* [PATCH v2 01/13] xen/events: avoid removing an event channel while handling it
2020-11-03 14:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Juergen Gross
@ 2020-11-03 14:13 ` Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] xen/events: add a proper barrier to 2-level uevent unmasking Juergen Gross
` (12 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2020-11-03 14:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Today it can happen that an event channel is being removed from the
system while the event handling loop is active. This can lead to a
race resulting in crashes or WARN() splats when trying to access the
irq_info structure related to the event channel.
Fix this problem by using a rwlock taken as reader in the event
handling loop and as writer when deallocating the irq_info structure.
As the observed problem was a NULL dereference in evtchn_from_irq()
make this function more robust against races by testing the irq_info
pointer to be not NULL before dereferencing it.
And finally make all accesses to evtchn_to_irq[row][col] atomic ones
in order to avoid seeing partial updates of an array element in irq
handling. Note that irq handling can be entered only for event channels
which have been valid before, so any not populated row isn't a problem
in this regard, as rows are only ever added and never removed.
This is XSA-331.
This is upstream commit 073d0552ead5bfc7a3a9c01de590e924f11b5dd2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reported-by: Jinoh Kang <luke1337@theori.io>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
---
drivers/xen/events/events_base.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
index e402620b8920..46cc722cf26a 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/irqnr.h>
#include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
#include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -70,6 +71,23 @@ const struct evtchn_ops *evtchn_ops;
*/
static DEFINE_MUTEX(irq_mapping_update_lock);
+/*
+ * Lock protecting event handling loop against removing event channels.
+ * Adding of event channels is no issue as the associated IRQ becomes active
+ * only after everything is setup (before request_[threaded_]irq() the handler
+ * can't be entered for an event, as the event channel will be unmasked only
+ * then).
+ */
+static DEFINE_RWLOCK(evtchn_rwlock);
+
+/*
+ * Lock hierarchy:
+ *
+ * irq_mapping_update_lock
+ * evtchn_rwlock
+ * IRQ-desc lock
+ */
+
static LIST_HEAD(xen_irq_list_head);
/* IRQ <-> VIRQ mapping. */
@@ -104,7 +122,7 @@ static void clear_evtchn_to_irq_row(unsigned row)
unsigned col;
for (col = 0; col < EVTCHN_PER_ROW; col++)
- evtchn_to_irq[row][col] = -1;
+ WRITE_ONCE(evtchn_to_irq[row][col], -1);
}
static void clear_evtchn_to_irq_all(void)
@@ -141,7 +159,7 @@ static int set_evtchn_to_irq(unsigned evtchn, unsigned irq)
clear_evtchn_to_irq_row(row);
}
- evtchn_to_irq[row][col] = irq;
+ WRITE_ONCE(evtchn_to_irq[row][col], irq);
return 0;
}
@@ -151,7 +169,7 @@ int get_evtchn_to_irq(unsigned evtchn)
return -1;
if (evtchn_to_irq[EVTCHN_ROW(evtchn)] == NULL)
return -1;
- return evtchn_to_irq[EVTCHN_ROW(evtchn)][EVTCHN_COL(evtchn)];
+ return READ_ONCE(evtchn_to_irq[EVTCHN_ROW(evtchn)][EVTCHN_COL(evtchn)]);
}
/* Get info for IRQ */
@@ -260,10 +278,14 @@ static void xen_irq_info_cleanup(struct irq_info *info)
*/
unsigned int evtchn_from_irq(unsigned irq)
{
- if (WARN(irq >= nr_irqs, "Invalid irq %d!\n", irq))
+ const struct irq_info *info = NULL;
+
+ if (likely(irq < nr_irqs))
+ info = info_for_irq(irq);
+ if (!info)
return 0;
- return info_for_irq(irq)->evtchn;
+ return info->evtchn;
}
unsigned irq_from_evtchn(unsigned int evtchn)
@@ -439,16 +461,21 @@ static int __must_check xen_allocate_irq_gsi(unsigned gsi)
static void xen_free_irq(unsigned irq)
{
struct irq_info *info = info_for_irq(irq);
+ unsigned long flags;
if (WARN_ON(!info))
return;
+ write_lock_irqsave(&evtchn_rwlock, flags);
+
list_del(&info->list);
set_info_for_irq(irq, NULL);
WARN_ON(info->refcnt > 0);
+ write_unlock_irqrestore(&evtchn_rwlock, flags);
+
kfree(info);
/* Legacy IRQ descriptors are managed by the arch. */
@@ -1234,6 +1261,8 @@ static void __xen_evtchn_do_upcall(void)
int cpu = get_cpu();
unsigned count;
+ read_lock(&evtchn_rwlock);
+
do {
vcpu_info->evtchn_upcall_pending = 0;
@@ -1249,6 +1278,7 @@ static void __xen_evtchn_do_upcall(void)
} while (count != 1 || vcpu_info->evtchn_upcall_pending);
out:
+ read_unlock(&evtchn_rwlock);
put_cpu();
}
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 02/13] xen/events: add a proper barrier to 2-level uevent unmasking
2020-11-03 14:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] xen/events: avoid removing an event channel while handling it Juergen Gross
@ 2020-11-03 14:13 ` Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] xen/events: fix race in evtchn_fifo_unmask() Juergen Gross
` (11 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2020-11-03 14:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
A follow-up patch will require certain write to happen before an event
channel is unmasked.
While the memory barrier is not strictly necessary for all the callers,
the main one will need it. In order to avoid an extra memory barrier
when using fifo event channels, mandate evtchn_unmask() to provide
write ordering.
The 2-level event handling unmask operation is missing an appropriate
barrier, so add it. Fifo event channels are fine in this regard due to
using sync_cmpxchg().
This is part of XSA-332.
This is upstream commit 4d3fe31bd993ef504350989786858aefdb877daa
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
---
drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c
index 8edef51c92e5..e4b75693600e 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c
@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ static void evtchn_2l_unmask(unsigned port)
BUG_ON(!irqs_disabled());
+ smp_wmb(); /* All writes before unmask must be visible. */
+
if (unlikely((cpu != cpu_from_evtchn(port))))
do_hypercall = 1;
else {
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 03/13] xen/events: fix race in evtchn_fifo_unmask()
2020-11-03 14:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] xen/events: avoid removing an event channel while handling it Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] xen/events: add a proper barrier to 2-level uevent unmasking Juergen Gross
@ 2020-11-03 14:13 ` Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] xen/events: add a new "late EOI" evtchn framework Juergen Gross
` (10 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2020-11-03 14:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Unmasking a fifo event channel can result in unmasking it twice, once
directly in the kernel and once via a hypercall in case the event was
pending.
Fix that by doing the local unmask only if the event is not pending.
This is part of XSA-332.
This is upstream commit f01337197419b7e8a492e83089552b77d3b5fb90
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c | 13 +++++++++----
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c
index 76b318e88382..3071256a9413 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c
@@ -227,19 +227,25 @@ static bool evtchn_fifo_is_masked(unsigned port)
return sync_test_bit(EVTCHN_FIFO_BIT(MASKED, word), BM(word));
}
/*
- * Clear MASKED, spinning if BUSY is set.
+ * Clear MASKED if not PENDING, spinning if BUSY is set.
+ * Return true if mask was cleared.
*/
-static void clear_masked(volatile event_word_t *word)
+static bool clear_masked_cond(volatile event_word_t *word)
{
event_word_t new, old, w;
w = *word;
do {
+ if (w & (1 << EVTCHN_FIFO_PENDING))
+ return false;
+
old = w & ~(1 << EVTCHN_FIFO_BUSY);
new = old & ~(1 << EVTCHN_FIFO_MASKED);
w = sync_cmpxchg(word, old, new);
} while (w != old);
+
+ return true;
}
static void evtchn_fifo_unmask(unsigned port)
@@ -248,8 +254,7 @@ static void evtchn_fifo_unmask(unsigned port)
BUG_ON(!irqs_disabled());
- clear_masked(word);
- if (evtchn_fifo_is_pending(port)) {
+ if (!clear_masked_cond(word)) {
struct evtchn_unmask unmask = { .port = port };
(void)HYPERVISOR_event_channel_op(EVTCHNOP_unmask, &unmask);
}
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 04/13] xen/events: add a new "late EOI" evtchn framework
2020-11-03 14:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Juergen Gross
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] xen/events: fix race in evtchn_fifo_unmask() Juergen Gross
@ 2020-11-03 14:13 ` Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] xen/blkback: use lateeoi irq binding Juergen Gross
` (9 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2020-11-03 14:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
In order to avoid tight event channel related IRQ loops add a new
framework of "late EOI" handling: the IRQ the event channel is bound
to will be masked until the event has been handled and the related
driver is capable to handle another event. The driver is responsible
for unmasking the event channel via the new function xen_irq_lateeoi().
This is similar to binding an event channel to a threaded IRQ, but
without having to structure the driver accordingly.
In order to support a future special handling in case a rogue guest
is sending lots of unsolicited events, add a flag to xen_irq_lateeoi()
which can be set by the caller to indicate the event was a spurious
one.
This is part of XSA-332.
