* [master][PATCH] 1/5] openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177
@ 2016-07-16 23:04 Armin Kuster
2016-07-16 23:04 ` [master][PATCH] 2/5] openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2178 Armin Kuster
` (3 more replies)
0 siblings, 4 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2016-07-16 23:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core, akuster808; +Cc: Armin Kuster
From: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
Affects openssl <= 1.0.2h
CVSS v2 Base Score: 7.5 HIGH
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
---
.../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch | 286 +++++++++++++++++++++
.../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 287 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df36d5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
+
+A common idiom in the codebase is:
+
+if (p + len > limit)
+{
+ return; /* Too long */
+}
+
+Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
+limit == p + SIZE
+
+"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
+message).
+
+The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
+defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
+undefined behaviour.
+
+For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
+provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
+values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
+
+Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
+
+CVE-2016-2177
+
+Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2016-2177
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+
+---
+ ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++-------
+ ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +-
+ ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
+ 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+index ab28702..ab7f690 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+
+ session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+
+- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
++ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ /* get the session-id */
+ j = *(p++);
+
+- if (p + j > d + n) {
++ if ((d + n) - p < j) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* cookie stuff */
+- if (p + 1 > d + n) {
++ if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ cookie_len = *(p++);
+
+- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
++ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ }
+ }
+
+- if (p + 2 > d + n) {
++ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ }
+
+ /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
+- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
++ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+
+ /* compression */
+ i = *(p++);
+- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
++ if ((d + n) - p < i) {
+ /* not enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+index b182998..54ee783 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+ int r;
+ #endif
+
+- if (session_id + len > limit) {
++ if (limit - session_id < len) {
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index fb64607..cdac011 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+ 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+ };
+
+- if (data >= (limit - 2))
++ if (limit - data <= 2)
+ return;
+ data += 2;
+
+- if (data > (limit - 4))
++ if (limit - data < 4)
+ return;
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+ if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ return;
+
+- if (data + size > limit)
++ if (limit - data < size)
+ return;
+ data += size;
+
+@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+ const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+ const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+
+- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
++ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+ return;
+@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+ } else {
+ const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+
+- if (data + len != limit)
++ if (limit - data != (int)(len))
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+ return;
+@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+ if (data == limit)
+ goto ri_check;
+
+- if (data > (limit - 2))
++ if (limit - data < 2)
+ goto err;
+
+ n2s(data, len);
+
+- if (data + len != limit)
++ if (limit - data != len)
+ goto err;
+
+- while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
++ while (limit - data >= 4) {
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+- if (data + size > (limit))
++ if (limit - data < size)
+ goto err;
+ # if 0
+ fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
+@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
+ if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+- if (data >= limit - 2)
++ if (limit - data <= 2)
+ return 1;
+ n2s(data, len);
+
+- if (data > limit - len)
++ if (limit - data < len)
+ return 1;
+
+- while (data <= limit - 4) {
++ while (limit - data >= 4) {
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+- if (data + size > limit)
++ if (limit - data < size)
+ return 1;
+ if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+ SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
+ # endif
+
+- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
++ if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ n2s(data, length);
+- if (data + length != d + n) {
++ if ((d + n) - data != length) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
++ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
+ n2s(data, type);
+ n2s(data, size);
+
+- if (data + size > (d + n))
++ if ((d + n) - data < size)
+ goto ri_check;
+
+ if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
+@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+ /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ i = *(p++);
+- p += i;
+- if (p >= limit)
++
++ if (limit - p <= i)
+ return -1;
++
++ p += i;
+ }
+ /* Skip past cipher list */
+ n2s(p, i);
+- p += i;
+- if (p >= limit)
++ if (limit - p <= i)
+ return -1;
++ p += i;
++
+ /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
+ i = *(p++);
+- p += i;
+- if (p > limit)
++ if (limit - p < i)
+ return -1;
++ p += i;
++
+ /* Now at start of extensions */
+- if ((p + 2) >= limit)
++ if (limit - p <= 2)
+ return 0;
+ n2s(p, i);
+- while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
++ while (limit - p >= 4) {
+ unsigned short type, size;
+ n2s(p, type);
+ n2s(p, size);
+- if (p + size > limit)
++ if (limit - p < size)
+ return 0;
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+ int r;
+--
+2.3.5
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
index 699fe62..e7d1106 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://find.pl;subdir=${BP}/util/ \
file://ptest_makefile_deps.patch \
file://configure-musl-target.patch \
file://parallel.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1d4007e53aad94a5b2002fe045ee7bb0b3d98f1a47f8b2bc851dcd1c74332919"
--
2.3.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [master][PATCH] 2/5] openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2178
2016-07-16 23:04 [master][PATCH] 1/5] openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177 Armin Kuster
@ 2016-07-16 23:04 ` Armin Kuster
2016-07-16 23:04 ` [master][PATCH] 3/5] bzip2: Security fix CVE-2016-3189 Armin Kuster
` (2 subsequent siblings)
3 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2016-07-16 23:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core, akuster808; +Cc: Armin Kuster
From: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
affects openssl <= 1.0.2h
CVSS v2 Base Score: 2.1 LOW
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
---
.../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2178.patch | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++
.../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2178.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2178.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2178.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27ade4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2178.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 399944622df7bd81af62e67ea967c470534090e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Cesar Pereida <cesar.pereida@aalto.fi>
+Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
+
+Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
+order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
+implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
+certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
+attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
+
+CVE-2016-2178
+
+Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2016-2178
+
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 9 +++++----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+Index: openssl-1.0.2h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssl-1.0.2h.orig/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
++++ openssl-1.0.2h/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
+ if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
+ goto err;
+ while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
+- if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
+- BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+- }
+
+ if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
+ if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
+@@ -282,6 +279,11 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_C
+ } else {
+ K = &k;
+ }
++
++ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
++ BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
++ }
++
+ DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
+ dsa->method_mont_p);
+ if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
index e7d1106..4f91e55 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://find.pl;subdir=${BP}/util/ \
file://configure-musl-target.patch \
file://parallel.patch \
file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "1d4007e53aad94a5b2002fe045ee7bb0b3d98f1a47f8b2bc851dcd1c74332919"
--
2.3.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [master][PATCH] 3/5] bzip2: Security fix CVE-2016-3189
2016-07-16 23:04 [master][PATCH] 1/5] openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177 Armin Kuster
2016-07-16 23:04 ` [master][PATCH] 2/5] openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2178 Armin Kuster
@ 2016-07-16 23:04 ` Armin Kuster
2016-08-08 12:41 ` Alexander Kanavin
2016-07-16 23:04 ` [master][PATCH] 4/5] python2: Security fix CVE-2016-5636 Armin Kuster
2016-07-16 23:04 ` [master][PATCH] 5/5] python3: " Armin Kuster
3 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2016-07-16 23:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core, akuster808; +Cc: Armin Kuster
From: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
Affects bzip2 <= 1.0.6
CVSS v2 Base Score: 4.3 MEDIUM
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
---
.../bzip2/bzip2-1.0.6/CVE-2016-3189.patch | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2_1.0.6.bb | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2-1.0.6/CVE-2016-3189.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2-1.0.6/CVE-2016-3189.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2-1.0.6/CVE-2016-3189.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d0c3a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2-1.0.6/CVE-2016-3189.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://bugzilla.suse.com/attachment.cgi?id=681334
+
+CVE: CVE-2016-3189
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+Index: bzip2-1.0.6/bzip2recover.c
+===================================================================
+--- bzip2-1.0.6.orig/bzip2recover.c
++++ bzip2-1.0.6/bzip2recover.c
+@@ -457,6 +457,7 @@ Int32 main ( Int32 argc, Char** argv )
+ bsPutUChar ( bsWr, 0x50 ); bsPutUChar ( bsWr, 0x90 );
+ bsPutUInt32 ( bsWr, blockCRC );
+ bsClose ( bsWr );
++ outFile = NULL;
+ }
+ if (wrBlock >= rbCtr) break;
+ wrBlock++;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2_1.0.6.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2_1.0.6.bb
index f717d85..ef7bc89 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2_1.0.6.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/bzip2/bzip2_1.0.6.bb
@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.bzip.org/${PV}/${BP}.tar.gz \
file://fix-bunzip2-qt-returns-0-for-corrupt-archives.patch \
file://configure.ac;subdir=${BP} \
file://Makefile.am;subdir=${BP} \
- file://run-ptest"
+ file://run-ptest \
+ file://CVE-2016-3189.patch \
+ "
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "00b516f4704d4a7cb50a1d97e6e8e15b"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "a2848f34fcd5d6cf47def00461fcb528a0484d8edef8208d6d2e2909dc61d9cd"
--
2.3.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [master][PATCH] 4/5] python2: Security fix CVE-2016-5636
2016-07-16 23:04 [master][PATCH] 1/5] openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177 Armin Kuster
2016-07-16 23:04 ` [master][PATCH] 2/5] openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2178 Armin Kuster
2016-07-16 23:04 ` [master][PATCH] 3/5] bzip2: Security fix CVE-2016-3189 Armin Kuster
@ 2016-07-16 23:04 ` Armin Kuster
2016-07-16 23:04 ` [master][PATCH] 5/5] python3: " Armin Kuster
3 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2016-07-16 23:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core, akuster808; +Cc: Armin Kuster
From: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
Affects python2 < 2.7.11
Base score (4.4) Medium
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
---
.../python/python/CVE-2016-5636.patch | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python_2.7.11.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/CVE-2016-5636.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/CVE-2016-5636.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/CVE-2016-5636.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a37471
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python/CVE-2016-5636.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Benjamin Peterson <benjamin@python.org>
+# Date 1453357424 28800
+# Node ID 985fc64c60d6adffd1138b6cc46df388ca91ca5d
+# Parent 7ec954b9fc54448a35b56d271340ba109eb381b9
+prevent buffer overflow in get_data (closes #26171)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://hg.python.org/cpython/rev/985fc64c60d6
+
+CVE: CVE-2016-5636
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+Index: Python-2.7.11/Misc/NEWS
+===================================================================
+--- Python-2.7.11.orig/Misc/NEWS
++++ Python-2.7.11/Misc/NEWS
+@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ What's New in Python 2.7.11?
+
+ *Release date: 2015-12-05*
+
++- Issue #26171: Fix possible integer overflow and heap corruption in
++ zipimporter.get_data().
++
+ Library
+ -------
+
+Index: Python-2.7.11/Modules/zipimport.c
+===================================================================
+--- Python-2.7.11.orig/Modules/zipimport.c
++++ Python-2.7.11/Modules/zipimport.c
+@@ -895,6 +895,11 @@ get_data(char *archive, PyObject *toc_en
+ PyMarshal_ReadShortFromFile(fp); /* local header size */
+ file_offset += l; /* Start of file data */
+
++ if (data_size > LONG_MAX - 1) {
++ fclose(fp);
++ PyErr_NoMemory();
++ return NULL;
++ }
+ raw_data = PyString_FromStringAndSize((char *)NULL, compress == 0 ?
+ data_size : data_size + 1);
+ if (raw_data == NULL) {
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python_2.7.11.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python_2.7.11.bb
index 7eced2d..1e4a30d 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python_2.7.11.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python_2.7.11.bb
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SRC_URI += "\
file://use_sysroot_ncurses_instead_of_host.patch \
file://avoid_parallel_make_races_on_pgen.patch \
file://add-CROSSPYTHONPATH-for-PYTHON_FOR_BUILD.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-5636.patch \
"
S = "${WORKDIR}/Python-${PV}"
--
2.3.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [master][PATCH] 5/5] python3: Security fix CVE-2016-5636
2016-07-16 23:04 [master][PATCH] 1/5] openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177 Armin Kuster
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2016-07-16 23:04 ` [master][PATCH] 4/5] python2: Security fix CVE-2016-5636 Armin Kuster
@ 2016-07-16 23:04 ` Armin Kuster
3 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Armin Kuster @ 2016-07-16 23:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core, akuster808; +Cc: Armin Kuster
From: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
Affects python3 < 3.5.1
Base Score (4.4) Medium
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
---
.../python/python3/CVE-2016-5636.patch | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.5.1.bb | 1 +
2 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2016-5636.patch
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2016-5636.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2016-5636.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d494d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2016-5636.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Benjamin Peterson <benjamin@python.org>
+# Date 1453357506 28800
+# Node ID 10dad6da1b28ea4af78ad9529e469fdbf4ebbc8f
+# Parent a3ac2cd93db9d5336dfd7b5b27efde2c568d8794# Parent 01ddd608b85c85952537d95a43bbabf4fb655057
+merge 3.4 (#26171)
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2016-5636
+
+https://hg.python.org/cpython/raw-rev/10dad6da1b28
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+Index: Python-3.5.1/Misc/NEWS
+===================================================================
+--- Python-3.5.1.orig/Misc/NEWS
++++ Python-3.5.1/Misc/NEWS
+@@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ Core and Builtins
+ Python.h header to fix a compilation error with OpenMP. PyThreadState_GET()
+ becomes an alias to PyThreadState_Get() to avoid ABI incompatibilies.
+
++- Issue #26171: Fix possible integer overflow and heap corruption in
++ zipimporter.get_data().
++
+ Library
+ -------
+
+Index: Python-3.5.1/Modules/zipimport.c
+===================================================================
+--- Python-3.5.1.orig/Modules/zipimport.c
++++ Python-3.5.1/Modules/zipimport.c
+@@ -1112,6 +1112,11 @@ get_data(PyObject *archive, PyObject *to
+ }
+ file_offset += l; /* Start of file data */
+
++ if (data_size > LONG_MAX - 1) {
++ fclose(fp);
++ PyErr_NoMemory();
++ return NULL;
++ }
+ bytes_size = compress == 0 ? data_size : data_size + 1;
+ if (bytes_size == 0)
+ bytes_size++;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.5.1.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.5.1.bb
index 0d667d2..bf29d12 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.5.1.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.5.1.bb
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ SRC_URI += "\
file://setup.py-find-libraries-in-staging-dirs.patch \
file://use_packed_importlib.patch \
file://configure.ac-fix-LIBPL.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-5636.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "e9ea6f2623fffcdd871b7b19113fde80"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c6d57c0c366d9060ab6c0cdf889ebf3d92711d466cc0119c441dbf2746f725c9"
--
2.3.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [master][PATCH] 3/5] bzip2: Security fix CVE-2016-3189
2016-07-16 23:04 ` [master][PATCH] 3/5] bzip2: Security fix CVE-2016-3189 Armin Kuster
@ 2016-08-08 12:41 ` Alexander Kanavin
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Alexander Kanavin @ 2016-08-08 12:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: openembedded-core
On 07/17/2016 02:04 AM, Armin Kuster wrote:
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +https://bugzilla.suse.com/attachment.cgi?id=681334
> +
> +CVE: CVE-2016-3189
Backport means the patch is taken from upstream development repository,
and it's also good to provide a link to where it is in the upstream.
This looks like a distro vendor fix, so the upstream-status should be
either pending or inappropriate (depending on the upstream development
situation).
Alex
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2016-08-08 12:42 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2016-07-16 23:04 [master][PATCH] 1/5] openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177 Armin Kuster
2016-07-16 23:04 ` [master][PATCH] 2/5] openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2178 Armin Kuster
2016-07-16 23:04 ` [master][PATCH] 3/5] bzip2: Security fix CVE-2016-3189 Armin Kuster
2016-08-08 12:41 ` Alexander Kanavin
2016-07-16 23:04 ` [master][PATCH] 4/5] python2: Security fix CVE-2016-5636 Armin Kuster
2016-07-16 23:04 ` [master][PATCH] 5/5] python3: " Armin Kuster
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