* [PATCH 2/6] curl: Security Advisory - curl - CVE-2014-3613
2014-11-18 16:18 [PATCH 0/6] Dizzy Next Armin Kuster
2014-11-18 16:18 ` [PATCH 1/6] subversion: Security Advisory - subversion - CVE-2014-3528 Armin Kuster
@ 2014-11-18 16:18 ` Armin Kuster
2014-11-18 16:18 ` [PATCH 3/6] curl: Security Advisory - curl - CVE-2014-3620 Armin Kuster
` (3 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2014-11-18 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Chong Lu <Chong.Lu@windriver.com>
By not detecting and rejecting domain names for partial literal IP addresses
properly when parsing received HTTP cookies, libcurl can be fooled to both
sending cookies to wrong sites and into allowing arbitrary sites to set cookies
for others.
(From OE-Core rev: 985ef933208da1dd1f17645613ce08e6ad27e2c1)
Signed-off-by: Chong Lu <Chong.Lu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2014-3613.patch | 269 +++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.37.1.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 270 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2014-3613.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2014-3613.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2014-3613.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e2fee0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2014-3613.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+From 545e322cc8c383ccdfb4ad85a1634c2b719a1adf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tim Ruehsen <tim.ruehsen@gmx.de>
+Date: Tue, 19 Aug 2014 21:01:28 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] cookies: only use full host matches for hosts used as IP
+ address
+
+By not detecting and rejecting domain names for partial literal IP
+addresses properly when parsing received HTTP cookies, libcurl can be
+fooled to both send cookies to wrong sites and to allow arbitrary sites
+to set cookies for others.
+
+CVE-2014-3613
+
+Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20140910A.html
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+
+Signed-off-by: Chong Lu <Chong.Lu@windriver.com>
+---
+ lib/cookie.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ tests/data/test1105 | 3 +--
+ tests/data/test31 | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
+ tests/data/test8 | 3 ++-
+ 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c
+index 0590643..46904ac 100644
+--- a/lib/cookie.c
++++ b/lib/cookie.c
+@@ -93,10 +93,11 @@ Example set of cookies:
+ #include "curl_memory.h"
+ #include "share.h"
+ #include "strtoofft.h"
+ #include "rawstr.h"
+ #include "curl_memrchr.h"
++#include "inet_pton.h"
+
+ /* The last #include file should be: */
+ #include "memdebug.h"
+
+ static void freecookie(struct Cookie *co)
+@@ -317,10 +318,32 @@ static void remove_expired(struct CookieInfo *cookies)
+ }
+ co = nx;
+ }
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Return true if the given string is an IP(v4|v6) address.
++ */
++static bool isip(const char *domain)
++{
++ struct in_addr addr;
++#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
++ struct in6_addr addr6;
++#endif
++
++ if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, domain, &addr)
++#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
++ || Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, domain, &addr6)
++#endif
++ ) {
++ /* domain name given as IP address */
++ return TRUE;
++ }
++
++ return FALSE;
++}
++
+ /****************************************************************************
+ *
+ * Curl_cookie_add()
+ *
+ * Add a single cookie line to the cookie keeping object.
+@@ -437,28 +460,31 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct SessionHandle *data,
+ badcookie = TRUE; /* out of memory bad */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ else if(Curl_raw_equal("domain", name)) {
++ bool is_ip;
++
+ /* Now, we make sure that our host is within the given domain,
+ or the given domain is not valid and thus cannot be set. */
+
+ if('.' == whatptr[0])
+ whatptr++; /* ignore preceding dot */
+
+- if(!domain || tailmatch(whatptr, domain)) {
+- const char *tailptr=whatptr;
+- if(tailptr[0] == '.')