This is upstream commit 54c9de89895e0a36047fcc4ae754ea5b8655fb9d
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
---
drivers/xen/events/events_base.c | 151 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
include/xen/events.h | 29 +++++-
2 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
index 46cc722cf26a..1a1325e09d50 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ static bool (*pirq_needs_eoi)(unsigned irq);
static struct irq_info *legacy_info_ptrs[NR_IRQS_LEGACY];
static struct irq_chip xen_dynamic_chip;
+static struct irq_chip xen_lateeoi_chip;
static struct irq_chip xen_percpu_chip;
static struct irq_chip xen_pirq_chip;
static void enable_dynirq(struct irq_data *data);
@@ -396,6 +397,33 @@ void notify_remote_via_irq(int irq)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(notify_remote_via_irq);
+static void xen_irq_lateeoi_locked(struct irq_info *info)
+{
+ evtchn_port_t evtchn;
+
+ evtchn = info->evtchn;
+ if (!VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
+ return;
+
+ unmask_evtchn(evtchn);
+}
+
+void xen_irq_lateeoi(unsigned int irq, unsigned int eoi_flags)
+{
+ struct irq_info *info;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ read_lock_irqsave(&evtchn_rwlock, flags);
+
+ info = info_for_irq(irq);
+
+ if (info)
+ xen_irq_lateeoi_locked(info);
+
+ read_unlock_irqrestore(&evtchn_rwlock, flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_irq_lateeoi);
+
static void xen_irq_init(unsigned irq)
{
struct irq_info *info;
@@ -867,7 +895,7 @@ int xen_pirq_from_irq(unsigned irq)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_pirq_from_irq);
-int bind_evtchn_to_irq(unsigned int evtchn)
+static int bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip(evtchn_port_t evtchn, struct irq_chip *chip)
{
int irq;
int ret;
@@ -884,7 +912,7 @@ int bind_evtchn_to_irq(unsigned int evtchn)
if (irq < 0)
goto out;
- irq_set_chip_and_handler_name(irq, &xen_dynamic_chip,
+ irq_set_chip_and_handler_name(irq, chip,
handle_edge_irq, "event");
ret = xen_irq_info_evtchn_setup(irq, evtchn);
@@ -905,8 +933,19 @@ int bind_evtchn_to_irq(unsigned int evtchn)
return irq;
}
+
+int bind_evtchn_to_irq(evtchn_port_t evtchn)
+{
+ return bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip(evtchn, &xen_dynamic_chip);
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bind_evtchn_to_irq);
+int bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(evtchn_port_t evtchn)
+{
+ return bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip(evtchn, &xen_lateeoi_chip);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi);
+
static int bind_ipi_to_irq(unsigned int ipi, unsigned int cpu)
{
struct evtchn_bind_ipi bind_ipi;
@@ -948,8 +987,9 @@ static int bind_ipi_to_irq(unsigned int ipi, unsigned int cpu)
return irq;
}
-int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq(unsigned int remote_domain,
- unsigned int remote_port)
+static int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_chip(unsigned int remote_domain,
+ evtchn_port_t remote_port,
+ struct irq_chip *chip)
{
struct evtchn_bind_interdomain bind_interdomain;
int err;
@@ -960,10 +1000,26 @@ int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq(unsigned int remote_domain,
err = HYPERVISOR_event_channel_op(EVTCHNOP_bind_interdomain,
&bind_interdomain);
- return err ? : bind_evtchn_to_irq(bind_interdomain.local_port);
+ return err ? : bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip(bind_interdomain.local_port,
+ chip);
+}
+
+int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq(unsigned int remote_domain,
+ evtchn_port_t remote_port)
+{
+ return bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_chip(remote_domain, remote_port,
+ &xen_dynamic_chip);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq);
+int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(unsigned int remote_domain,
+ evtchn_port_t remote_port)
+{
+ return bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_chip(remote_domain, remote_port,
+ &xen_lateeoi_chip);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi);
+
static int find_virq(unsigned int virq, unsigned int cpu)
{
struct evtchn_status status;
@@ -1059,14 +1115,15 @@ static void unbind_from_irq(unsigned int irq)
mutex_unlock(&irq_mapping_update_lock);
}
-int bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler(unsigned int evtchn,
- irq_handler_t handler,
- unsigned long irqflags,
- const char *devname, void *dev_id)
+static int bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler_chip(evtchn_port_t evtchn,
+ irq_handler_t handler,
+ unsigned long irqflags,
+ const char *devname, void *dev_id,
+ struct irq_chip *chip)
{
int irq, retval;
- irq = bind_evtchn_to_irq(evtchn);
+ irq = bind_evtchn_to_irq_chip(evtchn, chip);
if (irq < 0)
return irq;
retval = request_irq(irq, handler, irqflags, devname, dev_id);
@@ -1077,18 +1134,38 @@ int bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler(unsigned int evtchn,
return irq;
}
+
+int bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler(evtchn_port_t evtchn,
+ irq_handler_t handler,
+ unsigned long irqflags,
+ const char *devname, void *dev_id)
+{
+ return bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler_chip(evtchn, handler, irqflags,
+ devname, dev_id,
+ &xen_dynamic_chip);
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler);
-int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler(unsigned int remote_domain,
- unsigned int remote_port,
- irq_handler_t handler,
- unsigned long irqflags,
- const char *devname,
- void *dev_id)
+int bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(evtchn_port_t evtchn,
+ irq_handler_t handler,
+ unsigned long irqflags,
+ const char *devname, void *dev_id)
+{
+ return bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler_chip(evtchn, handler, irqflags,
+ devname, dev_id,
+ &xen_lateeoi_chip);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi);
+
+static int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_chip(
+ unsigned int remote_domain, evtchn_port_t remote_port,
+ irq_handler_t handler, unsigned long irqflags,
+ const char *devname, void *dev_id, struct irq_chip *chip)
{
int irq, retval;
- irq = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq(remote_domain, remote_port);
+ irq = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_chip(remote_domain, remote_port,
+ chip);
if (irq < 0)
return irq;
@@ -1100,8 +1177,33 @@ int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler(unsigned int remote_domain,
return irq;
}
+
+int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler(unsigned int remote_domain,
+ evtchn_port_t remote_port,
+ irq_handler_t handler,
+ unsigned long irqflags,
+ const char *devname,
+ void *dev_id)
+{
+ return bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_chip(remote_domain,
+ remote_port, handler, irqflags, devname,
+ dev_id, &xen_dynamic_chip);
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler);
+int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(unsigned int remote_domain,
+ evtchn_port_t remote_port,
+ irq_handler_t handler,
+ unsigned long irqflags,
+ const char *devname,
+ void *dev_id)
+{
+ return bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_chip(remote_domain,
+ remote_port, handler, irqflags, devname,
+ dev_id, &xen_lateeoi_chip);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi);
+
int bind_virq_to_irqhandler(unsigned int virq, unsigned int cpu,
irq_handler_t handler,
unsigned long irqflags, const char *devname, void *dev_id)
@@ -1645,6 +1747,21 @@ static struct irq_chip xen_dynamic_chip __read_mostly = {
.irq_retrigger = retrigger_dynirq,
};
+static struct irq_chip xen_lateeoi_chip __read_mostly = {
+ /* The chip name needs to contain "xen-dyn" for irqbalance to work. */
+ .name = "xen-dyn-lateeoi",
+
+ .irq_disable = disable_dynirq,
+ .irq_mask = disable_dynirq,
+ .irq_unmask = enable_dynirq,
+
+ .irq_ack = mask_ack_dynirq,
+ .irq_mask_ack = mask_ack_dynirq,
+
+ .irq_set_affinity = set_affinity_irq,
+ .irq_retrigger = retrigger_dynirq,
+};
+
static struct irq_chip xen_pirq_chip __read_mostly = {
.name = "xen-pirq",
diff --git a/include/xen/events.h b/include/xen/events.h
index c0e6a0598397..31952308a6d5 100644
--- a/include/xen/events.h
+++ b/include/xen/events.h
@@ -14,11 +14,16 @@
unsigned xen_evtchn_nr_channels(void);
-int bind_evtchn_to_irq(unsigned int evtchn);
-int bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler(unsigned int evtchn,
+int bind_evtchn_to_irq(evtchn_port_t evtchn);
+int bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(evtchn_port_t evtchn);
+int bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler(evtchn_port_t evtchn,
irq_handler_t handler,
unsigned long irqflags, const char *devname,
void *dev_id);
+int bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(evtchn_port_t evtchn,
+ irq_handler_t handler,
+ unsigned long irqflags, const char *devname,
+ void *dev_id);
int bind_virq_to_irq(unsigned int virq, unsigned int cpu, bool percpu);
int bind_virq_to_irqhandler(unsigned int virq, unsigned int cpu,
irq_handler_t handler,
@@ -31,13 +36,21 @@ int bind_ipi_to_irqhandler(enum ipi_vector ipi,
const char *devname,
void *dev_id);
int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq(unsigned int remote_domain,
- unsigned int remote_port);
+ evtchn_port_t remote_port);
+int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(unsigned int remote_domain,
+ evtchn_port_t remote_port);
int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler(unsigned int remote_domain,
- unsigned int remote_port,
+ evtchn_port_t remote_port,
irq_handler_t handler,
unsigned long irqflags,
const char *devname,
void *dev_id);
+int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(unsigned int remote_domain,
+ evtchn_port_t remote_port,
+ irq_handler_t handler,
+ unsigned long irqflags,
+ const char *devname,
+ void *dev_id);
/*
* Common unbind function for all event sources. Takes IRQ to unbind from.
@@ -46,6 +59,14 @@ int bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler(unsigned int remote_domain,
*/
void unbind_from_irqhandler(unsigned int irq, void *dev_id);
+/*
+ * Send late EOI for an IRQ bound to an event channel via one of the *_lateeoi
+ * functions above.
+ */
+void xen_irq_lateeoi(unsigned int irq, unsigned int eoi_flags);
+/* Signal an event was spurious, i.e. there was no action resulting from it. */
+#define XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS 0x00000001
+
#define XEN_IRQ_PRIORITY_MAX EVTCHN_FIFO_PRIORITY_MAX
#define XEN_IRQ_PRIORITY_DEFAULT EVTCHN_FIFO_PRIORITY_DEFAULT
#define XEN_IRQ_PRIORITY_MIN EVTCHN_FIFO_PRIORITY_MIN
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 05/13] xen/blkback: use lateeoi irq binding
2020-11-03 14:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Juergen Gross
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] xen/events: add a new "late EOI" evtchn framework Juergen Gross
@ 2020-11-03 14:13 ` Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] xen/netback: " Juergen Gross
` (8 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2020-11-03 14:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
In order to reduce the chance for the system becoming unresponsive due
to event storms triggered by a misbehaving blkfront use the lateeoi
irq binding for blkback and unmask the event channel only after
processing all pending requests.
As the thread processing requests is used to do purging work in regular
intervals an EOI may be sent only after having received an event. If
there was no pending I/O request flag the EOI as spurious.
This is part of XSA-332.
This is upstream commit 01263a1fabe30b4d542f34c7e2364a22587ddaf2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
---
drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c | 5 ++---
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c b/drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c
index 3666afa639d1..b18f0162cb9c 100644
--- a/drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c
+++ b/drivers/block/xen-blkback/blkback.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static inline void shrink_free_pagepool(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring, int num)
#define vaddr(page) ((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(page_to_pfn(page)))
-static int do_block_io_op(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring);
+static int do_block_io_op(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring, unsigned int *eoi_flags);
static int dispatch_rw_block_io(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring,
struct blkif_request *req,
struct pending_req *pending_req);
@@ -615,6 +615,8 @@ int xen_blkif_schedule(void *arg)
struct xen_vbd *vbd = &blkif->vbd;
unsigned long timeout;
int ret;
+ bool do_eoi;
+ unsigned int eoi_flags = XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS;
set_freezable();
while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
@@ -639,16 +641,23 @@ int xen_blkif_schedule(void *arg)
if (timeout == 0)
goto purge_gnt_list;
+ do_eoi = ring->waiting_reqs;
+
ring->waiting_reqs = 0;
smp_mb(); /* clear flag *before* checking for work */
- ret = do_block_io_op(ring);
+ ret = do_block_io_op(ring, &eoi_flags);
if (ret > 0)
ring->waiting_reqs = 1;
if (ret == -EACCES)
wait_event_interruptible(ring->shutdown_wq,
kthread_should_stop());
+ if (do_eoi && !ring->waiting_reqs) {
+ xen_irq_lateeoi(ring->irq, eoi_flags);
+ eoi_flags |= XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS;
+ }
+
purge_gnt_list:
if (blkif->vbd.feature_gnt_persistent &&
time_after(jiffies, ring->next_lru)) {
@@ -1121,7 +1130,7 @@ static void end_block_io_op(struct bio *bio)
* and transmute it to the block API to hand it over to the proper block disk.
*/
static int
-__do_block_io_op(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring)
+__do_block_io_op(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring, unsigned int *eoi_flags)
{
union blkif_back_rings *blk_rings = &ring->blk_rings;
struct blkif_request req;
@@ -1144,6 +1153,9 @@ __do_block_io_op(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring)
if (RING_REQUEST_CONS_OVERFLOW(&blk_rings->common, rc))
break;
+ /* We've seen a request, so clear spurious eoi flag. */
+ *eoi_flags &= ~XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS;
+
if (kthread_should_stop()) {
more_to_do = 1;
break;
@@ -1202,13 +1214,13 @@ __do_block_io_op(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring)
}
static int
-do_block_io_op(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring)
+do_block_io_op(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring, unsigned int *eoi_flags)
{
union blkif_back_rings *blk_rings = &ring->blk_rings;
int more_to_do;
do {
- more_to_do = __do_block_io_op(ring);
+ more_to_do = __do_block_io_op(ring, eoi_flags);
if (more_to_do)
break;
diff --git a/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c b/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c
index c4cd68116e7f..192ca58cc3c7 100644
--- a/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c
+++ b/drivers/block/xen-blkback/xenbus.c
@@ -229,9 +229,8 @@ static int xen_blkif_map(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring, grant_ref_t *gref,
BUG();
}
- err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler(blkif->domid, evtchn,
- xen_blkif_be_int, 0,
- "blkif-backend", ring);
+ err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(blkif->domid,
+ evtchn, xen_blkif_be_int, 0, "blkif-backend", ring);
if (err < 0) {
xenbus_unmap_ring_vfree(blkif->be->dev, ring->blk_ring);
ring->blk_rings.common.sring = NULL;
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 06/13] xen/netback: use lateeoi irq binding
2020-11-03 14:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Juergen Gross
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] xen/blkback: use lateeoi irq binding Juergen Gross
@ 2020-11-03 14:13 ` Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] xen/scsiback: " Juergen Gross
` (7 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2020-11-03 14:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
In order to reduce the chance for the system becoming unresponsive due
to event storms triggered by a misbehaving netfront use the lateeoi
irq binding for netback and unmask the event channel only just before
going to sleep waiting for new events.
Make sure not to issue an EOI when none is pending by introducing an
eoi_pending element to struct xenvif_queue.
When no request has been consumed set the spurious flag when sending
the EOI for an interrupt.
This is part of XSA-332.
This is upstream commit 23025393dbeb3b8b3b60ebfa724cdae384992e27
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
---
drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h | 15 +++++++
drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 11 +++++-
drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c | 13 ++++--
4 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
index 05847eb91a1b..32fe131ba366 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
@@ -140,6 +140,20 @@ struct xenvif_queue { /* Per-queue data for xenvif */
char name[QUEUE_NAME_SIZE]; /* DEVNAME-qN */
struct xenvif *vif; /* Parent VIF */
+ /*
+ * TX/RX common EOI handling.
+ * When feature-split-event-channels = 0, interrupt handler sets
+ * NETBK_COMMON_EOI, otherwise NETBK_RX_EOI and NETBK_TX_EOI are set
+ * by the RX and TX interrupt handlers.
+ * RX and TX handler threads will issue an EOI when either
+ * NETBK_COMMON_EOI or their specific bits (NETBK_RX_EOI or
+ * NETBK_TX_EOI) are set and they will reset those bits.
+ */
+ atomic_t eoi_pending;
+#define NETBK_RX_EOI 0x01
+#define NETBK_TX_EOI 0x02
+#define NETBK_COMMON_EOI 0x04
+
/* Use NAPI for guest TX */
struct napi_struct napi;
/* When feature-split-event-channels = 0, tx_irq = rx_irq. */
@@ -375,6 +389,7 @@ int xenvif_dealloc_kthread(void *data);
irqreturn_t xenvif_ctrl_irq_fn(int irq, void *data);
+bool xenvif_have_rx_work(struct xenvif_queue *queue, bool test_kthread);
void xenvif_rx_action(struct xenvif_queue *queue);
void xenvif_rx_queue_tail(struct xenvif_queue *queue, struct sk_buff *skb);
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
index 103ed00775eb..e889488b84a0 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
@@ -77,12 +77,28 @@ int xenvif_schedulable(struct xenvif *vif)
!vif->disabled;
}
+static bool xenvif_handle_tx_interrupt(struct xenvif_queue *queue)
+{
+ bool rc;
+
+ rc = RING_HAS_UNCONSUMED_REQUESTS(&queue->tx);
+ if (rc)
+ napi_schedule(&queue->napi);
+ return rc;
+}
+
static irqreturn_t xenvif_tx_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
struct xenvif_queue *queue = dev_id;
+ int old;
- if (RING_HAS_UNCONSUMED_REQUESTS(&queue->tx))
- napi_schedule(&queue->napi);
+ old = atomic_fetch_or(NETBK_TX_EOI, &queue->eoi_pending);
+ WARN(old & NETBK_TX_EOI, "Interrupt while EOI pending\n");
+
+ if (!xenvif_handle_tx_interrupt(queue)) {
+ atomic_andnot(NETBK_TX_EOI, &queue->eoi_pending);
+ xen_irq_lateeoi(irq, XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS);
+ }
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
@@ -116,19 +132,46 @@ static int xenvif_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
return work_done;
}
+static bool xenvif_handle_rx_interrupt(struct xenvif_queue *queue)
+{
+ bool rc;
+
+ rc = xenvif_have_rx_work(queue, false);
+ if (rc)
+ xenvif_kick_thread(queue);
+ return rc;
+}
+
static irqreturn_t xenvif_rx_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
struct xenvif_queue *queue = dev_id;
+ int old;
- xenvif_kick_thread(queue);
+ old = atomic_fetch_or(NETBK_RX_EOI, &queue->eoi_pending);
+ WARN(old & NETBK_RX_EOI, "Interrupt while EOI pending\n");
+
+ if (!xenvif_handle_rx_interrupt(queue)) {
+ atomic_andnot(NETBK_RX_EOI, &queue->eoi_pending);
+ xen_irq_lateeoi(irq, XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS);
+ }
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
irqreturn_t xenvif_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
- xenvif_tx_interrupt(irq, dev_id);
- xenvif_rx_interrupt(irq, dev_id);
+ struct xenvif_queue *queue = dev_id;
+ int old;
+
+ old = atomic_fetch_or(NETBK_COMMON_EOI, &queue->eoi_pending);
+ WARN(old, "Interrupt while EOI pending\n");
+
+ /* Use bitwise or as we need to call both functions. */
+ if ((!xenvif_handle_tx_interrupt(queue) |
+ !xenvif_handle_rx_interrupt(queue))) {
+ atomic_andnot(NETBK_COMMON_EOI, &queue->eoi_pending);
+ xen_irq_lateeoi(irq, XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS);
+ }
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
@@ -595,7 +638,7 @@ int xenvif_connect_ctrl(struct xenvif *vif, grant_ref_t ring_ref,
shared = (struct xen_netif_ctrl_sring *)addr;
BACK_RING_INIT(&vif->ctrl, shared, XEN_PAGE_SIZE);
- err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq(vif->domid, evtchn);
+ err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(vif->domid, evtchn);
if (err < 0)
goto err_unmap;
@@ -653,7 +696,7 @@ int xenvif_connect_data(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
if (tx_evtchn == rx_evtchn) {
/* feature-split-event-channels == 0 */
- err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler(
+ err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(
queue->vif->domid, tx_evtchn, xenvif_interrupt, 0,
queue->name, queue);
if (err < 0)
@@ -664,7 +707,7 @@ int xenvif_connect_data(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
/* feature-split-event-channels == 1 */
snprintf(queue->tx_irq_name, sizeof(queue->tx_irq_name),
"%s-tx", queue->name);
- err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler(
+ err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(
queue->vif->domid, tx_evtchn, xenvif_tx_interrupt, 0,
queue->tx_irq_name, queue);
if (err < 0)
@@ -674,7 +717,7 @@ int xenvif_connect_data(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
snprintf(queue->rx_irq_name, sizeof(queue->rx_irq_name),
"%s-rx", queue->name);
- err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler(
+ err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(
queue->vif->domid, rx_evtchn, xenvif_rx_interrupt, 0,
queue->rx_irq_name, queue);
if (err < 0)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
index 0020b2e8c279..fa1ac0abc924 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ void xenvif_napi_schedule_or_enable_events(struct xenvif_queue *queue)
if (more_to_do)
napi_schedule(&queue->napi);
+ else if (atomic_fetch_andnot(NETBK_TX_EOI | NETBK_COMMON_EOI,
+ &queue->eoi_pending) &
+ (NETBK_TX_EOI | NETBK_COMMON_EOI))
+ xen_irq_lateeoi(queue->tx_irq, 0);
}
static void tx_add_credit(struct xenvif_queue *queue)
@@ -1622,9 +1626,14 @@ static bool xenvif_ctrl_work_todo(struct xenvif *vif)
irqreturn_t xenvif_ctrl_irq_fn(int irq, void *data)
{
struct xenvif *vif = data;
+ unsigned int eoi_flag = XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS;
- while (xenvif_ctrl_work_todo(vif))
+ while (xenvif_ctrl_work_todo(vif)) {
xenvif_ctrl_action(vif);
+ eoi_flag = 0;
+ }
+
+ xen_irq_lateeoi(irq, eoi_flag);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c
index ef5887037b22..9b62f65b630e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c
@@ -490,13 +490,13 @@ static bool xenvif_rx_queue_ready(struct xenvif_queue *queue)
return queue->stalled && prod - cons >= 1;
}
-static bool xenvif_have_rx_work(struct xenvif_queue *queue)
+bool xenvif_have_rx_work(struct xenvif_queue *queue, bool test_kthread)
{
return xenvif_rx_ring_slots_available(queue) ||
(queue->vif->stall_timeout &&
(xenvif_rx_queue_stalled(queue) ||
xenvif_rx_queue_ready(queue))) ||
- kthread_should_stop() ||
+ (test_kthread && kthread_should_stop()) ||
queue->vif->disabled;
}
@@ -527,15 +527,20 @@ static void xenvif_wait_for_rx_work(struct xenvif_queue *queue)
{
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
- if (xenvif_have_rx_work(queue))
+ if (xenvif_have_rx_work(queue, true))
return;
for (;;) {
long ret;
prepare_to_wait(&queue->wq, &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
- if (xenvif_have_rx_work(queue))
+ if (xenvif_have_rx_work(queue, true))
break;
+ if (atomic_fetch_andnot(NETBK_RX_EOI | NETBK_COMMON_EOI,
+ &queue->eoi_pending) &
+ (NETBK_RX_EOI | NETBK_COMMON_EOI))
+ xen_irq_lateeoi(queue->rx_irq, 0);
+
ret = schedule_timeout(xenvif_rx_queue_timeout(queue));
if (!ret)
break;
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 07/13] xen/scsiback: use lateeoi irq binding
2020-11-03 14:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Juergen Gross
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] xen/netback: " Juergen Gross
@ 2020-11-03 14:13 ` Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] xen/pvcallsback: " Juergen Gross
` (6 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2020-11-03 14:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
In order to reduce the chance for the system becoming unresponsive due
to event storms triggered by a misbehaving scsifront use the lateeoi
irq binding for scsiback and unmask the event channel only just before
leaving the event handling function.
In case of a ring protocol error don't issue an EOI in order to avoid
the possibility to use that for producing an event storm. This at once
will result in no further call of scsiback_irq_fn(), so the ring_error
struct member can be dropped and scsiback_do_cmd_fn() can signal the
protocol error via a negative return value.
This is part of XSA-332.
This is upstream commit 86991b6e7ea6c613b7692f65106076943449b6b7
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
---
drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c | 23 +++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c b/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
index ba0942e481bc..33d6499d8472 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-scsiback.c
@@ -91,7 +91,6 @@ struct vscsibk_info {
unsigned int irq;
struct vscsiif_back_ring ring;
- int ring_error;
spinlock_t ring_lock;
atomic_t nr_unreplied_reqs;
@@ -722,7 +721,8 @@ static struct vscsibk_pend *prepare_pending_reqs(struct vscsibk_info *info,
return pending_req;
}
-static int scsiback_do_cmd_fn(struct vscsibk_info *info)
+static int scsiback_do_cmd_fn(struct vscsibk_info *info,
+ unsigned int *eoi_flags)
{
struct vscsiif_back_ring *ring = &info->ring;
struct vscsiif_request ring_req;
@@ -739,11 +739,12 @@ static int scsiback_do_cmd_fn(struct vscsibk_info *info)
rc = ring->rsp_prod_pvt;
pr_warn("Dom%d provided bogus ring requests (%#x - %#x = %u). Halting ring processing\n",
info->domid, rp, rc, rp - rc);
- info->ring_error = 1;
- return 0;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
while ((rc != rp)) {
+ *eoi_flags &= ~XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS;
+
if (RING_REQUEST_CONS_OVERFLOW(ring, rc))
break;
@@ -802,13 +803,16 @@ static int scsiback_do_cmd_fn(struct vscsibk_info *info)
static irqreturn_t scsiback_irq_fn(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
struct vscsibk_info *info = dev_id;
+ int rc;
+ unsigned int eoi_flags = XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS;
- if (info->ring_error)
- return IRQ_HANDLED;
-
- while (scsiback_do_cmd_fn(info))
+ while ((rc = scsiback_do_cmd_fn(info, &eoi_flags)) > 0)
cond_resched();
+ /* In case of a ring error we keep the event channel masked. */
+ if (!rc)
+ xen_irq_lateeoi(irq, eoi_flags);
+
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
@@ -829,7 +833,7 @@ static int scsiback_init_sring(struct vscsibk_info *info, grant_ref_t ring_ref,
sring = (struct vscsiif_sring *)area;
BACK_RING_INIT(&info->ring, sring, PAGE_SIZE);
- err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq(info->domid, evtchn);
+ err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(info->domid, evtchn);
if (err < 0)
goto unmap_page;
@@ -1252,7 +1256,6 @@ static int scsiback_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev,
info->domid = dev->otherend_id;
spin_lock_init(&info->ring_lock);
- info->ring_error = 0;
atomic_set(&info->nr_unreplied_reqs, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&info->waiting_to_free);
info->dev = dev;
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 08/13] xen/pvcallsback: use lateeoi irq binding
2020-11-03 14:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Juergen Gross
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] xen/scsiback: " Juergen Gross
@ 2020-11-03 14:13 ` Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] xen/pciback: " Juergen Gross
` (5 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2020-11-03 14:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
In order to reduce the chance for the system becoming unresponsive due
to event storms triggered by a misbehaving pvcallsfront use the lateeoi
irq binding for pvcallsback and unmask the event channel only after
handling all write requests, which are the ones coming in via an irq.
This requires modifying the logic a little bit to not require an event
for each write request, but to keep the ioworker running until no
further data is found on the ring page to be processed.
This is part of XSA-332.
This is upstream commit c8d647a326f06a39a8e5f0f1af946eacfa1835f8
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
---
drivers/xen/pvcalls-back.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/pvcalls-back.c b/drivers/xen/pvcalls-back.c
index ffe9bd843922..9439de2ca0e4 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/pvcalls-back.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/pvcalls-back.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ struct sock_mapping {
atomic_t write;
atomic_t io;
atomic_t release;
+ atomic_t eoi;
void (*saved_data_ready)(struct sock *sk);
struct pvcalls_ioworker ioworker;
};
@@ -87,7 +88,7 @@ static int pvcalls_back_release_active(struct xenbus_device *dev,
struct pvcalls_fedata *fedata,
struct sock_mapping *map);
-static void pvcalls_conn_back_read(void *opaque)
+static bool pvcalls_conn_back_read(void *opaque)
{
struct sock_mapping *map = (struct sock_mapping *)opaque;
struct msghdr msg;
@@ -107,17 +108,17 @@ static void pvcalls_conn_back_read(void *opaque)
virt_mb();
if (error)
- return;
+ return false;
size = pvcalls_queued(prod, cons, array_size);
if (size >= array_size)
- return;
+ return false;
spin_lock_irqsave(&map->sock->sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, flags);
if (skb_queue_empty(&map->sock->sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
atomic_set(&map->read, 0);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&map->sock->sk->sk_receive_queue.lock,
flags);
- return;
+ return true;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&map->sock->sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, flags);
wanted = array_size - size;
@@ -141,7 +142,7 @@ static void pvcalls_conn_back_read(void *opaque)
ret = inet_recvmsg(map->sock, &msg, wanted, MSG_DONTWAIT);
WARN_ON(ret > wanted);
if (ret == -EAGAIN) /* shouldn't happen */
- return;
+ return true;
if (!ret)
ret = -ENOTCONN;
spin_lock_irqsave(&map->sock->sk->sk_receive_queue.lock, flags);
@@ -160,10 +161,10 @@ static void pvcalls_conn_back_read(void *opaque)
virt_wmb();
notify_remote_via_irq(map->irq);
- return;
+ return true;
}
-static void pvcalls_conn_back_write(struct sock_mapping *map)
+static bool pvcalls_conn_back_write(struct sock_mapping *map)
{
struct pvcalls_data_intf *intf = map->ring;
struct pvcalls_data *data = &map->data;
@@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ static void pvcalls_conn_back_write(struct sock_mapping *map)
array_size = XEN_FLEX_RING_SIZE(map->ring_order);
size = pvcalls_queued(prod, cons, array_size);
if (size == 0)
- return;
+ return false;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
msg.msg_flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
@@ -198,12 +199,11 @@ static void pvcalls_conn_back_write(struct sock_mapping *map)
atomic_set(&map->write, 0);
ret = inet_sendmsg(map->sock, &msg, size);
- if (ret == -EAGAIN || (ret >= 0 && ret < size)) {
+ if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
atomic_inc(&map->write);
atomic_inc(&map->io);
+ return true;
}
- if (ret == -EAGAIN)
- return;
/* write the data, then update the indexes */
virt_wmb();
@@ -216,9 +216,13 @@ static void pvcalls_conn_back_write(struct sock_mapping *map)
}
/* update the indexes, then notify the other end */
virt_wmb();
- if (prod != cons + ret)
+ if (prod != cons + ret) {
atomic_inc(&map->write);
+ atomic_inc(&map->io);
+ }
notify_remote_via_irq(map->irq);
+
+ return true;
}
static void pvcalls_back_ioworker(struct work_struct *work)
@@ -227,6 +231,7 @@ static void pvcalls_back_ioworker(struct work_struct *work)
struct pvcalls_ioworker, register_work);
struct sock_mapping *map = container_of(ioworker, struct sock_mapping,
ioworker);
+ unsigned int eoi_flags = XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS;
while (atomic_read(&map->io) > 0) {
if (atomic_read(&map->release) > 0) {
@@ -234,10 +239,18 @@ static void pvcalls_back_ioworker(struct work_struct *work)
return;
}
- if (atomic_read(&map->read) > 0)
- pvcalls_conn_back_read(map);
- if (atomic_read(&map->write) > 0)
- pvcalls_conn_back_write(map);
+ if (atomic_read(&map->read) > 0 &&
+ pvcalls_conn_back_read(map))
+ eoi_flags = 0;
+ if (atomic_read(&map->write) > 0 &&
+ pvcalls_conn_back_write(map))
+ eoi_flags = 0;
+
+ if (atomic_read(&map->eoi) > 0 && !atomic_read(&map->write)) {
+ atomic_set(&map->eoi, 0);
+ xen_irq_lateeoi(map->irq, eoi_flags);
+ eoi_flags = XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS;
+ }
atomic_dec(&map->io);
}
@@ -334,12 +347,9 @@ static struct sock_mapping *pvcalls_new_active_socket(
goto out;
map->bytes = page;
- ret = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler(fedata->dev->otherend_id,
- evtchn,
- pvcalls_back_conn_event,
- 0,
- "pvcalls-backend",
- map);
+ ret = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(
+ fedata->dev->otherend_id, evtchn,
+ pvcalls_back_conn_event, 0, "pvcalls-backend", map);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
map->irq = ret;
@@ -873,15 +883,18 @@ static irqreturn_t pvcalls_back_event(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
struct xenbus_device *dev = dev_id;
struct pvcalls_fedata *fedata = NULL;
+ unsigned int eoi_flags = XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS;
- if (dev == NULL)
- return IRQ_HANDLED;
+ if (dev) {
+ fedata = dev_get_drvdata(&dev->dev);
+ if (fedata) {
+ pvcalls_back_work(fedata);
+ eoi_flags = 0;
+ }
+ }
- fedata = dev_get_drvdata(&dev->dev);
- if (fedata == NULL)
- return IRQ_HANDLED;
+ xen_irq_lateeoi(irq, eoi_flags);
- pvcalls_back_work(fedata);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
@@ -891,12 +904,15 @@ static irqreturn_t pvcalls_back_conn_event(int irq, void *sock_map)
struct pvcalls_ioworker *iow;
if (map == NULL || map->sock == NULL || map->sock->sk == NULL ||
- map->sock->sk->sk_user_data != map)
+ map->sock->sk->sk_user_data != map) {
+ xen_irq_lateeoi(irq, 0);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
+ }
iow = &map->ioworker;
atomic_inc(&map->write);
+ atomic_inc(&map->eoi);
atomic_inc(&map->io);
queue_work(iow->wq, &iow->register_work);
@@ -931,7 +947,7 @@ static int backend_connect(struct xenbus_device *dev)
goto error;
}
- err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq(dev->otherend_id, evtchn);
+ err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi(dev->otherend_id, evtchn);
if (err < 0)
goto error;
fedata->irq = err;
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 09/13] xen/pciback: use lateeoi irq binding
2020-11-03 14:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Juergen Gross
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] xen/pvcallsback: " Juergen Gross
@ 2020-11-03 14:13 ` Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] xen/events: switch user event channels to lateeoi model Juergen Gross
` (4 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2020-11-03 14:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
In order to reduce the chance for the system becoming unresponsive due
to event storms triggered by a misbehaving pcifront use the lateeoi irq
binding for pciback and unmask the event channel only just before
leaving the event handling function.
Restructure the handling to support that scheme. Basically an event can
come in for two reasons: either a normal request for a pciback action,
which is handled in a worker, or in case the guest has finished an AER
request which was requested by pciback.
When an AER request is issued to the guest and a normal pciback action
is currently active issue an EOI early in order to be able to receive
another event when the AER request has been finished by the guest.
Let the worker processing the normal requests run until no further
request is pending, instead of starting a new worker ion that case.
Issue the EOI only just before leaving the worker.
This scheme allows to drop calling the generic function
xen_pcibk_test_and_schedule_op() after processing of any request as
the handling of both request types is now separated more cleanly.
This is part of XSA-332.
This is upstream commit c2711441bc961b37bba0615dd7135857d189035f
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
---
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pci_stub.c | 14 ++++----
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback.h | 12 +++++--
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++------
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/xenbus.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pci_stub.c b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pci_stub.c
index 097410a7cdb7..adf3aae2939f 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pci_stub.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pci_stub.c
@@ -733,10 +733,17 @@ static pci_ers_result_t common_process(struct pcistub_device *psdev,
wmb();
notify_remote_via_irq(pdev->evtchn_irq);
+ /* Enable IRQ to signal "request done". */
+ xen_pcibk_lateeoi(pdev, 0);
+
ret = wait_event_timeout(xen_pcibk_aer_wait_queue,
!(test_bit(_XEN_PCIB_active, (unsigned long *)
&sh_info->flags)), 300*HZ);
+ /* Enable IRQ for pcifront request if not already active. */
+ if (!test_bit(_PDEVF_op_active, &pdev->flags))
+ xen_pcibk_lateeoi(pdev, 0);
+
if (!ret) {
if (test_bit(_XEN_PCIB_active,
(unsigned long *)&sh_info->flags)) {
@@ -750,13 +757,6 @@ static pci_ers_result_t common_process(struct pcistub_device *psdev,
}
clear_bit(_PCIB_op_pending, (unsigned long *)&pdev->flags);
- if (test_bit(_XEN_PCIF_active,
- (unsigned long *)&sh_info->flags)) {
- dev_dbg(&psdev->dev->dev,
- "schedule pci_conf service in " DRV_NAME "\n");
- xen_pcibk_test_and_schedule_op(psdev->pdev);
- }
-
res = (pci_ers_result_t)aer_op->err;
return res;
}
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback.h b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback.h
index 263c059bff90..235cdfe13494 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback.h
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <xen/events.h>
#include <xen/interface/io/pciif.h>
#define DRV_NAME "xen-pciback"
@@ -27,6 +28,8 @@ struct pci_dev_entry {
#define PDEVF_op_active (1<<(_PDEVF_op_active))
#define _PCIB_op_pending (1)
#define PCIB_op_pending (1<<(_PCIB_op_pending))
+#define _EOI_pending (2)
+#define EOI_pending (1<<(_EOI_pending))
struct xen_pcibk_device {
void *pci_dev_data;
@@ -182,12 +185,17 @@ static inline void xen_pcibk_release_devices(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev)
irqreturn_t xen_pcibk_handle_event(int irq, void *dev_id);
void xen_pcibk_do_op(struct work_struct *data);
+static inline void xen_pcibk_lateeoi(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev,
+ unsigned int eoi_flag)
+{
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(_EOI_pending, &pdev->flags))
+ xen_irq_lateeoi(pdev->evtchn_irq, eoi_flag);
+}
+
int xen_pcibk_xenbus_register(void);
void xen_pcibk_xenbus_unregister(void);
extern int verbose_request;
-
-void xen_pcibk_test_and_schedule_op(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev);
#endif
/* Handles shared IRQs that can to device domain and control domain. */
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
index 787966f44589..c4ed2c634ca7 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c
@@ -297,26 +297,41 @@ int xen_pcibk_disable_msix(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev,
return 0;
}
#endif
+
+static inline bool xen_pcibk_test_op_pending(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev)
+{
+ return test_bit(_XEN_PCIF_active,
+ (unsigned long *)&pdev->sh_info->flags) &&
+ !test_and_set_bit(_PDEVF_op_active, &pdev->flags);
+}
+
/*
* Now the same evtchn is used for both pcifront conf_read_write request
* as well as pcie aer front end ack. We use a new work_queue to schedule
* xen_pcibk conf_read_write service for avoiding confict with aer_core
* do_recovery job which also use the system default work_queue
*/
-void xen_pcibk_test_and_schedule_op(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev)
+static void xen_pcibk_test_and_schedule_op(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev)
{
+ bool eoi = true;
+
/* Check that frontend is requesting an operation and that we are not
* already processing a request */
- if (test_bit(_XEN_PCIF_active, (unsigned long *)&pdev->sh_info->flags)
- && !test_and_set_bit(_PDEVF_op_active, &pdev->flags)) {
+ if (xen_pcibk_test_op_pending(pdev)) {
schedule_work(&pdev->op_work);
+ eoi = false;
}
/*_XEN_PCIB_active should have been cleared by pcifront. And also make
sure xen_pcibk is waiting for ack by checking _PCIB_op_pending*/
if (!test_bit(_XEN_PCIB_active, (unsigned long *)&pdev->sh_info->flags)
&& test_bit(_PCIB_op_pending, &pdev->flags)) {
wake_up(&xen_pcibk_aer_wait_queue);
+ eoi = false;
}
+
+ /* EOI if there was nothing to do. */
+ if (eoi)
+ xen_pcibk_lateeoi(pdev, XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS);
}
/* Performing the configuration space reads/writes must not be done in atomic
@@ -324,10 +339,8 @@ void xen_pcibk_test_and_schedule_op(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev)
* use of semaphores). This function is intended to be called from a work
* queue in process context taking a struct xen_pcibk_device as a parameter */
-void xen_pcibk_do_op(struct work_struct *data)
+static void xen_pcibk_do_one_op(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev)
{
- struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev =
- container_of(data, struct xen_pcibk_device, op_work);
struct pci_dev *dev;
struct xen_pcibk_dev_data *dev_data = NULL;
struct xen_pci_op *op = &pdev->op;
@@ -400,16 +413,31 @@ void xen_pcibk_do_op(struct work_struct *data)
smp_mb__before_atomic(); /* /after/ clearing PCIF_active */
clear_bit(_PDEVF_op_active, &pdev->flags);
smp_mb__after_atomic(); /* /before/ final check for work */
+}
- /* Check to see if the driver domain tried to start another request in
- * between clearing _XEN_PCIF_active and clearing _PDEVF_op_active.
- */
- xen_pcibk_test_and_schedule_op(pdev);
+void xen_pcibk_do_op(struct work_struct *data)
+{
+ struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev =
+ container_of(data, struct xen_pcibk_device, op_work);
+
+ do {
+ xen_pcibk_do_one_op(pdev);
+ } while (xen_pcibk_test_op_pending(pdev));
+
+ xen_pcibk_lateeoi(pdev, 0);
}
irqreturn_t xen_pcibk_handle_event(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev = dev_id;
+ bool eoi;
+
+ /* IRQs might come in before pdev->evtchn_irq is written. */
+ if (unlikely(pdev->evtchn_irq != irq))
+ pdev->evtchn_irq = irq;
+
+ eoi = test_and_set_bit(_EOI_pending, &pdev->flags);
+ WARN(eoi, "IRQ while EOI pending\n");
xen_pcibk_test_and_schedule_op(pdev);
diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/xenbus.c b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/xenbus.c
index 833b2d2c4318..e7a670235965 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/xenbus.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/xenbus.c
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static int xen_pcibk_do_attach(struct xen_pcibk_device *pdev, int gnt_ref,
pdev->sh_info = vaddr;
- err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler(
+ err = bind_interdomain_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(
pdev->xdev->otherend_id, remote_evtchn, xen_pcibk_handle_event,
0, DRV_NAME, pdev);
if (err < 0) {
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 10/13] xen/events: switch user event channels to lateeoi model
2020-11-03 14:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Juergen Gross
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] xen/pciback: " Juergen Gross
@ 2020-11-03 14:13 ` Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] xen/events: use a common cpu hotplug hook for event channels Juergen Gross
` (3 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2020-11-03 14:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Instead of disabling the irq when an event is received and enabling
it again when handled by the user process use the lateeoi model.
This is part of XSA-332.
This is upstream commit c44b849cee8c3ac587da3b0980e01f77500d158c
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
---
drivers/xen/evtchn.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/evtchn.c b/drivers/xen/evtchn.c
index 052b55a14ebc..a43930191e20 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/evtchn.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/evtchn.c
@@ -166,7 +166,6 @@ static irqreturn_t evtchn_interrupt(int irq, void *data)
"Interrupt for port %d, but apparently not enabled; per-user %p\n",
evtchn->port, u);
- disable_irq_nosync(irq);
evtchn->enabled = false;
spin_lock(&u->ring_prod_lock);
@@ -292,7 +291,7 @@ static ssize_t evtchn_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
evtchn = find_evtchn(u, port);
if (evtchn && !evtchn->enabled) {
evtchn->enabled = true;
- enable_irq(irq_from_evtchn(port));
+ xen_irq_lateeoi(irq_from_evtchn(port), 0);
}
}
@@ -392,8 +391,8 @@ static int evtchn_bind_to_user(struct per_user_data *u, int port)
if (rc < 0)
goto err;
- rc = bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler(port, evtchn_interrupt, 0,
- u->name, evtchn);
+ rc = bind_evtchn_to_irqhandler_lateeoi(port, evtchn_interrupt, 0,
+ u->name, evtchn);
if (rc < 0)
goto err;
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 11/13] xen/events: use a common cpu hotplug hook for event channels
2020-11-03 14:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Juergen Gross
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] xen/events: switch user event channels to lateeoi model Juergen Gross
@ 2020-11-03 14:13 ` Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] xen/events: defer eoi in case of excessive number of events Juergen Gross
` (2 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2020-11-03 14:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Today only fifo event channels have a cpu hotplug callback. In order
to prepare for more percpu (de)init work move that callback into
events_base.c and add percpu_init() and percpu_deinit() hooks to
struct evtchn_ops.
This is part of XSA-332.
This is upstream commit 7beb290caa2adb0a399e735a1e175db9aae0523a
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
---
drivers/xen/events/events_base.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++
drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c | 40 +++++++++++++---------------
drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h | 3 +++
3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
index 1a1325e09d50..b2b5eccdc5df 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <linux/irqnr.h>
#include <linux/pci.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/cpuhotplug.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
#include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -1834,6 +1835,26 @@ void xen_callback_vector(void) {}
static bool fifo_events = true;
module_param(fifo_events, bool, 0);
+static int xen_evtchn_cpu_prepare(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (evtchn_ops->percpu_init)
+ ret = evtchn_ops->percpu_init(cpu);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int xen_evtchn_cpu_dead(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (evtchn_ops->percpu_deinit)
+ ret = evtchn_ops->percpu_deinit(cpu);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
void __init xen_init_IRQ(void)
{
int ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -1844,6 +1865,10 @@ void __init xen_init_IRQ(void)
if (ret < 0)
xen_evtchn_2l_init();
+ cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_XEN_EVTCHN_PREPARE,
+ "xen/evtchn:prepare",
+ xen_evtchn_cpu_prepare, xen_evtchn_cpu_dead);
+
evtchn_to_irq = kcalloc(EVTCHN_ROW(xen_evtchn_max_channels()),
sizeof(*evtchn_to_irq), GFP_KERNEL);
BUG_ON(!evtchn_to_irq);
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c
index 3071256a9413..59e6002c9699 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c
@@ -385,21 +385,6 @@ static void evtchn_fifo_resume(void)
event_array_pages = 0;
}
-static const struct evtchn_ops evtchn_ops_fifo = {
- .max_channels = evtchn_fifo_max_channels,
- .nr_channels = evtchn_fifo_nr_channels,
- .setup = evtchn_fifo_setup,
- .bind_to_cpu = evtchn_fifo_bind_to_cpu,
- .clear_pending = evtchn_fifo_clear_pending,
- .set_pending = evtchn_fifo_set_pending,
- .is_pending = evtchn_fifo_is_pending,
- .test_and_set_mask = evtchn_fifo_test_and_set_mask,
- .mask = evtchn_fifo_mask,
- .unmask = evtchn_fifo_unmask,
- .handle_events = evtchn_fifo_handle_events,
- .resume = evtchn_fifo_resume,
-};
-
static int evtchn_fifo_alloc_control_block(unsigned cpu)
{
void *control_block = NULL;
@@ -422,19 +407,36 @@ static int evtchn_fifo_alloc_control_block(unsigned cpu)
return ret;
}
-static int xen_evtchn_cpu_prepare(unsigned int cpu)
+static int evtchn_fifo_percpu_init(unsigned int cpu)
{
if (!per_cpu(cpu_control_block, cpu))
return evtchn_fifo_alloc_control_block(cpu);
return 0;
}
-static int xen_evtchn_cpu_dead(unsigned int cpu)
+static int evtchn_fifo_percpu_deinit(unsigned int cpu)
{
__evtchn_fifo_handle_events(cpu, true);
return 0;
}
+static const struct evtchn_ops evtchn_ops_fifo = {
+ .max_channels = evtchn_fifo_max_channels,
+ .nr_channels = evtchn_fifo_nr_channels,
+ .setup = evtchn_fifo_setup,
+ .bind_to_cpu = evtchn_fifo_bind_to_cpu,
+ .clear_pending = evtchn_fifo_clear_pending,
+ .set_pending = evtchn_fifo_set_pending,
+ .is_pending = evtchn_fifo_is_pending,
+ .test_and_set_mask = evtchn_fifo_test_and_set_mask,
+ .mask = evtchn_fifo_mask,
+ .unmask = evtchn_fifo_unmask,
+ .handle_events = evtchn_fifo_handle_events,
+ .resume = evtchn_fifo_resume,
+ .percpu_init = evtchn_fifo_percpu_init,
+ .percpu_deinit = evtchn_fifo_percpu_deinit,
+};
+
int __init xen_evtchn_fifo_init(void)
{
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
@@ -448,9 +450,5 @@ int __init xen_evtchn_fifo_init(void)
evtchn_ops = &evtchn_ops_fifo;
- cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_XEN_EVTCHN_PREPARE,
- "xen/evtchn:prepare",
- xen_evtchn_cpu_prepare, xen_evtchn_cpu_dead);
-
return ret;
}
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h b/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h
index 82938cff6c7a..fef1d645261e 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h
@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ struct evtchn_ops {
void (*handle_events)(unsigned cpu);
void (*resume)(void);
+
+ int (*percpu_init)(unsigned int cpu);
+ int (*percpu_deinit)(unsigned int cpu);
};
extern const struct evtchn_ops *evtchn_ops;
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 12/13] xen/events: defer eoi in case of excessive number of events
2020-11-03 14:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Juergen Gross
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] xen/events: use a common cpu hotplug hook for event channels Juergen Gross
@ 2020-11-03 14:13 ` Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] xen/events: block rogue events for some time Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 16:21 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Greg KH
13 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2020-11-03 14:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
In case rogue guests are sending events at high frequency it might
happen that xen_evtchn_do_upcall() won't stop processing events in
dom0. As this is done in irq handling a crash might be the result.
In order to avoid that, delay further inter-domain events after some
time in xen_evtchn_do_upcall() by forcing eoi processing into a
worker on the same cpu, thus inhibiting new events coming in.
The time after which eoi processing is to be delayed is configurable
via a new module parameter "event_loop_timeout" which specifies the
maximum event loop time in jiffies (default: 2, the value was chosen
after some tests showing that a value of 2 was the lowest with an
only slight drop of dom0 network throughput while multiple guests
performed an event storm).
How long eoi processing will be delayed can be specified via another
parameter "event_eoi_delay" (again in jiffies, default 10, again the
value was chosen after testing with different delay values).
This is part of XSA-332.
This is upstream commit e99502f76271d6bc4e374fe368c50c67a1fd3070
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
---
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +
drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c | 7 +-
drivers/xen/events/events_base.c | 189 +++++++++++++++++-
drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c | 30 +--
drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h | 14 +-
5 files changed, 216 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 988a0d2535b2..d2e59ceb6208 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5457,6 +5457,14 @@
improve timer resolution at the expense of processing
more timer interrupts.
+ xen.event_eoi_delay= [XEN]
+ How long to delay EOI handling in case of event
+ storms (jiffies). Default is 10.
+
+ xen.event_loop_timeout= [XEN]
+ After which time (jiffies) the event handling loop
+ should start to delay EOI handling. Default is 2.
+
nopv= [X86,XEN,KVM,HYPER_V,VMWARE]
Disables the PV optimizations forcing the guest to run
as generic guest with no PV drivers. Currently support
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c
index e4b75693600e..f026624898e7 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_2l.c
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static inline xen_ulong_t active_evtchns(unsigned int cpu,
* a bitset of words which contain pending event bits. The second
* level is a bitset of pending events themselves.
*/
-static void evtchn_2l_handle_events(unsigned cpu)
+static void evtchn_2l_handle_events(unsigned cpu, struct evtchn_loop_ctrl *ctrl)
{
int irq;
xen_ulong_t pending_words;
@@ -242,10 +242,7 @@ static void evtchn_2l_handle_events(unsigned cpu)
/* Process port. */
port = (word_idx * BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD) + bit_idx;
- irq = get_evtchn_to_irq(port);
-
- if (irq != -1)
- generic_handle_irq(irq);
+ handle_irq_for_port(port, ctrl);
bit_idx = (bit_idx + 1) % BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD;
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
index b2b5eccdc5df..f67b92a488da 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
#include <linux/pci.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/cpuhotplug.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/ktime.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
#include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -64,6 +66,15 @@
#include "events_internal.h"
+#undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
+#define MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX "xen."
+
+static uint __read_mostly event_loop_timeout = 2;
+module_param(event_loop_timeout, uint, 0644);
+
+static uint __read_mostly event_eoi_delay = 10;
+module_param(event_eoi_delay, uint, 0644);
+
const struct evtchn_ops *evtchn_ops;
/*
@@ -87,6 +98,7 @@ static DEFINE_RWLOCK(evtchn_rwlock);
* irq_mapping_update_lock
* evtchn_rwlock
* IRQ-desc lock
+ * percpu eoi_list_lock
*/
static LIST_HEAD(xen_irq_list_head);
@@ -119,6 +131,8 @@ static struct irq_chip xen_pirq_chip;
static void enable_dynirq(struct irq_data *data);
static void disable_dynirq(struct irq_data *data);
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned int, irq_epoch);
+
static void clear_evtchn_to_irq_row(unsigned row)
{
unsigned col;
@@ -398,17 +412,120 @@ void notify_remote_via_irq(int irq)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(notify_remote_via_irq);
+struct lateeoi_work {
+ struct delayed_work delayed;
+ spinlock_t eoi_list_lock;
+ struct list_head eoi_list;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct lateeoi_work, lateeoi);
+
+static void lateeoi_list_del(struct irq_info *info)
+{
+ struct lateeoi_work *eoi = &per_cpu(lateeoi, info->eoi_cpu);
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&eoi->eoi_list_lock, flags);
+ list_del_init(&info->eoi_list);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&eoi->eoi_list_lock, flags);
+}
+
+static void lateeoi_list_add(struct irq_info *info)
+{
+ struct lateeoi_work *eoi = &per_cpu(lateeoi, info->eoi_cpu);
+ struct irq_info *elem;
+ u64 now = get_jiffies_64();
+ unsigned long delay;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ if (now < info->eoi_time)
+ delay = info->eoi_time - now;
+ else
+ delay = 1;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&eoi->eoi_list_lock, flags);
+
+ if (list_empty(&eoi->eoi_list)) {
+ list_add(&info->eoi_list, &eoi->eoi_list);
+ mod_delayed_work_on(info->eoi_cpu, system_wq,
+ &eoi->delayed, delay);
+ } else {
+ list_for_each_entry_reverse(elem, &eoi->eoi_list, eoi_list) {
+ if (elem->eoi_time <= info->eoi_time)
+ break;
+ }
+ list_add(&info->eoi_list, &elem->eoi_list);
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&eoi->eoi_list_lock, flags);
+}
+
static void xen_irq_lateeoi_locked(struct irq_info *info)
{
evtchn_port_t evtchn;
+ unsigned int cpu;
evtchn = info->evtchn;
- if (!VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
+ if (!VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn) || !list_empty(&info->eoi_list))
return;
+ cpu = info->eoi_cpu;
+ if (info->eoi_time && info->irq_epoch == per_cpu(irq_epoch, cpu)) {
+ lateeoi_list_add(info);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ info->eoi_time = 0;
unmask_evtchn(evtchn);
}
+static void xen_irq_lateeoi_worker(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct lateeoi_work *eoi;
+ struct irq_info *info;
+ u64 now = get_jiffies_64();
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ eoi = container_of(to_delayed_work(work), struct lateeoi_work, delayed);
+
+ read_lock_irqsave(&evtchn_rwlock, flags);
+
+ while (true) {
+ spin_lock(&eoi->eoi_list_lock);
+
+ info = list_first_entry_or_null(&eoi->eoi_list, struct irq_info,
+ eoi_list);
+
+ if (info == NULL || now < info->eoi_time) {
+ spin_unlock(&eoi->eoi_list_lock);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ list_del_init(&info->eoi_list);
+
+ spin_unlock(&eoi->eoi_list_lock);
+
+ info->eoi_time = 0;
+
+ xen_irq_lateeoi_locked(info);
+ }
+
+ if (info)
+ mod_delayed_work_on(info->eoi_cpu, system_wq,
+ &eoi->delayed, info->eoi_time - now);
+
+ read_unlock_irqrestore(&evtchn_rwlock, flags);
+}
+
+static void xen_cpu_init_eoi(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct lateeoi_work *eoi = &per_cpu(lateeoi, cpu);
+
+ INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&eoi->delayed, xen_irq_lateeoi_worker);
+ spin_lock_init(&eoi->eoi_list_lock);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&eoi->eoi_list);
+}
+
void xen_irq_lateeoi(unsigned int irq, unsigned int eoi_flags)
{
struct irq_info *info;
@@ -428,6 +545,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_irq_lateeoi);
static void xen_irq_init(unsigned irq)
{
struct irq_info *info;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/* By default all event channels notify CPU#0. */
cpumask_copy(irq_get_affinity_mask(irq), cpumask_of(0));
@@ -442,6 +560,7 @@ static void xen_irq_init(unsigned irq)
set_info_for_irq(irq, info);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&info->eoi_list);
list_add_tail(&info->list, &xen_irq_list_head);
}
@@ -497,6 +616,9 @@ static void xen_free_irq(unsigned irq)
write_lock_irqsave(&evtchn_rwlock, flags);
+ if (!list_empty(&info->eoi_list))
+ lateeoi_list_del(info);
+
list_del(&info->list);
set_info_for_irq(irq, NULL);
@@ -1356,6 +1478,54 @@ void xen_send_IPI_one(unsigned int cpu, enum ipi_vector vector)
notify_remote_via_irq(irq);
}
+struct evtchn_loop_ctrl {
+ ktime_t timeout;
+ unsigned count;
+ bool defer_eoi;
+};
+
+void handle_irq_for_port(evtchn_port_t port, struct evtchn_loop_ctrl *ctrl)
+{
+ int irq;
+ struct irq_info *info;
+
+ irq = get_evtchn_to_irq(port);
+ if (irq == -1)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Check for timeout every 256 events.
+ * We are setting the timeout value only after the first 256
+ * events in order to not hurt the common case of few loop
+ * iterations. The 256 is basically an arbitrary value.
+ *
+ * In case we are hitting the timeout we need to defer all further
+ * EOIs in order to ensure to leave the event handling loop rather
+ * sooner than later.
+ */
+ if (!ctrl->defer_eoi && !(++ctrl->count & 0xff)) {
+ ktime_t kt = ktime_get();
+
+ if (!ctrl->timeout) {
+ kt = ktime_add_ms(kt,
+ jiffies_to_msecs(event_loop_timeout));
+ ctrl->timeout = kt;
+ } else if (kt > ctrl->timeout) {
+ ctrl->defer_eoi = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ info = info_for_irq(irq);
+
+ if (ctrl->defer_eoi) {
+ info->eoi_cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ info->irq_epoch = __this_cpu_read(irq_epoch);
+ info->eoi_time = get_jiffies_64() + event_eoi_delay;
+ }
+
+ generic_handle_irq(irq);
+}
+
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned, xed_nesting_count);
static void __xen_evtchn_do_upcall(void)
@@ -1363,6 +1533,7 @@ static void __xen_evtchn_do_upcall(void)
struct vcpu_info *vcpu_info = __this_cpu_read(xen_vcpu);
int cpu = get_cpu();
unsigned count;
+ struct evtchn_loop_ctrl ctrl = { 0 };
read_lock(&evtchn_rwlock);
@@ -1372,7 +1543,7 @@ static void __xen_evtchn_do_upcall(void)
if (__this_cpu_inc_return(xed_nesting_count) - 1)
goto out;
- xen_evtchn_handle_events(cpu);
+ xen_evtchn_handle_events(cpu, &ctrl);
BUG_ON(!irqs_disabled());
@@ -1383,6 +1554,13 @@ static void __xen_evtchn_do_upcall(void)
out:
read_unlock(&evtchn_rwlock);
+ /*
+ * Increment irq_epoch only now to defer EOIs only for
+ * xen_irq_lateeoi() invocations occurring from inside the loop
+ * above.
+ */
+ __this_cpu_inc(irq_epoch);
+
put_cpu();
}
@@ -1829,9 +2007,6 @@ void xen_callback_vector(void)
void xen_callback_vector(void) {}
#endif
-#undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
-#define MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX "xen."
-
static bool fifo_events = true;
module_param(fifo_events, bool, 0);
@@ -1839,6 +2014,8 @@ static int xen_evtchn_cpu_prepare(unsigned int cpu)
{
int ret = 0;
+ xen_cpu_init_eoi(cpu);
+
if (evtchn_ops->percpu_init)
ret = evtchn_ops->percpu_init(cpu);
@@ -1865,6 +2042,8 @@ void __init xen_init_IRQ(void)
if (ret < 0)
xen_evtchn_2l_init();
+ xen_cpu_init_eoi(smp_processor_id());
+
cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_XEN_EVTCHN_PREPARE,
"xen/evtchn:prepare",
xen_evtchn_cpu_prepare, xen_evtchn_cpu_dead);
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c
index 59e6002c9699..33462521bfd0 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_fifo.c
@@ -275,19 +275,9 @@ static uint32_t clear_linked(volatile event_word_t *word)
return w & EVTCHN_FIFO_LINK_MASK;
}
-static void handle_irq_for_port(unsigned port)
-{
- int irq;
-
- irq = get_evtchn_to_irq(port);
- if (irq != -1)
- generic_handle_irq(irq);
-}
-
-static void consume_one_event(unsigned cpu,
+static void consume_one_event(unsigned cpu, struct evtchn_loop_ctrl *ctrl,
struct evtchn_fifo_control_block *control_block,
- unsigned priority, unsigned long *ready,
- bool drop)
+ unsigned priority, unsigned long *ready)
{
struct evtchn_fifo_queue *q = &per_cpu(cpu_queue, cpu);
uint32_t head;
@@ -320,16 +310,17 @@ static void consume_one_event(unsigned cpu,
clear_bit(priority, ready);
if (evtchn_fifo_is_pending(port) && !evtchn_fifo_is_masked(port)) {
- if (unlikely(drop))
+ if (unlikely(!ctrl))
pr_warn("Dropping pending event for port %u\n", port);
else
- handle_irq_for_port(port);
+ handle_irq_for_port(port, ctrl);
}
q->head[priority] = head;
}
-static void __evtchn_fifo_handle_events(unsigned cpu, bool drop)
+static void __evtchn_fifo_handle_events(unsigned cpu,
+ struct evtchn_loop_ctrl *ctrl)
{
struct evtchn_fifo_control_block *control_block;
unsigned long ready;
@@ -341,14 +332,15 @@ static void __evtchn_fifo_handle_events(unsigned cpu, bool drop)
while (ready) {
q = find_first_bit(&ready, EVTCHN_FIFO_MAX_QUEUES);
- consume_one_event(cpu, control_block, q, &ready, drop);
+ consume_one_event(cpu, ctrl, control_block, q, &ready);
ready |= xchg(&control_block->ready, 0);
}
}
-static void evtchn_fifo_handle_events(unsigned cpu)
+static void evtchn_fifo_handle_events(unsigned cpu,
+ struct evtchn_loop_ctrl *ctrl)
{
- __evtchn_fifo_handle_events(cpu, false);
+ __evtchn_fifo_handle_events(cpu, ctrl);
}
static void evtchn_fifo_resume(void)
@@ -416,7 +408,7 @@ static int evtchn_fifo_percpu_init(unsigned int cpu)
static int evtchn_fifo_percpu_deinit(unsigned int cpu)
{
- __evtchn_fifo_handle_events(cpu, true);
+ __evtchn_fifo_handle_events(cpu, NULL);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h b/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h
index fef1d645261e..756c87532d33 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h
@@ -30,11 +30,15 @@ enum xen_irq_type {
*/
struct irq_info {
struct list_head list;
+ struct list_head eoi_list;
int refcnt;
enum xen_irq_type type; /* type */
unsigned irq;
unsigned int evtchn; /* event channel */
unsigned short cpu; /* cpu bound */
+ unsigned short eoi_cpu; /* EOI must happen on this cpu */
+ unsigned int irq_epoch; /* If eoi_cpu valid: irq_epoch of event */
+ u64 eoi_time; /* Time in jiffies when to EOI. */
union {
unsigned short virq;
@@ -53,6 +57,8 @@ struct irq_info {
#define PIRQ_SHAREABLE (1 << 1)
#define PIRQ_MSI_GROUP (1 << 2)
+struct evtchn_loop_ctrl;
+
struct evtchn_ops {
unsigned (*max_channels)(void);
unsigned (*nr_channels)(void);
@@ -67,7 +73,7 @@ struct evtchn_ops {
void (*mask)(unsigned port);
void (*unmask)(unsigned port);
- void (*handle_events)(unsigned cpu);
+ void (*handle_events)(unsigned cpu, struct evtchn_loop_ctrl *ctrl);
void (*resume)(void);
int (*percpu_init)(unsigned int cpu);
@@ -78,6 +84,7 @@ extern const struct evtchn_ops *evtchn_ops;
extern int **evtchn_to_irq;
int get_evtchn_to_irq(unsigned int evtchn);
+void handle_irq_for_port(evtchn_port_t port, struct evtchn_loop_ctrl *ctrl);
struct irq_info *info_for_irq(unsigned irq);
unsigned cpu_from_irq(unsigned irq);
@@ -135,9 +142,10 @@ static inline void unmask_evtchn(unsigned port)
return evtchn_ops->unmask(port);
}
-static inline void xen_evtchn_handle_events(unsigned cpu)
+static inline void xen_evtchn_handle_events(unsigned cpu,
+ struct evtchn_loop_ctrl *ctrl)
{
- return evtchn_ops->handle_events(cpu);
+ return evtchn_ops->handle_events(cpu, ctrl);
}
static inline void xen_evtchn_resume(void)
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 13/13] xen/events: block rogue events for some time
2020-11-03 14:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Juergen Gross
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] xen/events: defer eoi in case of excessive number of events Juergen Gross
@ 2020-11-03 14:13 ` Juergen Gross
2020-11-03 16:21 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Greg KH
13 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Juergen Gross @ 2020-11-03 14:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
In order to avoid high dom0 load due to rogue guests sending events at
high frequency, block those events in case there was no action needed
in dom0 to handle the events.
This is done by adding a per-event counter, which set to zero in case
an EOI without the XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS is received from a backend
driver, and incremented when this flag has been set. In case the
counter is 2 or higher delay the EOI by 1 << (cnt - 2) jiffies, but
not more than 1 second.
In order not to waste memory shorten the per-event refcnt to two bytes
(it should normally never exceed a value of 2). Add an overflow check
to evtchn_get() to make sure the 2 bytes really won't overflow.
This is part of XSA-332.
This is upstream commit 5f7f77400ab5b357b5fdb7122c3442239672186c
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
---
drivers/xen/events/events_base.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
index f67b92a488da..26df84c45db4 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
@@ -460,17 +460,34 @@ static void lateeoi_list_add(struct irq_info *info)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&eoi->eoi_list_lock, flags);
}
-static void xen_irq_lateeoi_locked(struct irq_info *info)
+static void xen_irq_lateeoi_locked(struct irq_info *info, bool spurious)
{
evtchn_port_t evtchn;
unsigned int cpu;
+ unsigned int delay = 0;
evtchn = info->evtchn;
if (!VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn) || !list_empty(&info->eoi_list))
return;
+ if (spurious) {
+ if ((1 << info->spurious_cnt) < (HZ << 2))
+ info->spurious_cnt++;
+ if (info->spurious_cnt > 1) {
+ delay = 1 << (info->spurious_cnt - 2);
+ if (delay > HZ)
+ delay = HZ;
+ if (!info->eoi_time)
+ info->eoi_cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ info->eoi_time = get_jiffies_64() + delay;
+ }
+ } else {
+ info->spurious_cnt = 0;
+ }
+
cpu = info->eoi_cpu;
- if (info->eoi_time && info->irq_epoch == per_cpu(irq_epoch, cpu)) {
+ if (info->eoi_time &&
+ (info->irq_epoch == per_cpu(irq_epoch, cpu) || delay)) {
lateeoi_list_add(info);
return;
}
@@ -507,7 +524,7 @@ static void xen_irq_lateeoi_worker(struct work_struct *work)
info->eoi_time = 0;
- xen_irq_lateeoi_locked(info);
+ xen_irq_lateeoi_locked(info, false);
}
if (info)
@@ -536,7 +553,7 @@ void xen_irq_lateeoi(unsigned int irq, unsigned int eoi_flags)
info = info_for_irq(irq);
if (info)
- xen_irq_lateeoi_locked(info);
+ xen_irq_lateeoi_locked(info, eoi_flags & XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS);
read_unlock_irqrestore(&evtchn_rwlock, flags);
}
@@ -1439,7 +1456,7 @@ int evtchn_get(unsigned int evtchn)
goto done;
err = -EINVAL;
- if (info->refcnt <= 0)
+ if (info->refcnt <= 0 || info->refcnt == SHRT_MAX)
goto done;
info->refcnt++;
diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h b/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h
index 756c87532d33..a35c8c7ac606 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_internal.h
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ enum xen_irq_type {
struct irq_info {
struct list_head list;
struct list_head eoi_list;
- int refcnt;
+ short refcnt;
+ short spurious_cnt;
enum xen_irq_type type; /* type */
unsigned irq;
unsigned int evtchn; /* event channel */
--
2.26.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch
2020-11-03 14:13 [PATCH v2 00/13] Backport of patch series for stable 5.4 branch Juergen Gross
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2020-11-03 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] xen/events: block rogue events for some time Juergen Gross
@ 2020-11-03 16:21 ` Greg KH
13 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Greg KH @ 2020-11-03 16:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Juergen Gross; +Cc: stable
On Tue, Nov 03, 2020 at 03:13:08PM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote:
> V2: correct first patch
patch 1 updated
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread