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* patch "crypto: asym_tpm: correct zero out potential secrets" added to char-misc-linus
@ 2020-12-31  9:49 gregkh
  2020-12-31 10:23 ` Blum Shem-Tov, Ilil
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: gregkh @ 2020-12-31  9:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: gregkh, ilil.blum.shem-tov, stable


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    crypto: asym_tpm: correct zero out potential secrets

to my char-misc git tree which can be found at
    git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git
in the char-misc-linus branch.

The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree
(usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)

The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the
next -rc kernel release.

If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.


From f93274ef0fe972c120c96b3207f8fce376231a60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 09:01:36 +0100
Subject: crypto: asym_tpm: correct zero out potential secrets

The function derive_pub_key() should be calling memzero_explicit()
instead of memset() in case the complier decides to optimize away the
call to memset() because it "knows" no one is going to touch the memory
anymore.

Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Ilil Blum Shem-Tov <ilil.blum.shem-tov@intel.com>
Tested-by: Ilil Blum Shem-Tov <ilil.blum.shem-tov@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/X8ns4AfwjKudpyfe@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
index 511932aa94a6..0959613560b9 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ static uint32_t derive_pub_key(const void *pub_key, uint32_t len, uint8_t *buf)
 	memcpy(cur, e, sizeof(e));
 	cur += sizeof(e);
 	/* Zero parameters to satisfy set_pub_key ABI. */
-	memset(cur, 0, SETKEY_PARAMS_SIZE);
+	memzero_explicit(cur, SETKEY_PARAMS_SIZE);
 
 	return cur - buf;
 }
-- 
2.30.0



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* RE: patch "crypto: asym_tpm: correct zero out potential secrets" added to char-misc-linus
  2020-12-31  9:49 patch "crypto: asym_tpm: correct zero out potential secrets" added to char-misc-linus gregkh
@ 2020-12-31 10:23 ` Blum Shem-Tov, Ilil
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Blum Shem-Tov, Ilil @ 2020-12-31 10:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, stable@vger.kernel.org

Thank you and Happy New-Year!

-----Original Message-----
From: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> 
Sent: Thursday, December 31, 2020 11:49
To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org; Blum Shem-Tov, Ilil <ilil.blum.shem-tov@intel.com>; stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: patch "crypto: asym_tpm: correct zero out potential secrets" added to char-misc-linus


This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    crypto: asym_tpm: correct zero out potential secrets

to my char-misc git tree which can be found at
    git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc.git
in the char-misc-linus branch.

The patch will show up in the next release of the linux-next tree (usually sometime within the next 24 hours during the week.)

The patch will hopefully also be merged in Linus's tree for the next -rc kernel release.

If you have any questions about this process, please let me know.


From f93274ef0fe972c120c96b3207f8fce376231a60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 09:01:36 +0100
Subject: crypto: asym_tpm: correct zero out potential secrets

The function derive_pub_key() should be calling memzero_explicit() instead of memset() in case the complier decides to optimize away the call to memset() because it "knows" no one is going to touch the memory anymore.

Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Ilil Blum Shem-Tov <ilil.blum.shem-tov@intel.com>
Tested-by: Ilil Blum Shem-Tov <ilil.blum.shem-tov@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/X8ns4AfwjKudpyfe@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
index 511932aa94a6..0959613560b9 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ static uint32_t derive_pub_key(const void *pub_key, uint32_t len, uint8_t *buf)
 	memcpy(cur, e, sizeof(e));
 	cur += sizeof(e);
 	/* Zero parameters to satisfy set_pub_key ABI. */
-	memset(cur, 0, SETKEY_PARAMS_SIZE);
+	memzero_explicit(cur, SETKEY_PARAMS_SIZE);
 
 	return cur - buf;
 }
--
2.30.0


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