* [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review
@ 2025-11-11 14:58 Steve Sakoman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Steve Sakoman @ 2025-11-11 14:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
Please review this set of changes for scarthgap and have comments back by
end of day Thursday, September 13
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/#/builders/29/builds/2708
The following changes since commit 06d4981313ce67a8d53b1c14be9845b4b5a9f4cf:
perf: add arm64 source files for unistd_64.h (2025-11-03 07:45:57 -0800)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/scarthgap-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/scarthgap-nut
Alexander Kanavin (3):
ca-certificates: get sources from debian tarballs
ca-certificates: submit sysroot patch upstream, drop
default-sysroot.patch
xf86-video-intel: correct SRC_URI as freedesktop anongit is down
Ankur Tyagi (2):
webkitgtk: upgrade 2.44.3 -> 2.44.4
wireless-regdb: upgrade 2024.10.07 -> 2025.10.07
Archana Polampalli (7):
go: fix CVE-2025-58185
go: fix CVE-2025-58187
go: fix CVE-2025-58188
go: fix CVE-2025-58189
go: fix CVE-2025-47912
go: fix CVE-2025-61723
go: fix CVE-2025-61724
Gyorgy Sarvari (1):
ca-certificates: fix on-target postinstall script
Peter Marko (1):
curl: ignore CVE-2025-10966
Richard Purdie (2):
ca-certificates: upgrade 20240203 -> 20241223
oeqa/selftest/devtool: Update after upstream repo changes
Theodore A. Roth (2):
ca-certificates: update 20211016 -> 20240203
ca-certificates: Add comment for provenance of SRCREV
Wang Mingyu (1):
ca-certificates: upgrade 20241223 -> 20250419
meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/devtool.py | 8 +-
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.22.12.inc | 7 +
.../go/go/CVE-2025-47912.patch | 226 ++++++++++++
.../go/go/CVE-2025-58185.patch | 142 +++++++
.../go/go/CVE-2025-58187.patch | 349 ++++++++++++++++++
.../go/go/CVE-2025-58188.patch | 194 ++++++++++
.../go/go/CVE-2025-58189.patch | 50 +++
.../go/go/CVE-2025-61723.patch | 223 +++++++++++
.../go/go/CVE-2025-61724.patch | 75 ++++
.../xorg-driver/xf86-video-intel_git.bb | 2 +-
....10.07.bb => wireless-regdb_2025.10.07.bb} | 2 +-
...ebkitgtk_2.44.3.bb => webkitgtk_2.44.4.bb} | 2 +-
...ertdata2pem.py-print-a-warning-for-e.patch | 21 +-
...icates-don-t-use-Debianisms-in-run-p.patch | 20 +-
...2-update-ca-certificates-use-SYSROOT.patch | 46 ---
...icates-use-relative-symlinks-from-ET.patch | 18 +-
.../ca-certificates/default-sysroot.patch | 50 ---
...0211016.bb => ca-certificates_20250419.bb} | 19 +-
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 1 +
19 files changed, 1311 insertions(+), 144 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go/CVE-2025-47912.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go/CVE-2025-58185.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go/CVE-2025-58187.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go/CVE-2025-58188.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go/CVE-2025-58189.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go/CVE-2025-61723.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go/CVE-2025-61724.patch
rename meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/{wireless-regdb_2024.10.07.bb => wireless-regdb_2025.10.07.bb} (94%)
rename meta/recipes-sato/webkit/{webkitgtk_2.44.3.bb => webkitgtk_2.44.4.bb} (98%)
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates/0002-update-ca-certificates-use-SYSROOT.patch
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/ca-certificates/default-sysroot.patch
rename meta/recipes-support/ca-certificates/{ca-certificates_20211016.bb => ca-certificates_20250419.bb} (84%)
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review
@ 2026-06-29 14:19 Yoann Congal
0 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Yoann Congal @ 2026-06-29 14:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
Please review this set of changes for scarthgap and have comments back by
end of day Wednesday, July 1.
Some patches are aimed at progressing toward Ubuntu 26.04 support:
* gawk: use native gawk when building glibc and grub
* grub/glibc: Bump versions to resolve hashequiv/reproducibility issues
* gawk: trim native build configuration
* gawk-native: fix gcc-15/C23 compilation issues
Improving the NVD CVE data fetching:
* cve-update-nvd2-native: allow setting resultsPerPage
NOTE: This patch does not exist in more recent branches
(cve-update-nvd2-native was drop in favor of git based fetching)
Move away from /git/ in URLs for oe/yp.org servers:
* oeqa: Drop /git/ from our urls
* recipetool: Recognise https://git. as git urls
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/#/builders/29/builds/4103
The following changes since commit 737293bead3e7b994347e47f09bc69437479d50c:
linux-yocto/6.6: address ltp hang (2026-06-23 20:33:35 +0200)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/scarthgap-review
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/scarthgap-review
for you to fetch changes up to 54ce24005721f5c82d42242524eaed93c8cbeafa:
recipetool: Recognise https://git. as git urls (2026-06-29 11:31:24 +0200)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alexander Kanavin (1):
gawk: use native gawk when building glibc and grub
Amaury Couderc (1):
python3: fix CVE-2026-4224
Anil Dongare (1):
libusb1: fix CVE-2026-23679 and CVE-2026-47104
Awais B (1):
cve-update-nvd2-native: allow setting resultsPerPage
Harish Sadineni (1):
binutils: Fix for CVE-2025-69648 and CVE-2025-69646
Hitendra Prajapati (2):
libsoup: fix for CVE-2025-11021
libsoup: fix for CVE-2026-2369
Richard Purdie (3):
grub/glibc: Bump versions to resolve hashequiv/reproducibility issues
oeqa: Drop /git/ from our urls
recipetool: Recognise https://git. as git urls
Ross Burton (1):
gawk: trim native build configuration
Sudhir Dumbhare (1):
nfs-utils: fix CVE-2025-12801
Theo Gaige (Schneider Electric) (1):
go: patch CVE-2026-27145
Vijay Anusuri (5):
xwayland: Fix CVE-2026-33999
xwayland: Fix CVE-2026-34000
xwayland: Fix CVE-2026-34001
xwayland: Fix CVE-2026-34002
xwayland: Fix CVE-2026-34003
Yoann Congal (1):
gawk-native: fix gcc-15/C23 compilation issues
.../recipes-test/gitrepotest/gitrepotest.bb | 2 +-
.../gitunpackoffline/gitunpackoffline.inc | 4 +-
.../lib/oeqa/manual/toaster-managed-mode.json | 6 +-
meta/lib/oeqa/sdkext/cases/devtool.py | 4 +-
meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/devtool.py | 4 +-
meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/recipetool.py | 2 +-
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 6 +-
.../nfs-utils/CVE-2025-12801-build-fix.patch | 44 ++
.../CVE-2025-12801-dependent_p1.patch | 450 +++++++++++++++++
.../CVE-2025-12801-dependent_p2.patch | 81 +++
.../CVE-2025-12801-dependent_p3.patch | 181 +++++++
.../CVE-2025-12801-dependent_p4.patch | 468 ++++++++++++++++++
.../nfs-utils/nfs-utils/CVE-2025-12801.patch | 254 ++++++++++
.../nfs-utils/nfs-utils_2.6.4.bb | 6 +
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc.inc | 6 +-
.../meta/cve-update-nvd2-native.bb | 13 +
.../binutils/binutils-2.42.inc | 2 +-
...ch => CVE-2025-69646_CVE-2025-69648.patch} | 2 +-
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.22.12.inc | 1 +
.../go/go/CVE-2026-27145.patch | 96 ++++
.../python/python3/CVE-2026-4224.patch | 121 +++++
.../python/python3_3.12.13.bb | 1 +
.../0001-Fix-some-C23-compilatio-issues.patch | 35 ++
meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk_5.3.0.bb | 15 +-
.../xwayland/xwayland/CVE-2026-33999.patch | 49 ++
.../xwayland/xwayland/CVE-2026-34000.patch | 72 +++
.../xwayland/xwayland/CVE-2026-34001.patch | 104 ++++
.../xwayland/xwayland/CVE-2026-34002.patch | 93 ++++
.../xwayland/xwayland/CVE-2026-34003-1.patch | 113 +++++
.../xwayland/xwayland/CVE-2026-34003-2.patch | 223 +++++++++
.../xwayland/xwayland_23.2.5.bb | 6 +
.../libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-11021.patch | 57 +++
.../libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2026-2369.patch | 32 ++
meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup_3.4.4.bb | 2 +
...-2026-23679_CVE-2026-47104-dependent.patch | 46 ++
.../CVE-2026-23679_CVE-2026-47104.patch | 88 ++++
meta/recipes-support/libusb/libusb1_1.0.27.bb | 2 +
scripts/lib/recipetool/create.py | 2 +-
38 files changed, 2676 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/nfs-utils/nfs-utils/CVE-2025-12801-build-fix.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/nfs-utils/nfs-utils/CVE-2025-12801-dependent_p1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/nfs-utils/nfs-utils/CVE-2025-12801-dependent_p2.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/nfs-utils/nfs-utils/CVE-2025-12801-dependent_p3.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/nfs-utils/nfs-utils/CVE-2025-12801-dependent_p4.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/nfs-utils/nfs-utils/CVE-2025-12801.patch
rename meta/recipes-devtools/binutils/binutils/{CVE-2025-69648.patch => CVE-2025-69646_CVE-2025-69648.patch} (99%)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go/CVE-2026-27145.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2026-4224.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/0001-Fix-some-C23-compilatio-issues.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/CVE-2026-33999.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/CVE-2026-34000.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/CVE-2026-34001.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/CVE-2026-34002.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/CVE-2026-34003-1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-graphics/xwayland/xwayland/CVE-2026-34003-2.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2025-11021.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libsoup/libsoup-3.4.4/CVE-2026-2369.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libusb/libusb1/CVE-2026-23679_CVE-2026-47104-dependent.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libusb/libusb1/CVE-2026-23679_CVE-2026-47104.patch
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review
@ 2026-07-28 22:21 Yoann Congal
0 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Yoann Congal @ 2026-07-28 22:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
Please review this set of changes for scarthgap and have comments back by
end of day Thursday, July 30.
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/?#/builders/29/builds/4312
The following changes since commit 762321beb0260b1411c7f98f13458ec99a118280:
bzip2: fix 'bzip2 --version > /tmp/aaa 2>&1' hang (2026-07-25 23:57:45 +0200)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/scarthgap-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/scarthgap-nut
for you to fetch changes up to 543550522f831479f07d332a40ba343c53ae1065:
openssh: set status for CVE-2026-59998 (2026-07-28 15:30:13 +0200)
----------------------------------------------------------------
AshishKumar Mishra (1):
package.bbclass: hardcode emit_pkgdata to run last
Darsh Kelaiya (5):
gawk: Fix CVE-2026-40467
gawk: Fix CVE-2026-40468
gawk: Fix CVE-2026-40469
gawk: Fix CVE-2026-40553
python3-setuptools: Fix CVE-2026-59890
Deepak Rathore (1):
sqlite3: fix CVE-2026-11822 and CVE-2026-11824
Devansh Patel (1):
openssh: set status for CVE-2026-59998
João Marcos Costa (1):
curl: add annotation for CVE-2026-10536
Martin Schwan (1):
cargo-update-recipe-crates: Don't fail for partially empty Cargo.lock
Shubham Pushpkar (1):
libsolv: Fix CVE-2026-9149
Siddharth Doshi (5):
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-28422
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-42307
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-43961
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-47162
vim: Security Fix for CVE-2026-47167
mark.yang (3):
python3-cryptography: set CVE_PRODUCT
python3-ply: set CVE_PRODUCT
python3-pyasn1: set CVE_PRODUCT
meta/classes-global/package.bbclass | 7 +-
.../cargo-update-recipe-crates.bbclass | 16 +-
.../openssh/openssh_9.6p1.bb | 1 +
.../python/python3-cryptography_42.0.5.bb | 2 +
.../python/python3-ply_3.11.bb | 2 +
.../python/python3-pyasn1_0.5.1.bb | 1 +
.../python3-setuptools/CVE-2026-59890.patch | 194 ++++++++++++++++++
.../python/python3-setuptools_69.1.1.bb | 1 +
.../gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40467.patch | 63 ++++++
.../gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40468.patch | 65 ++++++
.../gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40469.patch | 90 ++++++++
.../gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40553_p1.patch | 50 +++++
.../gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40553_p2.patch | 44 ++++
meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk_5.3.0.bb | 5 +
.../libsolv/libsolv/CVE-2026-9149.patch | 152 ++++++++++++++
.../libsolv/libsolv_0.7.28.bb | 1 +
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 1 +
.../CVE-2026-11822_CVE-2026-11824.patch | 41 ++++
meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3_3.45.3.bb | 1 +
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-28422.patch | 44 ++++
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-42307.patch | 121 +++++++++++
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-43961.patch | 65 ++++++
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-47162.patch | 39 ++++
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-47167.patch | 39 ++++
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 5 +
25 files changed, 1039 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-setuptools/CVE-2026-59890.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40467.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40468.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40469.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40553_p1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/gawk/gawk/CVE-2026-40553_p2.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libsolv/libsolv/CVE-2026-9149.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/sqlite/sqlite3/CVE-2026-11822_CVE-2026-11824.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-28422.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-42307.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-43961.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-47162.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-47167.patch
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 01/19] nasm: fix CVE-2026-6067 Fabien Thomas
` (18 more replies)
0 siblings, 19 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
Please review this set of changes for scarthgap and have comments back by
end of day Monday, November 23.
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/#/builders/29/builds/5152
The following changes since commit fc4316861becc9f0d41857b49f6438929ab4c291:
openssh: fix CVE-2026-123158 (aka "sshhole") (2026-11-10 10:47:42 +0100)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/scarthgap-review
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/scarthgap-review
for you to fetch changes up to 4dec16113d0fdd009bc78d75bcab843454367c40:
aspell: upgrade 0.60.8.1 -> 0.60.8.2 (2026-11-19 09:16:30 +0100)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Adarsh Jagadish Kamini (3):
curl: fix CVE-2026-92389
curl: fix CVE-2026-92388
curl: fix CVE-2026-87864
Alexander Yurkov (1):
oeqa/selftest/recipetool: Update create_go test.
Darsh Kelaiya (2):
curl: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2026-19931
curl: fix CVE-2026-18924
Fabien Thomas (1):
vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73076
João Marcos Costa (Schneider Electric) (1):
curl: fix CVE-2026-86409
Khem Raj (1):
aspell: Backport a fix to build with gcc-15/clang-19
Kris Gavvala (2):
nasm: fix CVE-2026-6067
nasm: fix CVE-2026-6068
Peter Marko (3):
popt: patch CVE-2026-18739
glibc: patch CVE-2026-86805 and CVE-2026-95818
gcc: patch CVE-2026-102010
Rohini Sangam (1):
bind: Security fix for CVE-2026-19667
Wang Mingyu (1):
aspell: upgrade 0.60.8.1 -> 0.60.8.2
Yoann Congal (2):
pseudo: Upgrade 1.9.11 -> 1.9.12+git
TEST-pseudo: test patches
Yogita Urade (1):
python3-urllib3: Fix CVE-2026-97687
meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/recipetool.py | 212 +-------
.../bind/bind/CVE-2026-19667-1.patch | 139 +++++
.../bind/bind/CVE-2026-19667-2.patch | 355 +++++++++++++
.../recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.18.49.bb | 2 +
.../0049-CVE-2026-86805-CVE-2026-95818.patch | 267 ++++++++++
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.39.bb | 1 +
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-13.5.inc | 1 +
.../gcc/gcc/0028-CVE-2026-102010.patch | 68 +++
.../nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6067.patch | 36 ++
.../nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-1.patch | 98 ++++
.../nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-2.patch | 80 +++
.../nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-3.patch | 51 ++
meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm_2.16.03.bb | 4 +
...ree-tests-when-the-function-or-sysca.patch | 157 ++++++
...-t-generate-unused-_int-paths-with-n.patch | 59 +++
...ts-linux-Don-t-require-linux-mount.h.patch | 67 +++
...004-configure-Require-GCC-5-or-later.patch | 76 +++
...erialize-path-changes-across-clients.patch | 339 ++++++++++++
...ath-lock-in-create-and-metadata-wrap.patch | 182 +++++++
...ted-files-under-the-path-lock-before.patch | 248 +++++++++
...s-Add-a-parallel-create-rename-link-.patch | 87 ++++
...Add-information-specific-to-file-pro.patch | 216 ++++++++
...S.md-Add-to-assist-future-developers.patch | 113 ++++
meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb | 16 +-
.../python3-urllib3/CVE-2026-97687_p1.patch | 285 +++++++++++
.../python3-urllib3/CVE-2026-97687_p2.patch | 482 ++++++++++++++++++
.../python/python3-urllib3_2.2.2.bb | 2 +
...{aspell_0.60.8.1.bb => aspell_0.60.8.2.bb} | 2 +-
.../curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch | 56 ++
.../curl/curl/CVE-2026-86409.patch | 36 ++
.../curl/curl/CVE-2026-87864.patch | 52 ++
.../curl/curl/CVE-2026-92388-1.patch | 151 ++++++
.../curl/curl/CVE-2026-92388-2.patch | 30 ++
.../curl/curl/CVE-2026-92389.patch | 60 +++
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 7 +
.../popt/popt/CVE-2026-18739.patch | 92 ++++
meta/recipes-support/popt/popt_1.19.bb | 2 +
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-73076.patch | 155 ++++++
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 +
39 files changed, 4087 insertions(+), 200 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2026-19667-1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2026-19667-2.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0049-CVE-2026-86805-CVE-2026-95818.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0028-CVE-2026-102010.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6067.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-2.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-3.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0001-test-Skip-open_tree-tests-when-the-function-or-sysca.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0002-makewrappers-Don-t-generate-unused-_int-paths-with-n.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0003-ports-linux-Don-t-require-linux-mount.h.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0004-configure-Require-GCC-5-or-later.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0005-pseudo_client-serialize-path-changes-across-clients.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0006-ports-hold-the-path-lock-in-create-and-metadata-wrap.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0007-ports-check-created-files-under-the-path-lock-before.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0008-test-parallel-ops-Add-a-parallel-create-rename-link-.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0009-README.security-Add-information-specific-to-file-pro.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0010-AGENTS.md-Add-to-assist-future-developers.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2026-97687_p1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2026-97687_p2.patch
rename meta/recipes-support/aspell/{aspell_0.60.8.1.bb => aspell_0.60.8.2.bb} (93%)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-86409.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-87864.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-92388-1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-92388-2.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-92389.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/popt/popt/CVE-2026-18739.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73076.patch
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 01/19] nasm: fix CVE-2026-6067
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 02/19] nasm: fix CVE-2026-6068 Fabien Thomas
` (17 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Kris Gavvala <kris.gavvala@windriver.com>
When using obj output format, specifying more than 256 segments in
the GROUP directive of the .asm file causes a heap-buffer-overflow.
This patch applies the upstream fix given by the commit in [1]
to address the issue in [2].
[1] https://github.com/netwide-assembler/nasm/commit/8890d723d0aa9ed1a790e2ce1c55eee8dfa0cf94
[2] https://github.com/netwide-assembler/nasm/issues/203
[3] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-6067
Signed-off-by: Kris Gavvala <kris.gavvala@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Bastien Jauny <bastien.jauny@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Fabien Thomas <fabien.thomas@smile.fr>
---
.../nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6067.patch | 36 +++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm_2.16.03.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6067.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6067.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6067.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f637a688e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6067.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 8bc3400afa0a3e46c890f8887d2f9bb5acc14024 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nick Clifton <nickclifton@github.com>
+Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 13:53:14 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] outobj: fix buffer overflow when too many segments in a group
+
+The number of entries in a group was hard-coded, but not enforced.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-6067
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/netwide-assembler/nasm/commit/8890d723d0aa9ed1a790e2ce1c55eee8dfa0cf94]
+
+Reported-by: <BreakingBad6@github.com>
+Fixes: https://github.com/netwide-assembler/nasm/issues/203
+Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kris Gavvala <kris.gavvala@windriver.com>
+---
+ output/outobj.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/output/outobj.c b/output/outobj.c
+index fc336c194..ad4adb373 100644
+--- a/output/outobj.c
++++ b/output/outobj.c
+@@ -1641,6 +1641,10 @@ obj_directive(enum directive directive, char *value)
+ /*
+ * Now p contains a segment name. Find it.
+ */
++ if (grp->nentries >= GROUP_MAX) {
++ nasm_nonfatal("too many segments in a group");
++ return DIRR_ERROR;
++ }
+ for (seg = seghead; seg; seg = seg->next)
+ if (!strcmp(seg->name, p))
+ break;
+--
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm_2.16.03.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm_2.16.03.bb
index 281f3940e7..729dfe8916 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm_2.16.03.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm_2.16.03.bb
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=90904486f8fbf1861cf42752e1a39efe"
SRC_URI = "http://www.nasm.us/pub/nasm/releasebuilds/${PV}/nasm-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
file://0001-stdlib-Add-strlcat.patch \
file://0002-Add-debug-prefix-map-option.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-6067.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "bef3de159bcd61adf98bb7cc87ee9046e944644ad76b7633f18ab063edb29e57"
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 02/19] nasm: fix CVE-2026-6068
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 01/19] nasm: fix CVE-2026-6067 Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 03/19] vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73076 Fabien Thomas
` (16 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Kris Gavvala <kris.gavvala@windriver.com>
- CVE-2026-6068-1.patch applies the upstream fix in [2],
addressing the issue in [1].
- CVE-2026-6068-2.patch applies [3],
adding helper functions used in [2].
- CVE-2026-6068-3.patch applies [4],
which prevents the compilation warning:
assignment discards 'const' qualifier
[1] https://github.com/netwide-assembler/nasm/issues/222
[2] https://github.com/netwide-assembler/nasm/commit/7bc82e7daf4cceb6a8af7ad2876485c9b4b01a56
[3] https://github.com/netwide-assembler/nasm/commit/44245e4684be1fac6c2fb7ac67dce8a55a574956
[4] https://github.com/netwide-assembler/nasm/commit/7b4e77dae29156a283d31fe707939ce21bf3eb3e
Signed-off-by: Kris Gavvala <kris.gavvala@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Bastien Jauny <bastien.jauny@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Fabien Thomas <fabien.thomas@smile.fr>
---
.../nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-1.patch | 98 +++++++++++++++++++
.../nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-2.patch | 80 +++++++++++++++
.../nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-3.patch | 51 ++++++++++
meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm_2.16.03.bb | 3 +
4 files changed, 232 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-2.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-3.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-1.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..44f691610a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+From e3a3fb40d21edb638f8191465574aaaaaacb336d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "H. Peter Anvin (Intel)" <hpa@zytor.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 17:27:47 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] asm/nasm.c: fix use-after-free for -M* options in -@
+ files
+
+-M* options in response files would hold on to a pointer to the new
+value, but in response files that is not a persistent buffer. Make
+sure to make a copy instead.
+
+This uses the new nasm_str[dup]to() helpers.
+
+(Note that calling nasm_free() on a NULL pointer is guaranteed safe.)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-6068
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/netwide-assembler/nasm/commit/7bc82e7daf4cceb6a8af7ad2876485c9b4b01a56]
+
+Reported-by: <BreakingBad6@github.com>
+Fixes: https://github.com/netwide-assembler/nasm/issues/222
+Fixes: CVE-2026-6068
+Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kris Gavvala <kris.gavvala@windriver.com>
+---
+ asm/nasm.c | 20 ++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/asm/nasm.c b/asm/nasm.c
+index 49fa00eb7..98bde83cb 100644
+--- a/asm/nasm.c
++++ b/asm/nasm.c
+@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ static unsigned int operating_mode;
+ /* Dependency flags */
+ static bool depend_emit_phony = false;
+ static bool depend_missing_ok = false;
+-static const char *depend_target = NULL;
+-static const char *depend_file = NULL;
++static char *depend_target = NULL;
++static char *depend_file = NULL;
+ struct strlist *depend_list;
+
+ static bool want_usage;
+@@ -709,6 +709,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ stdscan_cleanup();
+ src_free();
+ strlist_free(&include_path);
++ nasm_free(depend_file);
++ nasm_free(depend_target);
+
+ return terminate_after_phase;
+ }
+@@ -750,7 +752,8 @@ static void copy_filename(const char **dst, const char *src, const char *what)
+ }
+
+ /*
+- * Convert a string to a POSIX make-safe form
++ * Convert a string to a POSIX make-safe form; returns a newly allocated
++ * string.
+ */
+ static char *quote_for_pmake(const char *str)
+ {
+@@ -830,7 +833,8 @@ static char *quote_for_pmake(const char *str)
+ }
+
+ /*
+- * Convert a string to a Watcom make-safe form
++ * Convert a string to a Watcom make-safe form; returns a newly allocated
++ * string.
+ */
+ static char *quote_for_wmake(const char *str)
+ {
+@@ -1188,20 +1192,20 @@ static bool process_arg(char *p, char *q, int pass)
+ case 'D':
+ operating_mode |= OP_DEPEND;
+ if (q && (q[0] != '-' || q[1] == '\0')) {
+- depend_file = q;
++ nasm_strdupto(&depend_file, q);
+ advance = true;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 'F':
+- depend_file = q;
++ nasm_strdupto(&depend_file, q);
+ advance = true;
+ break;
+ case 'T':
+- depend_target = q;
++ nasm_strdupto(&depend_target, q);
+ advance = true;
+ break;
+ case 'Q':
+- depend_target = quote_for_make(q);
++ nasm_strto(&depend_target, quote_for_make(q));
+ advance = true;
+ break;
+ case 'W':
+--
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-2.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4b2334776a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From 4dfcfe9b333230788be7328e8fe943bda1610011 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "H. Peter Anvin (Intel)" <hpa@zytor.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 17:25:23 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Add nasm_strdupto() and nasm_strto(), to replace a string
+ variable
+
+It is common enough that one wants to set a string pointer to a newly
+allocated string, freeing the old one if it is not NULL.
+
+Add specific helper functions for this.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-6068
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/netwide-assembler/nasm/commit/44245e4684be1fac6c2fb7ac67dce8a55a574956]
+
+Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kris Gavvala <kris.gavvala@windriver.com>
+---
+ include/nasmlib.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+ nasmlib/alloc.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/include/nasmlib.h b/include/nasmlib.h
+index ed4222b11..fae86d3cd 100644
+--- a/include/nasmlib.h
++++ b/include/nasmlib.h
+@@ -102,6 +102,29 @@ char * safe_alloc nasm_strndup(const char *, size_t);
+ char * safe_alloc nasm_strcat(const char *one, const char *two);
+ char * safe_alloc end_with_null nasm_strcatn(const char *one, ...);
+
++/*
++ * Replace a string in a string pointer variable with a nasm_strdup()
++ * copy of the argument on the right, freeing the contents of the
++ * previous contents of the variable if non-NULL.
++ *
++ * If *str is NULL, simply return the old value of *ptrp.
++ */
++char *nasm_strdupto(char **ptrp, const char *str);
++
++/*
++ * Similar, but the new pointer must already have been heap allocated
++ * by the creating function.
++ */
++static inline char *nasm_strto(char **ptrp, char *str)
++{
++ char *ptr = *ptrp;
++ if (!str)
++ return ptr;
++ if (ptr)
++ nasm_free(ptr);
++ return *ptrp = str;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * nasm_[v]asprintf() are variants of the semi-standard [v]asprintf()
+ * functions, except that we return the pointer instead of a count.
+diff --git a/nasmlib/alloc.c b/nasmlib/alloc.c
+index b77d48217..fa3e9e996 100644
+--- a/nasmlib/alloc.c
++++ b/nasmlib/alloc.c
+@@ -101,6 +101,17 @@ char *nasm_strndup(const char *s, size_t len)
+ return memcpy(p, s, len);
+ }
+
++char *nasm_strdupto(char **ptrp, const char *str)
++{
++ char *ptr = *ptrp;
++ if (str) {
++ if (ptr)
++ nasm_free(ptr);
++ *ptrp = ptr = nasm_strdup(str);
++ }
++ return ptr;
++}
++
+ char *nasm_strcat(const char *one, const char *two)
+ {
+ char *rslt;
+--
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-3.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-3.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b25a6de583
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm/CVE-2026-6068-3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From db6cbdf6244ddb729b7c6331f62f42334bc00550 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kris Gavvala <kris.gavvala@windriver.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2026 00:57:12 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Drop const return type of filename_set_extension()
+
+filename_set_extension() always returns a newly allocated string
+buffer, drop the "const" from the return type.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-6068
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/netwide-assembler/nasm/commit/7b4e77dae2]
+
+Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
+Signed-off-by: Kris Gavvala <kris.gavvala@windriver.com>
+---
+ include/nasmlib.h | 5 +++--
+ nasmlib/filename.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/nasmlib.h b/include/nasmlib.h
+index 494d7842e..2771c5951 100644
+--- a/include/nasmlib.h
++++ b/include/nasmlib.h
+@@ -366,9 +366,10 @@ struct debug_prefix_list {
+ extern struct debug_prefix_list *debug_prefixes;
+
+ /*
+- * Add/replace or remove an extension to the end of a filename
++ * Add/replace or remove an extension to the end of a filename;
++ * returns a newly allocated buffer with the modified filename.
+ */
+-const char *filename_set_extension(const char *inname, const char *extension);
++char *filename_set_extension(const char *inname, const char *extension);
+ char *filename_debug_remap(char *dest, char const *inname, size_t len);
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/nasmlib/filename.c b/nasmlib/filename.c
+index 0e27f69e2..85c42a21c 100644
+--- a/nasmlib/filename.c
++++ b/nasmlib/filename.c
+@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ struct debug_prefix_list *debug_prefixes = NULL;
+ * field at the very end of the filename. Returns a newly allocated
+ * string buffer.
+ */
+-const char *filename_set_extension(const char *inname, const char *extension)
++char *filename_set_extension(const char *inname, const char *extension)
+ {
+ const char *q = inname;
+ char *p;
+--
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm_2.16.03.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm_2.16.03.bb
index 729dfe8916..d2608e3e20 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm_2.16.03.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/nasm/nasm_2.16.03.bb
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.nasm.us/pub/nasm/releasebuilds/${PV}/nasm-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
file://0001-stdlib-Add-strlcat.patch \
file://0002-Add-debug-prefix-map-option.patch \
file://CVE-2026-6067.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-6068-1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-6068-2.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-6068-3.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "bef3de159bcd61adf98bb7cc87ee9046e944644ad76b7633f18ab063edb29e57"
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 03/19] vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73076
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 01/19] nasm: fix CVE-2026-6067 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 02/19] nasm: fix CVE-2026-6068 Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 04/19] bind: Security fix for CVE-2026-19667 Fabien Thomas
` (15 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
Pick the patch from [1], also referenced in the NVD report [2].
[1] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/581a2f3ac9c6f96a26324f6b2c8c11415fd0d452
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73076
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Bastien Jauny <bastien.jauny@smile.fr>
[fatho: fix indentations to stay consistent with upstream]
Signed-off-by: Fabien Thomas <fabien.thomas@smile.fr>
---
.../vim/files/CVE-2026-73076.patch | 155 ++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 +
2 files changed, 156 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73076.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73076.patch b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73076.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..87f2d4b62f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-73076.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+From c74d28b907af0b1f1621f881f098374124bcd53d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
+Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2026 17:43:51 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0847: [security]: vimball: code execution via
+ .VimballRecord file
+
+Problem: [security]: vimball: code execution via .VimballRecord file
+ (tdjackey)
+Solution: Forbid arbitrary commands, fix broken directory deletion code,
+ refactor code
+
+Github Security Advisory:
+https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-r22p-fhw4-84p2
+Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>
+
+Backport Changes:
+
+The .VimballRecord rejection is placed after the fenc/filecnt extraction
+because the earlier strange-filename check block present in upstream 9.2 does
+not exist in the 9.1.1683 vim sources.
+Omitted src/testdir/test_plugin_vimball.vim because the current vim source
+archive does not include it.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-73076
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/581a2f3ac9c6f96a26324f6b2c8c11415fd0d452]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
+---
+ runtime/autoload/vimball.vim | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/runtime/autoload/vimball.vim b/runtime/autoload/vimball.vim
+index 6456984411..5791c7f44a 100644
+--- a/runtime/autoload/vimball.vim
++++ b/runtime/autoload/vimball.vim
+@@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ if &cp || exists("g:loaded_vimball")
+ finish
+ endif
+ let g:loaded_vimball = "v37"
+-if v:version < 702
++if v:version < 900
+ echohl WarningMsg
+- echo "***warning*** this version of vimball needs vim 7.2"
++ echo "***warning*** this version of vimball needs vim 9.0"
+ echohl Normal
+ finish
+ endif
+@@ -270,6 +270,13 @@ fun! vimball#Vimball(really,...)
+ let fenc = substitute(getline(linenr+1),'^\d\+\s*\(\S\{-}\)$','\1','')
+ let filecnt = filecnt + 1
+ " call Decho("fname<".fname."> fsize=".fsize." filecnt=".filecnt. " fenc=".fenc)
++ if fname =~? '\%(^\|/\)\.VimballRecord$'
++ echomsg "(Vimball) Forbidding .VimballRecord filename, aborting..."
++ exe "tabn ".curtabnr
++ bw! Vimball
++ call s:ChgDir(curdir)
++ return
++ endif
+
+ if a:really
+ echomsg "extracted <".fname.">: ".fsize." lines"
+@@ -309,7 +316,7 @@ fun! vimball#Vimball(really,...)
+ else
+ call mkdir(dirname)
+ endif
+- call s:RecordInVar(home,"rmdir('".dirname."')")
++ call s:RecordDirInVar(dirname)
+ endif
+ endwhile
+ endif
+@@ -343,7 +350,7 @@ fun! vimball#Vimball(really,...)
+ exe "silent w! ".fnameescape(fnamepath)
+ endif
+ echo "wrote ".fnameescape(fnamepath)
+- call s:RecordInVar(home,"call delete('".fnamepath."')")
++ call s:RecordInVar(fnamepath)
+ endif
+
+ " return to tab with vimball
+@@ -464,11 +471,17 @@ fun! vimball#RmVimball(...)
+ let s:VBRstring= substitute(exestring,'call delete(','','g')
+ let s:VBRstring= substitute(s:VBRstring,"[')]",'','g')
+ " call Decho("exe ".exestring)
+- sil! keepalt keepjumps exe exestring
++ let nr_files= 0
++ for line in split(exestring, '|')
++ if line !~ '^call delete(''[^'']\{-}''\(,"d"\)\?)$'
++ echomsg "ignoring .VimballRecord entry: " line
++ else
++ sil! keepalt keepjumps exe line
++ let nr_files+= 1
++ endif
++ endfor
+ sil! keepalt keepjumps d
+- let exestring= strlen(substitute(exestring,'call delete(.\{-})|\=',"D","g"))
+-" call Decho("exestring<".exestring.">")
+- echomsg "removed ".exestring." files"
++ echomsg "removed ".nr_files." files"
+ else
+ let s:VBRstring= ''
+ let curfile = substitute(curfile,'\.vmb','','')
+@@ -622,23 +635,22 @@ fun! s:ChgDir(newdir)
+ endfun
+
+ " ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+-" s:RecordInVar: record a un-vimball command in the .VimballRecord file {{{2
+-fun! s:RecordInVar(home,cmd)
+-" call Dfunc("RecordInVar(home<".a:home."> cmd<".a:cmd.">)")
+- if a:cmd =~ '^rmdir'
+-" if !exists("s:recorddir")
+-" let s:recorddir= substitute(a:cmd,'^rmdir',"call s:Rmdir",'')
+-" else
+-" let s:recorddir= s:recorddir."|".substitute(a:cmd,'^rmdir',"call s:Rmdir",'')
+-" endif
+- elseif !exists("s:recordfile")
+- let s:recordfile= a:cmd
+- else
+- let s:recordfile= s:recordfile."|".a:cmd
++" s:RecordInVar: record a un-vimball file deletion in the .VimballRecord file {{{2
++fun! s:RecordInVar(file)
++ if !exists("s:recordfile")
++ let s:recordfile=[]
+ endif
+-" call Dret("RecordInVar : s:recordfile<".(exists("s:recordfile")? s:recordfile : "")."> s:recorddir<".(exists("s:recorddir")? s:recorddir : "").">")
++ call add(s:recordfile, $'call delete({string(a:file)})')
+ endfun
+
++" s:RecordDirInVar: record a un-vimball dir deletion in the .VimballRecord file {{{2
++fun! s:RecordDirInVar(dir)
++ if !exists("s:recorddir")
++ let s:recorddir = []
++ endif
++ call add(s:recorddir, $'call delete({string(a:dir)},"d")')
++ endfun
++
+ " ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ " s:RecordInFile: {{{2
+ fun! s:RecordInFile(home)
+@@ -660,11 +672,11 @@ fun! s:RecordInFile(home)
+ setlocal ma
+ $
+ if exists("s:recordfile") && exists("s:recorddir")
+- let cmd= cmd.s:recordfile."|".s:recorddir
++ let cmd= cmd.join(s:recordfile, '|')."|".join(s:recorddir, '|')
+ elseif exists("s:recorddir")
+- let cmd= cmd.s:recorddir
++ let cmd= cmd.join(s:recorddir, '|')
+ elseif exists("s:recordfile")
+- let cmd= cmd.s:recordfile
++ let cmd= cmd.join(s:recordfile, '|')
+ else
+ " call Dret("s:RecordInFile : neither recordfile nor recorddir exist")
+ return
+--
+2.50.1
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc
index f84d2a9688..3a8b67085a 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
file://CVE-2026-73074.patch \
file://CVE-2026-73077.patch \
file://CVE-2026-73078.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-73076.patch \
"
PV .= ".1683"
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 04/19] bind: Security fix for CVE-2026-19667
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 03/19] vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73076 Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 05/19] oeqa/selftest/recipetool: Update create_go test Fabien Thomas
` (14 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Rohini Sangam <rsangam@mvista.com>
Pick patch from [1] and [2] also mentioned at Debian tracker in [3]
[1] https://github.com/isc-projects/bind9/commit/c4203fb70e3985452afddeadb7075aa91ae05d7d
[2] https://github.com/isc-projects/bind9/commit/993d10fe15adbac485d399f1e4144b55ed226ecf
[3] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-19667
Signed-off-by: Rohini Sangam <rsangam@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Bastien Jauny <bastien.jauny@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Fabien Thomas <fabien.thomas@smile.fr>
---
.../bind/bind/CVE-2026-19667-1.patch | 139 +++++++
.../bind/bind/CVE-2026-19667-2.patch | 355 ++++++++++++++++++
.../recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.18.49.bb | 2 +
3 files changed, 496 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2026-19667-1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2026-19667-2.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2026-19667-1.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2026-19667-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5c52e42034
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2026-19667-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+From e5c7129b2d312d14759aa8b4a146f78a6a60020e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Ond=C5=99ej=20Sur=C3=BD?= <ondrej@isc.org>
+Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 17:15:26 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Reject negative cache records that do not fit in a
+ dns_rdata_t
+
+dns_ncache_add() assembles each negative cache record in a 64 KiB stack
+buffer and then stores its size in dns_rdata_t.length, which is 16 bits
+wide. A record that fills the buffer exactly is recorded as being zero
+bytes long, which is small enough to satisfy the size checks in
+dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset() that would otherwise have rejected it. The
+truncated record is committed to the cache, and every reader of it then
+fails an assertion.
+
+A response whose authority section repeats one SOA record, with MNAME
+and RNAME compressed against a long QNAME, expands to exactly that size,
+so check the length where the record is produced rather than relying on
+the slab code to notice. Every other way of building a dns_rdata_t
+already refuses anything longer than DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH.
+
+While here, refuse a singleton RRset with more than one record and a
+second SOA RRset as DNS_R_TOOMANYRECORDS, which is now also what more
+than DNS_NCACHE_RDATA records reports instead of ISC_R_NOSPACE. The
+message parser and the resolver already reject duplicate singletons
+and a second SOA on their own, but dns_ncache_add() should not depend
+on its callers for that.
+
+Co-authored-by: Mark Andrews <marka@isc.org>
+(cherry picked from commit 8b20ed0a647cd1e9efc3bf442fc5d898f6a4de57)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-19667
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/isc-projects/bind9/commit/c4203fb70e3985452afddeadb7075aa91ae05d7d]
+
+Signed-off-by: Rohini Sangam <rsangam@mvista.com>
+---
+ lib/dns/ncache.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/dns/ncache.c b/lib/dns/ncache.c
+index c99c266..bab42bf 100644
+--- a/lib/dns/ncache.c
++++ b/lib/dns/ncache.c
+@@ -63,14 +63,30 @@ copy_rdataset(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, isc_buffer_t *buffer) {
+ return ISC_R_NOSPACE;
+ }
+ count = dns_rdataset_count(rdataset);
++
++ /*
++ * Reject duplicate singleton records.
++ */
++ if (dns_rdatatype_issingleton(rdataset->type) && count != 1) {
++ return DNS_R_TOOMANYRECORDS;
++ }
++
+ INSIST(count <= 65535);
+ isc_buffer_putuint16(buffer, (uint16_t)count);
+
++ if (ar.length < 2 + count * 2) {
++ /*
++ * The count took 2 bytes and each rdata needs at least 2
++ * more for its length. Bail early if that cannot fit.
++ */
++ return ISC_R_NOSPACE;
++ }
++
+ result = dns_rdataset_first(rdataset);
+ while (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
+ dns_rdataset_current(rdataset, &rdata);
+ dns_rdata_toregion(&rdata, &r);
+- INSIST(r.length <= 65535);
++ INSIST(r.length <= DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH);
+ isc_buffer_availableregion(buffer, &ar);
+ if (ar.length < 2) {
+ return ISC_R_NOSPACE;
+@@ -79,6 +95,7 @@ copy_rdataset(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, isc_buffer_t *buffer) {
+ * Copy the rdata length to the buffer.
+ */
+ isc_buffer_putuint16(buffer, (uint16_t)r.length);
++
+ /*
+ * Copy the rdata to the buffer.
+ */
+@@ -129,8 +146,9 @@ addoptout(dns_message_t *message, dns_db_t *cache, dns_dbnode_t *node,
+ dns_rdata_t rdata[DNS_NCACHE_RDATA];
+ dns_rdataset_t ncrdataset;
+ dns_rdatalist_t ncrdatalist;
+- unsigned char data[65536];
++ unsigned char data[UINT16_MAX];
+ unsigned int next = 0;
++ bool seen_soa = false;
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the authority data from 'message' into a negative cache
+@@ -177,6 +195,20 @@ addoptout(dns_message_t *message, dns_db_t *cache, dns_dbnode_t *node,
+ continue;
+ }
+ type = rdataset->type;
++
++ /*
++ * A negative response carries one SOA
++ * RRset. The resolver rejects a second
++ * one before it gets here; don't rely on
++ * that.
++ */
++ if (type == dns_rdatatype_soa) {
++ if (seen_soa) {
++ return DNS_R_TOOMANYRECORDS;
++ }
++ seen_soa = true;
++ }
++
+ if (type == dns_rdatatype_rrsig) {
+ type = rdataset->covers;
+ }
+@@ -224,10 +256,20 @@ addoptout(dns_message_t *message, dns_db_t *cache, dns_dbnode_t *node,
+ }
+
+ if (next >= DNS_NCACHE_RDATA) {
+- return ISC_R_NOSPACE;
++ return DNS_R_TOOMANYRECORDS;
+ }
+ dns_rdata_init(&rdata[next]);
+ isc_buffer_remainingregion(&buffer, &r);
++ /*
++ * dns_rdata_t.length is 16 bits wide,
++ * so a longer record would be silently
++ * truncated here and would then pass
++ * the size checks in
++ * dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset().
++ */
++ if (r.length > DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH) {
++ return ISC_R_NOSPACE;
++ }
+ rdata[next].data = r.base;
+ rdata[next].length = r.length;
+ rdata[next].rdclass =
+--
+2.44.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2026-19667-2.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2026-19667-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8427eae31f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2026-19667-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
+From 993d10fe15adbac485d399f1e4144b55ed226ecf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Ond=C5=99ej=20Sur=C3=BD?= <ondrej@isc.org>
+Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2026 10:05:05 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Test that an oversized negative cache record is rejected
+
+Nothing exercised dns_ncache_add() with a record too large to store, so
+the missing range check went unnoticed for as long as the length field
+was wide enough to hold one.
+
+The record has to be built below the message parser. SOA is the only
+record type whose negative cache form is larger than its wire form, and
+the parser now collapses repeated identical SOA records into one, so a
+response can no longer be made to reach the limit. Assemble the
+authority section by hand instead, sized to the exact 64 KiB fill that
+used to be stored as a zero-length record and to either side of
+DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH, and cover the singleton and record-count
+rejections while at it.
+
+Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5
+(cherry picked from commit a82c98e5db5b0ca3e2a1e2f42bcd7374d0235f70)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-19667
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/isc-projects/bind9/commit/993d10fe15adbac485d399f1e4144b55ed226ecf]
+
+Signed-off-by: Rohini Sangam <rsangam@mvista.com>
+---
+ tests/dns/Makefile.am | 1 +
+ tests/dns/ncache_test.c | 303 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 304 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 tests/dns/ncache_test.c
+
+diff --git a/tests/dns/Makefile.am b/tests/dns/Makefile.am
+index 7062c60..512329e 100644
+--- a/tests/dns/Makefile.am
++++ b/tests/dns/Makefile.am
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ check_PROGRAMS = \
+ dst_test \
+ keytable_test \
+ name_test \
++ ncache_test \
+ nsec3_test \
+ nsec3param_test \
+ private_test \
+diff --git a/tests/dns/ncache_test.c b/tests/dns/ncache_test.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..19a30b2
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/dns/ncache_test.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")
++ *
++ * SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
++ *
++ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
++ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
++ * file, you can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
++ *
++ * See the COPYRIGHT file distributed with this work for additional
++ * information regarding copyright ownership.
++ */
++
++#include <inttypes.h>
++#include <sched.h> /* IWYU pragma: keep */
++#include <setjmp.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <stdbool.h>
++#include <stddef.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++
++#define UNIT_TESTING
++#include <cmocka.h>
++
++#include <isc/stdtime.h>
++#include <isc/util.h>
++
++#include <dns/db.h>
++#include <dns/message.h>
++#include <dns/name.h>
++#include <dns/ncache.h>
++#include <dns/rdata.h>
++#include <dns/rdatalist.h>
++#include <dns/rdataset.h>
++#include <dns/result.h>
++
++#include <tests/dns.h>
++
++/*
++ * dns_ncache_add() turns every RRset it keeps from the authority section
++ * into one negative cache record laid out as
++ *
++ * owner name | type | trust | count | count * (rdlen | rdata)
++ *
++ * The rdata is copied verbatim and never parsed, so the tests below fill
++ * it from this buffer and only care about its length.
++ */
++static unsigned char filler[UINT16_MAX];
++
++/*
++ * dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset() stores each record behind a 2-byte length,
++ * or an 8-byte length, offset and order header with --enable-fixed-rrset,
++ * and refuses a record that would exceed DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH together
++ * with that header.
++ */
++#if DNS_RDATASET_FIXED
++#define SLAB_OVERHEAD 8
++#else
++#define SLAB_OVERHEAD 2
++#endif
++
++static dns_name_t *
++name_fromstring(dns_fixedname_t *fixed, const char *namestr) {
++ dns_name_t *name = dns_fixedname_initname(fixed);
++ isc_result_t result;
++
++ result = dns_name_fromstring(name, namestr, 0, NULL);
++ assert_int_equal(result, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
++
++ return name;
++}
++
++static dns_message_t *
++negative_response(void) {
++ dns_message_t *msg = NULL;
++
++ dns_message_create(mctx, DNS_MESSAGE_INTENTRENDER, &msg);
++ msg->flags = DNS_MESSAGEFLAG_QR | DNS_MESSAGEFLAG_AA;
++ msg->rcode = dns_rcode_nxdomain;
++
++ return msg;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Add an RRset of 'count' rdatas to the authority section of 'msg', at
++ * 'ownerstr', marked for negative caching the way the resolver marks
++ * them. The rdata lengths are chosen so that the negative cache record
++ * built from the RRset is exactly 'size' bytes long.
++ */
++static void
++add_rrset(dns_message_t *msg, const char *ownerstr, dns_rdatatype_t type,
++ dns_rdatatype_t covers, unsigned int count, size_t size) {
++ dns_name_t *name = NULL;
++ dns_rdatalist_t *rdatalist = NULL;
++ dns_rdataset_t *rdataset = NULL;
++ size_t payload, rdlen;
++ isc_result_t result;
++
++ result = dns_message_gettempname(msg, &name);
++ assert_int_equal(result, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
++ name_fromstring((dns_fixedname_t *)name, ownerstr);
++ name->attributes |= DNS_NAMEATTR_NCACHE;
++
++ result = dns_message_gettemprdatalist(msg, &rdatalist);
++ assert_int_equal(result, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
++ rdatalist->rdclass = dns_rdataclass_in;
++ rdatalist->type = type;
++ rdatalist->covers = covers;
++ rdatalist->ttl = 3600;
++
++ /*
++ * Split the rdata bytes evenly, giving the remainder to the first
++ * rdatas one byte at a time.
++ */
++ assert_true(size >= name->length + 5 + count * 2);
++ payload = size - name->length - 5 - count * 2;
++ rdlen = payload / count;
++
++ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
++ dns_rdata_t *rdata = NULL;
++
++ result = dns_message_gettemprdata(msg, &rdata);
++ assert_int_equal(result, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
++ rdata->rdclass = dns_rdataclass_in;
++ rdata->type = type;
++ rdata->data = filler;
++ rdata->length = rdlen + (i < payload % count ? 1 : 0);
++ assert_true(rdata->length <= DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH);
++ ISC_LIST_APPEND(rdatalist->rdata, rdata, link);
++ }
++
++ result = dns_message_gettemprdataset(msg, &rdataset);
++ assert_int_equal(result, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
++ result = dns_rdatalist_tordataset(rdatalist, rdataset);
++ assert_int_equal(result, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
++ rdataset->trust = dns_trust_authauthority;
++ rdataset->attributes |= DNS_RDATASETATTR_NCACHE;
++ ISC_LIST_APPEND(name->list, rdataset, link);
++
++ dns_message_addname(msg, name, DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY);
++ /*
++ * dns_ncache_add() skips the section when its count is zero.
++ */
++ msg->counts[DNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY] += count;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Cache 'msg' as an NXDOMAIN for 'qname' in a fresh cache and return the
++ * result of dns_ncache_add(), and in 'find_result' what a lookup of
++ * 'qname' sees afterwards: DNS_R_NCACHENXDOMAIN if the record was stored,
++ * ISC_R_NOTFOUND if it was rejected.
++ */
++static isc_result_t
++ncache_add(dns_message_t *msg, const dns_name_t *qname,
++ isc_result_t *find_result) {
++ isc_stdtime_t now;
++ dns_db_t *db = NULL;
++ dns_dbnode_t *node = NULL;
++ dns_fixedname_t ffound;
++ dns_name_t *found = dns_fixedname_initname(&ffound);
++ dns_rdataset_t rdataset = DNS_RDATASET_INIT;
++ isc_result_t result;
++
++ isc_stdtime_get(&now);
++
++ result = dns_db_create(mctx, "rbt", dns_rootname, dns_dbtype_cache,
++ dns_rdataclass_in, 0, NULL, &db);
++ assert_int_equal(result, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
++
++ result = dns_db_findnode(db, qname, true, &node);
++ assert_int_equal(result, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
++
++ result = dns_ncache_add(msg, db, node, dns_rdatatype_any, now, 0, 3600,
++ NULL);
++
++ dns_db_detachnode(db, &node);
++
++ *find_result = dns_db_find(db, qname, NULL, dns_rdatatype_a, 0, now,
++ NULL, found, &rdataset, NULL);
++ if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&rdataset)) {
++ dns_rdataset_disassociate(&rdataset);
++ }
++
++ dns_db_detach(&db);
++
++ return result;
++}
++
++/*
++ * A record that does not fit in dns_rdata_t.length must be rejected.
++ * Its size used to be truncated to 16 bits instead, so a record of
++ * exactly 65536 bytes was committed to the cache with a length of zero
++ * and every subsequent reader of the cache entry failed an assertion.
++ */
++ISC_RUN_TEST_IMPL(ncache_add_size) {
++ struct {
++ size_t size;
++ isc_result_t expected;
++ } tests[] = {
++ /*
++ * The largest record that can be stored: the slab needs
++ * SLAB_OVERHEAD more bytes for its record header.
++ */
++ { DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH - SLAB_OVERHEAD, ISC_R_SUCCESS },
++ { DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH + 1, ISC_R_NOSPACE },
++ { 65536, ISC_R_NOSPACE },
++ };
++ dns_fixedname_t fqname;
++ dns_name_t *qname = name_fromstring(&fqname, "missing.example.");
++
++ for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tests); i++) {
++ dns_message_t *msg = negative_response();
++ isc_result_t result, find_result;
++
++ /*
++ * Two RRSIG(NSEC) records, because a single rdata cannot be
++ * longer than DNS_RDATA_MAXLENGTH.
++ */
++ add_rrset(msg, "example.", dns_rdatatype_rrsig,
++ dns_rdatatype_nsec, 2, tests[i].size);
++
++ result = ncache_add(msg, qname, &find_result);
++ assert_int_equal(result, tests[i].expected);
++ assert_int_equal(find_result, tests[i].expected == ISC_R_SUCCESS
++ ? DNS_R_NCACHENXDOMAIN
++ : ISC_R_NOTFOUND);
++
++ dns_message_detach(&msg);
++ }
++}
++
++/*
++ * A negative response holds at most one SOA record. The message parser
++ * and the resolver enforce that on their own, so exercise the checks in
++ * dns_ncache_add() with hand-built messages.
++ */
++ISC_RUN_TEST_IMPL(ncache_add_soa) {
++ dns_fixedname_t fqname;
++ dns_name_t *qname = name_fromstring(&fqname, "missing.example.");
++ dns_message_t *msg = NULL;
++ isc_result_t result, find_result;
++
++ /* One SOA is fine. */
++ msg = negative_response();
++ add_rrset(msg, "example.", dns_rdatatype_soa, dns_rdatatype_none, 1,
++ 100);
++ result = ncache_add(msg, qname, &find_result);
++ assert_int_equal(result, ISC_R_SUCCESS);
++ assert_int_equal(find_result, DNS_R_NCACHENXDOMAIN);
++ dns_message_detach(&msg);
++
++ /* Two SOA records in one RRset are not. */
++ msg = negative_response();
++ add_rrset(msg, "example.", dns_rdatatype_soa, dns_rdatatype_none, 2,
++ 100);
++ result = ncache_add(msg, qname, &find_result);
++ assert_int_equal(result, DNS_R_TOOMANYRECORDS);
++ assert_int_equal(find_result, ISC_R_NOTFOUND);
++ dns_message_detach(&msg);
++
++ /* Neither are two SOA RRsets. */
++ msg = negative_response();
++ add_rrset(msg, "example.", dns_rdatatype_soa, dns_rdatatype_none, 1,
++ 100);
++ add_rrset(msg, "sub.example.", dns_rdatatype_soa, dns_rdatatype_none, 1,
++ 100);
++ result = ncache_add(msg, qname, &find_result);
++ assert_int_equal(result, DNS_R_TOOMANYRECORDS);
++ assert_int_equal(find_result, ISC_R_NOTFOUND);
++ dns_message_detach(&msg);
++}
++
++/*
++ * dns_ncache_add() stores at most DNS_NCACHE_RDATA (100) records.
++ */
++ISC_RUN_TEST_IMPL(ncache_add_count) {
++ dns_fixedname_t fqname;
++ dns_name_t *qname = name_fromstring(&fqname, "missing.example.");
++ dns_message_t *msg = negative_response();
++ isc_result_t result, find_result;
++
++ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 101; i++) {
++ char owner[64];
++
++ snprintf(owner, sizeof(owner), "nsec%u.example.", i);
++ add_rrset(msg, owner, dns_rdatatype_nsec, dns_rdatatype_none, 1,
++ 100);
++ }
++
++ result = ncache_add(msg, qname, &find_result);
++ assert_int_equal(result, DNS_R_TOOMANYRECORDS);
++ assert_int_equal(find_result, ISC_R_NOTFOUND);
++ dns_message_detach(&msg);
++}
++
++ISC_TEST_LIST_START
++ISC_TEST_ENTRY(ncache_add_size)
++ISC_TEST_ENTRY(ncache_add_soa)
++ISC_TEST_ENTRY(ncache_add_count)
++ISC_TEST_LIST_END
++
++ISC_TEST_MAIN
+--
+2.44.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.18.49.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.18.49.bb
index 723a09e739..fef00e363f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.18.49.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.18.49.bb
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.xz \
file://bind-ensure-searching-for-json-headers-searches-sysr.patch \
file://0001-named-lwresd-V-and-start-log-hide-build-options.patch \
file://0001-avoid-start-failure-with-bind-user.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-19667-1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-19667-2.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c43ce4548ebed788cd9df63658a7de105ceafba43fcd63fa352b1093e525cd24"
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 05/19] oeqa/selftest/recipetool: Update create_go test.
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 04/19] bind: Security fix for CVE-2026-19667 Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 06/19] pseudo: Upgrade 1.9.11 -> 1.9.12+git Fabien Thomas
` (13 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Alexander Yurkov <alexander.v.yurkov@gmail.com>
Adjust test_recipetool_go_create test to a smaller repository.
Combine test_recipetool_go_create and test_recipetool_go_replace_modules
tests into test_recipetool_go_create, the new test performs both tests.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Yurkov <alexander.v.yurkov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vyacheslav Yurkov <uvv.mail@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit d1256f8ff4a94d4f32b2b9ca855359dd2d691beb)
Backport to fix test_recipetool_create_go failing on the autobuilder:
google.golang.org/protobuf's go-import meta now points to
github.com/protocolbuffers/protobuf-go instead of go.googlesource.com/protobuf,
so the hardcoded expectation no longer matches. Upstream switched the test
to a dedicated small repository, which avoids this dependency entirely.
Seen on https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/#/builders/35/builds/5235
Signed-off-by: Bastien Jauny <bastien.jauny@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Fabien Thomas <fabien.thomas@smile.fr>
---
meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/recipetool.py | 212 ++-------------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 196 deletions(-)
diff --git a/meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/recipetool.py b/meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/recipetool.py
index 8c54e65ad6..5bde8903f3 100644
--- a/meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/recipetool.py
+++ b/meta/lib/oeqa/selftest/cases/recipetool.py
@@ -760,13 +760,13 @@ class RecipetoolCreateTests(RecipetoolBase):
temprecipe = os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'recipe')
os.makedirs(temprecipe)
- recipefile = os.path.join(temprecipe, 'edgex-go_git.bb')
- deps_require_file = os.path.join(temprecipe, 'edgex-go', 'edgex-go-modules.inc')
- lics_require_file = os.path.join(temprecipe, 'edgex-go', 'edgex-go-licenses.inc')
- modules_txt_file = os.path.join(temprecipe, 'edgex-go', 'modules.txt')
+ recipefile = os.path.join(temprecipe, 'recipetool-go-test_git.bb')
+ deps_require_file = os.path.join(temprecipe, 'recipetool-go-test', 'recipetool-go-test-modules.inc')
+ lics_require_file = os.path.join(temprecipe, 'recipetool-go-test', 'recipetool-go-test-licenses.inc')
+ modules_txt_file = os.path.join(temprecipe, 'recipetool-go-test', 'modules.txt')
- srcuri = 'https://github.com/edgexfoundry/edgex-go.git'
- srcrev = "v3.0.0"
+ srcuri = 'https://git.yoctoproject.org/recipetool-go-test.git'
+ srcrev = "c3e213c01b6c1406b430df03ef0d1ae77de5d2f7"
srcbranch = "main"
result = runCmd('recipetool create -o %s %s -S %s -B %s' % (temprecipe, srcuri, srcrev, srcbranch))
@@ -775,207 +775,27 @@ class RecipetoolCreateTests(RecipetoolBase):
inherits = ['go-vendor']
checkvars = {}
- checkvars['GO_IMPORT'] = "github.com/edgexfoundry/edgex-go"
+ checkvars['GO_IMPORT'] = "git.yoctoproject.org/recipetool-go-test"
checkvars['SRC_URI'] = {'git://${GO_IMPORT};destsuffix=git/src/${GO_IMPORT};nobranch=1;name=${BPN};protocol=https',
'file://modules.txt'}
- checkvars['LIC_FILES_CHKSUM'] = {'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/LICENSE;md5=8f8bc924cf73f6a32381e5fd4c58d603'}
+ checkvars['LIC_FILES_CHKSUM'] = {
+ 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/LICENSE;md5=4e3933dd47afbf115e484d11385fb3bd',
+ 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/is/LICENSE;md5=62beaee5a116dd1e80161667b1df39ab'
+ }
- self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(recipefile))
self._test_recipe_contents(recipefile, checkvars, inherits)
+ self.assertNotIn('Traceback', result.output)
checkvars = {}
checkvars['VENDORED_LIC_FILES_CHKSUM'] = set(
- ['file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/Microsoft/go-winio/LICENSE;md5=69205ff73858f2c22b2ca135b557e8ef',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/armon/go-metrics/LICENSE;md5=d2d77030c0183e3d1e66d26dc1f243be',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/cenkalti/backoff/LICENSE;md5=1571d94433e3f3aa05267efd4dbea68b',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/davecgh/go-spew/LICENSE;md5=c06795ed54b2a35ebeeb543cd3a73e56',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/eclipse/paho.mqtt.golang/LICENSE;md5=dcdb33474b60c38efd27356d8f2edec7',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/eclipse/paho.mqtt.golang/edl-v10;md5=3adfcc70f5aeb7a44f3f9b495aa1fbf3',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-bootstrap/v3/LICENSE;md5=0d6dae39976133b2851fba4c1e1275ff',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-configuration/v3/LICENSE;md5=0d6dae39976133b2851fba4c1e1275ff',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-core-contracts/v3/LICENSE;md5=0d6dae39976133b2851fba4c1e1275ff',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-messaging/v3/LICENSE;md5=0d6dae39976133b2851fba4c1e1275ff',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-registry/v3/LICENSE;md5=0d6dae39976133b2851fba4c1e1275ff',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-secrets/v3/LICENSE;md5=f9fa2f4f8e0ef8cc7b5dd150963eb457',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/fatih/color/LICENSE.md;md5=316e6d590bdcde7993fb175662c0dd5a',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2/LICENSE;md5=827f5a2fa861382d35a3943adf9ebb86',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v3/LICENSE;md5=3b83ef96387f14655fc854ddc3c6bd57',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v3/json/LICENSE;md5=591778525c869cdde0ab5a1bf283cd81',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/go-kit/log/LICENSE;md5=5b7c15ad5fffe2ff6e9d58a6c161f082',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/go-logfmt/logfmt/LICENSE;md5=98e39517c38127f969de33057067091e',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/go-playground/locales/LICENSE;md5=3ccbda375ee345400ad1da85ba522301',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/go-playground/universal-translator/LICENSE;md5=2e2b21ef8f61057977d27c727c84bef1',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/go-playground/validator/v10/LICENSE;md5=a718a0f318d76f7c5d510cbae84f0b60',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/go-redis/redis/v7/LICENSE;md5=58103aa5ea1ee9b7a369c9c4a95ef9b5',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/golang/protobuf/LICENSE;md5=939cce1ec101726fa754e698ac871622',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/gomodule/redigo/LICENSE;md5=2ee41112a44fe7014dce33e26468ba93',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/google/uuid/LICENSE;md5=88073b6dd8ec00fe09da59e0b6dfded1',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/gorilla/mux/LICENSE;md5=33fa1116c45f9e8de714033f99edde13',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/gorilla/websocket/LICENSE;md5=c007b54a1743d596f46b2748d9f8c044',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/hashicorp/consul/api/LICENSE;md5=b8a277a612171b7526e9be072f405ef4',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/hashicorp/errwrap/LICENSE;md5=b278a92d2c1509760384428817710378',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/hashicorp/go-cleanhttp/LICENSE;md5=65d26fcc2f35ea6a181ac777e42db1ea',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog/LICENSE;md5=ec7f605b74b9ad03347d0a93a5cc7eb8',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/hashicorp/go-immutable-radix/LICENSE;md5=65d26fcc2f35ea6a181ac777e42db1ea',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror/LICENSE;md5=d44fdeb607e2d2614db9464dbedd4094',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/hashicorp/go-rootcerts/LICENSE;md5=65d26fcc2f35ea6a181ac777e42db1ea',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru/LICENSE;md5=f27a50d2e878867827842f2c60e30bfc',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/hashicorp/serf/LICENSE;md5=b278a92d2c1509760384428817710378',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/leodido/go-urn/LICENSE;md5=8f50db5538ec1148a9b3d14ed96c3418',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/mattn/go-colorable/LICENSE;md5=24ce168f90aec2456a73de1839037245',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/mattn/go-isatty/LICENSE;md5=f509beadd5a11227c27b5d2ad6c9f2c6',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/mitchellh/consulstructure/LICENSE;md5=96ada10a9e51c98c4656f2cede08c673',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/mitchellh/copystructure/LICENSE;md5=56da355a12d4821cda57b8f23ec34bc4',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/mitchellh/go-homedir/LICENSE;md5=3f7765c3d4f58e1f84c4313cecf0f5bd',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure/LICENSE;md5=3f7765c3d4f58e1f84c4313cecf0f5bd',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/mitchellh/reflectwalk/LICENSE;md5=3f7765c3d4f58e1f84c4313cecf0f5bd',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/nats-io/nats.go/LICENSE;md5=86d3f3a95c324c9479bd8986968f4327',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/nats-io/nkeys/LICENSE;md5=86d3f3a95c324c9479bd8986968f4327',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/nats-io/nuid/LICENSE;md5=86d3f3a95c324c9479bd8986968f4327',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/pmezard/go-difflib/LICENSE;md5=e9a2ebb8de779a07500ddecca806145e',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics/LICENSE;md5=1bdf5d819f50f141366dabce3be1460f',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/spiffe/go-spiffe/v2/LICENSE;md5=86d3f3a95c324c9479bd8986968f4327',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/stretchr/objx/LICENSE;md5=d023fd31d3ca39ec61eec65a91732735',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/stretchr/testify/LICENSE;md5=188f01994659f3c0d310612333d2a26f',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/x448/float16/LICENSE;md5=de8f8e025d57fe7ee0b67f30d571323b',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/zeebo/errs/LICENSE;md5=84914ab36fc0eb48edbaa53e66e8d326',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/LICENSE;md5=5d4950ecb7b26d2c5e4e7b4e0dd74707',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/golang.org/x/mod/LICENSE;md5=5d4950ecb7b26d2c5e4e7b4e0dd74707',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/golang.org/x/net/LICENSE;md5=5d4950ecb7b26d2c5e4e7b4e0dd74707',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/golang.org/x/sync/LICENSE;md5=5d4950ecb7b26d2c5e4e7b4e0dd74707',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/LICENSE;md5=5d4950ecb7b26d2c5e4e7b4e0dd74707',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/golang.org/x/text/LICENSE;md5=5d4950ecb7b26d2c5e4e7b4e0dd74707',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/golang.org/x/tools/LICENSE;md5=5d4950ecb7b26d2c5e4e7b4e0dd74707',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/google.golang.org/genproto/LICENSE;md5=3b83ef96387f14655fc854ddc3c6bd57',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/google.golang.org/grpc/LICENSE;md5=3b83ef96387f14655fc854ddc3c6bd57',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/google.golang.org/protobuf/LICENSE;md5=02d4002e9171d41a8fad93aa7faf3956',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/gopkg.in/eapache/queue.v1/LICENSE;md5=1bfd4408d3de090ef6b908b0cc45a316',
- 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/gopkg.in/yaml.v3/LICENSE;md5=3c91c17266710e16afdbb2b6d15c761c'])
-
+ ['file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/godbus/dbus/v5/LICENSE;md5=09042bd5c6c96a2b9e45ddf1bc517eed',
+ 'file://src/${GO_IMPORT}/vendor/github.com/matryer/is/LICENSE;md5=62beaee5a116dd1e80161667b1df39ab'])
self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(lics_require_file))
self._test_recipe_contents(lics_require_file, checkvars, [])
+ # make sure that dependencies don't mention local directory ./matryer/is
dependencies = \
- [ ('github.com/eclipse/paho.mqtt.golang','v1.4.2', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-bootstrap','v3.0.1','github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-bootstrap/v3','/v3', ''),
- ('github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-configuration','v3.0.0','github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-configuration/v3','/v3', ''),
- ('github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-core-contracts','v3.0.0','github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-core-contracts/v3','/v3', ''),
- ('github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-messaging','v3.0.0','github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-messaging/v3','/v3', ''),
- ('github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-secrets','v3.0.1','github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-secrets/v3','/v3', ''),
- ('github.com/fxamacker/cbor','v2.4.0','github.com/fxamacker/cbor/v2','/v2', ''),
- ('github.com/gomodule/redigo','v1.8.9', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/google/uuid','v1.3.0', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/gorilla/mux','v1.8.0', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics','v0.0.0-20201227073835-cf1acfcdf475', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/spiffe/go-spiffe','v2.1.4','github.com/spiffe/go-spiffe/v2','/v2', ''),
- ('github.com/stretchr/testify','v1.8.2', '', '', ''),
- ('go.googlesource.com/crypto','v0.8.0','golang.org/x/crypto', '', ''),
- ('gopkg.in/eapache/queue.v1','v1.1.0', '', '', ''),
- ('gopkg.in/yaml.v3','v3.0.1', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/microsoft/go-winio','v0.6.0','github.com/Microsoft/go-winio', '', ''),
- ('github.com/hashicorp/go-metrics','v0.3.10','github.com/armon/go-metrics', '', ''),
- ('github.com/cenkalti/backoff','v2.2.1+incompatible', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/davecgh/go-spew','v1.1.1', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-registry','v3.0.0','github.com/edgexfoundry/go-mod-registry/v3','/v3', ''),
- ('github.com/fatih/color','v1.9.0', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/go-jose/go-jose','v3.0.0','github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v3','/v3', ''),
- ('github.com/go-kit/log','v0.2.1', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/go-logfmt/logfmt','v0.5.1', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/go-playground/locales','v0.14.1', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/go-playground/universal-translator','v0.18.1', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/go-playground/validator','v10.13.0','github.com/go-playground/validator/v10','/v10', ''),
- ('github.com/go-redis/redis','v7.3.0','github.com/go-redis/redis/v7','/v7', ''),
- ('github.com/golang/protobuf','v1.5.2', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/gorilla/websocket','v1.4.2', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/hashicorp/consul','v1.20.0','github.com/hashicorp/consul/api', '', 'api'),
- ('github.com/hashicorp/errwrap','v1.0.0', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/hashicorp/go-cleanhttp','v0.5.1', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog','v0.14.1', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/hashicorp/go-immutable-radix','v1.3.0', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror','v1.1.1', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/hashicorp/go-rootcerts','v1.0.2', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru','v0.5.4', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/hashicorp/serf','v0.10.1', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/leodido/go-urn','v1.2.3', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/mattn/go-colorable','v0.1.12', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/mattn/go-isatty','v0.0.14', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/mitchellh/consulstructure','v0.0.0-20190329231841-56fdc4d2da54', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/mitchellh/copystructure','v1.2.0', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/mitchellh/go-homedir','v1.1.0', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure','v1.5.0', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/mitchellh/reflectwalk','v1.0.2', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/nats-io/nats.go','v1.25.0', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/nats-io/nkeys','v0.4.4', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/nats-io/nuid','v1.0.1', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/pmezard/go-difflib','v1.0.0', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/stretchr/objx','v0.5.0', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/x448/float16','v0.8.4', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/zeebo/errs','v1.3.0', '', '', ''),
- ('go.googlesource.com/mod','v0.8.0','golang.org/x/mod', '', ''),
- ('go.googlesource.com/net','v0.9.0','golang.org/x/net', '', ''),
- ('go.googlesource.com/sync','v0.1.0','golang.org/x/sync', '', ''),
- ('go.googlesource.com/sys','v0.7.0','golang.org/x/sys', '', ''),
- ('go.googlesource.com/text','v0.9.0','golang.org/x/text', '', ''),
- ('go.googlesource.com/tools','v0.6.0','golang.org/x/tools', '', ''),
- ('github.com/googleapis/go-genproto','v0.0.0-20230223222841-637eb2293923','google.golang.org/genproto', '', ''),
- ('github.com/grpc/grpc-go','v1.53.0','google.golang.org/grpc', '', ''),
- ('go.googlesource.com/protobuf','v1.28.1','google.golang.org/protobuf', '', ''),
- ]
-
- src_uri = set()
- for d in dependencies:
- src_uri.add(self._go_urifiy(*d))
-
- checkvars = {}
- checkvars['GO_DEPENDENCIES_SRC_URI'] = src_uri
-
- self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(deps_require_file))
- self._test_recipe_contents(deps_require_file, checkvars, [])
-
- def test_recipetool_create_go_replace_modules(self):
- # Check handling of replaced modules
- temprecipe = os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'recipe')
- os.makedirs(temprecipe)
-
- recipefile = os.path.join(temprecipe, 'openapi-generator_git.bb')
- deps_require_file = os.path.join(temprecipe, 'openapi-generator', 'go-modules.inc')
- lics_require_file = os.path.join(temprecipe, 'openapi-generator', 'go-licenses.inc')
- modules_txt_file = os.path.join(temprecipe, 'openapi-generator', 'modules.txt')
-
- srcuri = 'https://github.com/OpenAPITools/openapi-generator.git'
- srcrev = "v7.2.0"
- srcbranch = "master"
- srcsubdir = "samples/openapi3/client/petstore/go"
-
- result = runCmd('recipetool create -o %s %s -S %s -B %s --src-subdir %s' % (temprecipe, srcuri, srcrev, srcbranch, srcsubdir))
-
- self.maxDiff = None
- inherits = ['go-vendor']
-
- checkvars = {}
- checkvars['GO_IMPORT'] = "github.com/OpenAPITools/openapi-generator/samples/openapi3/client/petstore/go"
- checkvars['SRC_URI'] = {'git://${GO_IMPORT};destsuffix=git/src/${GO_IMPORT};nobranch=1;name=${BPN};protocol=https',
- 'file://modules.txt'}
-
- self.assertNotIn('Traceback', result.output)
- self.assertIn('No license file was detected for the main module', result.output)
- self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(recipefile))
- self._test_recipe_contents(recipefile, checkvars, inherits)
-
- # make sure that dependencies don't mention local directory ./go-petstore
- dependencies = \
- [ ('github.com/stretchr/testify','v1.8.4', '', '', ''),
- ('go.googlesource.com/oauth2','v0.10.0','golang.org/x/oauth2', '', ''),
- ('github.com/davecgh/go-spew','v1.1.1', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/golang/protobuf','v1.5.3', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/kr/pretty','v0.3.0', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/pmezard/go-difflib','v1.0.0', '', '', ''),
- ('github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal','v1.9.0', '', '', ''),
- ('go.googlesource.com/net','v0.12.0','golang.org/x/net', '', ''),
- ('github.com/golang/appengine','v1.6.7','google.golang.org/appengine', '', ''),
- ('go.googlesource.com/protobuf','v1.31.0','google.golang.org/protobuf', '', ''),
- ('gopkg.in/check.v1','v1.0.0-20201130134442-10cb98267c6c', '', '', ''),
- ('gopkg.in/yaml.v3','v3.0.1', '', '', ''),
+ [ ('github.com/godbus/dbus','v5.1.0', 'github.com/godbus/dbus/v5', '/v5', ''),
]
src_uri = set()
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 06/19] pseudo: Upgrade 1.9.11 -> 1.9.12+git
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 05/19] oeqa/selftest/recipetool: Update create_go test Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 07/19] TEST-pseudo: test patches Fabien Thomas
` (12 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
Switch from master to the pseudo-1.9 stable branch.
Changelog:
* pseudo_client: Fix xattr/rename handling with empty paths
* ports/linux/guts: Add open_tree wrapper
* test: Add open_tree test
* ports/linux/pseudo_wrappers.c: Add syscall support for open_tree() wrapper
* test: Add open_tree syscall test
* test: Add open_tree_attr syscall test
* ports/linux/guts: Add open_tree_attr wrapper
* ports/linux/pseudo_wrappers: forward pre-init syscall/prctl to the real function
* pseudo_util: bound pseudo_get_value()'s recovery re-init
* Makefile.in: Bump to 1.9.12
* ports/linux: Add missing header
* ports/linux: Fix header ordering for Ubuntu 22.04
* ports/linux/guts: Fix uninitialized pseudo_path in open_tree wrappers
Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Fabien Thomas <fabien.thomas@smile.fr>
---
meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb
index 1320d19ad4..764f81b683 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
require pseudo.inc
-SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/pseudo;branch=master;protocol=https \
+SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/pseudo;branch=pseudo-1.9;protocol=https \
file://fallback-passwd \
file://fallback-group \
"
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
file://older-glibc-symbols.patch"
SRC_URI[prebuilt.sha256sum] = "ed9f456856e9d86359f169f46a70ad7be4190d6040282b84c8d97b99072485aa"
-SRCREV = "ba8887e5f1e922f866681ec7dec1a00b602a9328"
+SRCREV = "e627b0dcb639f387db935fae1f9b93b30cded5e1"
S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
-PV = "1.9.11"
+PV = "1.9.12+git"
# largefile and 64bit time_t support adds these macros via compiler flags globally
# remove them for pseudo since pseudo intercepts some of the functions which will be
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 07/19] TEST-pseudo: test patches
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 06/19] pseudo: Upgrade 1.9.11 -> 1.9.12+git Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 08/19] popt: patch CVE-2026-18739 Fabien Thomas
` (11 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
Signed-off-by: Fabien Thomas <fabien.thomas@smile.fr>
---
...ree-tests-when-the-function-or-sysca.patch | 157 ++++++++
...-t-generate-unused-_int-paths-with-n.patch | 59 +++
...ts-linux-Don-t-require-linux-mount.h.patch | 67 ++++
...004-configure-Require-GCC-5-or-later.patch | 76 ++++
...erialize-path-changes-across-clients.patch | 339 ++++++++++++++++++
...ath-lock-in-create-and-metadata-wrap.patch | 182 ++++++++++
...ted-files-under-the-path-lock-before.patch | 248 +++++++++++++
...s-Add-a-parallel-create-rename-link-.patch | 87 +++++
...Add-information-specific-to-file-pro.patch | 216 +++++++++++
...S.md-Add-to-assist-future-developers.patch | 113 ++++++
meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb | 10 +
11 files changed, 1554 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0001-test-Skip-open_tree-tests-when-the-function-or-sysca.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0002-makewrappers-Don-t-generate-unused-_int-paths-with-n.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0003-ports-linux-Don-t-require-linux-mount.h.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0004-configure-Require-GCC-5-or-later.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0005-pseudo_client-serialize-path-changes-across-clients.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0006-ports-hold-the-path-lock-in-create-and-metadata-wrap.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0007-ports-check-created-files-under-the-path-lock-before.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0008-test-parallel-ops-Add-a-parallel-create-rename-link-.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0009-README.security-Add-information-specific-to-file-pro.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0010-AGENTS.md-Add-to-assist-future-developers.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0001-test-Skip-open_tree-tests-when-the-function-or-sysca.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0001-test-Skip-open_tree-tests-when-the-function-or-sysca.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4100a66213
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0001-test-Skip-open_tree-tests-when-the-function-or-sysca.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+From a4ba40892a621f342846139397fb2c636ca9dcf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 10:15:03 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] test: Skip open_tree tests when the function or syscall is
+ unavailable
+
+From: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+
+test-open_tree failed to build on systems where glibc does not provide
+open_tree() (added in glibc 2.36), e.g. Ubuntu 22.04, breaking 'make test'.
+
+Declare open_tree() weak so the test links, and skip the test if the
+symbol is not resolved or the call returns ENOSYS. Under pseudo the
+symbol always resolves to libpseudo's wrapper, which returns ENOSYS
+when libc lacks open_tree().
+
+test-open_tree_attr-syscall failed on kernels older than 6.15 which do
+not implement the open_tree_attr syscall. Probe the syscall first and
+skip the test if it returns ENOSYS.
+
+Both tests return 77 to indicate a skip, which the shell wrappers convert
+to 255 so run_tests.sh reports them as skipped, matching the existing
+openat2 tests.
+
+(cherry picked from commit ef3fadb80ea4822fd6ddbdd6fd21dd6a358f010f)
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending [patches under test, https://lore.kernel.org/all/1794413712-18072-2-git-send-email-mark.hatle@kernel.crashing.org/]
+AI-Generated: Uses GitHub Copilot
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+---
+ test/test-open_tree.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ test/test-open_tree.sh | 15 +++++++++++++--
+ test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall.sh | 15 +++++++++++++--
+ 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/test-open_tree.c b/test/test-open_tree.c
+index 9570f11..3b1b7ea 100644
+--- a/test/test-open_tree.c
++++ b/test/test-open_tree.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
+ #define TEST_DIR "test-open-tree-dir"
+ #define TEST_FILE "test-open-tree-file"
+
++/*
++ * Older glibc versions (< 2.36) do not provide open_tree(). Declare it
++ * weak so the test still links; at runtime it resolves to glibc's or
++ * libpseudo's open_tree if either provides it, otherwise it is NULL and
++ * the test is skipped.
++ */
++extern int open_tree(int dirfd, const char *path, unsigned int flags) __attribute__((weak));
++
+ static int test_no_flags(void) {
+ int treefd = -1;
+ int fd = -1;
+@@ -124,6 +132,23 @@ static void cleanup(void) {
+ }
+
+ int main(void) {
++ int probefd;
++
++ if (!open_tree) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "open_tree() not available, skipping.\n");
++ return 77;
++ }
++
++ /* pseudo exports open_tree() but returns ENOSYS if libc lacks it */
++ probefd = open_tree(AT_FDCWD, ".", 0);
++ if (probefd == -1 && errno == ENOSYS) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "open_tree() returned ENOSYS, skipping.\n");
++ return 77;
++ }
++ if (probefd != -1) {
++ close(probefd);
++ }
++
+ cleanup();
+
+ if (mkdir(TEST_DIR, 0777) == -1) {
+diff --git a/test/test-open_tree.sh b/test/test-open_tree.sh
+index 427d550..274c654 100755
+--- a/test/test-open_tree.sh
++++ b/test/test-open_tree.sh
+@@ -1,9 +1,20 @@
+ #!/bin/sh
+
+-./test/test-open_tree
++# rc 77 indicates open_tree() is not available, so report skipped (255).
++# This usually indicates that glibc does not have the open_tree function.
++run_test() {
++ "$@"
++ rc=$?
++ if [ "$rc" -eq 77 ]; then
++ exit 255
++ fi
++ return "$rc"
++}
++
++run_test ./test/test-open_tree
+ rc1=$?
+
+-PSEUDO_IGNORE_PATHS=/ ./test/test-open_tree
++run_test env PSEUDO_IGNORE_PATHS=/ ./test/test-open_tree
+ rc2=$?
+
+ exit $((rc1 | rc2))
+diff --git a/test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall.c b/test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall.c
+index cc38c5f..e4e652e 100644
+--- a/test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall.c
++++ b/test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall.c
+@@ -150,6 +150,17 @@ static void cleanup(void) {
+ }
+
+ int main(void) {
++ int probefd;
++
++ probefd = do_open_tree_attr_syscall(AT_FDCWD, ".", 0);
++ if (probefd == -1 && errno == ENOSYS) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "open_tree_attr syscall not supported, skipping.\n");
++ return 77;
++ }
++ if (probefd != -1) {
++ close(probefd);
++ }
++
+ cleanup();
+
+ if (mkdir(TEST_DIR, 0777) == -1) {
+diff --git a/test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall.sh b/test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall.sh
+index f6e51f4..d87043e 100755
+--- a/test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall.sh
++++ b/test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall.sh
+@@ -1,9 +1,20 @@
+ #!/bin/sh
+
+-./test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall
++# rc 77 indicates the open_tree_attr syscall is not supported (ENOSYS),
++# so report skipped (255). This usually indicates an older kernel.
++run_test() {
++ "$@"
++ rc=$?
++ if [ "$rc" -eq 77 ]; then
++ exit 255
++ fi
++ return "$rc"
++}
++
++run_test ./test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall
+ rc1=$?
+
+-PSEUDO_IGNORE_PATHS=/ ./test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall
++run_test env PSEUDO_IGNORE_PATHS=/ ./test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall
+ rc2=$?
+
+ exit $((rc1 | rc2))
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0002-makewrappers-Don-t-generate-unused-_int-paths-with-n.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0002-makewrappers-Don-t-generate-unused-_int-paths-with-n.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..923a33edf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0002-makewrappers-Don-t-generate-unused-_int-paths-with-n.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 9e4a0cec44021a548adeb3c55ab4c8240da5659a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 10:15:04 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] makewrappers: Don't generate unused _int paths with
+ noignore_path
+
+From: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+
+With preserve_paths=1 the canonical path from pseudo_root_path() is
+stored in <path>_int rather than overwriting the path argument. The
+only reader of <path>_int is the ignore_paths() check, which is not
+generated when noignore_path=1 is also set.
+
+open_tree, open_tree_attr and openat2 set both options, so path_int was
+assigned but never used, resulting in:
+
+ warning: variable 'path_int' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
+
+It also meant an extra pseudo_root_path() call per invocation, as the
+guts for these functions resolve the path themselves.
+
+Skip the declaration and assignment of the _int paths when both options
+are set. The generated code for all other wrappers is unchanged.
+
+(cherry picked from commit f86ca21137e8a846ba64e66243a54554be533c5e)
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending [patches under test, https://lore.kernel.org/all/1794413712-18072-2-git-send-email-mark.hatle@kernel.crashing.org/]
+AI-Generated: Uses GitHub Copilot
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+---
+ makewrappers | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/makewrappers b/makewrappers
+index 19508fa..4c99cf3 100755
+--- a/makewrappers
++++ b/makewrappers
+@@ -389,7 +389,8 @@ class Function:
+ return self.args.call()
+
+ def paths_decl(self):
+- if self.preserve_paths:
++ # path_int is only read by the ignore_paths() check
++ if self.preserve_paths and not self.noignore_path:
+ return "\n\t".join("char *" + path + "_int;" for path in self.paths_to_munge)
+ return ""
+
+@@ -420,6 +421,9 @@ class Function:
+ "\t\t\t%s -1;\n"
+ "\t\t\tgoto quick_exit;\n"
+ "\t\t}\n" % (path, self.rc_assign()))
++ if self.preserve_paths and self.noignore_path:
++ # path_int is only read by the ignore_paths() check
++ continue
+ fix_paths.append(
+ "%s = pseudo_root_path(__func__, __LINE__, %s%s, %s, %s);" %
+ (pathvar, prefix, self.dirfd, path, self.flags))
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0003-ports-linux-Don-t-require-linux-mount.h.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0003-ports-linux-Don-t-require-linux-mount.h.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7ec83a39f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0003-ports-linux-Don-t-require-linux-mount.h.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+From 71e5702d36d9ecf27c32f064105459e25b1721f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 10:15:05 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] ports/linux: Don't require <linux/mount.h>
+
+From: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+
+<linux/mount.h> only exists in kernel headers from 5.2, so pseudo no
+longer built on older hosts such as CentOS 7. pseudo only needs
+OPEN_TREE_CLONE, which already has a fallback, and struct mount_attr,
+which is only used through pointers, so declare it instead of including
+the header. The forward declaration is also needed without the header,
+or each prototype using the struct declares a different type.
+
+(cherry picked from commit e545758f96dbe8a70623957009fd79502e638cd1)
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending [patches under test, https://lore.kernel.org/all/1794413712-18072-2-git-send-email-mark.hatle@kernel.crashing.org/]
+AI-Generated: Uses GitHub Copilot
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+---
+ ports/linux/portdefs.h | 7 +++++--
+ test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall.c | 1 -
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ports/linux/portdefs.h b/ports/linux/portdefs.h
+index ac1d971..546c33b 100644
+--- a/ports/linux/portdefs.h
++++ b/ports/linux/portdefs.h
+@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ GLIBC_COMPAT_SYMBOL(memcpy,2.0);
+ #include <sys/prctl.h>
+ #include <linux/seccomp.h>
+ #include <sys/mount.h>
+-#include <linux/mount.h>
+
+ /* close_range()'s flags, and unshare(), are only declared by glibc under
+ * _GNU_SOURCE, which pseudo does not build with. <linux/close_range.h> is
+@@ -94,11 +93,15 @@ extern int unshare(int flags);
+ #define SYS_open_tree __NR_open_tree
+ #endif
+
+-/* OPEN_TREE_CLONE may be missing from older host headers.
++/* The new mount API is only in <sys/mount.h> from glibc 2.36, and
++ * <linux/mount.h> is missing from older kernel headers (before 5.2), so
++ * don't rely on either. OPEN_TREE_CLONE is kernel ABI, and struct
++ * mount_attr is only used through pointers, so it can stay incomplete.
+ */
+ #ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLONE
+ #define OPEN_TREE_CLONE (1U << 0)
+ #endif
++struct mount_attr;
+
+ #ifndef SYS_open_tree_attr
+
+diff --git a/test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall.c b/test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall.c
+index e4e652e..aead9d4 100644
+--- a/test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall.c
++++ b/test/test-open_tree_attr-syscall.c
+@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <sys/syscall.h>
+-#include <linux/mount.h>
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
+
+ #ifndef SYS_open_tree_attr
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0004-configure-Require-GCC-5-or-later.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0004-configure-Require-GCC-5-or-later.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1f4d7051b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0004-configure-Require-GCC-5-or-later.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+From 19829a590a6504b148223d0de3ea3835699c876c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 10:15:06 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] configure: Require GCC 5 or later
+
+From: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+
+pseudo uses __has_include, which GCC only supports from version 5, so
+older compilers such as GCC 4.8 on CentOS 7 failed part way through the
+build.
+
+clang reports itself as GCC 4.2.1, so it is only checked for
+__has_include.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 7add07ba4f5b5095a66614bb210e5d42cfe33555)
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending [patches under test, https://lore.kernel.org/all/1794413712-18072-2-git-send-email-mark.hatle@kernel.crashing.org/]
+AI-Generated: Uses GitHub Copilot
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+---
+ README | 3 +++
+ configure | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/README b/README
+index c4cb997..039f960 100644
+--- a/README
++++ b/README
+@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ environment, allowing ordinary users to run commands which give the illusion
+ of creating device nodes, changing file ownership, and otherwise doing
+ things necessary for creating distribution packages or filesystems.
+
++Building pseudo requires GCC 5 or later (or clang), which the configure
++script checks for.
++
+ To configure, run the provided configure script. Note that this is
+ NOT an autoconf script.
+
+diff --git a/configure b/configure
+index 68c9962..f561dcb 100755
+--- a/configure
++++ b/configure
+@@ -232,6 +232,31 @@ if [ -z "$opt_sqlite_lib" ]; then
+ opt_sqlite_lib=$opt_lib
+ fi
+
++# pseudo uses __has_include, which needs GCC 5 or later. clang reports
++# itself as GCC 4.2.1, so only check its support for __has_include.
++if ! cc_version=$(${CC:-cc} -dumpversion 2>/dev/null); then
++ echo >&2 "Error: can't run the C compiler '${CC:-cc}'."
++ exit 1
++fi
++cc_check=$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/pseudo-configure.XXXXXX") || exit 1
++cat > "$cc_check/cc_check.c" <<EOF
++#if defined(__clang__)
++# if !defined(__has_include)
++# error clang without __has_include
++# endif
++#elif !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 5
++# error GCC older than 5
++#endif
++int pseudo_cc_check;
++EOF
++if ! cc_check_out=$(${CC:-cc} -c -o "$cc_check/cc_check.o" "$cc_check/cc_check.c" 2>&1); then
++ echo >&2 "Error: pseudo requires GCC 5 or later (${CC:-cc} reports version $cc_version)."
++ echo >&2 "$cc_check_out"
++ rm -rf "$cc_check"
++ exit 1
++fi
++rm -rf "$cc_check"
++
+ if [ ! -f "${opt_sqlite}/include/sqlite3.h" ]; then
+ echo >&2 "SQLite3 headers not found in at ${opt_sqlite}/include/sqlite3.h. Please check that SQLite3 and SQLite3 headers are installed."
+ exit 1
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0005-pseudo_client-serialize-path-changes-across-clients.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0005-pseudo_client-serialize-path-changes-across-clients.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e0008a53f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0005-pseudo_client-serialize-path-changes-across-clients.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
+From 7d712bbcec30795defab1f5e6d4a5f1b2a9a9bbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 10:15:07 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] pseudo_client: serialize path changes across clients
+
+From: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+
+test-parallel-rename and test-parallel-symlinks failed with "inode
+mismatch" and "path mismatch" errors, and clients were aborted by the
+server.
+
+rename() and unlink() look at the destination, send OP_MAY_UNLINK,
+make the change on disk, and then send OP_DID_UNLINK and OP_RENAME, as
+separate steps. The wrapper lock only covers one process, so another
+client can rename onto the same name in between. The first client then
+marks and removes the wrong inode, and its OP_RENAME finds a different
+entry at the destination. ln -sf does the same, as it creates a
+temporary symlink and renames it over the link.
+
+Readers race in the same way: a client can lstat() a name before
+another client replaces it, but only report the result to the server
+afterwards. If the filesystem has meanwhile reused the inode number
+for a new file, the server sees the inode under the wrong path, and
+aborts the reader.
+
+Add a path lock shared by all clients of a server, using fcntl() locks
+on pseudo.pathlock in the local state directory. makewrappers gains a
+path_lock option which holds the lock around the guts of a wrapper:
+exclusive (path_lock=1) for rename, renameat, unlink, unlinkat and
+rmdir, and shared (path_lock=shared) for the stat family, so readers
+don't block each other but can't observe a name in the middle of a
+change.
+
+fcntl() locks belong to the process, so a forked child doesn't share
+them, and they are released if the process dies. The descriptor is
+kept open and protected like pseudo's other internal descriptors. If
+the lock can't be taken the operation runs unlocked as before.
+
+Both tests now pass consistently, including with PSEUDO_DEBUG set. The
+lock adds about 4us to an lstat() (about 12%) and 2% to a rename.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 4a605712d6a4c9b410cc51c33f3d08a2836ab7d0)
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending [patches under test, https://lore.kernel.org/all/1794413712-18072-2-git-send-email-mark.hatle@kernel.crashing.org/]
+AI-Generated: Uses GitHub Copilot
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+---
+ makewrappers | 17 +++++++
+ ports/linux/statx/wrapfuncs.in | 2 +-
+ ports/linux/wrapfuncs.in | 24 +++++-----
+ ports/unix/wrapfuncs.in | 10 ++--
+ pseudo.h | 1 +
+ pseudo_client.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ pseudo_client.h | 2 +
+ templates/wrapfuncs.c | 2 +-
+ 8 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/makewrappers b/makewrappers
+index 4c99cf3..6b96c74 100755
+--- a/makewrappers
++++ b/makewrappers
+@@ -244,6 +244,11 @@ class Function:
+ self.noignore_path = False
+ self.hand_wrapped = None
+ self.async_skip = None
++ # Hold the client path lock (pseudo_client_path_lock()) around
++ # the guts: path_lock=1 (exclusive) for operations that check,
++ # change and then record a path in separate steps, and
++ # path_lock=shared for operations that only look at a path.
++ self.path_lock = None
+ # used for the copyright date when creating stub functions
+ self.date = datetime.date.today().year
+ # Used to define pointers that should EFAULT if null
+@@ -494,6 +499,18 @@ class Function:
+ else:
+ return "rc ="
+
++ def path_lock_begin(self):
++ """take the client path lock, for path_lock=1 functions"""
++ if self.path_lock:
++ return "int path_lock_fd = pseudo_client_path_lock(%d);\n\t\t\t" % (self.path_lock == "shared")
++ return ""
++
++ def path_lock_end(self):
++ """release the client path lock, for path_lock=1 functions"""
++ if self.path_lock:
++ return "\n\t\t\tpseudo_client_path_unlock(path_lock_fd);"
++ return ""
++
+ def def_return(self):
+ """return default value (or just return)"""
+ if self.type == 'void':
+diff --git a/ports/linux/statx/wrapfuncs.in b/ports/linux/statx/wrapfuncs.in
+index a81fb91..3ca40ac 100644
+--- a/ports/linux/statx/wrapfuncs.in
++++ b/ports/linux/statx/wrapfuncs.in
+@@ -1 +1 @@
+-int statx(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, unsigned int mask, struct statx *statxbuf); /* efault=path */
++int statx(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, unsigned int mask, struct statx *statxbuf); /* efault=path, path_lock=shared */
+diff --git a/ports/linux/wrapfuncs.in b/ports/linux/wrapfuncs.in
+index d417ed3..65f2d7a 100644
+--- a/ports/linux/wrapfuncs.in
++++ b/ports/linux/wrapfuncs.in
+@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@ int open(const char *path, int flags, ...{mode_t mode}); /* flags=((flags&O_NOFO
+ int __open_2(const char *path, int flags); /* flags=((flags&O_NOFOLLOW)||((flags&(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))==(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))), noignore_path=1 */
+ int __open64_2(const char *path, int flags); /* flags=((flags&O_NOFOLLOW)||((flags&(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))==(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))), noignore_path=1 */
+ char *get_current_dir_name(void);
+-int __xstat(int ver, const char *path, struct stat *buf);
+-int __lxstat(int ver, const char *path, struct stat *buf); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
++int __xstat(int ver, const char *path, struct stat *buf); /* path_lock=shared */
++int __lxstat(int ver, const char *path, struct stat *buf); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=shared */
+ int __fxstat(int ver, int fd, struct stat *buf);
+ int lchmod(const char *path, mode_t mode); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+ int lchown(const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int __fxstatat(int ver, int dirfd, const char *path, struct stat *buf, int flags);
++int __fxstatat(int ver, int dirfd, const char *path, struct stat *buf, int flags); /* path_lock=shared */
+ int openat(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, ...{mode_t mode}); /* flags=((flags&O_NOFOLLOW)||((flags&(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))==(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))), noignore_path=1 */
+ int __openat_2(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags); /* flags=((flags&O_NOFOLLOW)||((flags&(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))==(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))), noignore_path=1 */
+ int open_tree(int dirfd, const char *path, unsigned int flags); /* preserve_paths=1, noignore_path=1 */
+@@ -25,18 +25,18 @@ int open64(const char *path, int flags, ...{mode_t mode}); /* flags=((flags&O_NO
+ int openat64(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, ...{mode_t mode}); /* flags=((flags&O_NOFOLLOW)||((flags&(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))==(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))), noignore_path=1 */
+ int __openat64_2(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags); /* flags=((flags&O_NOFOLLOW)||((flags&(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))==(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))), noignore_path=1 */
+ int creat64(const char *path, mode_t mode);
+-int stat(const char *path, struct stat *buf); /* real_func=pseudo_stat */
+-int lstat(const char *path, struct stat *buf); /* real_func=pseudo_lstat, flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
++int stat(const char *path, struct stat *buf); /* real_func=pseudo_stat, path_lock=shared */
++int lstat(const char *path, struct stat *buf); /* real_func=pseudo_lstat, flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=shared */
+ int fstat(int fd, struct stat *buf); /* real_func=pseudo_fstat */
+-int fstatat(int dirfd, const char *path, struct stat *buf, int flags);
+-int stat64(const char *path, struct stat64 *buf); /* real_func=pseudo_stat64 */
+-int lstat64(const char *path, struct stat64 *buf); /* real_func=pseudo_lstat64, flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
++int fstatat(int dirfd, const char *path, struct stat *buf, int flags); /* path_lock=shared */
++int stat64(const char *path, struct stat64 *buf); /* real_func=pseudo_stat64, path_lock=shared */
++int lstat64(const char *path, struct stat64 *buf); /* real_func=pseudo_lstat64, flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=shared */
+ int fstat64(int fd, struct stat64 *buf); /* real_func=pseudo_fstat64 */
+-int fstatat64(int dirfd, const char *path, struct stat64 *buf, int flags);
+-int __xstat64(int ver, const char *path, struct stat64 *buf);
+-int __lxstat64(int ver, const char *path, struct stat64 *buf); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
++int fstatat64(int dirfd, const char *path, struct stat64 *buf, int flags); /* path_lock=shared */
++int __xstat64(int ver, const char *path, struct stat64 *buf); /* path_lock=shared */
++int __lxstat64(int ver, const char *path, struct stat64 *buf); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=shared */
+ int __fxstat64(int ver, int fd, struct stat64 *buf);
+-int __fxstatat64(int ver, int dirfd, const char *path, struct stat64 *buf, int flags);
++int __fxstatat64(int ver, int dirfd, const char *path, struct stat64 *buf, int flags); /* path_lock=shared */
+ FILE *fopen64(const char *path, const char *mode); /* noignore_path=1 */
+ int nftw64(const char *path, int (*fn)(const char *, const struct stat64 *, int, struct FTW *), int nopenfd, int flag); /* noignore_path=1 */
+ FILE *freopen64(const char *path, const char *mode, FILE *stream); /* noignore_path=1 */
+diff --git a/ports/unix/wrapfuncs.in b/ports/unix/wrapfuncs.in
+index 5665735..a4892fe 100644
+--- a/ports/unix/wrapfuncs.in
++++ b/ports/unix/wrapfuncs.in
+@@ -53,13 +53,13 @@ int mkstemp(char *template); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+ int mkostemp(char *template, int oflags); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+ int mkstemps(char *template, int suffixlen); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+ int mkostemps(char *template, int suffixlen, int oflags); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int rename(const char *oldpath, const char *newpath); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int renameat(int olddirfd, const char *oldpath, int newdirfd, const char *newpath); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int rmdir(const char *path); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
++int rename(const char *oldpath, const char *newpath); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int renameat(int olddirfd, const char *oldpath, int newdirfd, const char *newpath); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int rmdir(const char *path); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
+ int symlink(const char *oldname, const char *newpath); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+ int symlinkat(const char *oldname, int dirfd, const char *newpath); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int unlink(const char *path); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int unlinkat(int dirfd, const char *path, int rflags); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
++int unlink(const char *path); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int unlinkat(int dirfd, const char *path, int rflags); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
+ # primarily for use with chroot()
+ ssize_t readlink(const char *path, char *buf, size_t bufsiz); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+ ssize_t readlinkat(int dirfd, const char *path, char *buf, size_t bufsiz); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+diff --git a/pseudo.h b/pseudo.h
+index 3e98c0b..c1077cb 100644
+--- a/pseudo.h
++++ b/pseudo.h
+@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ extern char *pseudo_version;
+
+ #define PSEUDO_LOCKFILE "pseudo.lock"
+ #define PSEUDO_LOGFILE "pseudo.log"
++#define PSEUDO_PATHLOCK "pseudo.pathlock"
+ #define PSEUDO_PIDFILE "pseudo.pid"
+ #define PSEUDO_SOCKET "pseudo.socket"
+
+diff --git a/pseudo_client.c b/pseudo_client.c
+index 6bdb17c..759afeb 100644
+--- a/pseudo_client.c
++++ b/pseudo_client.c
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ static char *base_path(int dirfd, const char *path, int leave_last);
+ static int connect_fd = -1;
+ static int server_pid = 0;
+ int pseudo_localstate_dir_fd = -1;
++static int pseudo_pathlock_fd = -1;
+ int pseudo_pwd_fd = -1;
+ int pseudo_pwd_lck_fd = -1;
+ char *pseudo_pwd_lck_name = NULL;
+@@ -532,6 +533,7 @@ pseudo_init_client(void) {
+ /* Ensure that all of the values are reset */
+ server_pid = 0;
+ pseudo_localstate_dir_fd = -1;
++ pseudo_pathlock_fd = -1;
+ pseudo_pwd_fd = -1;
+ pseudo_pwd_lck_fd = -1;
+ pseudo_pwd_lck_name = NULL;
+@@ -1173,6 +1175,80 @@ pseudo_fd(int fd, int how) {
+ return(newfd);
+ }
+
++/* Operations such as rename() and unlink() look at the destination, change
++ * it on disk, and then tell the server what happened, in several separate
++ * steps. Another client doing the same to the same name in between makes
++ * the database describe a file that is no longer there, which the server
++ * reports as an inode or path mismatch. Wrappers marked path_lock=1 hold
++ * this lock, shared by every client of the server, for the whole sequence.
++ *
++ * fcntl() locks belong to the process, so a forked child does not share
++ * them even though it inherits the descriptor, and they are released if
++ * the process dies. The descriptor is kept open and protected like
++ * pseudo's other internal descriptors.
++ *
++ * Wrappers that only look at a path (stat() and friends) take the lock
++ * shared: they don't block each other, but can't observe a path between
++ * the change on disk and the database update.
++ *
++ * Returns the descriptor to pass to pseudo_client_path_unlock(), or -1 if
++ * the lock could not be taken, in which case the operation runs unlocked.
++ */
++int
++pseudo_client_path_lock(int shared) {
++ static char *lock_path = NULL;
++ struct flock lk = { .l_type = shared ? F_RDLCK : F_WRLCK, .l_whence = SEEK_SET };
++ int save_errno = errno;
++ int locked = 0, retried = 0;
++
++ pseudo_antimagic();
++ for (;;) {
++ if (pseudo_pathlock_fd == -1) {
++ if (!lock_path)
++ lock_path = pseudo_localstatedir_path(PSEUDO_PATHLOCK);
++ if (lock_path)
++ pseudo_pathlock_fd = pseudo_fd(open(lock_path,
++ O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_CLOEXEC, 0644), MOVE_FD);
++ if (pseudo_pathlock_fd == -1) {
++ pseudo_debug(PDBGF_CLIENT, "path lock: can't open '%s': %s\n",
++ lock_path ? lock_path : "<nil>", strerror(errno));
++ break;
++ }
++ }
++ if (fcntl(pseudo_pathlock_fd, F_SETLKW, &lk) == 0) {
++ locked = 1;
++ break;
++ }
++ if (errno == EINTR)
++ continue;
++ /* closed behind our back: reopen it once */
++ if (errno == EBADF && !retried) {
++ pseudo_pathlock_fd = -1;
++ retried = 1;
++ continue;
++ }
++ pseudo_debug(PDBGF_CLIENT, "path lock: can't lock '%s': %s\n",
++ lock_path ? lock_path : "<nil>", strerror(errno));
++ break;
++ }
++ pseudo_magic();
++ errno = save_errno;
++ return locked ? pseudo_pathlock_fd : -1;
++}
++
++void
++pseudo_client_path_unlock(int fd) {
++ struct flock lk = { .l_type = F_UNLCK, .l_whence = SEEK_SET };
++ int save_errno = errno;
++
++ if (fd != -1) {
++ pseudo_antimagic();
++ fcntl(fd, F_SETLK, &lk);
++ pseudo_magic();
++ }
++ errno = save_errno;
++}
++
+ static int
+ client_connect(void) {
+ /* we have a server pid, is it responsive? */
+@@ -1913,6 +1989,8 @@ pseudo_client_op(pseudo_op_t op, int access, int fd, int dirfd, const char *path
+ startfd = pseudo_util_evlog_fd + 1;
+ if (pseudo_localstate_dir_fd >= startfd)
+ startfd = pseudo_localstate_dir_fd + 1;
++ if (pseudo_pathlock_fd >= startfd)
++ startfd = pseudo_pathlock_fd + 1;
+ if (pseudo_pwd_fd >= startfd)
+ startfd = pseudo_pwd_fd + 1;
+ if (pseudo_pwd_lck_fd >= startfd)
+@@ -1926,7 +2004,8 @@ pseudo_client_op(pseudo_op_t op, int access, int fd, int dirfd, const char *path
+ */
+ for (i = fd; i < startfd && i <= close_range_maxfd; ++i) {
+ if (i == pseudo_util_debug_fd || i == pseudo_util_evlog_fd ||
+- i == pseudo_localstate_dir_fd || i == pseudo_pwd_fd ||
++ i == pseudo_localstate_dir_fd || i == pseudo_pathlock_fd ||
++ i == pseudo_pwd_fd ||
+ i == pseudo_pwd_lck_fd || i == pseudo_grp_fd ||
+ i == connect_fd)
+ continue;
+@@ -1952,6 +2031,8 @@ pseudo_client_op(pseudo_op_t op, int access, int fd, int dirfd, const char *path
+ pseudo_util_debug_fd = pseudo_fd(fd, COPY_FD);
+ } else if (fd == pseudo_localstate_dir_fd) {
+ pseudo_localstate_dir_fd = pseudo_fd(fd, COPY_FD);
++ } else if (fd == pseudo_pathlock_fd) {
++ pseudo_pathlock_fd = pseudo_fd(fd, COPY_FD);
+ } else if (fd == pseudo_pwd_fd) {
+ pseudo_pwd_fd = pseudo_fd(fd, COPY_FD);
+ /* since we have a FILE * on it, we close that... */
+diff --git a/pseudo_client.h b/pseudo_client.h
+index 9b9f86a..217981d 100644
+--- a/pseudo_client.h
++++ b/pseudo_client.h
+@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ extern void pseudo_client_touchgid(void);
+ extern char *pseudo_client_fdpath(int fd);
+ extern int pseudo_client_shutdown(int);
+ extern int pseudo_fd(int fd, int how);
++extern int pseudo_client_path_lock(int shared);
++extern void pseudo_client_path_unlock(int fd);
+ #define MOVE_FD 0
+ #define COPY_FD 1
+ #define PSEUDO_MIN_FD 20
+diff --git a/templates/wrapfuncs.c b/templates/wrapfuncs.c
+index 9385a40..a57c997 100644
+--- a/templates/wrapfuncs.c
++++ b/templates/wrapfuncs.c
+@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ ${maybe_async_skip}
+ } else {
+ /* exec*() use this to restore the sig mask */
+ pseudo_saved_sigmask = saved;
+- ${rc_assign} wrap_$name(${call_args});
++ ${path_lock_begin}${rc_assign} wrap_$name(${call_args});${path_lock_end}
+ }
+ }
+ ${variadic_end}
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0006-ports-hold-the-path-lock-in-create-and-metadata-wrap.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0006-ports-hold-the-path-lock-in-create-and-metadata-wrap.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..23815b7aac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0006-ports-hold-the-path-lock-in-create-and-metadata-wrap.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+From e52f678bbc2c34b1bc8519a42f03c9006657b161 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 10:15:08 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] ports: hold the path lock in create and metadata wrappers
+
+From: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+
+Like rename() and unlink(), the wrappers that create a name, or that
+look at a path and then change its metadata in the database, do so in
+separate steps: the real operation on disk, then a request to the
+server. Another client renaming onto or removing the same name in
+between leaves the database out of step with the filesystem, which the
+server reports as an inode or path mismatch, and may abort a client.
+
+Hold the path lock exclusively in the wrappers that create a name:
+link, linkat, symlink, symlinkat, mkdir, mkdirat, mkfifo, mkfifoat,
+mknod, mknodat, __xmknod, __xmknodat, bind, mkdtemp and the mkstemp
+family. None of these can block indefinitely.
+
+Hold it shared in the wrappers that look at a path and then record or
+query its metadata: chmod, lchmod, fchmodat, chown, lchown, fchownat,
+fts_read, fts_children, and the path based xattr calls.
+
+(cherry picked from commit c8b1b3ab4d552570f854d3ee19f3bf9611ae633a)
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending [patches under test, https://lore.kernel.org/all/1794413712-18072-2-git-send-email-mark.hatle@kernel.crashing.org/]
+AI-Generated: Uses GitHub Copilot
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+---
+ ports/linux/wrapfuncs.in | 16 ++++++------
+ ports/linux/xattr/wrapfuncs.in | 16 ++++++------
+ ports/unix/wrapfuncs.in | 46 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ports/linux/wrapfuncs.in b/ports/linux/wrapfuncs.in
+index 65f2d7a..a682383 100644
+--- a/ports/linux/wrapfuncs.in
++++ b/ports/linux/wrapfuncs.in
+@@ -5,17 +5,17 @@ char *get_current_dir_name(void);
+ int __xstat(int ver, const char *path, struct stat *buf); /* path_lock=shared */
+ int __lxstat(int ver, const char *path, struct stat *buf); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=shared */
+ int __fxstat(int ver, int fd, struct stat *buf);
+-int lchmod(const char *path, mode_t mode); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int lchown(const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
++int lchmod(const char *path, mode_t mode); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=shared */
++int lchown(const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=shared */
+ int __fxstatat(int ver, int dirfd, const char *path, struct stat *buf, int flags); /* path_lock=shared */
+ int openat(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags, ...{mode_t mode}); /* flags=((flags&O_NOFOLLOW)||((flags&(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))==(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))), noignore_path=1 */
+ int __openat_2(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags); /* flags=((flags&O_NOFOLLOW)||((flags&(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))==(O_CREAT|O_EXCL))), noignore_path=1 */
+ int open_tree(int dirfd, const char *path, unsigned int flags); /* preserve_paths=1, noignore_path=1 */
+ int open_tree_attr(int dirfd, const char *path, unsigned int flags, struct mount_attr *attr, size_t size); /* preserve_paths=1, noignore_path=1*/
+-int mknod(const char *path, mode_t mode, dev_t dev); /* real_func=pseudo_mknod */
+-int mknodat(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode, dev_t dev); /* real_func=pseudo_mknodat */
+-int __xmknod(int ver, const char *path, mode_t mode, dev_t *dev); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int __xmknodat(int ver, int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode, dev_t *dev); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
++int mknod(const char *path, mode_t mode, dev_t dev); /* real_func=pseudo_mknod, path_lock=1 */
++int mknodat(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode, dev_t dev); /* real_func=pseudo_mknodat, path_lock=1 */
++int __xmknod(int ver, const char *path, mode_t mode, dev_t *dev); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int __xmknodat(int ver, int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode, dev_t *dev); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
+ int fcntl(int fd, int cmd, ...{struct flock *lock}); /* noignore_path=1 */
+ int fcntl64(int fd, int cmd, ...{struct flock *lock}); /* noignore_path=1 */
+ # just so we know the inums of symlinks
+@@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ int ftw64(const char *path, int (*fn)(const char *, const struct stat64 *, int),
+ int glob64(const char *pattern, int flags, int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob64_t *pglob);
+ int scandir64(const char *path, struct dirent64 ***namelist, int (*filter)(const struct dirent64 *), int (*compar)());
+ int truncate64(const char *path, off64_t length);
+-int mkostemp64(char *template, int oflags); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int mkstemp64(char *template); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
++int mkostemp64(char *template, int oflags); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int mkstemp64(char *template); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
+ int getgrouplist(const char *user, gid_t group, gid_t *groups, int *ngroups);
+ int setgroups(size_t size, const gid_t *list);
+ int setfsgid(gid_t fsgid);
+diff --git a/ports/linux/xattr/wrapfuncs.in b/ports/linux/xattr/wrapfuncs.in
+index 09eba23..89b1c68 100644
+--- a/ports/linux/xattr/wrapfuncs.in
++++ b/ports/linux/xattr/wrapfuncs.in
+@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
+-ssize_t getxattr(const char *path, const char *name, void *value, size_t size); /* flags=0, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17" */
+-ssize_t lgetxattr(const char *path, const char *name, void *value, size_t size); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17" */
++ssize_t getxattr(const char *path, const char *name, void *value, size_t size); /* flags=0, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17", path_lock=shared */
++ssize_t lgetxattr(const char *path, const char *name, void *value, size_t size); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17", path_lock=shared */
+ ssize_t fgetxattr(int filedes, const char *name, void *value, size_t size); /* version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17" */
+-int setxattr(const char *path, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int xflags); /* flags=0, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17" */
+-int lsetxattr(const char *path, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int xflags); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17" */
++int setxattr(const char *path, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int xflags); /* flags=0, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17", path_lock=shared */
++int lsetxattr(const char *path, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int xflags); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17", path_lock=shared */
+ int fsetxattr(int filedes, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int xflags); /* version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17" */
+-ssize_t listxattr(const char *path, char *list, size_t size); /* flags=0, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17" */
+-ssize_t llistxattr(const char *path, char *list, size_t size); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17" */
++ssize_t listxattr(const char *path, char *list, size_t size); /* flags=0, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17", path_lock=shared */
++ssize_t llistxattr(const char *path, char *list, size_t size); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17", path_lock=shared */
+ ssize_t flistxattr(int filedes, char *list, size_t size); /* version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17" */
+-int removexattr(const char *path, const char *name); /* flags=0, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17" */
+-int lremovexattr(const char *path, const char *name); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17" */
++int removexattr(const char *path, const char *name); /* flags=0, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17", path_lock=shared */
++int lremovexattr(const char *path, const char *name); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17", path_lock=shared */
+ int fremovexattr(int filedes, const char *name); /* version="GLIBC_2.3", version-aarch64="GLIBC_2.17" */
+diff --git a/ports/unix/wrapfuncs.in b/ports/unix/wrapfuncs.in
+index a4892fe..b9d0782 100644
+--- a/ports/unix/wrapfuncs.in
++++ b/ports/unix/wrapfuncs.in
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ char *getwd(char *buf);
+ int close(int fd); /* noignore_path=1 */
+ int fchmod(int fd, mode_t mode);
+ int fchown(int fd, uid_t owner, gid_t group);
+-int lchown(const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
++int lchown(const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=shared */
+ int dup2(int oldfd, int newfd); /* noignore_path=1 */
+ int dup(int fd); /* noignore_path=1 */
+ int chdir(const char *path); /* noignore_path=1 */
+@@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ int access(const char *path, int mode);
+ int faccessat(int dirfd, const char *path, int mode, int flags);
+ int faccessat2(int dirfd, const char *path, int mode, int flags);
+ FTS *fts_open(char * const *path_argv, int options, int (*compar)(const FTSENT **, const FTSENT **)); /* inode64=1 */
+-FTSENT *fts_read(FTS *ftsp); /* noignore_path=1, inode64=1 */
+-FTSENT *fts_children(FTS *ftsp, int options); /* noignore_path=1, inode64=1 */
++FTSENT *fts_read(FTS *ftsp); /* noignore_path=1, inode64=1, path_lock=shared */
++FTSENT *fts_children(FTS *ftsp, int options); /* noignore_path=1, inode64=1, path_lock=shared */
+ int ftw(const char *path, int (*fn)(const char *, const struct stat *, int), int nopenfd);
+ int nftw(const char *path, int (*fn)(const char *, const struct stat *, int, struct FTW *), int nopenfd, int flag);
+ int glob(const char *pattern, int flags, int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob_t *pglob);
+ int lutimes(const char *path, const struct timeval *tv); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-char *mkdtemp(char *template);
++char *mkdtemp(char *template); /* path_lock=1 */
+ char *mktemp(char *template);
+ long pathconf(const char *path, int name);
+ char *realpath(const char *name, char *resolved_name); /* version="GLIBC_2.3" */
+@@ -37,27 +37,27 @@ int fclose(FILE *fp); /* noignore_path=1 */
+ FILE *freopen(const char *path, const char *mode, FILE *stream); /* noignore_path=1 */
+ int chroot(const char *path); /* noignore_path=1 */
+ int acct(const char *path);
+-int chmod(const char *path, mode_t mode);
+-int chown(const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group);
+-int fchmodat(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode, int flags);
+-int fchownat(int dirfd, const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group, int flags);
+-int link(const char *oldname, const char *newname); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int linkat(int olddirfd, const char *oldname, int newdirfd, const char *newname, int flags);
+-int mkdir(const char *path, mode_t mode); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int mkdirat(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int mkfifo(const char *path, mode_t mode); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int mkfifoat(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int mknod(const char *path, mode_t mode, dev_t dev); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int mknodat(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode, dev_t dev); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int mkstemp(char *template); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int mkostemp(char *template, int oflags); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int mkstemps(char *template, int suffixlen); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int mkostemps(char *template, int suffixlen, int oflags); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
++int chmod(const char *path, mode_t mode); /* path_lock=shared */
++int chown(const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group); /* path_lock=shared */
++int fchmodat(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode, int flags); /* path_lock=shared */
++int fchownat(int dirfd, const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group, int flags); /* path_lock=shared */
++int link(const char *oldname, const char *newname); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int linkat(int olddirfd, const char *oldname, int newdirfd, const char *newname, int flags); /* path_lock=1 */
++int mkdir(const char *path, mode_t mode); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int mkdirat(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int mkfifo(const char *path, mode_t mode); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int mkfifoat(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int mknod(const char *path, mode_t mode, dev_t dev); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int mknodat(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode, dev_t dev); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int mkstemp(char *template); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int mkostemp(char *template, int oflags); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int mkstemps(char *template, int suffixlen); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int mkostemps(char *template, int suffixlen, int oflags); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
+ int rename(const char *oldpath, const char *newpath); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
+ int renameat(int olddirfd, const char *oldpath, int newdirfd, const char *newpath); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
+ int rmdir(const char *path); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
+-int symlink(const char *oldname, const char *newpath); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
+-int symlinkat(const char *oldname, int dirfd, const char *newpath); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW */
++int symlink(const char *oldname, const char *newpath); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
++int symlinkat(const char *oldname, int dirfd, const char *newpath); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
+ int unlink(const char *path); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
+ int unlinkat(int dirfd, const char *path, int rflags); /* flags=AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW, path_lock=1 */
+ # primarily for use with chroot()
+@@ -74,4 +74,4 @@ void sync(void); /* async_skip= */
+ int sync_file_range(int fd, off64_t offset, off64_t nbytes, unsigned int flags); /* async_skip=0 */
+ int msync(void *addr, size_t length, int flags); /* async_skip=0 */
+ mode_t umask(mode_t mask);
+-int bind(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen);
++int bind(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen); /* path_lock=1 */
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0007-ports-check-created-files-under-the-path-lock-before.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0007-ports-check-created-files-under-the-path-lock-before.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0c7716e72a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0007-ports-check-created-files-under-the-path-lock-before.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+From 45bf43b216bfa281bbbf838f18acbf8df0531f67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 10:15:09 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] ports: check created files under the path lock before
+ recording them
+
+From: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+
+open() and friends with O_CREAT create a file and then send OP_CREAT
+for the path, so another client can rename onto or remove the name in
+between, like the other wrappers that create names. They can't hold
+the path lock across the real call, as opening a FIFO can block
+indefinitely, which could deadlock against a client waiting for the
+lock.
+
+Instead, take the lock after the file has been opened, and only send
+OP_CREAT if the path still names the file that was opened, using a new
+pseudo_client_path_matches_fd(). With the lock held no other client is
+part way through changing the path, so if it now names a different
+file, that client has already recorded the change and recording ours
+would be wrong.
+
+This covers openat (and so open, creat and their variants), openat2,
+fopen, freopen, fopen64 and freopen64. openat and openat2 now also take
+the recorded stat data from the descriptor rather than from an earlier
+lookup of the path.
+
+AI-Generated: Uses GitHub Copilot
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 21fe63e9dbeb50aa21b498b485d0c3d87f632bc3)
+
+Also include the pseudo_real_fstat and pseudo_real_stat declarations
+(pseudo_client.h), definitions (pseudo_util.c) and initialization
+(pseudo_wrappers.c) from fcd8a81 ("pseudo_client: resolve
+/proc/<pid>/fd/<n> to the descriptor").
+
+The new pseudo_client_path_matches_fd() needs them, but the rest of
+fcd8a81 is an unrelated behavior change that is not being backported.
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending [patches under test, https://lore.kernel.org/all/1794413712-18072-2-git-send-email-mark.hatle@kernel.crashing.org/]
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+---
+ ports/linux/guts/fopen64.c | 5 ++++-
+ ports/linux/guts/freopen64.c | 5 ++++-
+ ports/linux/guts/openat.c | 8 +++++++-
+ ports/linux/openat2/guts/openat2.c | 8 +++++++-
+ ports/unix/guts/fopen.c | 5 ++++-
+ ports/unix/guts/freopen.c | 5 ++++-
+ pseudo_client.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ pseudo_client.h | 3 +++
+ pseudo_util.c | 2 ++
+ pseudo_wrappers.c | 2 ++
+ 10 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ports/linux/guts/fopen64.c b/ports/linux/guts/fopen64.c
+index e76da69..a6efd18 100644
+--- a/ports/linux/guts/fopen64.c
++++ b/ports/linux/guts/fopen64.c
+@@ -22,8 +22,11 @@
+ pseudo_debug(PDBGF_FILE, "fopen64 '%s': fd %d <FILE %p>\n", path, fd, (void *) rc);
+ if (real___fxstat64(_STAT_VER, fd, &buf) != -1) {
+ if (!existed) {
++ int path_lock_fd = pseudo_client_path_lock(0);
+ real_fchmod(fd, PSEUDO_FS_MODE(0666 & ~pseudo_umask, 0));
+- pseudo_client_op(OP_CREAT, 0, -1, -1, path, &buf);
++ if (pseudo_client_path_matches_fd(path, fd, 0))
++ pseudo_client_op(OP_CREAT, 0, -1, -1, path, &buf);
++ pseudo_client_path_unlock(path_lock_fd);
+ }
+ pseudo_client_op(OP_OPEN, pseudo_access_fopen(mode), fd, -1, path, &buf);
+ } else {
+diff --git a/ports/linux/guts/freopen64.c b/ports/linux/guts/freopen64.c
+index 5fc9073..6057eda 100644
+--- a/ports/linux/guts/freopen64.c
++++ b/ports/linux/guts/freopen64.c
+@@ -21,8 +21,11 @@
+ pseudo_debug(PDBGF_FILE, "freopen64 '%s': fd %d\n", path, fd);
+ if (real___fxstat64(_STAT_VER, fd, &buf) != -1) {
+ if (!existed) {
++ int path_lock_fd = pseudo_client_path_lock(0);
+ real_fchmod(fd, PSEUDO_FS_MODE(0666 & ~pseudo_umask, 0));
+- pseudo_client_op(OP_CREAT, 0, -1, -1, path, &buf);
++ if (pseudo_client_path_matches_fd(path, fd, 0))
++ pseudo_client_op(OP_CREAT, 0, -1, -1, path, &buf);
++ pseudo_client_path_unlock(path_lock_fd);
+ }
+ pseudo_client_op(OP_OPEN, pseudo_access_fopen(mode), fd, -1, path, &buf);
+ } else {
+diff --git a/ports/linux/guts/openat.c b/ports/linux/guts/openat.c
+index 656ac2b..13bd395 100644
+--- a/ports/linux/guts/openat.c
++++ b/ports/linux/guts/openat.c
+@@ -148,9 +148,15 @@
+ if (stat_rc != -1) {
+ buf.st_mode = PSEUDO_DB_MODE(buf.st_mode, mode);
+ if (!existed) {
++ int path_lock_fd = pseudo_client_path_lock(0);
+ real_fchmod(rc, PSEUDO_FS_MODE(mode, 0));
+ // file has no path, but has been created
+- pseudo_client_op(OP_CREAT, 0, -1, dirfd, path, &buf);
++ if (pseudo_client_path_matches_fd(path, rc, flags & O_NOFOLLOW) &&
++ real___fxstat64(_STAT_VER, rc, &buf) != -1) {
++ buf.st_mode = PSEUDO_DB_MODE(buf.st_mode, mode);
++ pseudo_client_op(OP_CREAT, 0, -1, dirfd, path, &buf);
++ }
++ pseudo_client_path_unlock(path_lock_fd);
+ }
+ pseudo_client_op(OP_OPEN, PSEUDO_ACCESS(flags), rc, dirfd, path, &buf);
+ } else {
+diff --git a/ports/linux/openat2/guts/openat2.c b/ports/linux/openat2/guts/openat2.c
+index a0acbe7..687029a 100644
+--- a/ports/linux/openat2/guts/openat2.c
++++ b/ports/linux/openat2/guts/openat2.c
+@@ -183,9 +183,15 @@
+ if (stat_rc != -1) {
+ buf.st_mode = PSEUDO_DB_MODE(buf.st_mode, my_how.mode);
+ if (!existed) {
++ int path_lock_fd = pseudo_client_path_lock(0);
+ real_fchmod(rc, PSEUDO_FS_MODE(my_how.mode, 0));
+ // file has no path, but has been created
+- pseudo_client_op(OP_CREAT, 0, -1, dirfd, pseudo_path, &buf);
++ if (pseudo_client_path_matches_fd(pseudo_path, rc, my_how.flags & O_NOFOLLOW) &&
++ real___fxstat64(_STAT_VER, rc, &buf) != -1) {
++ buf.st_mode = PSEUDO_DB_MODE(buf.st_mode, my_how.mode);
++ pseudo_client_op(OP_CREAT, 0, -1, dirfd, pseudo_path, &buf);
++ }
++ pseudo_client_path_unlock(path_lock_fd);
+ }
+ pseudo_client_op(OP_OPEN, PSEUDO_ACCESS(my_how.flags), rc, dirfd, pseudo_path, &buf);
+ } else {
+diff --git a/ports/unix/guts/fopen.c b/ports/unix/guts/fopen.c
+index 26a6abc..78388f7 100644
+--- a/ports/unix/guts/fopen.c
++++ b/ports/unix/guts/fopen.c
+@@ -21,8 +21,11 @@
+ pseudo_debug(PDBGF_OP, "fopen '%s': fd %d <FILE %p>\n", path, fd, (void *) rc);
+ if (base_fstat(fd, &buf) != -1) {
+ if (!existed) {
++ int path_lock_fd = pseudo_client_path_lock(0);
+ real_fchmod(fd, PSEUDO_FS_MODE(0666 & ~pseudo_umask, 0));
+- pseudo_client_op(OP_CREAT, 0, -1, -1, path, &buf);
++ if (pseudo_client_path_matches_fd(path, fd, 0))
++ pseudo_client_op(OP_CREAT, 0, -1, -1, path, &buf);
++ pseudo_client_path_unlock(path_lock_fd);
+ }
+ pseudo_client_op(OP_OPEN, pseudo_access_fopen(mode), fd, -1, path, &buf);
+ } else {
+diff --git a/ports/unix/guts/freopen.c b/ports/unix/guts/freopen.c
+index 703b6aa..5d63c9f 100644
+--- a/ports/unix/guts/freopen.c
++++ b/ports/unix/guts/freopen.c
+@@ -21,8 +21,11 @@
+ pseudo_debug(PDBGF_OP, "freopen '%s': fd %d\n", path, fd);
+ if (base_fstat(fd, &buf) != -1) {
+ if (!existed) {
++ int path_lock_fd = pseudo_client_path_lock(0);
+ real_fchmod(fd, PSEUDO_FS_MODE(0666 & ~pseudo_umask, 0));
+- pseudo_client_op(OP_CREAT, 0, -1, -1, path, &buf);
++ if (pseudo_client_path_matches_fd(path, fd, 0))
++ pseudo_client_op(OP_CREAT, 0, -1, -1, path, &buf);
++ pseudo_client_path_unlock(path_lock_fd);
+ }
+ pseudo_client_op(OP_OPEN, pseudo_access_fopen(mode), fd, -1, path, &buf);
+ } else {
+diff --git a/pseudo_client.c b/pseudo_client.c
+index 759afeb..fe99aa6 100644
+--- a/pseudo_client.c
++++ b/pseudo_client.c
+@@ -1249,6 +1249,31 @@ pseudo_client_path_unlock(int fd) {
+ errno = save_errno;
+ }
+
++/* Operations that can block, such as open() on a FIFO, can't hold the path
++ * lock across the real call. Instead they take the lock afterwards and
++ * check that the path still names the file they opened before recording
++ * it. With the lock held, no other client is part way through changing the
++ * path, so if it now names a different file, that client has already
++ * recorded the change, and recording ours would be wrong.
++ */
++int
++pseudo_client_path_matches_fd(const char *path, int fd, int nofollow) {
++ PSEUDO_STATBUF pbuf, fbuf;
++ int save_errno = errno;
++ int rc;
++
++ if (!path || fd < 0 || !pseudo_real_fstat || !pseudo_real_lstat || !pseudo_real_stat)
++ return 1;
++ rc = pseudo_real_fstat(fd, &fbuf) == 0 &&
++ (nofollow ? pseudo_real_lstat(path, &pbuf) : pseudo_real_stat(path, &pbuf)) == 0 &&
++ pbuf.st_dev == fbuf.st_dev && pbuf.st_ino == fbuf.st_ino;
++ if (!rc)
++ pseudo_debug(PDBGF_FILE, "'%s' no longer names fd %d, not recording it.\n",
++ path, fd);
++ errno = save_errno;
++ return rc;
++}
++
+ static int
+ client_connect(void) {
+ /* we have a server pid, is it responsive? */
+diff --git a/pseudo_client.h b/pseudo_client.h
+index 217981d..77fe2ff 100644
+--- a/pseudo_client.h
++++ b/pseudo_client.h
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ extern int pseudo_client_shutdown(int);
+ extern int pseudo_fd(int fd, int how);
+ extern int pseudo_client_path_lock(int shared);
+ extern void pseudo_client_path_unlock(int fd);
++extern int pseudo_client_path_matches_fd(const char *path, int fd, int nofollow);
+ #define MOVE_FD 0
+ #define COPY_FD 1
+ #define PSEUDO_MIN_FD 20
+@@ -53,6 +54,8 @@ extern FILE *pseudo_grp;
+
+ /* pseudo_wrappers will try to initialize these */
+ extern int (*pseudo_real_lstat)(const char *path, PSEUDO_STATBUF *buf);
++extern int (*pseudo_real_fstat)(int fd, PSEUDO_STATBUF *buf);
++extern int (*pseudo_real_stat)(const char *path, PSEUDO_STATBUF *buf);
+ extern int (*pseudo_real_fork)(void);
+ extern int (*pseudo_real_execv)(const char *, char * const *);
+
+diff --git a/pseudo_util.c b/pseudo_util.c
+index b8afe34..0267585 100644
+--- a/pseudo_util.c
++++ b/pseudo_util.c
+@@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ static int pseudo_util_initted = -1; /* Not yet run */
+
+ /* bypass wrapper logic on path computations */
+ int (*pseudo_real_lstat)(const char *path, PSEUDO_STATBUF *buf) = NULL;
++int (*pseudo_real_fstat)(int fd, PSEUDO_STATBUF *buf) = NULL;
++int (*pseudo_real_stat)(const char *path, PSEUDO_STATBUF *buf) = NULL;
+ /* bash workaround */
+ int (*pseudo_real_unsetenv)(const char *) = unsetenv;
+ char * (*pseudo_real_getenv)(const char *) = getenv;
+diff --git a/pseudo_wrappers.c b/pseudo_wrappers.c
+index e54dad5..94f4260 100644
+--- a/pseudo_wrappers.c
++++ b/pseudo_wrappers.c
+@@ -177,6 +177,8 @@ pseudo_init_wrappers(void) {
+ pseudo_real_fsetxattr = real_fsetxattr;
+ #endif
+ pseudo_real_lstat = base_lstat;
++ pseudo_real_fstat = base_fstat;
++ pseudo_real_stat = base_stat;
+ /* and these are used so the client's server spawn can bypass
+ * wrappers.
+ */
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0008-test-parallel-ops-Add-a-parallel-create-rename-link-.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0008-test-parallel-ops-Add-a-parallel-create-rename-link-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..752a2283d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0008-test-parallel-ops-Add-a-parallel-create-rename-link-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From ad74f92191757254172af8ae39549b256b880321 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 10:15:10 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] test-parallel-ops: Add a parallel create/rename/link/chmod
+ test
+
+From: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+
+Four workers repeatedly create, rename onto, chmod, chown, symlink,
+hard link and remove the same names in one directory. The test fails
+if any of the operations fail, or if the server logged an inode or path
+mismatch while it ran.
+
+Without the path lock in the create, metadata and open wrappers, the
+server reports mismatches and occasionally aborts a client.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 7f582310cb7eb67da9b20ceb3082331518f6d4fb)
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending [patches under test, https://lore.kernel.org/all/1794413712-18072-2-git-send-email-mark.hatle@kernel.crashing.org/]
+AI-Generated: Uses GitHub Copilot
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+---
+ test/test-parallel-ops.sh | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100755 test/test-parallel-ops.sh
+
+diff --git a/test/test-parallel-ops.sh b/test/test-parallel-ops.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000..2fccd30
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/test/test-parallel-ops.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
++#!/bin/bash
++#
++# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-only
++#
++# Several clients create, rename, link, chmod and remove the same names in
++# one directory at once. pseudo must not let one client's operation land in
++# the middle of another client's change to the same name, or the server
++# finds the database out of step with the filesystem. It then logs an
++# "inode mismatch" or "path mismatch" error, and may abort a client.
++#
++# The temporary tree has to live below $PWD so that pseudo tracks it.
++
++tmpdir="$(mktemp -d -p "$PWD" parallel_ops_XXXXXX)"
++trap "rm -rf '$tmpdir'" EXIT TERM INT
++
++log="${PSEUDO_LOCALSTATEDIR:-$PWD/var/pseudo}/pseudo.log"
++mismatches() {
++ grep -c "mismatch" "$log" 2>/dev/null || true
++}
++before=$(mismatches)
++
++cd "$tmpdir" || exit 1
++: > target
++
++worker() {
++ for i in $(seq 50); do
++ echo "$1 $i" > "tmp.$1" || echo "FAILED: create tmp.$1" >> failed
++ mv -f "tmp.$1" target || echo "FAILED: mv tmp.$1 target" >> failed
++ chmod 640 target 2>/dev/null
++ chown 0:0 target 2>/dev/null
++ ln -sf target lnk || echo "FAILED: ln -sf target lnk" >> failed
++ mkdir dir 2>/dev/null; rmdir dir 2>/dev/null
++ mkfifo "f.$1" && mv -f "f.$1" fifo || echo "FAILED: mkfifo/mv f.$1" >> failed
++ ln -f target "hard.$1" 2>/dev/null && rm -f "hard.$1"
++ done
++}
++
++for w in 1 2 3 4; do
++ worker $w &
++done
++wait
++
++rc=0
++if [ -e failed ]; then
++ sort failed | uniq -c
++ rc=1
++fi
++after=$(mismatches)
++if [ "${after:-0}" -ne "${before:-0}" ]; then
++ echo "FAILED: $((after - before)) mismatch error(s) in $log"
++ rc=1
++fi
++exit $rc
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0009-README.security-Add-information-specific-to-file-pro.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0009-README.security-Add-information-specific-to-file-pro.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9ec387f631
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0009-README.security-Add-information-specific-to-file-pro.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+From 3863f5d291743306efa6acc62dd43a26ba2ff2f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 10:15:11 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] README.security: Add information specific to file/process
+ security
+
+From: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+
+As noted in the README.security file, pseudo is not intended for
+secure computing, but to assist in build system workflows.
+
+During review the recent rewrite_proc_fd_ref it was noted that
+the way pseudo is working may be counter to the way selinux and
+similar tools are expecting the system to behave. This behavior
+change is acceptable for the build environment workflow, but
+is not acceptable to a running/server workflow.
+
+See the README.security file for more details.
+
+AI-Generated: Used GitHub Copilot to assist in writing the file
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 019e93e03f7bb4fe2bacf3658f7dd6bf0d23fb65)
+
+Changes from the cherry-picked version, to match this branch:
+
+Section 1: mention DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, as this branch still has the
+Darwin port, and note that the port is known not to work and is
+unlikely to be useful (see b550fd3, which removes it on master).
+
+Section 3: drop the /proc/self/fd/<n> and /dev/fd/<n> item, as
+rewrite_proc_fd_ref() (fcd8a81) is not on this branch. fchmodat calls
+the real fchmodat(), not chmod, and mknodat is implemented by
+ports/linux/guts/__xmknodat.c, as the Linux guts override ports/unix;
+both corrections were made upstream in 81d4150 and dd69ed1.
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending [patches under test, https://lore.kernel.org/all/1794413712-18072-2-git-send-email-mark.hatle@kernel.crashing.org/]
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+---
+ README | 3 +
+ README.security | 152 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 155 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 README.security
+
+diff --git a/README b/README
+index 039f960..e4fb5ec 100644
+--- a/README
++++ b/README
+@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ environment, allowing ordinary users to run commands which give the illusion
+ of creating device nodes, changing file ownership, and otherwise doing
+ things necessary for creating distribution packages or filesystems.
+
++pseudo is not a security boundary and must not be used in security
++sensitive applications. See README.security for details.
++
+ Building pseudo requires GCC 5 or later (or clang), which the configure
+ script checks for.
+
+diff --git a/README.security b/README.security
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..2cb124f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/README.security
+@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
++pseudo -- security considerations
++
++SUMMARY:
++
++pseudo is a build tool. It exists so that ordinary users can produce
++packages and filesystem images containing files that appear to be owned
++by root, device nodes, special permissions and extended attributes.
++
++pseudo is NOT a security boundary and must not be used in security
++sensitive applications. In particular, do not use pseudo:
++
++* to contain, confine or sandbox untrusted programs;
++* as a substitute for real privileges, a real chroot, a container or a
++ virtual machine;
++* to process filesystem trees that untrusted or concurrent processes can
++ modify while pseudo is running;
++* as the only guarantee that the ownership, permissions, SELinux labels
++ or file capabilities in a security critical image are correct.
++
++
++1. INTERCEPTION IS COOPERATIVE
++
++pseudo works by loading libpseudo with LD_PRELOAD (DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
++on Darwin) and wrapping libc functions. Anything that does not go
++through those wrappers reaches the real filesystem directly, with the
++real privileges of the user who started pseudo. This includes:
++
++* statically linked programs;
++* programs that make system calls directly, including language runtimes
++ that do not use libc for file operations, and interfaces such as
++ io_uring;
++* setuid/setgid programs, for which the dynamic linker ignores
++ LD_PRELOAD;
++* any program that clears LD_PRELOAD, or that sets PSEUDO_UNLOAD or
++ PSEUDO_DISABLED (see pseudo_client.c), both of which are deliberately
++ supported ways to turn pseudo off.
++
++A program running under pseudo can therefore always step outside of it.
++pseudo cannot be used to restrict what a program does.
++
++The Darwin port is described as implemented, but it has not worked for
++a long time: System Integrity Protection and the hardened runtime block
++DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES, so it is unlikely to be useful.
++
++
++2. "ROOT" EXISTS ONLY IN THE DATABASE
++
++pseudo grants no privileges. Files on disk remain owned by the real
++user, and the ownership and modes that programs see under pseudo are
++read back from pseudo's database. The kernel does not enforce any of
++the emulated ownership or permissions.
++
++The real on-disk modes are also deliberately different from the
++emulated ones. PSEUDO_FS_MODE (pseudo_client.h) always adds owner read
++and write permission (and owner execute for directories) so that the
++emulated root can access everything, and removes group/other write,
++setuid and setgid bits from the real file. A file that is meant to be
++mode 0600 or 0000 and owned by root, for example /etc/shadow or a
++private key, is readable and writable on disk by the build user and by
++any process running as that user, whether or not it is under pseudo.
++
++Treat everything pseudo writes as accessible to the build user.
++
++
++3. FILE DESCRIPTORS BECOME PATHS (TOCTOU)
++
++Many security sensitive programs rely on the kernel resolving a file
++descriptor, or a path relative to a directory descriptor, to a specific
++inode. This is how they avoid races where a path component is replaced
++with a symlink between checking a file and using it. pseudo removes
++that protection in several ways:
++
++* Paths are canonicalized in user space. pseudo_fix_path()
++ (pseudo_util.c) walks each path component with lstat() and readlink()
++ and builds an absolute path, and the real function is then called
++ with that absolute path (see doc/chroot). A call such as
++ openat(dirfd, "file", ...) is no longer anchored to dirfd; it becomes
++ an operation on "<recorded path of dirfd>/file". Kernel guarantees
++ such as O_NOFOLLOW on intermediate components or RESOLVE_BENEATH are
++ not reproduced by this resolution, except in the few wrappers marked
++ preserve_paths in wrapfuncs.in, which handle paths themselves.
++
++* The path pseudo recorded for a descriptor (fd_path() in
++ pseudo_client.c) is used to resolve paths relative to it. That
++ record can be stale: the file or directory may have been renamed, or
++ the descriptor may have been inherited, received over a socket, or
++ opened by a call pseudo did not see.
++
++* Several wrappers check a path and then act on it by path in a second
++ step. For example, fchmodat (ports/unix/guts/fchmodat.c) stats the
++ path and later calls the real fchmodat() on the same path, and mknodat
++ (ports/linux/guts/__xmknodat.c) removes the path again by name if the
++ database update fails.
++
++If anything else can change the tree while pseudo is working on it, an
++operation may be applied to a different file than the one that was
++checked, both in pseudo's database and on the real filesystem. Only
++run pseudo on trees that are fully under the control of the build.
++
++
++4. THE CHROOT IS EMULATED
++
++pseudo's chroot() support only prepends a stored prefix to absolute
++paths and strips it from some results (see doc/chroot). No real
++chroot() is performed, and the README notes the support is incomplete.
++Any of the bypasses in section 1, or any path pseudo resolves
++differently from the kernel, reaches the host filesystem. pseudo's
++chroot must not be relied on to keep a program inside a directory.
++
++
++5. METADATA LIVES IN A DATABASE THAT CAN DRIFT
++
++Emulated ownership, modes, device nodes and extended attributes,
++including security.selinux and security.capability, exist only in
++pseudo's database until a packaging or image step copies them out.
++Entries are keyed by path and inode number. When files are changed
++outside of pseudo, for example deleted or recreated without pseudo
++loaded, an inode number can be reused and the database can attach the
++old file's ownership, mode or attributes to a new file. The server
++reports such cases as "inode mismatch" or "path mismatch" (pseudo.c),
++but cannot always know which side is correct.
++
++Accesses to paths listed in PSEUDO_IGNORE_PATHS are deliberately not
++tracked at all.
++
++Generated images should be verified independently if their ownership,
++permissions, labels or capabilities matter for security. Do not
++ignore mismatch errors in pseudo's log.
++
++
++6. THE SERVER TRUSTS ITS CLIENTS
++
++The pseudo server listens on a Unix socket in its local state directory
++and does not authenticate clients beyond the filesystem permissions of
++that socket. Any process running as the build user can connect and
++change the database, and the database files themselves are writable by
++that user. The resulting metadata can only be trusted as much as every
++process running as the build user.
++
++
++RECOMMENDATIONS:
++
++* Run pseudo only on build output that is private to the build and is
++ not modified concurrently by anything outside of it.
++* Run untrusted build steps under a real isolation mechanism (a
++ container, a virtual machine, or a dedicated user), with pseudo inside
++ it if needed, never pseudo alone.
++* Do not store secrets in a pseudo-managed tree on a shared system;
++ they are readable by the build user regardless of their emulated
++ ownership and mode.
++* Verify the ownership, permissions, labels and capabilities of
++ security relevant files in the final image.
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0010-AGENTS.md-Add-to-assist-future-developers.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0010-AGENTS.md-Add-to-assist-future-developers.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62bbab1464
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/files/0010-AGENTS.md-Add-to-assist-future-developers.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+From 56e1fc69be92cefc58d6d9829069776b53f86470 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 10:15:12 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] AGENTS.md: Add to assist future developers
+
+From: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+
+Based partially off of the Yocto Project standards, this is my attempt
+at documenting the configuration I use with agents during maintainer
+and development activities.
+
+(cherry picked from commit fe4e4f0d920d587f0ded3c044255ee27269d2646)
+
+Upstream-Status: Pending [patches under test, https://lore.kernel.org/all/1794413712-18072-2-git-send-email-mark.hatle@kernel.crashing.org/]
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.hatle@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <yoann.congal@smile.fr>
+---
+ AGENTS.md | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 AGENTS.md
+
+diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..c0d041a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/AGENTS.md
+@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
++# AGENTS.md — pseudo
++
++Guidance for AI agents working in the `pseudo` repository.
++
++## Making changes
++
++- No web PR workflow. The project uses **patches on mailing lists**
++ (yocto-patches@lists.yoctoproject.org). Don't assume GitHub PR
++ conventions apply. Subject on the mailing list must include
++ '[pseudo]'.
++- One Git commit per logical change (e.g., one commit per fix, refactor or new test).
++- Split unrelated changes, even small ones found along the way: a bug
++ noticed during a refactor gets its own commit.
++- Keep every commit building cleanly, with tests passing, so the series
++ bisects. Put a new test after the fix it checks.
++- Commit message format:
++ - Summary line prefixed with the component or short file path,
++ e.g. `pseudo_util: Remove stale with_libpseudo() comment`.
++ Check `git log --oneline <path>` for the prefix convention already in use.
++ - Body explains what/why/how, and how it was tested.
++ - Prefer explaining *why* a change was made over restating what's
++ already visible in the diff, unless the diff is long/hard to follow
++ or the reason for the change isn't known — in those cases, summarize
++ what changed instead.
++ - Be succinct: use as few sentences and lines as possible while still
++ covering what/why/how. Cut restatements, filler, and any detail a
++ reviewer wouldn't need (e.g. exact test-run counts, step-by-step
++ narration). One short paragraph is usually enough; only add a second
++ if a distinct point (e.g. testing) needs it.
++ - The most relevant information about the change should be presented first.
++ - Reference bugs as `[YOCTO #1234]` when applicable.
++ - Use `Reported-by`, `Suggested-by`, `Tested-by`, `Reviewed-by`, `Cc` tags
++ where relevant.
++
++### AI-generated code
++
++- **Mandatory**: any AI-generated code/commit must add an `AI-Generated:`
++ tag line in the commit message, placed *before* `Signed-off-by` (if present),
++ naming the tool used, e.g.:
++
++ ```
++ component: Add the ability to ...
++
++ AI-Generated: Uses GitHub Copilot
++ ```
++
++- **Mandatory** Do not automatically add a `Signed-off-by`. This tag must
++ always be written by the human contributor, never by the AI tool — the
++ DCO/Developer's Statement of Origin still applies in full.
++- Contributor is responsible for confirming the AI tool's terms don't
++ conflict with the project's open source license/IP policy, and that
++ any third-party copyrighted material in the AI output is properly
++ licensed before contributing it. See the Linux Foundation generative AI
++ guidance: https://www.linuxfoundation.org/legal/generative-ai.
++- `Co-authored-by` should be omitted in favor of the `AI-Generated` tag.
++ Don't add other tool-specific trailers either (e.g. `Copilot-Session`).
++
++## Building and testing
++
++- Configure and build: `./configure --prefix=$(pwd)/test && make`
++- Full test suite: `make test-verbose` (or `make test`). Single tests:
++ `./run_tests.sh -v test-name`.
++- Tests are `test/test-*.sh`, with optional `test/test-*.c` programs that
++ the Makefile builds automatically. A script exits 0 to pass and 255 to
++ report a skip; C helpers conventionally exit 77 for "not supported"
++ (for example ENOSYS), which the script maps to 255. Create temporary
++ trees below $PWD so pseudo tracks them.
++- Changes to the server, locking or path handling: also run the
++ test-parallel-* tests several times, as they are timing dependent.
++
++## Code layout
++
++- Wrappers are generated by `makewrappers` from `ports/*/wrapfuncs.in`,
++ `templates/` and the guts in `ports/*/guts/`. Don't edit the generated
++ files (pseudo_wrapfuncs.*, pseudo_wrapper_table.c, pseudo_ports.h,
++ port_wrappers.c).
++- Linux is the only port. Put port-specific definitions in
++ `ports/<port>/portdefs.h`. Where shared code needs something only one
++ port provides, fail with `#error` for other ports rather than silently
++ falling back.
++- Keep pseudo.1 and README.security in step with behaviour changes:
++ options, environment variables, diagnostics, security model.
++
++When in doubt about a convention, grep `git log --oneline <path>` in the
++target repo for precedent before inventing a new style.
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb
index 764f81b683..82f1f946b8 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/pseudo/pseudo_git.bb
@@ -3,6 +3,16 @@ require pseudo.inc
SRC_URI = "git://git.yoctoproject.org/pseudo;branch=pseudo-1.9;protocol=https \
file://fallback-passwd \
file://fallback-group \
+ file://0001-test-Skip-open_tree-tests-when-the-function-or-sysca.patch \
+ file://0002-makewrappers-Don-t-generate-unused-_int-paths-with-n.patch \
+ file://0003-ports-linux-Don-t-require-linux-mount.h.patch \
+ file://0004-configure-Require-GCC-5-or-later.patch \
+ file://0005-pseudo_client-serialize-path-changes-across-clients.patch \
+ file://0006-ports-hold-the-path-lock-in-create-and-metadata-wrap.patch \
+ file://0007-ports-check-created-files-under-the-path-lock-before.patch \
+ file://0008-test-parallel-ops-Add-a-parallel-create-rename-link-.patch \
+ file://0009-README.security-Add-information-specific-to-file-pro.patch \
+ file://0010-AGENTS.md-Add-to-assist-future-developers.patch \
"
SRC_URI:append:class-native = " \
http://downloads.yoctoproject.org/mirror/sources/pseudo-prebuilt-2.33.tar.xz;subdir=git/prebuilt;name=prebuilt \
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 08/19] popt: patch CVE-2026-18739
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 07/19] TEST-pseudo: test patches Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 09/19] glibc: patch CVE-2026-86805 and CVE-2026-95818 Fabien Thomas
` (10 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Pick patch referencing this CVE.
Convert change in cmake file to autotools/makefile.
Install the new test in recipe.
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
[fatho: fix CVE metadata]
Signed-off-by: Fabien Thomas <fabien.thomas@smile.fr>
---
.../popt/popt/CVE-2026-18739.patch | 92 +++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-support/popt/popt_1.19.bb | 2 +
2 files changed, 94 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/popt/popt/CVE-2026-18739.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/popt/popt/CVE-2026-18739.patch b/meta/recipes-support/popt/popt/CVE-2026-18739.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..94366f6343
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/popt/popt/CVE-2026-18739.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+From 14c42b415ba0c11640f7d4ee80920452d0287058 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yao Zhang <294772273@qq.com>
+Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 14:52:10 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2026-18739: off-by-one error in poptStuffArgs()
+
+The poptStuffArgs function only checks whether (con->os - con->optionStack)
+is equal to POPT_OPTION_DEPTH (10) before incrementing con->os, and does
+not increment the value by 1 to perform boundary pre-checking, as
+handleAlias does.
+
+Add a new test program as a reproducer for this case.
+
+Co-authored-by: Panu Matilainen <pmatilai@redhat.com>
+
+Fixes: CVE-2026-18739
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-18739
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/rpm-software-management/popt/commit/14c42b415ba0c11640f7d4ee80920452d0287058]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ src/popt.c | 2 +-
+ tests/Makefile.am | 5 ++++-
+ tests/testit.sh | 2 ++
+ tests/tstuff.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 tests/tstuff.c
+
+diff --git a/src/popt.c b/src/popt.c
+index 9ea3dfe..458aadc 100644
+--- a/src/popt.c
++++ b/src/popt.c
+@@ -1668,7 +1668,7 @@ int poptStuffArgs(poptContext con, const char ** argv)
+ int argc;
+ int rc;
+
+- if ((con->os - con->optionStack) == POPT_OPTION_DEPTH)
++ if ((con->os - con->optionStack + 1) == POPT_OPTION_DEPTH)
+ return POPT_ERROR_OPTSTOODEEP;
+
+ for (argc = 0; argv[argc]; argc++)
+diff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am
+index c410389..99fbf64 100644
+--- a/tests/Makefile.am
++++ b/tests/Makefile.am
+@@ -11,7 +11,10 @@ EXTRA_DIST = testit.sh \
+
+ AM_CPPFLAGS = -I. -I$(top_srcdir)/src
+
+-noinst_PROGRAMS = test1 test2 tdict test3
++noinst_PROGRAMS = test1 test2 tdict test3 tstuff
++tstuff_SOURCES = tstuff.c
++tstuff_LDFLAGS =
++tstuff_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/src/libpopt.la
+ test1_SOURCES = test1.c
+ test1_LDFLAGS =
+ test1_LDADD = $(top_builddir)/src/libpopt.la
+diff --git a/tests/testit.sh b/tests/testit.sh
+index 4078f51..d26be3a 100755
+--- a/tests/testit.sh
++++ b/tests/testit.sh
+@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ run test1 "test1 - 61" "" -x=f1
+
+ run test1 "test1 - 62" "arg1: 0 arg2: (none) aInt: 1" --randint=-1
+
++run tstuff "tstuff - 1" "-13"
++
+ if ! [ -e test3-data ]; then
+ # create symlink for running during 'make distcheck'
+ ln -s "${srcdir}/test3-data" test3-data
+diff --git a/tests/tstuff.c b/tests/tstuff.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..b820c7b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/tstuff.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <popt.h>
++
++int main(int argc, char *argv[])
++{
++ poptContext ctx = poptGetContext(argv[0], argc, (const char **)argv, NULL, 0);
++ int rc = 0;
++ for (int i = 0; i < 100; ++i) {
++ const char *ea[] = { "a", NULL };
++ if ((rc = poptStuffArgs(ctx, ea)))
++ break;
++ }
++ printf("%d\n", rc);
++
++ poptFreeContext(ctx);
++ return rc;
++}
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/popt/popt_1.19.bb b/meta/recipes-support/popt/popt_1.19.bb
index c8b4875c1b..18cc4f2867 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/popt/popt_1.19.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/popt/popt_1.19.bb
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ DEPENDS = "virtual/libiconv"
SRC_URI = "http://ftp.rpm.org/popt/releases/popt-1.x/${BP}.tar.gz \
file://run-ptest \
file://CVE-2026-18743.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-18739.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c25a4838fc8e4c1c8aacb8bd620edb3084a3d63bf8987fdad3ca2758c63240f9"
@@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ do_compile_ptest() {
do_install_ptest() {
install ${B}/tests/.libs/test* ${D}/${PTEST_PATH}
install ${B}/tests/.libs/tdict ${D}/${PTEST_PATH}
+ install ${B}/tests/.libs/tstuff ${D}/${PTEST_PATH}
install ${B}/tests/testit.sh ${D}/${PTEST_PATH}
install ${B}/tests/test-poptrc ${D}/${PTEST_PATH}
}
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 09/19] glibc: patch CVE-2026-86805 and CVE-2026-95818
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 08/19] popt: patch CVE-2026-18739 Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 10/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-92389 Fabien Thomas
` (9 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Pick patch [1] which is [2] backported to 2.41 (oldest release still
receiving security updates) which is mentioned in [3] and [4].
On request, all testing code was removed from the patch.
[1] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=629565b0c91dc326ac622b05982f21a374cd03c4
[2] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=ed0c137b97eb940b4b64981e84ed806d3276edd9
[3] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-86805
[4] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-95818
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Bastien Jauny <bastien.jauny@smile.fr>
---
.../0049-CVE-2026-86805-CVE-2026-95818.patch | 267 ++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.39.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 268 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0049-CVE-2026-86805-CVE-2026-95818.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0049-CVE-2026-86805-CVE-2026-95818.patch b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0049-CVE-2026-86805-CVE-2026-95818.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dde4f8b901
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc/0049-CVE-2026-86805-CVE-2026-95818.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+From 629565b0c91dc326ac622b05982f21a374cd03c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
+Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2026 15:15:32 -0300
+Subject: [PATCH] elf: Open the normalized $ORIGIN rpath in AT_SECURE programs
+ (BZ 34360)
+
+For AT_SECURE programs the loader honors $ORIGIN in DT_RPATH only when the
+expansion is rooted in a trusted directory, but it validated the lexically
+normalized path while opening the raw expansion. As "a/b/../c" only names
+"a/c" when "b" is not a symlink, an attacker who controls a component of
+$ORIGIN -- e.g. by hard-linking the setuid binary into an attacker-owned
+directory -- can make the opened path escape the trusted directory even
+though the check passed, loading an attacker-controlled object.
+
+Normalize the expansion in place and open that, so the path that is opened
+is exactly the path that was validated. _dl_normalize_path rewrites the
+string in place without ever advancing its write cursor past its read
+cursor or appending, so it stays within the original storage.
+
+Add elf/tst-origin-secure as a regression test.
+
+Reviewed-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit ed0c137b97eb940b4b64981e84ed806d3276edd9)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-86805
+CVE: CVE-2026-95818
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=commit;h=629565b0c91dc326ac622b05982f21a374cd03c4]
+Omit the regression tests and their test harness prerequisites from this backport.
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ elf/dl-load.c | 74 +++++++++----------------
+ elf/dl-path-normalize.h | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 elf/dl-path-normalize.h
+
+diff --git a/elf/dl-load.c b/elf/dl-load.c
+index 7b21f1dffa..0d141a61c1 100644
+--- a/elf/dl-load.c
++++ b/elf/dl-load.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <gnu/lib-names.h>
++#include <dl-path-normalize.h>
+
+ /* Type for the buffer we put the ELF header and hopefully the program
+ header. This buffer does not really have to be too large. In most
+@@ -124,54 +125,24 @@ static const size_t system_dirs_len[] =
+ };
+ #define nsystem_dirs_len array_length (system_dirs_len)
+
++/* Return true if the normalized path NPATH of length NLEN is rooted in one of
++ the trusted system directories. The system_dirs entries carry a trailing
++ '/'; NPATH matches an entry when it shares the entry's leading component
++ sequence and then either ends or continues with '/'. For instance,
++ "/lib64" and "/lib64/x" match "/lib64/" but "/lib64x" does not. */
+ static bool
+-is_trusted_path_normalize (const char *path, size_t len)
++path_is_trusted (const char *npath, size_t nlen)
+ {
+- if (len == 0)
+- return false;
+-
+- char *npath = (char *) alloca (len + 2);
+- char *wnp = npath;
+- while (*path != '\0')
+- {
+- if (path[0] == '/')
+- {
+- if (path[1] == '.')
+- {
+- if (path[2] == '.' && (path[3] == '/' || path[3] == '\0'))
+- {
+- while (wnp > npath && *--wnp != '/')
+- ;
+- path += 3;
+- continue;
+- }
+- else if (path[2] == '/' || path[2] == '\0')
+- {
+- path += 2;
+- continue;
+- }
+- }
+-
+- if (wnp > npath && wnp[-1] == '/')
+- {
+- ++path;
+- continue;
+- }
+- }
+-
+- *wnp++ = *path++;
+- }
+-
+- if (wnp == npath || wnp[-1] != '/')
+- *wnp++ = '/';
+-
+ const char *trun = system_dirs;
+
+ for (size_t idx = 0; idx < nsystem_dirs_len; ++idx)
+ {
+- if (wnp - npath >= system_dirs_len[idx]
+- && memcmp (trun, npath, system_dirs_len[idx]) == 0)
+- /* Found it. */
++ /* Compare against the entry without its trailing '/'. */
++ size_t dirlen = system_dirs_len[idx] - 1;
++
++ if (nlen >= dirlen
++ && memcmp (trun, npath, dirlen) == 0
++ && (npath[dirlen] == '/' || npath[dirlen] == '\0'))
+ return true;
+
+ trun += system_dirs_len[idx] + 1;
+@@ -361,16 +332,21 @@ _dl_dst_substitute (struct link_map *l, const char *input, char *result)
+ checked for trust, the authors of the binaries themselves are
+ trusted to have designed this correctly. Only $ORIGIN is tested in
+ this way because it may be manipulated in some ways with hard
+- links. */
+- if (__glibc_unlikely (check_for_trusted)
+- && !is_trusted_path_normalize (result, wp - result))
+- {
+- *result = '\0';
+- return result;
+- }
++ links.
++
++ _dl_normalize_path replaces the expansion with its normalized form
++ in place, so that the path that is opened is exactly the path that
++ was validated. */
+
+ *wp = '\0';
+
++ if (__glibc_unlikely (check_for_trusted))
++ {
++ size_t nlen = _dl_normalize_path (result);
++ if (!path_is_trusted (result, nlen))
++ *result = '\0';
++ }
++
+ return result;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/elf/dl-path-normalize.h b/elf/dl-path-normalize.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..ca4b14698c
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/elf/dl-path-normalize.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
++/* In-place lexical path normalization for the dynamic loader.
++ Copyright (C) 2026 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
++ This file is part of the GNU C Library.
++
++ The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
++ License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
++ version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
++
++ The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
++ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
++ Lesser General Public License for more details.
++
++ You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
++ License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
++ <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
++
++#ifndef _DL_PATH_NORMALIZE_H
++#define _DL_PATH_NORMALIZE_H
++
++#include <stddef.h>
++#include <string.h>
++
++/* Lexically normalize the null-terminated PATH in place and return the
++ length of the result (excluding the terminating NUL byte):
++
++ - Runs of '/' are collapsed to a single '/'.
++
++ - "." components are removed.
++
++ - A ".." component removes the preceding component if there is one and it
++ is not itself a preserved "..". In an absolute path a surplus ".." at
++ the root is dropped ("/../a" normalizes to "/a"), in a relative path
++ leading ".." components are preserved ("../a" stays "../a", "a/../../b"
++ normalizes to "../b").
++
++ - The result has no trailing '/' except for the root path "/" itself
++ ("/a/" normalizes to "/a").
++
++ - The result is empty if and only if every component cancels or is removed
++ ("", ".", "a/.." all normalize to "").
++
++ The PATH is written in place, and the internal write cursor never runs
++ ahead of the read cursor. Only bytes within the strlen (PATH) + 1 storage
++ are accessed. */
++static inline size_t
++_dl_normalize_path (char *path)
++{
++ /* The root '/' of an absolute path is not removed. */
++ char *pstart = path + (path[0] == '/');
++ const char *rnp = pstart;
++ char *wnp = pstart;
++ /* End of the prefix a ".." may not remove. Either the root '/', or, for
++ relative paths, the original start of the string extended by any
++ preserved leading ".." components. */
++ char *limit = pstart;
++
++ while (*rnp != '\0')
++ {
++ /* Collapse consecutive separators. */
++ if (*rnp == '/')
++ {
++ ++rnp;
++ continue;
++ }
++
++ /* [RNP, REND) is the next input component. */
++ const char *rend = rnp;
++ while (*rend != '\0' && *rend != '/')
++ ++rend;
++ size_t clen = rend - rnp;
++
++ /* Drop '.' component. */
++ if (clen == 1 && rnp[0] == '.')
++ ;
++ else if (clen == 2 && rnp[0] == '.' && rnp[1] == '.')
++ {
++ if (wnp > limit)
++ {
++ /* Remove the last component along with the '/' separating it
++ from its predecessor (the root '/' of an absolute path is
++ retained). */
++ while (wnp > limit && wnp[-1] != '/')
++ --wnp;
++ if (wnp > pstart)
++ --wnp;
++ }
++ else if (pstart == path)
++ {
++ /* No component is left and the original path is relative:
++ keep the unresolvable ".." (it becomes part of the
++ preserved prefix). */
++ if (wnp > pstart)
++ *wnp++ = '/';
++ *wnp++ = '.';
++ *wnp++ = '.';
++ limit = wnp;
++ }
++ /* Otherwise the path is absolute and the surplus ".." at the
++ root is dropped ("/../a" normalizes to "/a"). */
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ if (wnp > pstart)
++ *wnp++ = '/';
++ memmove (wnp, rnp, clen);
++ wnp += clen;
++ }
++
++ rnp = rend;
++ }
++
++ *wnp = '\0';
++ return wnp - path;
++}
++
++#endif /* _DL_PATH_NORMALIZE_H */
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.39.bb b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.39.bb
index 09ac0fc53f..1598249b7b 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.39.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc_2.39.bb
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GLIBC_GIT_URI};branch=${SRCBRANCH};name=glibc \
file://0042-CVE-2026-8674.patch \
file://0047-CVE-2026-89092.patch \
file://0048-CVE-2026-97399.patch \
+ file://0049-CVE-2026-86805-CVE-2026-95818.patch \
"
S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
B = "${WORKDIR}/build-${TARGET_SYS}"
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 10/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-92389
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 09/19] glibc: patch CVE-2026-86805 and CVE-2026-95818 Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 11/19] curl: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2026-19931 Fabien Thomas
` (8 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Adarsh Jagadish Kamini <adarsh.jagadish.kamini@est.tech>
Backport patch to fix CVE-2026-92389.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92389
Upstream fix:
https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/63dd390fab905a239a97e270
Tested with ptest:
Before: PASSED: 857, FAILED: 0, SKIPPED: 0, ABORTED: 0
After: PASSED: 857, FAILED: 0, SKIPPED: 0, ABORTED: 0
Signed-off-by: Adarsh Jagadish Kamini <adarsh.jagadish.kamini@est.tech>
[bajau: fixed recipe files list]
Signed-off-by: Bastien Jauny <bastien.jauny@smile.fr>
---
.../curl/curl/CVE-2026-92389.patch | 60 +++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-92389.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-92389.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-92389.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..387cca9ee1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-92389.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+From a1705881527f7ee59606a61c4ba52e0737655571 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 23:46:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] tftp: verify direction in a few places
+
+Closes #22974
+
+Conflicts Resolved:
+
+Adaptation notes:
+- Upstream moved tftp_tx() above tftp_connect_for_tx(); kept 8.7.1 layout and added the upload check in tftp_tx().
+
+Assisted-by: kiro:claude-opus-5.5
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-92389
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/63dd390fab905a239a97e270]
+
+Signed-off-by: Adarsh Jagadish Kamini <adarsh.jagadish.kamini@est.tech>
+---
+ lib/tftp.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tftp.c b/lib/tftp.c
+index ff2b7b7457..371902c0d8 100644
+--- a/lib/tftp.c
++++ b/lib/tftp.c
+@@ -545,10 +545,14 @@ static CURLcode tftp_send_first(struct tftp_state_data *state,
+ break;
+
+ case TFTP_EVENT_ACK: /* Connected for transmit */
++ if(!data->state.upload)
++ return CURLE_TFTP_ILLEGAL;
+ result = tftp_connect_for_tx(state, event);
+ break;
+
+ case TFTP_EVENT_DATA: /* Connected for receive */
++ if(data->state.upload)
++ return CURLE_TFTP_ILLEGAL;
+ result = tftp_connect_for_rx(state, event);
+ break;
+
+@@ -709,6 +713,9 @@ static CURLcode tftp_tx(struct tftp_state_data *state, tftp_event_t event)
+ char *bufptr;
+ bool eos;
+
++ if(!data->state.upload)
++ return CURLE_TFTP_ILLEGAL;
++
+ switch(event) {
+
+ case TFTP_EVENT_ACK:
+@@ -1131,6 +1138,8 @@ static CURLcode tftp_receive_packet(struct Curl_easy *data)
+
+ switch(state->event) {
+ case TFTP_EVENT_DATA:
++ if(data->state.upload)
++ return CURLE_TFTP_ILLEGAL;
+ /* Don't pass to the client empty or retransmitted packets */
+ if(state->rbytes > 4 &&
+ (NEXT_BLOCKNUM(state->block) == getrpacketblock(&state->rpacket))) {
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
index ab33d4aa77..e08ca2f930 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.se/download/${BP}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2026-13608.patch \
file://CVE-2026-8286.patch \
file://CVE-2026-80230.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-92389.patch \
"
SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 11/19] curl: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2026-19931
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 10/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-92389 Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 12/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-18924 Fabien Thomas
` (7 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Darsh Kelaiya <dkelaiya@cisco.com>
Analysis:
- The advisory [1] names [2] as its fixed-in commit. It moves
connection maintenance to admin handles, preserving the identity
used by authentication reuse checks.
- Earlier, [4] added Negotiate/NTLM connection reuse checks,
including an SSPI ambient-user check using recent_conn_id.
Later, [5] removed that SSPI check; the other checks remain.
- Curl 8.7.1 predates [4]. Applying [2] alone would not reproduce
the later upstream behavior; a source fix needs backport analysis.
- The advisory describes Negotiate reuse with empty credentials and
lists curl 8.7.1 within the affected range [1].
- On Linux, this requires krb5 and negotiate-auth. Scarthgap enables
negotiate-auth but leaves krb5 disabled by default.
- Follow the merged GSS-API configuration check in [3]. Set
not-applicable-config if either option is absent; otherwise keep
unpatched while the source backport is deferred.
- Record the CVE as not-applicable-config unless both required
PACKAGECONFIG options are enabled; otherwise retain unpatched status.
The CVE_STATUS decision is conditional, not hardcoded.
Reference:
[1] https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2026-19931.html
[2] https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/7103a93b05bc69ea98ed9d05d02fa9eeba533f2f
[3] https://github.com/openembedded/openembedded-core/commit/93c410c455b92a2b1fe3b77347e57d02f344056b
[4] https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/1a17959fc7a80864c9c9b37097856bdb4a465cf8
[5] https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/1c58877705b172da892cb9c18c5edb572f2d1d73
Signed-off-by: Darsh Kelaiya <dkelaiya@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Bastien Jauny <bastien.jauny@smile.fr>
---
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
index e08ca2f930..4be96a6f7f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-8458] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'krb5 negotia
CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-9547] = "not-applicable-config: vulnerable libssh backend is not enabled by the recipe"
CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-82209] = "not-applicable-config: public suffix list support is disabled by the recipe with --without-libpsl"
CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-12064] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'libssh2', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: SCP/SFTP support is not enabled in PACKAGECONFIG', d)}"
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2026-19931] = "${@bb.utils.contains('PACKAGECONFIG', 'krb5 negotiate-auth', 'unpatched', 'not-applicable-config: GSS-API Negotiate is disabled', d)}"
inherit autotools pkgconfig binconfig multilib_header ptest
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 12/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-18924
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 11/19] curl: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2026-19931 Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 13/19] python3-urllib3: Fix CVE-2026-97687 Fabien Thomas
` (6 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Darsh Kelaiya <dkelaiya@cisco.com>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [2],
using the commit shown in [1].
Make accepted HTTP/2 push handles inherit their parent's share object.
Use the curl 8.7.1 share setter to retain its locking, reference
counting and shared-cache handling during cleanup.
Retain curl_easy_duphandle() instead of the later creation change in
[3]. In 8.7.1, duplication leaves the share and connection-cache
pointers NULL. The share setter increments its use count before the
push callback and multi addition; cleanup releases it. Share cleanup
is blocked while this reference remains. Keep the documented
inheritance of parent options.
[1] https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/90325ff0444cbdff368bda5d26d6405a0bb6ee43
[2] https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2026-18924.html
[3] https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/fad90b666df98c93ee165341b0c8101c7b10ad7b
Signed-off-by: Darsh Kelaiya <dkelaiya@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Bastien Jauny <bastien.jauny@smile.fr>
---
.../curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch | 56 +++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 57 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cf8a3a6290
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-18924.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From 90325ff0444cbdff368bda5d26d6405a0bb6ee43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:02:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] http2: make server push transfers inherit share from
+ parent
+
+Reported-by: Stephan Zeisberg
+Closes #22488
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-18924
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/90325ff0444cbdff368bda5d26d6405a0bb6ee43]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Use share.h because curl 8.7.1 does not have curl_share.h.
+- Use curl_easy_setopt(second, CURLOPT_SHARE, data->share)
+ instead of Curl_share_easy_link(), which is absent from curl 8.7.1.
+ The setter locks the share, updates its dirty counter and links
+ shared caches.
+- Retain curl_easy_duphandle() instead of the later curl_easy_init()
+ change in [1], preserving curl 8.7.1's documented push-option
+ inheritance. In 8.7.1, duplication leaves share and state.conn_cache
+ NULL. The share setter increments share->dirty before the push
+ callback and Curl_multi_add_perform(). Curl_close() drops the use
+ count on rejection or cleanup; curl_share_cleanup() refuses to free
+ a share still in use. The share lifetime fix therefore does not
+ require the later handle-creation change.
+
+[1] https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/fad90b666df98c93ee165341b0c8101c7b10ad7b
+
+(cherry picked from commit 90325ff0444cbdff368bda5d26d6405a0bb6ee43)
+Signed-off-by: Darsh Kelaiya <dkelaiya@cisco.com>
+---
+ lib/http2.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/http2.c b/lib/http2.c
+index 99d7f3b0e2..694900fd8c 100644
+--- a/lib/http2.c
++++ b/lib/http2.c
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
+ #include "transfer.h"
+ #include "dynbuf.h"
+ #include "headers.h"
++#include "share.h"
+ /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */
+ #include "curl_printf.h"
+ #include "curl_memory.h"
+@@ -776,6 +777,8 @@ static struct Curl_easy *h2_duphandle(struct Curl_cfilter *cf,
+ second->req.p.http = http;
+ http2_data_setup(cf, second, &second_stream);
+ second->state.priority.weight = data->state.priority.weight;
++ if(data->share)
++ (void)curl_easy_setopt(second, CURLOPT_SHARE, data->share);
+ }
+ }
+ return second;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
index 4be96a6f7f..ab784b4d73 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.se/download/${BP}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2026-8286.patch \
file://CVE-2026-80230.patch \
file://CVE-2026-92389.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-18924.patch \
"
SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 13/19] python3-urllib3: Fix CVE-2026-97687
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 12/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-18924 Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 14/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-86409 Fabien Thomas
` (5 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Yogita Urade <yurade@cisco.com>
This patch applies the upstream fix as referenced in [3],
using the commit shown in [1] and [2].
[1]
https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/b6447295fff7b38fdffc67e0df9712d60cef3cc3
[2]
https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/07408cec79d1856d81bb42c74a904a24fdb9e465
[3] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97687
Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yurade@cisco.com>
[bajau: fixed SRC_URI indentation in the recipe file]
Signed-off-by: Bastien Jauny <bastien.jauny@smile.fr>
---
.../python3-urllib3/CVE-2026-97687_p1.patch | 285 +++++++++++
.../python3-urllib3/CVE-2026-97687_p2.patch | 482 ++++++++++++++++++
.../python/python3-urllib3_2.2.2.bb | 2 +
3 files changed, 769 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2026-97687_p1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2026-97687_p2.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2026-97687_p1.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2026-97687_p1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..241be4adaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2026-97687_p1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+From b6447295fff7b38fdffc67e0df9712d60cef3cc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dustin Hoeppner <dhoepp@me.com>
+Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 08:27:08 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix `proxy_ssl_context` ignored for HTTPS forwarding proxies
+ (#3786)
+
+Co-authored-by: Illia Volochii <illia.volochii@gmail.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-97687
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/b6447295fff7b38fdffc67e0df9712d60cef3cc3]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- Shifted the upstream policy-selection block to the target method's
+ indentation so this intermediate patch applies and compiles.
+
+Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yurade@cisco.com>
+---
+ changelog/2577.bugfix.rst | 2 +
+ src/urllib3/connection.py | 16 +-
+ src/urllib3/poolmanager.py | 15 ++
+ .../test_proxy_poolmanager.py | 149 ++++++++++++++++--
+ 4 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 changelog/2577.bugfix.rst
+
+diff --git a/changelog/2577.bugfix.rst b/changelog/2577.bugfix.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..57d7f1f
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/changelog/2577.bugfix.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
++Fixed usage of ``proxy_ssl_context`` with ``ProxyManager`` when ``use_forwarding_for_https=True``.
++Passing ``ssl_context`` instead of ``proxy_ssl_context`` for HTTPS proxies in this configuration now emits a ``FutureWarning`` and will raise an error in v3.0.
+diff --git a/src/urllib3/connection.py b/src/urllib3/connection.py
+index 1b16279..b9760c6 100644
+--- a/src/urllib3/connection.py
++++ b/src/urllib3/connection.py
+@@ -649,6 +649,20 @@ class HTTPSConnection(HTTPConnection):
+ # Remove trailing '.' from fqdn hostnames to allow certificate validation
+ server_hostname_rm_dot = server_hostname.rstrip(".")
+
++ # Forwarding proxies should use proxy SSL context for
++ # wrapping since that's the connection being established,
++ # whereas tunneling proxies should use the connection's SSL
++ # context.
++ # However, for backwards compatibility reasons, if the proxy
++ # is forwarding but no proxy SSL context is provided, we
++ # fall back to using the connection's SSL context until
++ # urllib3 v3.0. Appropriate warning is emitted in
++ # ``ProxyManager.__init__``.
++ if self.proxy_is_forwarding and self.proxy_config is not None:
++ ssl_context = self.proxy_config.ssl_context
++ else:
++ ssl_context = self.ssl_context
++
+ sock_and_verified = _ssl_wrap_socket_and_match_hostname(
+ sock=sock,
+ cert_reqs=self.cert_reqs,
+@@ -662,7 +676,7 @@ class HTTPSConnection(HTTPConnection):
+ key_file=self.key_file,
+ key_password=self.key_password,
+ server_hostname=server_hostname_rm_dot,
+- ssl_context=self.ssl_context,
++ ssl_context=ssl_context,
+ tls_in_tls=tls_in_tls,
+ assert_hostname=self.assert_hostname,
+ assert_fingerprint=self.assert_fingerprint,
+diff --git a/src/urllib3/poolmanager.py b/src/urllib3/poolmanager.py
+index 5763fea..290cfe1 100644
+--- a/src/urllib3/poolmanager.py
++++ b/src/urllib3/poolmanager.py
+@@ -581,6 +581,21 @@ class ProxyManager(PoolManager):
+ if proxy.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
+ raise ProxySchemeUnknown(proxy.scheme)
+
++ if (
++ use_forwarding_for_https
++ and proxy.scheme == "https"
++ and connection_pool_kw.get("ssl_context") is not None
++ ):
++ warnings.warn(
++ "Passing ssl_context when use_forwarding_for_https=True is deprecated "
++ "and will raise an error in urllib3 v3.0. "
++ "Use proxy_ssl_context to configure the TLS connection to the proxy.",
++ FutureWarning,
++ stacklevel=2,
++ )
++ if proxy_ssl_context is None:
++ proxy_ssl_context = connection_pool_kw.get("ssl_context")
++
+ if not proxy.port:
+ port = port_by_scheme.get(proxy.scheme, 80)
+ proxy = proxy._replace(port=port)
+diff --git a/test/with_dummyserver/test_proxy_poolmanager.py b/test/with_dummyserver/test_proxy_poolmanager.py
+index a0b1172..f116b41 100644
+--- a/test/with_dummyserver/test_proxy_poolmanager.py
++++ b/test/with_dummyserver/test_proxy_poolmanager.py
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import shutil
+ import socket
+ import ssl
+ import tempfile
++import typing
+ from test import LONG_TIMEOUT, SHORT_TIMEOUT, resolvesLocalhostFQDN, withPyOpenSSL
+ from test.conftest import ServerConfig
+
+@@ -24,7 +25,7 @@ from dummyserver.testcase import (
+ )
+ from urllib3 import HTTPResponse
+ from urllib3._collections import HTTPHeaderDict
+-from urllib3.connection import VerifiedHTTPSConnection
++from urllib3.connection import HTTPSConnection, VerifiedHTTPSConnection
+ from urllib3.connectionpool import connection_from_url
+ from urllib3.exceptions import (
+ ConnectTimeoutError,
+@@ -165,6 +166,43 @@ class TestHTTPProxyManager(HypercornDummyProxyTestCase):
+ r = https.request("GET", f"{self.https_url}/")
+ assert r.status == 200
+
++ @requires_network()
++ @pytest.mark.parametrize(
++ "proxy_ssl_context_kw",
++ [
++ ("ssl_context",),
++ ("proxy_ssl_context",),
++ ("ssl_context", "proxy_ssl_context"),
++ ],
++ )
++ def test_https_proxy_forwarding_for_https_with_custom_context(
++ self, proxy_ssl_context_kw: tuple[str, ...]
++ ) -> None:
++ """
++ Test that an HTTP request succeeds when using a forwarding HTTPS
++ proxy with an SSL context provided via either
++ ``proxy_ssl_context``, ``ssl_context`` (fallback), or both.
++ """
++
++ proxy_ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
++ proxy_ctx.load_verify_locations(DEFAULT_CA)
++
++ warning_checker: contextlib.AbstractContextManager[typing.Any]
++ if "ssl_context" in proxy_ssl_context_kw:
++ warning_checker = pytest.warns(FutureWarning, match="ssl_context")
++ else:
++ warning_checker = contextlib.nullcontext()
++ with warning_checker:
++ proxy = proxy_from_url(
++ self.https_proxy_url,
++ **{kw: proxy_ctx for kw in proxy_ssl_context_kw},
++ use_forwarding_for_https=True,
++ )
++
++ with proxy:
++ resp = proxy.request("GET", self.https_url)
++ assert resp.status == 200
++
+ def test_nagle_proxy(self) -> None:
+ """Test that proxy connections do not have TCP_NODELAY turned on"""
+ with ProxyManager(self.proxy_url) as http:
+@@ -708,20 +746,8 @@ class TestHTTPProxyManager(HypercornDummyProxyTestCase):
+ # see https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/103472
+ @pytest.mark.filterwarnings("default::ResourceWarning")
+ @requires_network()
+- @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+- ["proxy_scheme", "use_forwarding_for_https"],
+- [
+- ("http", False),
+- ("https", False),
+- ("https", True),
+- ],
+- )
+- def test_proxy_https_target_tls_error(
+- self, proxy_scheme: str, use_forwarding_for_https: str
+- ) -> None:
+- if proxy_scheme == "https" and use_forwarding_for_https:
+- pytest.skip("Test is expected to fail due to urllib3/urllib3#2577")
+-
++ @pytest.mark.parametrize("proxy_scheme", ["http", "https"])
++ def test_proxy_https_target_tls_error(self, proxy_scheme: str) -> None:
+ proxy_url = self.https_proxy_url if proxy_scheme == "https" else self.proxy_url
+ proxy_ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
+ proxy_ctx.load_verify_locations(DEFAULT_CA)
+@@ -731,12 +757,103 @@ class TestHTTPProxyManager(HypercornDummyProxyTestCase):
+ proxy_url,
+ proxy_ssl_context=proxy_ctx,
+ ssl_context=ctx,
+- use_forwarding_for_https=use_forwarding_for_https,
+ ) as proxy:
+ with pytest.raises(MaxRetryError) as e:
+ proxy.request("GET", self.https_url)
+ assert isinstance(e.value.reason, SSLError)
+
++ @requires_network()
++ def test_forwarding_proxy_tls_error_with_fallback(self) -> None:
++ """
++ Test that when only ``ssl_context`` is passed to a forwarding
++ HTTPS proxy, a ``FutureWarning`` is emitted and if the TLS
++ handshake with the proxy fails using that context, the error is
++ a ``ProxyError`` wrapping the original TLS error.
++ """
++ ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
++
++ with pytest.warns(FutureWarning, match="ssl_context"):
++ proxy = proxy_from_url(
++ self.https_proxy_url,
++ ssl_context=ctx,
++ use_forwarding_for_https=True,
++ )
++
++ with proxy:
++ with pytest.raises(MaxRetryError) as e:
++ proxy.request("GET", self.https_url)
++ assert isinstance(e.value.reason, ProxyError)
++ assert isinstance(e.value.reason.original_error, SSLError)
++
++ @requires_network()
++ def test_forwarding_proxy_ssl_context_precedence(self) -> None:
++ """
++ Test that when both ``ssl_context`` and ``proxy_ssl_context``
++ are passed to a forwarding HTTPS proxy, ``proxy_ssl_context`` is
++ used for the proxy connection and ``ssl_context`` is ignored
++ (with a warning).
++ """
++ ssl_context = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=DEFAULT_CA)
++ proxy_ssl_context = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=DEFAULT_CA)
++
++ with pytest.warns(FutureWarning, match="ssl_context"):
++ proxy = proxy_from_url(
++ self.https_proxy_url,
++ proxy_ssl_context=proxy_ssl_context,
++ ssl_context=ssl_context,
++ use_forwarding_for_https=True,
++ )
++
++ with proxy:
++ pool = proxy.connection_from_url(self.https_url)
++ with contextlib.closing(pool._new_conn()) as conn:
++ conn = typing.cast(HTTPSConnection, conn)
++ conn.connect()
++ assert isinstance(conn.sock, ssl.SSLSocket)
++ assert conn.sock.context is proxy_ssl_context
++
++ @requires_network()
++ def test_forwarding_proxy_ssl_context_fallback(self) -> None:
++ """
++ Test that when only ``ssl_context`` is passed to a forwarding
++ HTTPS proxy, a ``FutureWarning`` is emitted and ``ssl_context``
++ is used as the proxy TLS context (fallback).
++ """
++ ssl_context = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=DEFAULT_CA)
++
++ with pytest.warns(FutureWarning, match="ssl_context"):
++ proxy = proxy_from_url(
++ self.https_proxy_url,
++ ssl_context=ssl_context,
++ use_forwarding_for_https=True,
++ )
++
++ with proxy:
++ pool = proxy.connection_from_url(self.https_url)
++ with contextlib.closing(pool._new_conn()) as conn:
++ conn = typing.cast(HTTPSConnection, conn)
++ conn.connect()
++ assert isinstance(conn.sock, ssl.SSLSocket)
++ assert conn.sock.context is ssl_context
++
++ @requires_network()
++ def test_forwarding_non_https_proxy_ssl_context_fallback(self) -> None:
++ """
++ Test that when only ``ssl_context`` is passed to a forwarding
++ non-HTTPS proxy, no warning or error is emitted.
++ """
++ ssl_context = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=DEFAULT_CA)
++ # No warning/error should be emitted even when ``ssl_context``
++ # is provided to a non-HTTPS proxy for some reason.
++ proxy = proxy_from_url(
++ self.proxy_url,
++ ssl_context=ssl_context,
++ use_forwarding_for_https=True,
++ )
++ with proxy:
++ resp = proxy.request("GET", self.https_url)
++ assert resp.status == 200
++
+ # stdlib http.client.HTTPConnection._tunnel() causes a ResourceWarning
+ # see https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/103472
+ @pytest.mark.filterwarnings("default::ResourceWarning")
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2026-97687_p2.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2026-97687_p2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5824a5664b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3/CVE-2026-97687_p2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+From 07408cec79d1856d81bb42c74a904a24fdb9e465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrey Petrov <andrey.petrov@shazow.net>
+Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2026 18:20:36 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Isolate HTTPS proxy TLS settings from target TLS (#5093)
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-97687
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/07408cec79d1856d81bb42c74a904a24fdb9e465]
+
+Backport Changes:
+- The upstream connection.py hunk conflicted because Scarthgap's
+ urllib3 2.2.2 lacks the newer HTTP/2 connection-probe structure.
+ Ported the proxy-only TLS policy through the existing
+ HTTPSConnection.connect() and _connect_tls_proxy() paths.
+- Adapted proxy-context tests for Scarthgap's API: create_urllib3_context()
+ has no verify_flags keyword, so tests set verify_flags on the returned
+ SSLContext. Tests distinguish target CERT_REQUIRED and proxy CERT_NONE,
+ assert that the proxy context is unchanged, and check the fallback policy
+ with pool cert_reqs/ca_certs.
+
+Signed-off-by: Yogita Urade <yurade@cisco.com>
+---
+ changelog/5093.bugfix.rst | 7 +
+ src/urllib3/connection.py | 102 +++++++-----
+ src/urllib3/poolmanager.py | 8 +-
+ .../test_proxy_poolmanager.py | 159 +++++++++++++++++-
+ 4 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 changelog/5093.bugfix.rst
+
+diff --git a/changelog/5093.bugfix.rst b/changelog/5093.bugfix.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f64ad4a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/changelog/5093.bugfix.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
++Fixed ``HTTPSConnection.connect()`` overriding
++``ProxyConfig.ssl_context``'s certificate policy and proxy identity checks with
++the target connection's TLS settings when forwarding through an HTTPS proxy.
++
++``HTTPSConnection`` no longer applies target SNI, assertions, or client
++credentials to forwarding proxy handshakes and continues to use its
++``ssl_context`` as a fallback when an HTTPS proxy forwards an HTTP target.
+diff --git a/src/urllib3/connection.py b/src/urllib3/connection.py
+index b9760c6..e69bfb1 100644
+--- a/src/urllib3/connection.py
++++ b/src/urllib3/connection.py
+@@ -649,39 +649,34 @@ class HTTPSConnection(HTTPConnection):
+ # Remove trailing '.' from fqdn hostnames to allow certificate validation
+ server_hostname_rm_dot = server_hostname.rstrip(".")
+
+- # Forwarding proxies should use proxy SSL context for
+- # wrapping since that's the connection being established,
+- # whereas tunneling proxies should use the connection's SSL
+- # context.
+- # However, for backwards compatibility reasons, if the proxy
+- # is forwarding but no proxy SSL context is provided, we
+- # fall back to using the connection's SSL context until
+- # urllib3 v3.0. Appropriate warning is emitted in
+- # ``ProxyManager.__init__``.
++ # Forwarding proxies should establish TLS using proxy-specific policy.
++ # For tunneling proxies, the target connection uses its own TLS policy.
++ wrapped_socket: ssl.SSLSocket | SSLTransport
+ if self.proxy_is_forwarding and self.proxy_config is not None:
+- ssl_context = self.proxy_config.ssl_context
++ wrapped_socket = self._connect_tls_proxy(self.host, sock)
++ is_verified = self.proxy_is_verified is True
+ else:
+- ssl_context = self.ssl_context
+-
+- sock_and_verified = _ssl_wrap_socket_and_match_hostname(
+- sock=sock,
+- cert_reqs=self.cert_reqs,
+- ssl_version=self.ssl_version,
+- ssl_minimum_version=self.ssl_minimum_version,
+- ssl_maximum_version=self.ssl_maximum_version,
+- ca_certs=self.ca_certs,
+- ca_cert_dir=self.ca_cert_dir,
+- ca_cert_data=self.ca_cert_data,
+- cert_file=self.cert_file,
+- key_file=self.key_file,
+- key_password=self.key_password,
+- server_hostname=server_hostname_rm_dot,
+- ssl_context=ssl_context,
+- tls_in_tls=tls_in_tls,
+- assert_hostname=self.assert_hostname,
+- assert_fingerprint=self.assert_fingerprint,
+- )
+- self.sock = sock_and_verified.socket
++ sock_and_verified = _ssl_wrap_socket_and_match_hostname(
++ sock=sock,
++ cert_reqs=self.cert_reqs,
++ ssl_version=self.ssl_version,
++ ssl_minimum_version=self.ssl_minimum_version,
++ ssl_maximum_version=self.ssl_maximum_version,
++ ca_certs=self.ca_certs,
++ ca_cert_dir=self.ca_cert_dir,
++ ca_cert_data=self.ca_cert_data,
++ cert_file=self.cert_file,
++ key_file=self.key_file,
++ key_password=self.key_password,
++ server_hostname=server_hostname_rm_dot,
++ ssl_context=self.ssl_context,
++ tls_in_tls=tls_in_tls,
++ assert_hostname=self.assert_hostname,
++ assert_fingerprint=self.assert_fingerprint,
++ )
++ wrapped_socket = sock_and_verified.socket
++ is_verified = sock_and_verified.is_verified
++ self.sock = wrapped_socket
+
+ # Forwarding proxies can never have a verified target since
+ # the proxy is the one doing the verification. Should instead
+@@ -690,7 +685,7 @@ class HTTPSConnection(HTTPConnection):
+ if self.proxy_is_forwarding:
+ self.is_verified = False
+ else:
+- self.is_verified = sock_and_verified.is_verified
++ self.is_verified = is_verified
+
+ # If there's a proxy to be connected to we are fully connected.
+ # This is set twice (once above and here) due to forwarding proxies
+@@ -700,24 +695,47 @@ class HTTPSConnection(HTTPConnection):
+ # Set `self.proxy_is_verified` unless it's already set while
+ # establishing a tunnel.
+ if self._has_connected_to_proxy and self.proxy_is_verified is None:
+- self.proxy_is_verified = sock_and_verified.is_verified
++ self.proxy_is_verified = is_verified
+
+ def _connect_tls_proxy(self, hostname: str, sock: socket.socket) -> ssl.SSLSocket:
+ """
+ Establish a TLS connection to the proxy using the provided SSL context.
+ """
+- # `_connect_tls_proxy` is called when self._tunnel_host is truthy.
+ proxy_config = typing.cast(ProxyConfig, self.proxy_config)
+- ssl_context = proxy_config.ssl_context
++ proxy_ssl_context = proxy_config.ssl_context
++
++ ssl_context: ssl.SSLContext | None
++ cert_reqs: int | str | None
++ if proxy_ssl_context is not None:
++ # Prefer the proxy's cert policy for the proxy connection
++ ssl_context = proxy_ssl_context
++ cert_reqs = proxy_ssl_context.verify_mode
++ ca_certs = None
++ ca_cert_dir = None
++ ca_cert_data = None
++ ssl_version = None
++ ssl_minimum_version = None
++ ssl_maximum_version = None
++ else:
++ # Otherwise we inherit the pool's cert policies
++ ssl_context = self.ssl_context if self.proxy_is_forwarding else None
++ cert_reqs = self.cert_reqs
++ ca_certs = self.ca_certs
++ ca_cert_dir = self.ca_cert_dir
++ ca_cert_data = self.ca_cert_data
++ ssl_version = self.ssl_version
++ ssl_minimum_version = self.ssl_minimum_version
++ ssl_maximum_version = self.ssl_maximum_version
++
+ sock_and_verified = _ssl_wrap_socket_and_match_hostname(
+ sock,
+- cert_reqs=self.cert_reqs,
+- ssl_version=self.ssl_version,
+- ssl_minimum_version=self.ssl_minimum_version,
+- ssl_maximum_version=self.ssl_maximum_version,
+- ca_certs=self.ca_certs,
+- ca_cert_dir=self.ca_cert_dir,
+- ca_cert_data=self.ca_cert_data,
++ cert_reqs=cert_reqs,
++ ssl_version=ssl_version,
++ ssl_minimum_version=ssl_minimum_version,
++ ssl_maximum_version=ssl_maximum_version,
++ ca_certs=ca_certs,
++ ca_cert_dir=ca_cert_dir,
++ ca_cert_data=ca_cert_data,
+ server_hostname=hostname,
+ ssl_context=ssl_context,
+ assert_hostname=proxy_config.assert_hostname,
+diff --git a/src/urllib3/poolmanager.py b/src/urllib3/poolmanager.py
+index 290cfe1..1cf0167 100644
+--- a/src/urllib3/poolmanager.py
++++ b/src/urllib3/poolmanager.py
+@@ -581,6 +581,9 @@ class ProxyManager(PoolManager):
+ if proxy.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
+ raise ProxySchemeUnknown(proxy.scheme)
+
++ # Keep the deprecated ssl_context fallback on the manager for
++ # compatibility, while passing only explicit proxy policy to connections.
++ self.proxy_ssl_context = proxy_ssl_context
+ if (
+ use_forwarding_for_https
+ and proxy.scheme == "https"
+@@ -593,8 +596,8 @@ class ProxyManager(PoolManager):
+ FutureWarning,
+ stacklevel=2,
+ )
+- if proxy_ssl_context is None:
+- proxy_ssl_context = connection_pool_kw.get("ssl_context")
++ if self.proxy_ssl_context is None:
++ self.proxy_ssl_context = connection_pool_kw.get("ssl_context")
+
+ if not proxy.port:
+ port = port_by_scheme.get(proxy.scheme, 80)
+@@ -602,7 +605,6 @@ class ProxyManager(PoolManager):
+
+ self.proxy = proxy
+ self.proxy_headers = proxy_headers or {}
+- self.proxy_ssl_context = proxy_ssl_context
+ self.proxy_config = ProxyConfig(
+ proxy_ssl_context,
+ use_forwarding_for_https,
+diff --git a/test/with_dummyserver/test_proxy_poolmanager.py b/test/with_dummyserver/test_proxy_poolmanager.py
+index f116b41..6dbae5f 100644
+--- a/test/with_dummyserver/test_proxy_poolmanager.py
++++ b/test/with_dummyserver/test_proxy_poolmanager.py
+@@ -113,6 +113,13 @@ class TestHTTPProxyManager(HypercornDummyProxyTestCase):
+ assert r.status == 200
+ assert_is_verified(https, proxy=True, target=False)
+
++ def test_is_verified_https_proxy_to_http_target_without_proxy_config(self) -> None:
++ with proxy_from_url(self.https_proxy_url, ca_certs=DEFAULT_CA) as https:
++ https.connection_pool_kw["_proxy_config"] = None
++ r = https.request("GET", f"{self.http_url}/")
++ assert r.status == 200
++ assert_is_verified(https, proxy=True, target=False)
++
+ def test_is_verified_https_proxy_to_https_target(self) -> None:
+ with proxy_from_url(self.https_proxy_url, ca_certs=DEFAULT_CA) as https:
+ r = https.request("GET", f"{self.https_url}/")
+@@ -143,6 +150,18 @@ class TestHTTPProxyManager(HypercornDummyProxyTestCase):
+ r = https.request("GET", f"{self.http_url}/")
+ assert r.status == 200
+
++ @withPyOpenSSL
++ def test_https_proxy_with_proxy_ssl_context_pyopenssl(self) -> None:
++ proxy_ssl_context = create_urllib3_context()
++ proxy_ssl_context.load_verify_locations(DEFAULT_CA)
++
++ with proxy_from_url(
++ self.https_proxy_url,
++ proxy_ssl_context=proxy_ssl_context,
++ ) as https:
++ response = https.request("GET", f"{self.http_url}/")
++ assert response.status == 200
++
+ @withPyOpenSSL
+ def test_https_proxy_pyopenssl_not_supported(self) -> None:
+ with proxy_from_url(self.https_proxy_url, ca_certs=DEFAULT_CA) as https:
+@@ -793,8 +812,8 @@ class TestHTTPProxyManager(HypercornDummyProxyTestCase):
+ used for the proxy connection and ``ssl_context`` is ignored
+ (with a warning).
+ """
+- ssl_context = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=DEFAULT_CA)
+- proxy_ssl_context = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=DEFAULT_CA)
++ ssl_context = create_urllib3_context(cert_reqs=ssl.CERT_REQUIRED)
++ proxy_ssl_context = create_urllib3_context(cert_reqs=ssl.CERT_NONE)
+
+ with pytest.warns(FutureWarning, match="ssl_context"):
+ proxy = proxy_from_url(
+@@ -811,6 +830,7 @@ class TestHTTPProxyManager(HypercornDummyProxyTestCase):
+ conn.connect()
+ assert isinstance(conn.sock, ssl.SSLSocket)
+ assert conn.sock.context is proxy_ssl_context
++ assert proxy_ssl_context.verify_mode == ssl.CERT_NONE
+
+ @requires_network()
+ def test_forwarding_proxy_ssl_context_fallback(self) -> None:
+@@ -819,15 +839,21 @@ class TestHTTPProxyManager(HypercornDummyProxyTestCase):
+ HTTPS proxy, a ``FutureWarning`` is emitted and ``ssl_context``
+ is used as the proxy TLS context (fallback).
+ """
+- ssl_context = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=DEFAULT_CA)
++ ssl_context = create_urllib3_context(cert_reqs=ssl.CERT_NONE)
+
+ with pytest.warns(FutureWarning, match="ssl_context"):
+ proxy = proxy_from_url(
+ self.https_proxy_url,
+ ssl_context=ssl_context,
++ cert_reqs=ssl.CERT_REQUIRED,
++ ca_certs=DEFAULT_CA,
+ use_forwarding_for_https=True,
+ )
+
++ assert proxy.proxy_ssl_context is ssl_context
++ assert proxy.proxy_config is not None
++ assert proxy.proxy_config.ssl_context is None
++
+ with proxy:
+ pool = proxy.connection_from_url(self.https_url)
+ with contextlib.closing(pool._new_conn()) as conn:
+@@ -835,6 +861,23 @@ class TestHTTPProxyManager(HypercornDummyProxyTestCase):
+ conn.connect()
+ assert isinstance(conn.sock, ssl.SSLSocket)
+ assert conn.sock.context is ssl_context
++ assert ssl_context.verify_mode == ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
++
++ @requires_network()
++ def test_https_proxy_to_http_target_ssl_context_fallback(self) -> None:
++ ssl_context = create_urllib3_context()
++ ssl_context.load_verify_locations(DEFAULT_CA)
++
++ with proxy_from_url(
++ self.https_proxy_url,
++ ssl_context=ssl_context,
++ ) as proxy:
++ pool = proxy.connection_from_url(self.http_url)
++ with contextlib.closing(pool._new_conn()) as conn:
++ conn = typing.cast(HTTPSConnection, conn)
++ conn.connect()
++ assert isinstance(conn.sock, ssl.SSLSocket)
++ assert conn.sock.context is ssl_context
+
+ @requires_network()
+ def test_forwarding_non_https_proxy_ssl_context_fallback(self) -> None:
+@@ -946,10 +989,14 @@ class TestHTTPSProxyVerification:
+ proxy_url = f"https://{proxy.host}:{proxy.port}"
+ destination_url = f"https://{server.host}:{server.port}"
+
++ proxy_ctx = urllib3.util.ssl_.create_urllib3_context()
++ proxy_ctx.verify_flags = 0
++ proxy_ctx.load_verify_locations(proxy.ca_certs)
+ proxy_fingerprint = self._get_proxy_fingerprint_md5(proxy.ca_certs)
+ with proxy_from_url(
+ proxy_url,
+- ca_certs=proxy.ca_certs,
++ ca_certs=server.ca_certs,
++ proxy_ssl_context=proxy_ctx,
+ proxy_assert_fingerprint=proxy_fingerprint,
+ ) as https:
+ https.request("GET", destination_url)
+@@ -957,21 +1004,29 @@ class TestHTTPSProxyVerification:
+ # stdlib http.client.HTTPConnection._tunnel() causes a ResourceWarning
+ # see https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/103472
+ @pytest.mark.filterwarnings("default::ResourceWarning")
++ @pytest.mark.parametrize("use_forwarding_for_https", [False, True])
+ def test_https_proxy_assert_fingerprint_md5_non_matching(
+- self, no_san_proxy_with_server: tuple[ServerConfig, ServerConfig]
++ self,
++ no_san_proxy_with_server: tuple[ServerConfig, ServerConfig],
++ use_forwarding_for_https: bool,
+ ) -> None:
+ proxy, server = no_san_proxy_with_server
+ proxy_url = f"https://{proxy.host}:{proxy.port}"
+ destination_url = f"https://{server.host}:{server.port}"
+
++ proxy_ctx = urllib3.util.ssl_.create_urllib3_context()
++ proxy_ctx.verify_flags = 0
++ proxy_ctx.load_verify_locations(proxy.ca_certs)
+ proxy_fingerprint = self._get_proxy_fingerprint_md5(proxy.ca_certs)
+ new_char = "b" if proxy_fingerprint[5] == "a" else "a"
+ proxy_fingerprint = proxy_fingerprint[:5] + new_char + proxy_fingerprint[6:]
+
+ with proxy_from_url(
+ proxy_url,
+- ca_certs=proxy.ca_certs,
++ ca_certs=server.ca_certs,
++ proxy_ssl_context=proxy_ctx,
+ proxy_assert_fingerprint=proxy_fingerprint,
++ use_forwarding_for_https=use_forwarding_for_https,
+ ) as https:
+ with pytest.raises(MaxRetryError) as e:
+ https.request("GET", destination_url)
+@@ -995,8 +1050,11 @@ class TestHTTPSProxyVerification:
+ # stdlib http.client.HTTPConnection._tunnel() causes a ResourceWarning
+ # see https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/103472
+ @pytest.mark.filterwarnings("default::ResourceWarning")
++ @pytest.mark.parametrize("use_forwarding_for_https", [False, True])
+ def test_https_proxy_assert_hostname_non_matching(
+- self, san_proxy_with_server: tuple[ServerConfig, ServerConfig]
++ self,
++ san_proxy_with_server: tuple[ServerConfig, ServerConfig],
++ use_forwarding_for_https: bool,
+ ) -> None:
+ proxy, server = san_proxy_with_server
+ destination_url = f"https://{server.host}:{server.port}"
+@@ -1006,6 +1065,7 @@ class TestHTTPSProxyVerification:
+ proxy.base_url,
+ ca_certs=proxy.ca_certs,
+ proxy_assert_hostname=proxy_hostname,
++ use_forwarding_for_https=use_forwarding_for_https,
+ ) as https:
+ with pytest.raises(MaxRetryError) as e:
+ https.request("GET", destination_url)
+@@ -1099,7 +1159,9 @@ class TestHTTPSProxyVerification:
+ proxy_url = f"https://{proxy.host}:{proxy.port}"
+ destination_url = f"https://{server.host}:{server.port}"
+
+- proxy_ctx = urllib3.util.ssl_.create_urllib3_context()
++ proxy_ctx = urllib3.util.ssl_.create_urllib3_context()
++ proxy_ctx.verify_flags = 0
++ proxy_ctx.load_verify_locations(proxy.ca_certs)
+ try:
+ proxy_ctx.hostname_checks_common_name = True
+ # PyPy doesn't like us setting 'hostname_checks_common_name'
+@@ -1110,6 +1172,86 @@ class TestHTTPSProxyVerification:
+ pytest.skip("Test requires 'SSLContext.hostname_checks_common_name=True'")
+
+ with proxy_from_url(
+- proxy_url, ca_certs=proxy.ca_certs, proxy_ssl_context=proxy_ctx
++ proxy_url, ca_certs=server.ca_certs, proxy_ssl_context=proxy_ctx
+ ) as https:
+ https.request("GET", destination_url)
++
++ @pytest.mark.parametrize(
++ "target_tls_kwargs",
++ [
++ pytest.param({"server_hostname": "example.com"}, id="server-hostname"),
++ pytest.param({"assert_hostname": "example.com"}, id="assert-hostname"),
++ pytest.param({"assert_fingerprint": "00" * 32}, id="assert-fingerprint"),
++ ],
++ )
++ def test_https_proxy_forwarding_ignores_target_identity_settings(
++ self,
++ san_proxy_with_server: tuple[ServerConfig, ServerConfig],
++ target_tls_kwargs: dict[str, typing.Any],
++ ) -> None:
++ proxy, server = san_proxy_with_server
++ proxy_ctx = create_urllib3_context()
++ proxy_ctx.load_verify_locations(proxy.ca_certs)
++
++ with proxy_from_url(
++ proxy.base_url,
++ proxy_ssl_context=proxy_ctx,
++ proxy_assert_hostname=proxy.host,
++ use_forwarding_for_https=True,
++ **target_tls_kwargs,
++ ) as https:
++ pool = https.connection_from_url(server.base_url)
++ with contextlib.closing(pool._new_conn()) as conn:
++ conn = typing.cast(HTTPSConnection, conn)
++ conn.connect()
++ assert isinstance(conn.sock, ssl.SSLSocket)
++ assert conn.sock.context is proxy_ctx
++
++ def test_https_proxy_forwarding_ignores_target_client_certificate(
++ self,
++ san_proxy_with_server: tuple[ServerConfig, ServerConfig],
++ ) -> None:
++ proxy, server = san_proxy_with_server
++ proxy_ctx = create_urllib3_context()
++ proxy_ctx.load_verify_locations(proxy.ca_certs)
++ missing_cert = str(pathlib.Path(proxy.ca_certs).with_name("missing-cert.pem"))
++
++ with proxy_from_url(
++ proxy.base_url,
++ proxy_ssl_context=proxy_ctx,
++ cert_file=missing_cert,
++ use_forwarding_for_https=True,
++ ) as https:
++ pool = https.connection_from_url(server.base_url)
++ with contextlib.closing(pool._new_conn()) as conn:
++ conn = typing.cast(HTTPSConnection, conn)
++ conn.connect()
++ assert isinstance(conn.sock, ssl.SSLSocket)
++ assert conn.sock.context is proxy_ctx
++
++ def test_https_proxy_forwarding_ignores_target_tls_policy(
++ self,
++ san_proxy_with_server: tuple[ServerConfig, ServerConfig],
++ ) -> None:
++ proxy, server = san_proxy_with_server
++ proxy_ctx = create_urllib3_context(cert_reqs=ssl.CERT_REQUIRED)
++ proxy_ctx.load_verify_locations(proxy.ca_certs)
++ proxy_cert_store_stats = proxy_ctx.cert_store_stats()
++
++ with proxy_from_url(
++ proxy.base_url,
++ proxy_ssl_context=proxy_ctx,
++ cert_reqs=ssl.CERT_NONE,
++ ca_certs=DEFAULT_CA,
++ use_forwarding_for_https=True,
++ ) as https:
++ for target_url in (server.base_url, "https://example.com/"):
++ pool = https.connection_from_url(target_url)
++ with contextlib.closing(pool._new_conn()) as conn:
++ conn = typing.cast(HTTPSConnection, conn)
++ conn.connect()
++ assert isinstance(conn.sock, ssl.SSLSocket)
++ assert conn.sock.context is proxy_ctx
++
++ assert proxy_ctx.verify_mode == ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
++ assert proxy_ctx.cert_store_stats() == proxy_cert_store_stats
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3_2.2.2.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3_2.2.2.bb
index 7ca210429b..95667d3fd8 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3_2.2.2.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3-urllib3_2.2.2.bb
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://CVE-2025-50181.patch \
file://CVE-2026-21441.patch \
file://CVE-2026-44431.patch \
file://CVE-2026-97689.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-97687_p1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-97687_p2.patch \
"
RDEPENDS:${PN} += "\
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 14/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-86409
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 13/19] python3-urllib3: Fix CVE-2026-97687 Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 15/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-92388 Fabien Thomas
` (4 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: João Marcos Costa (Schneider Electric) <joaomarcos.costa@bootlin.com>
This vulnerability, marked as High [1], was fixed upstream [2] since
v8.22.0.
Backport the fix to curl v8.7.1.
The only changes not included in the backport are the ones related to
test1978, which is not available in v8.7.1.
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-86409
[2] https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2026-86409.html
Signed-off-by: João Marcos Costa (Schneider Electric) <joaomarcos.costa@bootlin.com>
[bajau: updated the SRC_URI patch list]
Signed-off-by: Bastien Jauny <bastien.jauny@smile.fr>
---
.../curl/curl/CVE-2026-86409.patch | 36 +++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-86409.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-86409.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-86409.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..55a4def13b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-86409.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 0d375942119d6a8fe6a4c6874a2f1f05d3312ad0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Jo=C3=A3o=20Marcos=20Costa?= <joaomarcos.costa@bootlin.com>
+Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2026 17:55:56 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] setopt: make NULL CURLOPT_AWS_SIGV4 disable aws-sigv4 auth
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Disable `CURLAUTH_AWS_SIGV4` when `CURLOPT_AWS_SIGV4` is set to NULL.
+Syncing behavior with `CURLAUTH_HTTPSIG`.
+
+Reported-by: Stanislav Fort
+
+Closes #22681
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-86409
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/c3c70440e8d9938c0bb732595751e8aebc614f24]
+
+Signed-off-by: João Marcos Costa <joaomarcos.costa@bootlin.com>
+---
+ lib/setopt.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/setopt.c b/lib/setopt.c
+index 8a5a5d7c33..bcf41807e7 100644
+--- a/lib/setopt.c
++++ b/lib/setopt.c
+@@ -693,6 +693,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param)
+ */
+ if(data->set.str[STRING_AWS_SIGV4])
+ data->set.httpauth = CURLAUTH_AWS_SIGV4;
++ else
++ data->set.httpauth &= ~(uint32_t)CURLAUTH_AWS_SIGV4;
+ break;
+ #endif
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
index ab784b4d73..eade4f8d31 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.se/download/${BP}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2026-80230.patch \
file://CVE-2026-92389.patch \
file://CVE-2026-18924.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-86409.patch \
"
SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 15/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-92388
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 14/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-86409 Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 16/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-87864 Fabien Thomas
` (3 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Adarsh Jagadish Kamini <adarsh.jagadish.kamini@est.tech>
Backport patch to fix CVE-2026-92388.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92388
Upstream fix:
https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/ba8f8a7f27a5c5e19e4ef212
https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/b85acacec9b38442741bb019bc9
Tested with ptest:
Before: PASSED: 857, FAILED: 0, SKIPPED: 0, ABORTED: 0
After: PASSED: 857, FAILED: 0, SKIPPED: 0, ABORTED: 0
Signed-off-by: Adarsh Jagadish Kamini <adarsh.jagadish.kamini@est.tech>
Signed-off-by: Fabien Thomas <fabien.thomas@smile.fr>
---
.../curl/curl/CVE-2026-92388-1.patch | 151 ++++++++++++++++++
.../curl/curl/CVE-2026-92388-2.patch | 30 ++++
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 2 +
3 files changed, 183 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-92388-1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-92388-2.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-92388-1.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-92388-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1e91ab68f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-92388-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+From c6624e91bc9e8726b3cc45692ec0834650719a15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 15:17:37 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ftplistparser: no more overwriting set.write_func
+
+The entries in the 'set' struct should remain as set by the application.
+
+Closes #22969
+
+Backport notes for curl 8.7.1:
+- lib/cw-out.c: no CW_OUT_BODY_0LEN in 8.7.1; listmode handling applied
+ to CW_OUT_BODY only. Added #include "ftplistparser.h".
+- lib/ftplistparser.c: context conflict only; added Curl_ftp_listmode().
+- lib/ftplistparser.h: added Curl_ftp_listmode()/Curl_ftp_parselist
+ stubs to the existing CURL_DISABLE_FTP #else branch.
+- lib/ftp-int.h: does not exist in 8.7.1 (struct ftp_wc is in lib/ftp.h).
+ The now-unused ftp_wc.backup member is removed from lib/ftp.h instead.
+
+Assisted-by: kiro:claude-sonnet-5
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-92388
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/ba8f8a7f27a5c5e19e4ef212]
+Signed-off-by: Adarsh Jagadish Kamini <adarsh.jagadish.kamini@est.tech>
+---
+ lib/cw-out.c | 11 +++++++++--
+ lib/ftp.c | 13 -------------
+ lib/ftp.h | 5 -----
+ lib/ftplistparser.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ lib/ftplistparser.h | 5 +++++
+ 5 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/cw-out.c b/lib/cw-out.c
+index c168837817..e1527f475e 100644
+--- a/lib/cw-out.c
++++ b/lib/cw-out.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include "multiif.h"
+ #include "sendf.h"
+ #include "cw-out.h"
++#include "ftplistparser.h"
+
+ /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */
+ #include "curl_printf.h"
+@@ -166,8 +167,14 @@ static void cw_get_writefunc(struct Curl_easy *data, cw_out_type otype,
+ {
+ switch(otype) {
+ case CW_OUT_BODY:
+- *pwcb = data->set.fwrite_func;
+- *pwcb_data = data->set.out;
++ if(Curl_ftp_listmode(data)) {
++ *pwcb = Curl_ftp_parselist;
++ *pwcb_data = data;
++ }
++ else {
++ *pwcb = data->set.fwrite_func;
++ *pwcb_data = data->set.out;
++ }
+ *pmax_write = CURL_MAX_WRITE_SIZE;
+ /* if we ever want buffering of BODY output, we can set `min_write`
+ * the preferred size. The default should always be to pass data
+diff --git a/lib/ftp.c b/lib/ftp.c
+index 5bbdeb0540..3ab395cee8 100644
+--- a/lib/ftp.c
++++ b/lib/ftp.c
+@@ -3949,15 +3949,6 @@ static CURLcode init_wc_data(struct Curl_easy *data)
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+- /* backup old write_function */
+- ftpwc->backup.write_function = data->set.fwrite_func;
+- /* parsing write function */
+- data->set.fwrite_func = Curl_ftp_parselist;
+- /* backup old file descriptor */
+- ftpwc->backup.file_descriptor = data->set.out;
+- /* let the writefunc callback know the transfer */
+- data->set.out = data;
+-
+ infof(data, "Wildcard - Parsing started");
+ return CURLE_OK;
+
+@@ -3992,10 +3983,6 @@ static CURLcode wc_statemach(struct Curl_easy *data)
+ /* In this state is LIST response successfully parsed, so lets restore
+ previous WRITEFUNCTION callback and WRITEDATA pointer */
+ struct ftp_wc *ftpwc = wildcard->ftpwc;
+- data->set.fwrite_func = ftpwc->backup.write_function;
+- data->set.out = ftpwc->backup.file_descriptor;
+- ftpwc->backup.write_function = ZERO_NULL;
+- ftpwc->backup.file_descriptor = NULL;
+ wildcard->state = CURLWC_DOWNLOADING;
+
+ if(Curl_ftp_parselist_geterror(ftpwc->parser)) {
+diff --git a/lib/ftp.h b/lib/ftp.h
+index 977fc883b1..7e6097af8f 100644
+--- a/lib/ftp.h
++++ b/lib/ftp.h
+@@ -87,11 +87,6 @@ struct ftp_parselist_data; /* defined later in ftplistparser.c */
+
+ struct ftp_wc {
+ struct ftp_parselist_data *parser;
+-
+- struct {
+- curl_write_callback write_function;
+- FILE *file_descriptor;
+- } backup;
+ };
+
+ typedef enum {
+diff --git a/lib/ftplistparser.c b/lib/ftplistparser.c
+index 82f1ea00d3..eae799ff3b 100644
+--- a/lib/ftplistparser.c
++++ b/lib/ftplistparser.c
+@@ -361,6 +361,16 @@ static CURLcode ftp_pl_insert_finfo(struct Curl_easy *data,
+
+ #define MAX_FTPLIST_BUFFER 10000 /* arbitrarily set */
+
++/* returns TRUE if in wildcard listing mode */
++bool Curl_ftp_listmode(struct Curl_easy *data)
++{
++ if(data->state.wildcardmatch) {
++ struct WildcardData * const wildcard = data->wildcard;
++ return wildcard && (wildcard->state <= CURLWC_MATCHING);
++ }
++ return FALSE;
++}
++
+ size_t Curl_ftp_parselist(char *buffer, size_t size, size_t nmemb,
+ void *connptr)
+ {
+diff --git a/lib/ftplistparser.h b/lib/ftplistparser.h
+index 5ba1f6a97d..115f916f60 100644
+--- a/lib/ftplistparser.h
++++ b/lib/ftplistparser.h
+@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@
+
+ #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP
+
++/* returns TRUE if in wildcard listing mode */
++bool Curl_ftp_listmode(struct Curl_easy *data);
++
+ /* WRITEFUNCTION callback for parsing LIST responses */
+ size_t Curl_ftp_parselist(char *buffer, size_t size, size_t nmemb,
+ void *connptr);
+@@ -72,6 +75,8 @@ struct Curl_easy;
+
+ #else
+ /* FTP is disabled */
++#define Curl_ftp_listmode(x) FALSE
++#define Curl_ftp_parselist ZERO_NULL
+ #define Curl_wildcard_dtor(x)
+ #endif /* CURL_DISABLE_FTP */
+ #endif /* HEADER_CURL_FTPLISTPARSER_H */
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-92388-2.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-92388-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..322461d028
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-92388-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 8d0e0470e1eddf23a2d5c8f613e2a6d662a4b977 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 14:32:52 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ftplistparser: only use the list parser in CURLWC_MATCHING
+ state
+
+Follow-up to ba8f8a7
+
+Closes #22985
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-92388
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/b85acacec9b38442741bb019bc9]
+Signed-off-by: Adarsh Jagadish Kamini <adarsh.jagadish.kamini@est.tech>
+---
+ lib/ftplistparser.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/ftplistparser.c b/lib/ftplistparser.c
+index eae799ff3b..daf7f06467 100644
+--- a/lib/ftplistparser.c
++++ b/lib/ftplistparser.c
+@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ bool Curl_ftp_listmode(struct Curl_easy *data)
+ {
+ if(data->state.wildcardmatch) {
+ struct WildcardData * const wildcard = data->wildcard;
+- return wildcard && (wildcard->state <= CURLWC_MATCHING);
++ return wildcard && (wildcard->state == CURLWC_MATCHING);
+ }
+ return FALSE;
+ }
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
index eade4f8d31..d1df661b1a 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.se/download/${BP}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2026-92389.patch \
file://CVE-2026-18924.patch \
file://CVE-2026-86409.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-92388-1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-92388-2.patch \
"
SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 16/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-87864
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 15/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-92388 Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 17/19] gcc: patch CVE-2026-102010 Fabien Thomas
` (2 subsequent siblings)
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Adarsh Jagadish Kamini <adarsh.jagadish.kamini@est.tech>
Backport patch to fix CVE-2026-87864.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87864
Upstream fix:
https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/3b547de301342b347fb3c6ea6ae797
Tested with ptest:
Before: PASSED: 857, FAILED: 0, SKIPPED: 0, ABORTED: 0
After: PASSED: 857, FAILED: 0, SKIPPED: 0, ABORTED: 0
Signed-off-by: Adarsh Jagadish Kamini <adarsh.jagadish.kamini@est.tech>
Signed-off-by: Fabien Thomas <fabien.thomas@smile.fr>
---
.../curl/curl/CVE-2026-87864.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-87864.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-87864.patch b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-87864.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9ddfb6054c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2026-87864.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 409f23eaf6c3a4573fa68db155010b4c9054601e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Eissing <stefan@eissing.org>
+Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2026 09:47:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] imap: APPEND CRLF fix
+
+Deny an APPEND operation with CRLF conversion requested as we are unable
+to predict the final upload size and APPEND requires us to announce it
+before starting the upload.
+
+The check for unknown sizes had already been there, but the crlf
+conversion that renders a known size unknown was not accounted for.
+
+Closes #22702
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-87864
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/3b547de301342b347fb3c6ea6ae797]
+
+Signed-off-by: Adarsh Jagadish Kamini <adarsh.jagadish.kamini@est.tech>
+---
+ lib/imap.c | 11 ++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/imap.c b/lib/imap.c
+index 0e013e740a..6e4194b0cf 100644
+--- a/lib/imap.c
++++ b/lib/imap.c
+@@ -790,7 +790,6 @@ static CURLcode imap_perform_append(struct Curl_easy *data)
+ result = Curl_creader_set_mime(data, &data->set.mimepost);
+ if(result)
+ return result;
+- data->state.infilesize = Curl_creader_client_length(data);
+ }
+ else
+ #endif
+@@ -800,9 +799,15 @@ static CURLcode imap_perform_append(struct Curl_easy *data)
+ return result;
+ }
+
+- /* Check we know the size of the upload */
++ /* Check we know the size of the upload. This takes all readers
++ * into account. Especially crlf conversions which make the size
++ * unpredictable, e.g. -1. */
++ data->state.infilesize = Curl_creader_total_length(data);
+ if(data->state.infilesize < 0) {
+- failf(data, "Cannot APPEND with unknown input file size");
++ if(data->set.crlf)
++ failf(data, "Cannot APPEND with CRLF conversion making size unknown");
++ else
++ failf(data, "Cannot APPEND with unknown input file size");
+ return CURLE_UPLOAD_FAILED;
+ }
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
index d1df661b1a..076c8756f5 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_8.7.1.bb
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.se/download/${BP}.tar.xz \
file://CVE-2026-86409.patch \
file://CVE-2026-92388-1.patch \
file://CVE-2026-92388-2.patch \
+ file://CVE-2026-87864.patch \
"
SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 17/19] gcc: patch CVE-2026-102010
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 16/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-87864 Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 18/19] aspell: Backport a fix to build with gcc-15/clang-19 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 19/19] aspell: upgrade 0.60.8.1 -> 0.60.8.2 Fabien Thomas
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Pick patch referencing this CVE.
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabien Thomas <fabien.thomas@smile.fr>
---
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-13.5.inc | 1 +
.../gcc/gcc/0028-CVE-2026-102010.patch | 68 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 69 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0028-CVE-2026-102010.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-13.5.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-13.5.inc
index 13fbfa5a98..2de17a4177 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-13.5.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-13.5.inc
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${BASEURI} \
file://0024-Avoid-hardcoded-build-paths-into-ppc-libgcc.patch \
file://0025-gcc-testsuite-tweaks-for-mips-OE.patch \
file://0027-Fix-gcc-vect-module-testcases.patch \
+ file://0028-CVE-2026-102010.patch \
"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ec3df0015ed01411f91f9a9cd5b4da3070eb1222b02fadf4133c30c090399855"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0028-CVE-2026-102010.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0028-CVE-2026-102010.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3bd1afeee3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc/0028-CVE-2026-102010.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From aaa8351f4d2e636f9680a1f0a8ebc2f0a60611e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jonathan Wakely <jwakely@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2026 18:14:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] libstdc++: Fix use-after-free in pbds binary heap
+ (CVE-2026-102010) [PR127656]
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+After reallocating the storage the m_a_entries pointer is left dangling
+and the new storage is leaked.
+
+libstdc++-v3/ChangeLog:
+
+ PR libstdc++/127656
+ * include/ext/pb_ds/detail/binary_heap_/erase_fn_imps.hpp
+ (erase_if): Update m_a_entries after reallocation.
+ * testsuite/ext/pb_ds/regression/priority_queues_erase_if.cc:
+ New test.
+
+Reviewed-by: Tomasz Kamiński <tkaminsk@redhat.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-102010
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commitdiff;h=aaa8351f4d2e636f9680a1f0a8ebc2f0a60611e6]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ .../detail/binary_heap_/erase_fn_imps.hpp | 1 +
+ .../regression/priority_queues_erase_if.cc | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 libstdc++-v3/testsuite/ext/pb_ds/regression/priority_queues_erase_if.cc
+
+diff --git a/libstdc++-v3/include/ext/pb_ds/detail/binary_heap_/erase_fn_imps.hpp b/libstdc++-v3/include/ext/pb_ds/detail/binary_heap_/erase_fn_imps.hpp
+index 2e70ed5c663..80d2cccbbf0 100644
+--- a/libstdc++-v3/include/ext/pb_ds/detail/binary_heap_/erase_fn_imps.hpp
++++ b/libstdc++-v3/include/ext/pb_ds/detail/binary_heap_/erase_fn_imps.hpp
+@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ erase_if(Pred pred)
+ entry_pointer new_entries = s_entry_allocator.allocate(new_size);
+ std::copy(m_a_entries, m_a_entries + left, new_entries);
+ s_entry_allocator.deallocate(m_a_entries, m_actual_size);
++ m_a_entries = new_entries;
+ m_actual_size = new_size;
+ resize_policy::notify_arbitrary(m_actual_size);
+ }
+diff --git a/libstdc++-v3/testsuite/ext/pb_ds/regression/priority_queues_erase_if.cc b/libstdc++-v3/testsuite/ext/pb_ds/regression/priority_queues_erase_if.cc
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000000..30b8452eff9
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/libstdc++-v3/testsuite/ext/pb_ds/regression/priority_queues_erase_if.cc
+@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
++// { dg-do run }
++
++// CVE-2026-201020 use-after-free in binary heap erase_if
++
++#include <ext/pb_ds/priority_queue.hpp>
++
++bool is_odd(int v) { return v & 1; }
++
++int main()
++{
++ using __gnu_pbds::priority_queue;
++ using __gnu_pbds::binary_heap_tag;
++ priority_queue<int, std::less<int>, binary_heap_tag> q;
++ q.push(1);
++ q.push(2);
++ q.push(3);
++ q.erase_if(&is_odd);
++ q.clear();
++}
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 18/19] aspell: Backport a fix to build with gcc-15/clang-19
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 17/19] gcc: patch CVE-2026-102010 Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 19/19] aspell: upgrade 0.60.8.1 -> 0.60.8.2 Fabien Thomas
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(From OE-Core rev: d6cb53c0773d28f57b5699125ef825936d4725d1)
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabien Thomas <fabien.thomas@smile.fr>
---
...default-vector_hash-t.hpp-fix-gcc-15.patch | 42 +++++++++++++++++++
.../recipes-support/aspell/aspell_0.60.8.1.bb | 3 +-
2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell/0001-modules-speller-default-vector_hash-t.hpp-fix-gcc-15.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell/0001-modules-speller-default-vector_hash-t.hpp-fix-gcc-15.patch b/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell/0001-modules-speller-default-vector_hash-t.hpp-fix-gcc-15.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4045e8e412
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell/0001-modules-speller-default-vector_hash-t.hpp-fix-gcc-15.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From d45bf96b0a3556acb2c83069a78eaaac973d31b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sergei Trofimovich <slyich@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 21 Jul 2024 22:01:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp: fix gcc-15 build
+
+Uncoming `gcc-15` added extra checks for template instantiation that is
+guaranteed to fail in
+ https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commitdiff;h=313afcfdabeab3e6705ac0bd1273627075be0023
+
+As a result `aspell` build now fails as:
+
+ In file included from modules/speller/default/readonly_ws.cpp:51:
+ modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp: In member function 'void aspeller::VectorHashTable<Parms>::recalc_size()':
+ modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp:186:43: error: 'class aspeller::VectorHashTable<Parms>' has no member named 'e'
+ 186 | for (iterator i = begin(); i != this->e; ++i, ++this->_size);
+ | ^
+ modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp:186:59: error: 'class aspeller::VectorHashTable<Parms>' has no member named '_size'; did you mean 'size'?
+ 186 | for (iterator i = begin(); i != this->e; ++i, ++this->_size);
+ | ^~~~~
+ | size
+
+It looks like `_size` is `size_` mis-spelling and `e` was not introduced
+here.
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNUAspell/aspell/commit/ee6cbb12ff36a1e6618d7388a78dd4e0a2b44041]
+Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+---
+ modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp b/modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp
+index 969a80c..e4420b4 100644
+--- a/modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp
++++ b/modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp
+@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ namespace aspeller {
+ template<class Parms>
+ void VectorHashTable<Parms>::recalc_size() {
+ size_ = 0;
+- for (iterator i = begin(); i != this->e; ++i, ++this->_size);
++ for (iterator i = begin(), e = end(); i != e; ++i, ++size_);
+ }
+
+ }
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell_0.60.8.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell_0.60.8.1.bb
index 0ea9b063e0..43940b1e1b 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell_0.60.8.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell_0.60.8.1.bb
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ HOMEPAGE = "http://aspell.net/"
LICENSE = "LGPL-2.0-only | LGPL-2.1-only"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=7fbc338309ac38fefcd64b04bb903e34"
-SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/aspell/aspell-${PV}.tar.gz"
+SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/aspell/aspell-${PV}.tar.gz \
+ file://0001-modules-speller-default-vector_hash-t.hpp-fix-gcc-15.patch"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d6da12b34d42d457fa604e435ad484a74b2effcd120ff40acd6bb3fb2887d21b"
PACKAGECONFIG ??= ""
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [OE-core][scarthgap 19/19] aspell: upgrade 0.60.8.1 -> 0.60.8.2
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 18/19] aspell: Backport a fix to build with gcc-15/clang-19 Fabien Thomas
@ 2026-11-19 15:22 ` Fabien Thomas
18 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Fabien Thomas @ 2026-11-19 15:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
From: Wang Mingyu <wangmy@fujitsu.com>
0001-modules-speller-default-vector_hash-t.hpp-fix-gcc-15.patch
removed since it's included in 0.60.8.2
Signed-off-by: Wang Mingyu <wangmy@fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Dubois-Briand <mathieu.dubois-briand@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
(From OE-Core rev: 1218499d028b5d5ee269cc4919a98fd1a9fa3f3f)
Changelog: https://github.com/GNUAspell/aspell/releases/tag/rel-0.60.8.2
Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabien Thomas <fabien.thomas@smile.fr>
---
...default-vector_hash-t.hpp-fix-gcc-15.patch | 42 -------------------
...{aspell_0.60.8.1.bb => aspell_0.60.8.2.bb} | 5 +--
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell/0001-modules-speller-default-vector_hash-t.hpp-fix-gcc-15.patch
rename meta/recipes-support/aspell/{aspell_0.60.8.1.bb => aspell_0.60.8.2.bb} (84%)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell/0001-modules-speller-default-vector_hash-t.hpp-fix-gcc-15.patch b/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell/0001-modules-speller-default-vector_hash-t.hpp-fix-gcc-15.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4045e8e412..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell/0001-modules-speller-default-vector_hash-t.hpp-fix-gcc-15.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From d45bf96b0a3556acb2c83069a78eaaac973d31b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sergei Trofimovich <slyich@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun, 21 Jul 2024 22:01:50 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp: fix gcc-15 build
-
-Uncoming `gcc-15` added extra checks for template instantiation that is
-guaranteed to fail in
- https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=commitdiff;h=313afcfdabeab3e6705ac0bd1273627075be0023
-
-As a result `aspell` build now fails as:
-
- In file included from modules/speller/default/readonly_ws.cpp:51:
- modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp: In member function 'void aspeller::VectorHashTable<Parms>::recalc_size()':
- modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp:186:43: error: 'class aspeller::VectorHashTable<Parms>' has no member named 'e'
- 186 | for (iterator i = begin(); i != this->e; ++i, ++this->_size);
- | ^
- modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp:186:59: error: 'class aspeller::VectorHashTable<Parms>' has no member named '_size'; did you mean 'size'?
- 186 | for (iterator i = begin(); i != this->e; ++i, ++this->_size);
- | ^~~~~
- | size
-
-It looks like `_size` is `size_` mis-spelling and `e` was not introduced
-here.
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/GNUAspell/aspell/commit/ee6cbb12ff36a1e6618d7388a78dd4e0a2b44041]
-Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
----
- modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp b/modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp
-index 969a80c..e4420b4 100644
---- a/modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp
-+++ b/modules/speller/default/vector_hash-t.hpp
-@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ namespace aspeller {
- template<class Parms>
- void VectorHashTable<Parms>::recalc_size() {
- size_ = 0;
-- for (iterator i = begin(); i != this->e; ++i, ++this->_size);
-+ for (iterator i = begin(), e = end(); i != e; ++i, ++size_);
- }
-
- }
diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell_0.60.8.1.bb b/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell_0.60.8.2.bb
similarity index 84%
rename from meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell_0.60.8.1.bb
rename to meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell_0.60.8.2.bb
index 43940b1e1b..5b4fab7c35 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell_0.60.8.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-support/aspell/aspell_0.60.8.2.bb
@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@ HOMEPAGE = "http://aspell.net/"
LICENSE = "LGPL-2.0-only | LGPL-2.1-only"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=7fbc338309ac38fefcd64b04bb903e34"
-SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/aspell/aspell-${PV}.tar.gz \
- file://0001-modules-speller-default-vector_hash-t.hpp-fix-gcc-15.patch"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "d6da12b34d42d457fa604e435ad484a74b2effcd120ff40acd6bb3fb2887d21b"
+SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/aspell/aspell-${PV}.tar.gz"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "57fe4863eae6048f72245a8575b44b718fb85ca14b9f8c0afc41b254dfd76919"
PACKAGECONFIG ??= ""
PACKAGECONFIG[curses] = "--enable-curses,--disable-curses,ncurses"
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-19 15:24 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-11-19 15:22 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 01/19] nasm: fix CVE-2026-6067 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 02/19] nasm: fix CVE-2026-6068 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 03/19] vim: Fix for CVE-2026-73076 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 04/19] bind: Security fix for CVE-2026-19667 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 05/19] oeqa/selftest/recipetool: Update create_go test Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 06/19] pseudo: Upgrade 1.9.11 -> 1.9.12+git Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 07/19] TEST-pseudo: test patches Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 08/19] popt: patch CVE-2026-18739 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 09/19] glibc: patch CVE-2026-86805 and CVE-2026-95818 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 10/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-92389 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 11/19] curl: set CVE_STATUS for CVE-2026-19931 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 12/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-18924 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 13/19] python3-urllib3: Fix CVE-2026-97687 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 14/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-86409 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 15/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-92388 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 16/19] curl: fix CVE-2026-87864 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 17/19] gcc: patch CVE-2026-102010 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 18/19] aspell: Backport a fix to build with gcc-15/clang-19 Fabien Thomas
2026-11-19 15:22 ` [OE-core][scarthgap 19/19] aspell: upgrade 0.60.8.1 -> 0.60.8.2 Fabien Thomas
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2026-07-28 22:21 [OE-core][scarthgap 00/19] Patch review Yoann Congal
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