+- tailptr++;
+- strstore(&co->domain, tailptr); /* don't prefix w/dots
+- internally */
++ is_ip = isip(domain ? domain : whatptr);
++
++ if(!domain
++ || (is_ip && !strcmp(whatptr, domain))
++ || (!is_ip && tailmatch(whatptr, domain))) {
++ strstore(&co->domain, whatptr);
+ if(!co->domain) {
+ badcookie = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+- co->tailmatch=TRUE; /* we always do that if the domain name was
+- given */
++ if(!is_ip)
++ co->tailmatch=TRUE; /* we always do that if the domain name was
++ given */
+ }
+ else {
+ /* we did not get a tailmatch and then the attempted set domain
+ is not a domain to which the current host belongs. Mark as
+ bad. */
+@@ -966,17 +992,21 @@ struct Cookie *Curl_cookie_getlist(struct CookieInfo *c,
+ struct Cookie *newco;
+ struct Cookie *co;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ struct Cookie *mainco=NULL;
+ size_t matches = 0;
++ bool is_ip;
+
+ if(!c || !c->cookies)
+ return NULL; /* no cookie struct or no cookies in the struct */
+
+ /* at first, remove expired cookies */
+ remove_expired(c);
+
++ /* check if host is an IP(v4|v6) address */
++ is_ip = isip(host);
++
+ co = c->cookies;
+
+ while(co) {
+ /* only process this cookie if it is not expired or had no expire
+ date AND that if the cookie requires we're secure we must only
+@@ -984,12 +1014,12 @@ struct Cookie *Curl_cookie_getlist(struct CookieInfo *c,
+ if((!co->expires || (co->expires > now)) &&
+ (co->secure?secure:TRUE)) {
+
+ /* now check if the domain is correct */
+ if(!co->domain ||
+- (co->tailmatch && tailmatch(co->domain, host)) ||
+- (!co->tailmatch && Curl_raw_equal(host, co->domain)) ) {
++ (co->tailmatch && !is_ip && tailmatch(co->domain, host)) ||
++ ((!co->tailmatch || is_ip) && Curl_raw_equal(host, co->domain)) ) {
+ /* the right part of the host matches the domain stuff in the
+ cookie data */
+
+ /* now check the left part of the path with the cookies path
+ requirement */
+diff --git a/tests/data/test1105 b/tests/data/test1105
+index 25f194c..9564775 100644
+--- a/tests/data/test1105
++++ b/tests/data/test1105
+@@ -57,10 +57,9 @@ userid=myname&password=mypassword
+ # Netscape HTTP Cookie File
+ # http://curl.haxx.se/docs/http-cookies.html
+ # This file was generated by libcurl! Edit at your own risk.
+
+ 127.0.0.1 FALSE /we/want/ FALSE 0 foobar name
+-.127.0.0.1 TRUE "/silly/" FALSE 0 mismatch this
+-.0.0.1 TRUE / FALSE 0 partmatch present
++127.0.0.1 FALSE "/silly/" FALSE 0 mismatch this
+ </file>
+ </verify>
+ </testcase>
+diff --git a/tests/data/test31 b/tests/data/test31
+index 38af83b..dfcac04 100644
+--- a/tests/data/test31
++++ b/tests/data/test31
+@@ -49,11 +49,12 @@ Set-Cookie: nodomainnovalue
+ Set-Cookie: nodomain=value; expires=Fri Feb 2 11:56:27 GMT 2035
+ Set-Cookie: novalue; domain=reallysilly
+ Set-Cookie: test=yes; domain=foo.com; expires=Sat Feb 2 11:56:27 GMT 2030
+ Set-Cookie: test2=yes; domain=se; expires=Sat Feb 2 11:56:27 GMT 2030
+ Set-Cookie: magic=yessir; path=/silly/; HttpOnly
+-Set-Cookie: blexp=yesyes; domain=.0.0.1; domain=.0.0.1; expiry=totally bad;
++Set-Cookie: blexp=yesyes; domain=127.0.0.1; domain=127.0.0.1; expiry=totally bad;
++Set-Cookie: partialip=nono; domain=.0.0.1;
+
+ boo
+ </data>
+ </reply>
+
+@@ -93,36 +94,36 @@ Accept: */*
+ <file name="log/jar31.txt" mode="text">
+ # Netscape HTTP Cookie File
+ # http://curl.haxx.se/docs/http-cookies.html
+ # This file was generated by libcurl! Edit at your own risk.
+
+-.127.0.0.1 TRUE /silly/ FALSE 0 ismatch this
+-.127.0.0.1 TRUE /overwrite FALSE 0 overwrite this2
+-.127.0.0.1 TRUE /secure1/ TRUE 0 sec1value secure1
+-.127.0.0.1 TRUE /secure2/ TRUE 0 sec2value secure2
+-.127.0.0.1 TRUE /secure3/ TRUE 0 sec3value secure3
+-.127.0.0.1 TRUE /secure4/ TRUE 0 sec4value secure4
+-.127.0.0.1 TRUE /secure5/ TRUE 0 sec5value secure5
+-.127.0.0.1 TRUE /secure6/ TRUE 0 sec6value secure6
+-.127.0.0.1 TRUE /secure7/ TRUE 0 sec7value secure7
+-.127.0.0.1 TRUE /secure8/ TRUE 0 sec8value secure8
+-.127.0.0.1 TRUE /secure9/ TRUE 0 secure very1
+-#HttpOnly_.127.0.0.1 TRUE /p1/ FALSE 0 httpo1 value1
+-#HttpOnly_.127.0.0.1 TRUE /p2/ FALSE 0 httpo2 value2
+-#HttpOnly_.127.0.0.1 TRUE /p3/ FALSE 0 httpo3 value3
+-#HttpOnly_.127.0.0.1 TRUE /p4/ FALSE 0 httpo4 value4
+-#HttpOnly_.127.0.0.1 TRUE /p4/ FALSE 0 httponly myvalue1
+-#HttpOnly_.127.0.0.1 TRUE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec myvalue2
+-#HttpOnly_.127.0.0.1 TRUE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec2 myvalue3
+-#HttpOnly_.127.0.0.1 TRUE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec3 myvalue4
+-#HttpOnly_.127.0.0.1 TRUE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec4 myvalue5
+-#HttpOnly_.127.0.0.1 TRUE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec5 myvalue6
+-#HttpOnly_.127.0.0.1 TRUE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec6 myvalue7
+-#HttpOnly_.127.0.0.1 TRUE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec7 myvalue8
+-#HttpOnly_.127.0.0.1 TRUE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec8 myvalue9
+-.127.0.0.1 TRUE / FALSE 0 partmatch present
++127.0.0.1 FALSE /silly/ FALSE 0 ismatch this
++127.0.0.1 FALSE /overwrite FALSE 0 overwrite this2
++127.0.0.1 FALSE /secure1/ TRUE 0 sec1value secure1
++127.0.0.1 FALSE /secure2/ TRUE 0 sec2value secure2
++127.0.0.1 FALSE /secure3/ TRUE 0 sec3value secure3
++127.0.0.1 FALSE /secure4/ TRUE 0 sec4value secure4
++127.0.0.1 FALSE /secure5/ TRUE 0 sec5value secure5
++127.0.0.1 FALSE /secure6/ TRUE 0 sec6value secure6
++127.0.0.1 FALSE /secure7/ TRUE 0 sec7value secure7
++127.0.0.1 FALSE /secure8/ TRUE 0 sec8value secure8
++127.0.0.1 FALSE /secure9/ TRUE 0 secure very1
++#HttpOnly_127.0.0.1 FALSE /p1/ FALSE 0 httpo1 value1
++#HttpOnly_127.0.0.1 FALSE /p2/ FALSE 0 httpo2 value2
++#HttpOnly_127.0.0.1 FALSE /p3/ FALSE 0 httpo3 value3
++#HttpOnly_127.0.0.1 FALSE /p4/ FALSE 0 httpo4 value4
++#HttpOnly_127.0.0.1 FALSE /p4/ FALSE 0 httponly myvalue1
++#HttpOnly_127.0.0.1 FALSE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec myvalue2
++#HttpOnly_127.0.0.1 FALSE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec2 myvalue3
++#HttpOnly_127.0.0.1 FALSE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec3 myvalue4
++#HttpOnly_127.0.0.1 FALSE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec4 myvalue5
++#HttpOnly_127.0.0.1 FALSE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec5 myvalue6
++#HttpOnly_127.0.0.1 FALSE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec6 myvalue7
++#HttpOnly_127.0.0.1 FALSE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec7 myvalue8
++#HttpOnly_127.0.0.1 FALSE /p4/ TRUE 0 httpandsec8 myvalue9
++127.0.0.1 FALSE / FALSE 0 partmatch present
+ 127.0.0.1 FALSE /we/want/ FALSE 2054030187 nodomain value
+ #HttpOnly_127.0.0.1 FALSE /silly/ FALSE 0 magic yessir
+-.0.0.1 TRUE /we/want/ FALSE 0 blexp yesyes
++127.0.0.1 FALSE /we/want/ FALSE 0 blexp yesyes
+ </file>
+ </verify>
+ </testcase>
+diff --git a/tests/data/test8 b/tests/data/test8
+index 4d54541..030fd55 100644
+--- a/tests/data/test8
++++ b/tests/data/test8
+@@ -40,11 +40,12 @@ Set-Cookie: mismatch=this; domain=%HOSTIP; path="/silly/";
+ Set-Cookie: partmatch=present; domain=.0.0.1; path=/w;
+ Set-Cookie: duplicate=test; domain=.0.0.1; domain=.0.0.1; path=/donkey;
+ Set-Cookie: cookie=yes; path=/we;
+ Set-Cookie: cookie=perhaps; path=/we/want;
+ Set-Cookie: nocookie=yes; path=/WE;
+-Set-Cookie: blexp=yesyes; domain=.0.0.1; domain=.0.0.1; expiry=totally bad;
++Set-Cookie: blexp=yesyes; domain=%HOSTIP; domain=%HOSTIP; expiry=totally bad;
++Set-Cookie: partialip=nono; domain=.0.0.1;
+
+ </file>
+ <precheck>
+ perl -e 'if ("%HOSTIP" !~ /\.0\.0\.1$/) {print "Test only works for HOSTIPs ending with .0.0.1"; exit(1)}'
+ </precheck>
+--
+2.1.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.37.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.37.1.bb
index 39ded80..1147675 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.37.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.37.1.bb
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;beginline=7;md5=3a34942f4ae3fbf1a303160714e66
SRC_URI = "http://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
file://pkgconfig_fix.patch \
+ file://CVE-2014-3613.patch \
"
# curl likes to set -g0 in CFLAGS, so we stop it
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4/6] nss: CVE-2014-1568
2014-11-18 16:18 [PATCH 0/6] Dizzy Next Armin Kuster
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2014-11-18 16:18 ` [PATCH 3/6] curl: Security Advisory - curl - CVE-2014-3620 Armin Kuster
@ 2014-11-18 16:18 ` Armin Kuster
2014-11-18 16:18 ` [PATCH 5/6] tzcode: update to 2014j Armin Kuster
2014-11-18 16:18 ` [PATCH 6/6] tzdata: " Armin Kuster
