended), then a DigestInfo
++ * without the mandatory ASN.1 NULL parameter will also be accepted.
++ */
++SECStatus _SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo(SECOidTag digestAlg,
++ const SECItem* digest,
++ const SECItem* dataRecoveredFromSignature,
++ PRBool unsafeAllowMissingParameters);
++
++#endif /* _PKCS1SIG_H_ */
+--
+1.7.9.5
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
index ce7bff4..008bdad 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SRC_URI = "\
file://nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch \
file://nss-CVE-2013-5606.patch \
file://nss-CVE-2014-1544.patch \
+ file://nss-CVE-2014-1568.patch \
"
SRC_URI_append = "\
file://nss.pc.in \
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/1] nss: CVE-2014-1568
2014-11-06 7:50 [PATCH 0/1] nss: CVE-2014-1568 Chong Lu
2014-11-06 7:50 ` [PATCH 1/1] " Chong Lu
@ 2014-11-08 0:34 ` Burton, Ross
2014-11-11 1:50 ` Chong Lu
2014-11-12 5:54 ` akuster808
1 sibling, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Burton, Ross @ 2014-11-08 0:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chong Lu; +Cc: OE-core
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 683 bytes --]
Hi Chong,
On 6 November 2014 07:50, Chong Lu <Chong.Lu@windriver.com> wrote:
> The following changes since commit
> 0add8abc12b850e38a6ec7dcf2856fab2c0107b6:
>
> buildtools-tarball: package all of Python (2014-11-05 23:30:49 +0000)
>
> are available in the git repository at:
>
> git://git.pokylinux.org/poky-contrib chonglu/nss
> http://git.pokylinux.org/cgit.cgi/poky-contrib/log/?h=chonglu/nss
>
> Chong Lu (1):
> nss: CVE-2014-1568
>
Sorry, but we've just merged Saul's upgrade of NSS to 3.17 so this doesn't
apply, and as we're unfrozen now an upgrade to the fixed 3.17.1 seems like
the sensible way forwards. Could you do this upgrade?
Ross
[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 1221 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/1] nss: CVE-2014-1568
2014-11-08 0:34 ` [PATCH 0/1] " Burton, Ross
@ 2014-11-11 1:50 ` Chong Lu
2014-11-12 5:54 ` akuster808
1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Chong Lu @ 2014-11-11 1:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Burton, Ross; +Cc: OE-core
On 11/08/2014 08:34 AM, Burton, Ross wrote:
> Hi Chong,
>
> On 6 November 2014 07:50, Chong Lu <Chong.Lu@windriver.com
> <mailto:Chong.Lu@windriver.com>> wrote:
>
> The following changes since commit
> 0add8abc12b850e38a6ec7dcf2856fab2c0107b6:
>
> buildtools-tarball: package all of Python (2014-11-05 23:30:49
> +0000)
>
> are available in the git repository at:
>
> git://git.pokylinux.org/poky-contrib
> <http://git.pokylinux.org/poky-contrib> chonglu/nss
> http://git.pokylinux.org/cgit.cgi/poky-contrib/log/?h=chonglu/nss
>
> Chong Lu (1):
> nss: CVE-2014-1568
>
>
> Sorry, but we've just merged Saul's upgrade of NSS to 3.17 so this
> doesn't apply, and as we're unfrozen now an upgrade to the fixed
> 3.17.1 seems like the sensible way forwards. Could you do this upgrade?
>
> Ross
Hi Ross,
I've sent a patch to upgrade nss.
Best Regards
Chong
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/1] nss: CVE-2014-1568
2014-11-08 0:34 ` [PATCH 0/1] " Burton, Ross
2014-11-11 1:50 ` Chong Lu
@ 2014-11-12 5:54 ` akuster808
2014-11-12 9:28 ` Burton, Ross
1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: akuster808 @ 2014-11-12 5:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Burton, Ross, Chong Lu; +Cc: OE-core
Would I upgrade nss for dizzy or backport the cve fix (leaning towards
back porting).
- armin
On 11/07/2014 04:34 PM, Burton, Ross wrote:
> Hi Chong,
>
> On 6 November 2014 07:50, Chong Lu <Chong.Lu@windriver.com
> <mailto:Chong.Lu@windriver.com>> wrote:
>
> The following changes since commit
> 0add8abc12b850e38a6ec7dcf2856fab2c0107b6:
>
> buildtools-tarball: package all of Python (2014-11-05 23:30:49 +0000)
>
> are available in the git repository at:
>
> git://git.pokylinux.org/poky-contrib
> <http://git.pokylinux.org/poky-contrib> chonglu/nss
> http://git.pokylinux.org/cgit.cgi/poky-contrib/log/?h=chonglu/nss
>
> Chong Lu (1):
> nss: CVE-2014-1568
>
>
> Sorry, but we've just merged Saul's upgrade of NSS to 3.17 so this
> doesn't apply, and as we're unfrozen now an upgrade to the fixed 3.17.1
> seems like the sensible way forwards. Could you do this upgrade?
>
> Ross
>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/1] nss: CVE-2014-1568
2014-11-12 5:54 ` akuster808
@ 2014-11-12 9:28 ` Burton, Ross
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Burton, Ross @ 2014-11-12 9:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: akuster808; +Cc: OE-core
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 429 bytes --]
Hi Armin,
On 12 November 2014 05:54, akuster808 <akuster808@gmail.com> wrote:
> Would I upgrade nss for dizzy or backport the cve fix (leaning towards
> back porting).
>
For stable releases, unless there's a *very* good reason then backport the
CVE patch instead of upgrading. The recent exception was openssl in daisy
which was upgraded because the number of patches being applied would be
unmanageable!
Ross
[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 862 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2014-11-12 9:28 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2014-11-06 7:50 [PATCH 0/1] nss: CVE-2014-1568 Chong Lu
2014-11-06 7:50 ` [PATCH 1/1] " Chong Lu
2014-11-08 0:34 ` [PATCH 0/1] " Burton, Ross
2014-11-11 1:50 ` Chong Lu
2014-11-12 5:54 ` akuster808
2014-11-12 9:28 ` Burton, Ross
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox