Re: [PATCH linux-5.9 1/1] net: netfilter: fix KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in nft_flow_rule_create

Re: [PATCH linux-5.9 1/1] net: netfilter: fix KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in nft_flow_rule_create

[Saeed Mirzamohammadi]

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Attached the syzkaller C repro.

Tested-by: Saeed Mirzamohammadi <saeed.mirzamohammadi@oracle.com>

[-- Attachment #2: repro.c --]
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// autogenerated by syzkaller (https://github.com/google/syzkaller)

#define _GNU_SOURCE

#include <endian.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#define BITMASK(bf_off,bf_len) (((1ull << (bf_len)) - 1) << (bf_off))
#define STORE_BY_BITMASK(type,htobe,addr,val,bf_off,bf_len) *(type*)(addr) =htobe((htobe(*(type*)(addr)) & ~BITMASK((bf_off), (bf_len))) | (((type)(val)<< (bf_off)) & BITMASK((bf_off), (bf_len))))

uint64_t r[2] = {0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff};

int main(void)
{
        syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x1ffff000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul);
    syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000ul, 0x1000000ul, 7ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul);
    syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x21000000ul, 0x1000ul, 0ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul);
                intptr_t res = 0;
    res = syscall(__NR_socket, 0x10ul, 3ul, 0xc);
    if (res != -1)
        r[0] = res;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000240 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000248 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000250 = 0x20000100;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000100 = 0x20000280;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000280 = 0x14;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000284 = 0x10;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000286 = 1;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000288 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000028c = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000290 = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000291 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000292 = htobe16(0xa);
*(uint32_t*)0x20000294 = 0x14;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000298 = 2;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000299 = 0xa;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000029a = 0x401;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000029c = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200002a0 = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x200002a4 = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x200002a5 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x200002a6 = htobe16(0);
*(uint32_t*)0x200002a8 = 0x20;
*(uint8_t*)0x200002ac = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x200002ad = 0xa;
*(uint16_t*)0x200002ae = 0x401;
*(uint32_t*)0x200002b0 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200002b4 = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x200002b8 = 1;
*(uint8_t*)0x200002b9 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x200002ba = htobe16(0);
*(uint16_t*)0x200002bc = 9;
*(uint16_t*)0x200002be = 1;
memcpy((void*)0x200002c0, "syz0\000", 5);
*(uint32_t*)0x200002c8 = 0x48;
*(uint8_t*)0x200002cc = 3;
*(uint8_t*)0x200002cd = 0xa;
*(uint16_t*)0x200002ce = 0x201;
*(uint32_t*)0x200002d0 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200002d4 = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x200002d8 = 1;
*(uint8_t*)0x200002d9 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x200002da = htobe16(0);
*(uint16_t*)0x200002dc = 9;
*(uint16_t*)0x200002de = 3;
memcpy((void*)0x200002e0, "syz0\000", 5);
*(uint16_t*)0x200002e8 = 9;
*(uint16_t*)0x200002ea = 1;
memcpy((void*)0x200002ec, "syz0\000", 5);
*(uint16_t*)0x200002f4 = 8;
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x200002f6, 0xa, 0, 14);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x200002f7, 1, 6, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x200002f7, 0, 7, 1);
*(uint32_t*)0x200002f8 = htobe32(2);
*(uint16_t*)0x200002fc = 0x14;
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x200002fe, 4, 0, 14);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x200002ff, 0, 6, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x200002ff, 1, 7, 1);
*(uint16_t*)0x20000300 = 8;
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x20000302, 2, 0, 14);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x20000303, 1, 6, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x20000303, 0, 7, 1);
*(uint32_t*)0x20000304 = htobe32(2);
*(uint16_t*)0x20000308 = 8;
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x2000030a, 1, 0, 14);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x2000030b, 1, 6, 1);
STORE_BY_BITMASK(uint16_t, , 0x2000030b, 0, 7, 1);
*(uint32_t*)0x2000030c = htobe32(0);
*(uint32_t*)0x20000310 = 0x14;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000314 = 0x11;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000316 = 1;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000318 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000031c = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000320 = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000321 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000322 = htobe16(0xa);
*(uint64_t*)0x20000108 = 0xa4;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000258 = 1;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000260 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000268 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000270 = 0;
    syscall(__NR_sendmsg, r[0], 0x20000240ul, 0ul);
    res = syscall(__NR_socket, 0x10ul, 3ul, 0xc);
    if (res != -1)
        r[1] = res;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000c0 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200000c8 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000d0 = 0x20000080;
*(uint64_t*)0x20000080 = 0x20000500;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000500 = 0x14;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000504 = 0x10;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000506 = 1;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000508 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000050c = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000510 = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000511 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000512 = htobe16(0xa);
*(uint32_t*)0x20000514 = 0x2c;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000518 = 6;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000519 = 0xa;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000051a = 0x401;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000051c = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000520 = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000524 = 1;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000525 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000526 = htobe16(0);
*(uint16_t*)0x20000528 = 9;
*(uint16_t*)0x2000052a = 1;
memcpy((void*)0x2000052c, "syz0\000", 5);
*(uint16_t*)0x20000534 = 9;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000536 = 2;
memcpy((void*)0x20000538, "syz0\000", 5);
*(uint32_t*)0x20000540 = 0x14;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000544 = 0x11;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000546 = 1;
*(uint32_t*)0x20000548 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x2000054c = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000550 = 0;
*(uint8_t*)0x20000551 = 0;
*(uint16_t*)0x20000552 = htobe16(0xa);
*(uint64_t*)0x20000088 = 0x54;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000d8 = 1;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000e0 = 0;
*(uint64_t*)0x200000e8 = 0;
*(uint32_t*)0x200000f0 = 0;
    syscall(__NR_sendmsg, r[1], 0x200000c0ul, 0ul);
    return 0;
}


[-- Attachment #3: Type: text/plain, Size: 1210 bytes --]


> On Oct 20, 2020, at 9:45 AM, Saeed Mirzamohammadi <saeed.mirzamohammadi@oracle.com> wrote:
> 
> Thanks! Yes, that looks good to me.
> 
> Saeed
> 
>> On Oct 20, 2020, at 4:50 AM, Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> wrote:
>> 
>> On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 10:25:32AM -0700, saeed.mirzamohammadi@oracle.com wrote:
>>> From: Saeed Mirzamohammadi <saeed.mirzamohammadi@oracle.com>
>>> 
>>> This patch fixes the issue due to:
>>> 
>>> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nft_flow_rule_create+0x622/0x6a2
>>> net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:40
>>> Read of size 8 at addr ffff888103910b58 by task syz-executor227/16244
>>> 
>>> The error happens when expr->ops is accessed early on before performing the boundary check and after nft_expr_next() moves the expr to go out-of-bounds.
>>> 
>>> This patch checks the boundary condition before expr->ops that fixes the slab-out-of-bounds Read issue.
>> 
>> Thanks. I made a slight variant of your patch.
>> 
>> I'm attaching it, it is also fixing the problem but it introduced
>> nft_expr_more() and use it everywhere.
>> 
>> Let me know if this looks fine to you.
>> <0001-netfilter-fix-KASAN-slab-out-of-bounds-Read-in-nft_f.patch>
> 

Re: [PATCH linux-5.9 1/1] net: netfilter: fix KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in nft_flow_rule_create

[Saeed Mirzamohammadi]

Adding stable.


> On Oct 21, 2020, at 1:08 PM, Saeed Mirzamohammadi <saeed.mirzamohammadi@oracle.com> wrote:
> 
> Attached the syzkaller C repro.
> 
> Tested-by: Saeed Mirzamohammadi <saeed.mirzamohammadi@oracle.com>
> <repro.c>
>> On Oct 20, 2020, at 9:45 AM, Saeed Mirzamohammadi <saeed.mirzamohammadi@oracle.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Thanks! Yes, that looks good to me.
>> 
>> Saeed
>> 
>>> On Oct 20, 2020, at 4:50 AM, Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 10:25:32AM -0700, saeed.mirzamohammadi@oracle.com wrote:
>>>> From: Saeed Mirzamohammadi <saeed.mirzamohammadi@oracle.com>
>>>> 
>>>> This patch fixes the issue due to:
>>>> 
>>>> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nft_flow_rule_create+0x622/0x6a2
>>>> net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c:40
>>>> Read of size 8 at addr ffff888103910b58 by task syz-executor227/16244
>>>> 
>>>> The error happens when expr->ops is accessed early on before performing the boundary check and after nft_expr_next() moves the expr to go out-of-bounds.
>>>> 
>>>> This patch checks the boundary condition before expr->ops that fixes the slab-out-of-bounds Read issue.
>>> 
>>> Thanks. I made a slight variant of your patch.
>>> 
>>> I'm attaching it, it is also fixing the problem but it introduced
>>> nft_expr_more() and use it everywhere.
>>> 
>>> Let me know if this looks fine to you.
>>> <0001-netfilter-fix-KASAN-slab-out-of-bounds-Read-in-nft_f.patch>
>> 
> 

Re: [PATCH linux-5.9 1/1] net: netfilter: fix KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in nft_flow_rule_create

[Greg KH]

On Sun, Oct 25, 2020 at 04:31:57PM -0700, Saeed Mirzamohammadi wrote:
> Adding stable.

What did that do?

confused,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH linux-5.9 1/1] net: netfilter: fix KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in nft_flow_rule_create

[Florian Westphal]

Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

[ Trimming CC ]

> On Sun, Oct 25, 2020 at 04:31:57PM -0700, Saeed Mirzamohammadi wrote:
> > Adding stable.
> 
> What did that do?

Its a request to pick up

commit 31cc578ae2de19c748af06d859019dced68e325d
Author: Saeed Mirzamohammadi <saeed.mirzamohammadi@oracle.com>
Date:   Tue Oct 20 13:41:36 2020 +0200

    netfilter: nftables_offload: KASAN slab-out-of-bounds Read in nft_flow_rule_create

Which lacks a Fixes tag.  Should have been:

Fixes: c9626a2cbdb20e2 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add hardware offload support")
(v5.3+)

Hope that makes things clearer.

Re: [PATCH linux-5.9 1/1] net: netfilter: fix KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in nft_flow_rule_create

[Greg KH]

On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 07:42:26AM +0100, Florian Westphal wrote:
> Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 
> [ Trimming CC ]
> 
> > On Sun, Oct 25, 2020 at 04:31:57PM -0700, Saeed Mirzamohammadi wrote:
> > > Adding stable.
> > 
> > What did that do?
> 
> Its a request to pick up
> 
> commit 31cc578ae2de19c748af06d859019dced68e325d
> Author: Saeed Mirzamohammadi <saeed.mirzamohammadi@oracle.com>
> Date:   Tue Oct 20 13:41:36 2020 +0200
> 
>     netfilter: nftables_offload: KASAN slab-out-of-bounds Read in nft_flow_rule_create
> 
> Which lacks a Fixes tag.  Should have been:
> 
> Fixes: c9626a2cbdb20e2 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add hardware offload support")
> (v5.3+)
> 
> Hope that makes things clearer.

That makes it much more obvious and clearer, thank you.  Saeed, please
be more explicit in the future.

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH linux-5.9 1/1] net: netfilter: fix KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in nft_flow_rule_create

[Pablo Neira Ayuso]

Hi Greg,

On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 07:21:11AM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 25, 2020 at 04:31:57PM -0700, Saeed Mirzamohammadi wrote:
> > Adding stable.
> 
> What did that do?

Saeed is requesting that stable maintainers cherry-picks this patch:

31cc578ae2de ("netfilter: nftables_offload: KASAN slab-out-of-bounds
Read in nft_flow_rule_create")

into stable 5.4 and 5.8.

Thanks.

Re: [PATCH linux-5.9 1/1] net: netfilter: fix KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in nft_flow_rule_create

[Greg KH]

On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 09:19:22AM +0100, Pablo Neira Ayuso wrote:
> Hi Greg,
> 
> On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 07:21:11AM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Sun, Oct 25, 2020 at 04:31:57PM -0700, Saeed Mirzamohammadi wrote:
> > > Adding stable.
> > 
> > What did that do?
> 
> Saeed is requesting that stable maintainers cherry-picks this patch:
> 
> 31cc578ae2de ("netfilter: nftables_offload: KASAN slab-out-of-bounds
> Read in nft_flow_rule_create")
> 
> into stable 5.4 and 5.8.

5.9 is also a stable kernel :)

Will go queue it up everywhere...

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH linux-5.9 1/1] net: netfilter: fix KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in nft_flow_rule_create

[Pablo Neira Ayuso]

On Thu, Oct 29, 2020 at 12:02:41PM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 09:19:22AM +0100, Pablo Neira Ayuso wrote:
> > Hi Greg,
> > 
> > On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 07:21:11AM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> > > On Sun, Oct 25, 2020 at 04:31:57PM -0700, Saeed Mirzamohammadi wrote:
> > > > Adding stable.
> > > 
> > > What did that do?
> > 
> > Saeed is requesting that stable maintainers cherry-picks this patch:
> > 
> > 31cc578ae2de ("netfilter: nftables_offload: KASAN slab-out-of-bounds
> > Read in nft_flow_rule_create")
> > 
> > into stable 5.4 and 5.8.
> 
> 5.9 is also a stable kernel :)

Oh, indeed, I forgot this one :)

> Will go queue it up everywhere...

Thanks.