5 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2014-11-18 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Chong Lu <Chong.Lu@windriver.com>
the patch comes from:
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-1568
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1064636
nss ng log:
=====
changeset: 11252:ad411fb64046
user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
date: Tue Sep 23 19:28:34 2014 +0200
summary: Fix bug 1064636, patch part 2, r=rrelyea
=====
changeset: 11253:4e90910ad2f9
user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
date: Tue Sep 23 19:28:45 2014 +0200
summary: Fix bug 1064636, patch part 3, r=rrelyea
=====
changeset: 11254:fb7208e91ae8
user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
date: Tue Sep 23 19:28:52 2014 +0200
summary: Fix bug 1064636, patch part 1, r=rrelyea
=====
changeset: 11255:8dd6c6ac977d
user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
date: Tue Sep 23 19:39:40 2014 +0200
summary: Bug 1064636, follow up commit to fix Windows build bustage
Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Chong Lu <Chong.Lu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
---
.../nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1568.patch | 670 +++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc | 1 +
2 files changed, 671 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1568.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1568.patch b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1568.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbdb00c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nss/files/nss-CVE-2014-1568.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,670 @@
+nss: CVE-2014-1568
+
+the patch comes from:
+http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-1568
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1064636
+nss ng log:
+=====
+changeset: 11252:ad411fb64046
+user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
+date: Tue Sep 23 19:28:34 2014 +0200
+summary: Fix bug 1064636, patch part 2, r=rrelyea
+=====
+changeset: 11253:4e90910ad2f9
+user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
+date: Tue Sep 23 19:28:45 2014 +0200
+summary: Fix bug 1064636, patch part 3, r=rrelyea
+=====
+changeset: 11254:fb7208e91ae8
+user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
+date: Tue Sep 23 19:28:52 2014 +0200
+summary: Fix bug 1064636, patch part 1, r=rrelyea
+=====
+changeset: 11255:8dd6c6ac977d
+user: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
+date: Tue Sep 23 19:39:40 2014 +0200
+summary: Bug 1064636, follow up commit to fix Windows build bustage
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Li Wang <li.wang@windriver.com>
+---
+ nss/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c | 202 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c | 69 +++++++--------
+ nss/lib/util/manifest.mn | 2 +
+ nss/lib/util/nssutil.def | 6 ++
+ nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.h | 30 +++++++
+ 6 files changed, 360 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.c
+ create mode 100644 nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.h
+
+diff --git a/nss/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c b/nss/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
+index c1ac39b..0a20672 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
++++ b/nss/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
+@@ -12,78 +12,111 @@
+ #include "secasn1.h"
+ #include "secoid.h"
+ #include "pk11func.h"
++#include "pkcs1sig.h"
+ #include "secdig.h"
+ #include "secerr.h"
+ #include "keyi.h"
+
+ /*
+-** Decrypt signature block using public key
+-** Store the hash algorithm oid tag in *tagp
+-** Store the digest in the digest buffer
+-** Store the digest length in *digestlen
++** Recover the DigestInfo from an RSA PKCS#1 signature.
++**
++** If givenDigestAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, copy givenDigestAlg to digestAlgOut.
++** Otherwise, parse the DigestInfo structure and store the decoded digest
++** algorithm into digestAlgOut.
++**
++** Store the encoded DigestInfo into digestInfo.
++** Store the DigestInfo length into digestInfoLen.
++**
++** This function does *not* verify that the AlgorithmIdentifier in the
++** DigestInfo identifies givenDigestAlg or that the DigestInfo is encoded
++** correctly; verifyPKCS1DigestInfo does that.
++**
+ ** XXX this is assuming that the signature algorithm has WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION
+ */
+ static SECStatus
+-DecryptSigBlock(SECOidTag *tagp, unsigned char *digest,
+- unsigned int *digestlen, unsigned int maxdigestlen,
+- SECKEYPublicKey *key, const SECItem *sig, char *wincx)
++recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(SECOidTag givenDigestAlg,
++ /*out*/ SECOidTag* digestAlgOut,
++ /*out*/ unsigned char** digestInfo,
++ /*out*/ unsigned int* digestInfoLen,
++ SECKEYPublicKey* key,
++ const SECItem* sig, void* wincx)
+ {
+- SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL;
+- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+- SECStatus rv;
+- SECOidTag tag;
+- SECItem it;
+-
+- if (key == NULL) goto loser;
+-
++ SGNDigestInfo* di = NULL;
++ SECItem it;
++ PRBool rv = SECSuccess;
++
++ PORT_Assert(digestAlgOut);
++ PORT_Assert(digestInfo);
++ PORT_Assert(digestInfoLen);
++ PORT_Assert(key);
++ PORT_Assert(key->keyType == rsaKey);
++ PORT_Assert(sig);
++
++ it.data = NULL;
+ it.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(key);
+- if (!it.len) goto loser;
+- it.data = buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(it.len);
+- if (!buf) goto loser;
++ if (it.len != 0) {
++ it.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(it.len);
++ }
++ if (it.len == 0 || it.data == NULL ) {
++ rv = SECFailure;
++ }
+
+- /* decrypt the block */
+- rv = PK11_VerifyRecover(key, (SECItem *)sig, &it, wincx);
+- if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
++ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++ /* decrypt the block */
++ rv = PK11_VerifyRecover(key, sig, &it, wincx);
++ }
+
+- di = SGN_DecodeDigestInfo(&it);
+- if (di == NULL) goto sigloser;
++ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++ if (givenDigestAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
++ /* We don't need to parse the DigestInfo if the caller gave us the
++ * digest algorithm to use. Later verifyPKCS1DigestInfo will verify
++ * that the DigestInfo identifies the given digest algorithm and
++ * that the DigestInfo is encoded absolutely correctly.
++ */
++ *digestInfoLen = it.len;
++ *digestInfo = (unsigned char*)it.data;
++ *digestAlgOut = givenDigestAlg;
++ return SECSuccess;
++ }
++ }
+
+- /*
+- ** Finally we have the digest info; now we can extract the algorithm
+- ** ID and the signature block
+- */
+- tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&di->digestAlgorithm);
+- /* Check that tag is an appropriate algorithm */
+- if (tag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
+- goto sigloser;
+- }
+- /* make sure the "parameters" are not too bogus. */
+- if (di->digestAlgorithm.parameters.len > 2) {
+- goto sigloser;
+- }
+- if (di->digest.len > maxdigestlen) {
+- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
+- goto loser;
++ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++ /* The caller didn't specify a digest algorithm to use, so choose the
++ * digest algorithm by parsing the AlgorithmIdentifier within the
++ * DigestInfo.
++ */
++ di = SGN_DecodeDigestInfo(&it);
++ if (!di) {
++ rv = SECFailure;
++ }
+ }
+- PORT_Memcpy(digest, di->digest.data, di->digest.len);
+- *tagp = tag;
+- *digestlen = di->digest.len;
+- goto done;
+
+- sigloser:
+- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
++ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++ *digestAlgOut = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&di->digestAlgorithm);
++ if (*digestAlgOut == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
++ rv = SECFailure;
++ }
++ }
+
+- loser:
+- rv = SECFailure;
++ if (di) {
++ SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
++ }
++
++ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++ *digestInfoLen = it.len;
++ *digestInfo = (unsigned char*)it.data;
++ } else {
++ if (it.data) {
++ PORT_Free(it.data);
++ }
++ *digestInfo = NULL;
++ *digestInfoLen = 0;
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
++ }
+
+- done:
+- if (di != NULL) SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
+- if (buf != NULL) PORT_Free(buf);
+-
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+-
+ struct VFYContextStr {
+ SECOidTag hashAlg; /* the hash algorithm */
+ SECKEYPublicKey *key;
+@@ -99,14 +132,14 @@ struct VFYContextStr {
+ union {
+ unsigned char buffer[1];
+
+- /* the digest in the decrypted RSA signature */
+- unsigned char rsadigest[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
+ /* the full DSA signature... 40 bytes */
+ unsigned char dsasig[DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN];
+ /* the full ECDSA signature */
+ unsigned char ecdsasig[2 * MAX_ECKEY_LEN];
+ } u;
+- unsigned int rsadigestlen;
++ unsigned int pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen;
++ /* the encoded DigestInfo from a RSA PKCS#1 signature */
++ unsigned char *pkcs1RSADigestInfo;
+ void * wincx;
+ void *hashcx;
+ const SECHashObject *hashobj;
+@@ -117,6 +150,17 @@ struct VFYContextStr {
+ * VFY_EndWithSignature call. */
+ };
+
++static SECStatus
++verifyPKCS1DigestInfo(const VFYContext* cx, const SECItem* digest)
++{
++ SECItem pkcs1DigestInfo;
++ pkcs1DigestInfo.data = cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo;
++ pkcs1DigestInfo.len = cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen;
++ return _SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo(
++ cx->hashAlg, digest, &pkcs1DigestInfo,
++ PR_TRUE /*XXX: unsafeAllowMissingParameters*/);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * decode the ECDSA or DSA signature from it's DER wrapping.
+ * The unwrapped/raw signature is placed in the buffer pointed
+@@ -376,16 +420,16 @@ vfy_CreateContext(const SECKEYPublicKey *key, const SECItem *sig,
+ cx->encAlg = encAlg;
+ cx->hashAlg = hashAlg;
+ cx->key = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(key);
++ cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo = NULL;
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ if (sig) {
+ switch (type) {
+ case rsaKey:
+- rv = DecryptSigBlock(&cx->hashAlg, cx->u.buffer, &cx->rsadigestlen,
+- HASH_LENGTH_MAX, cx->key, sig, (char*)wincx);
+- if (cx->hashAlg != hashAlg && hashAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
+- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+- rv = SECFailure;
+- }
++ rv = recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(hashAlg, &cx->hashAlg,
++ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo,
++ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen,
++ cx->key,
++ sig, wincx);
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ case ecKey:
+@@ -469,6 +513,9 @@ VFY_DestroyContext(VFYContext *cx, PRBool freeit)
+ if (cx->key) {
+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(cx->key);
+ }
++ if (cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo) {
++ PORT_Free(cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo);
++ }
+ if (freeit) {
+ PORT_ZFree(cx, sizeof(VFYContext));
+ }
+@@ -548,21 +595,25 @@ VFY_EndWithSignature(VFYContext *cx, SECItem *sig)
+ }
+ break;
+ case rsaKey:
++ {
++ SECItem digest;
++ digest.data = final;
++ digest.len = part;
+ if (sig) {
+- SECOidTag hashid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
+- rv = DecryptSigBlock(&hashid, cx->u.buffer, &cx->rsadigestlen,
+- HASH_LENGTH_MAX, cx->key, sig, (char*)cx->wincx);
+- if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (hashid != cx->hashAlg)) {
+- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
++ SECOidTag hashid;
++ PORT_Assert(cx->hashAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN);
++ rv = recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(cx->hashAlg, &hashid,
++ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo,
++ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen,
++ cx->key,
++ sig, cx->wincx);
++ PORT_Assert(cx->hashAlg == hashid);
++ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+- if ((part != cx->rsadigestlen) ||
+- PORT_Memcmp(final, cx->u.buffer, part)) {
+- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+- return SECFailure;
+- }
+- break;
++ return verifyPKCS1DigestInfo(cx, &digest);
++ }
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ return SECFailure; /* shouldn't happen */
+@@ -595,12 +646,7 @@ vfy_VerifyDigest(const SECItem *digest, const SECKEYPublicKey *key,
+ if (cx != NULL) {
+ switch (key->keyType) {
+ case rsaKey:
+- if ((digest->len != cx->rsadigestlen) ||
+- PORT_Memcmp(digest->data, cx->u.buffer, digest->len)) {
+- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+- } else {
+- rv = SECSuccess;
+- }
++ rv = verifyPKCS1DigestInfo(cx, digest);
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ case ecKey:
+diff --git a/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+index 89b5bd8..ba6dcfa 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
++++ b/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include "blapi.h"
+ #include "pkcs11.h"
+ #include "pkcs11i.h"
++#include "pkcs1sig.h"
+ #include "lowkeyi.h"
+ #include "secder.h"
+ #include "secdig.h"
+@@ -2580,54 +2581,42 @@ sftk_hashCheckSign(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
+ }
+
+ SECStatus
+-RSA_HashCheckSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key,
++RSA_HashCheckSign(SECOidTag digestOid, NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key,
+ unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen,
+- unsigned char *digest, unsigned int digestLen)
++ unsigned char *digestData, unsigned int digestLen)
+ {
++ unsigned char *pkcs1DigestInfoData;
++ SECItem pkcs1DigestInfo;
++ SECItem digest;
++ unsigned int bufferSize;
++ SECStatus rv;
+
+- SECItem it;
+- SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL;
+- SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+-
+- it.data = NULL;
+-
+- if (key == NULL) goto loser;
+-
+- it.len = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(key);
+- if (!it.len) goto loser;
++ /* pkcs1DigestInfo.data must be less than key->u.rsa.modulus.len */
++ bufferSize = key->u.rsa.modulus.len;
++ pkcs1DigestInfoData = PORT_ZAlloc(bufferSize);
++ if (!pkcs1DigestInfoData) {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
++ return SECFailure;
++ }
+
+- it.data = (unsigned char *) PORT_Alloc(it.len);
+- if (it.data == NULL) goto loser;
++ pkcs1DigestInfo.data = pkcs1DigestInfoData;
++ pkcs1DigestInfo.len = bufferSize;
+
+ /* decrypt the block */
+- rv = RSA_CheckSignRecover(key, it.data, &it.len, it.len, sig, sigLen);
+- if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
+-
+- di = SGN_DecodeDigestInfo(&it);
+- if (di == NULL) goto loser;
+- if (di->digest.len != digestLen) goto loser;
+-
+- /* make sure the tag is OK */
+- if (SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&di->digestAlgorithm) != hashOid) {
+- goto loser;
+- }
+- /* make sure the "parameters" are not too bogus. */
+- if (di->digestAlgorithm.parameters.len > 2) {
+- goto loser;
+- }
+- /* Now check the signature */
+- if (PORT_Memcmp(digest, di->digest.data, di->digest.len) == 0) {
+- goto done;
++ rv = RSA_CheckSignRecover(key, pkcs1DigestInfo.data,
++ &pkcs1DigestInfo.len, pkcs1DigestInfo.len,
++ sig, sigLen);
++ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
++ } else {
++ digest.data = (PRUint8*) digestData;
++ digest.len = digestLen;
++ rv = _SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo(
++ digestOid, &digest, &pkcs1DigestInfo,
++ PR_TRUE /*XXX: unsafeAllowMissingParameters*/);
+ }
+
+- loser:
+- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+- rv = SECFailure;
+-
+- done:
+- if (it.data != NULL) PORT_Free(it.data);
+- if (di != NULL) SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
+-
++ PORT_Free(pkcs1DigestInfoData);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/nss/lib/util/manifest.mn b/nss/lib/util/manifest.mn
+index ed54a16..9ff3758 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/util/manifest.mn
++++ b/nss/lib/util/manifest.mn
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ EXPORTS = \
+ pkcs11t.h \
+ pkcs11n.h \
+ pkcs11u.h \
++ pkcs1sig.h \
+ portreg.h \
+ secasn1.h \
+ secasn1t.h \
+@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ CSRCS = \
+ nssrwlk.c \
+ nssilock.c \
+ oidstring.c \
++ pkcs1sig.c \
+ portreg.c \
+ secalgid.c \
+ secasn1d.c \
+diff --git a/nss/lib/util/nssutil.def b/nss/lib/util/nssutil.def
+index 86a0ad7..9d98df2 100644
+--- a/nss/lib/util/nssutil.def
++++ b/nss/lib/util/nssutil.def
+@@ -271,3 +271,9 @@ SECITEM_ZfreeArray;
+ ;+ local:
+ ;+ *;
+ ;+};
++;+NSSUTIL_3.17.1 { # NSS Utilities 3.17.1 release
++;+ global:
++_SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo;
++;+ local:
++;+ *;
++;+};
+diff --git a/nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.c b/nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..03b16f5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
++/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
++ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
++ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
++ */
++
++#include "pkcs1sig.h"
++#include "hasht.h"
++#include "secerr.h"
++#include "secasn1t.h"
++#include "secoid.h"
++
++typedef struct pkcs1PrefixStr pkcs1Prefix;
++struct pkcs1PrefixStr {
++ unsigned int len;
++ PRUint8 *data;
++};
++
++typedef struct pkcs1PrefixesStr pkcs1Prefixes;
++struct pkcs1PrefixesStr {
++ unsigned int digestLen;
++ pkcs1Prefix prefixWithParams;
++ pkcs1Prefix prefixWithoutParams;
++};
++
++/* The value for SGN_PKCS1_DIGESTINFO_MAX_PREFIX_LEN_EXCLUDING_OID is based on
++ * the possible prefix encodings as explained below.
++ */
++#define MAX_PREFIX_LEN_EXCLUDING_OID 10
++
++static SECStatus
++encodePrefix(const SECOidData *hashOid, unsigned int digestLen,
++ pkcs1Prefix *prefix, PRBool withParams)
++{
++ /* with params coding is:
++ * Sequence (2 bytes) {
++ * Sequence (2 bytes) {
++ * Oid (2 bytes) {
++ * Oid value (derOid->oid.len)
++ * }
++ * NULL (2 bytes)
++ * }
++ * OCTECT (2 bytes);
++ *
++ * without params coding is:
++ * Sequence (2 bytes) {
++ * Sequence (2 bytes) {
++ * Oid (2 bytes) {
++ * Oid value (derOid->oid.len)
++ * }
++ * }
++ * OCTECT (2 bytes);
++ */
++
++ unsigned int innerSeqLen = 2 + hashOid->oid.len;
++ unsigned int outerSeqLen = 2 + innerSeqLen + 2 + digestLen;
++ unsigned int extra = 0;
++
++ if (withParams) {
++ innerSeqLen += 2;
++ outerSeqLen += 2;
++ extra = 2;
++ }
++
++ if (innerSeqLen >= 128 ||
++ outerSeqLen >= 128 ||
++ (outerSeqLen + 2 - digestLen) >
++ (MAX_PREFIX_LEN_EXCLUDING_OID + hashOid->oid.len)) {
++ /* this is actually a library failure, It shouldn't happen */
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
++ return SECFailure;
++ }
++
++ prefix->len = 6 + hashOid->oid.len + extra + 2;
++ prefix->data = PORT_Alloc(prefix->len);
++ if (!prefix->data) {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
++ return SECFailure;
++ }
++
++ prefix->data[0] = SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE|SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
++ prefix->data[1] = outerSeqLen;
++ prefix->data[2] = SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE|SEC_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
++ prefix->data[3] = innerSeqLen;
++ prefix->data[4] = SEC_ASN1_OBJECT_ID;
++ prefix->data[5] = hashOid->oid.len;
++ PORT_Memcpy(&prefix->data[6], hashOid->oid.data, hashOid->oid.len);
++ if (withParams) {
++ prefix->data[6 + hashOid->oid.len] = SEC_ASN1_NULL;
++ prefix->data[6 + hashOid->oid.len + 1] = 0;
++ }
++ prefix->data[6 + hashOid->oid.len + extra] = SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
++ prefix->data[6 + hashOid->oid.len + extra + 1] = digestLen;
++
++ return SECSuccess;
++}
++
++SECStatus
++_SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo(SECOidTag digestAlg,
++ const SECItem* digest,
++ const SECItem* dataRecoveredFromSignature,
++ PRBool unsafeAllowMissingParameters)
++{
++ SECOidData *hashOid;
++ pkcs1Prefixes pp;
++ const pkcs1Prefix* expectedPrefix;
++ SECStatus rv, rv2, rv3;
++
++ if (!digest || !digest->data ||
++ !dataRecoveredFromSignature || !dataRecoveredFromSignature->data) {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
++ return SECFailure;
++ }
++
++ hashOid = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(digestAlg);
++ if (hashOid == NULL) {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
++ return SECFailure;
++ }
++
++ pp.digestLen = digest->len;
++ pp.prefixWithParams.data = NULL;
++ pp.prefixWithoutParams.data = NULL;
++
++ rv2 = encodePrefix(hashOid, pp.digestLen, &pp.prefixWithParams, PR_TRUE);
++ rv3 = encodePrefix(hashOid, pp.digestLen, &pp.prefixWithoutParams, PR_FALSE);
++
++ rv = SECSuccess;
++ if (rv2 != SECSuccess || rv3 != SECSuccess) {
++ rv = SECFailure;
++ }
++
++ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++ /* We don't attempt to avoid timing attacks on these comparisons because
++ * signature verification is a public key operation, not a private key
++ * operation.
++ */
++
++ if (dataRecoveredFromSignature->len ==
++ pp.prefixWithParams.len + pp.digestLen) {
++ expectedPrefix = &pp.prefixWithParams;
++ } else if (unsafeAllowMissingParameters &&
++ dataRecoveredFromSignature->len ==
++ pp.prefixWithoutParams.len + pp.digestLen) {
++ expectedPrefix = &pp.prefixWithoutParams;
++ } else {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
++ rv = SECFailure;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
++ if (memcmp(dataRecoveredFromSignature->data, expectedPrefix->data,
++ expectedPrefix->len) ||
++ memcmp(dataRecoveredFromSignature->data + expectedPrefix->len,
++ digest->data, digest->len)) {
++ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
++ rv = SECFailure;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (pp.prefixWithParams.data) {
++ PORT_Free(pp.prefixWithParams.data);
++ }
++ if (pp.prefixWithoutParams.data) {
++ PORT_Free(pp.prefixWithoutParams.data);
++ }
++
++ return rv;
++}
+diff --git a/nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.h b/nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7c52b15
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/nss/lib/util/pkcs1sig.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
++/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
++ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
++ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
++ */
++
++#ifndef _PKCS1SIG_H_
++#define _PKCS1SIG_H_
++
++#include "hasht.h"
++#include "seccomon.h"
++#include "secoidt.h"
++
++/* SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo verifies that the length of the digest is correct
++ * for the given algorithm, then verifies that the recovered data from the
++ * PKCS#1 signature is a properly-formatted DigestInfo that identifies the
++ * given digest algorithm, then verifies that the digest in the DigestInfo
++ * matches the given digest.
++ *
++ * dataRecoveredFromSignature must be the result of calling PK11_VerifyRecover
++ * or equivalent.
++ *
++ * If unsafeAllowMissingParameters is true (not recommended), then a DigestInfo
++ * without the mandatory ASN.1 NULL parameter will also be accepted.
++ */
++SECStatus _SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo(SECOidTag digestAlg,
++ const SECItem* digest,
++ const SECItem* dataRecoveredFromSignature,
++ PRBool unsafeAllowMissingParameters);
++
++#endif /* _PKCS1SIG_H_ */
+--
+1.7.9.5
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
index ce7bff4..008bdad 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/nss/nss.inc
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SRC_URI = "\
file://nss-3.15.1-fix-CVE-2013-1739.patch \
file://nss-CVE-2013-5606.patch \
file://nss-CVE-2014-1544.patch \
+ file://nss-CVE-2014-1568.patch \
"
SRC_URI_append = "\
file://nss.pc.in \
--
1.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread