[PATCH for 5.10.y 0/2] backports of ddbd89deb7d3 and aa6f8dcbab47

[PATCH for 5.10.y 0/2] backports of ddbd89deb7d3 and aa6f8dcbab47

[Halil Pasic]

Dear Stable Team,

This is a backport of ddbd89deb7d3 ("swiotlb: fix info leak with
DMA_FROM_DEVICE") and aa6f8dcbab47 ("swiotlb: rework "fix info leak with
DMA_FROM_DEVICE"") to 5.10.y.  

I had to handle some merge conflicts, and at this point we have
swiotlb_tbl_sync_single() as opposed to swiotlb_sync_single_for_device()
so I had to handle that as well.

Halil Pasic (2):
  swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE
  swiotlb: rework "fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE"

 kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)


base-commit: 9d7b0ced5647e0df1b200ee29119cb58ff958339
-- 
2.32.0

[PATCH for 5.10.x 1/2] swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE

[Halil Pasic]

The problem I'm addressing was discovered by the LTP test covering
cve-2018-1000204.

A short description of what happens follows:
1) The test case issues a command code 00 (TEST UNIT READY) via the SG_IO
   interface with: dxfer_len == 524288, dxdfer_dir == SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV
   and a corresponding dxferp. The peculiar thing about this is that TUR
   is not reading from the device.
2) In sg_start_req() the invocation of blk_rq_map_user() effectively
   bounces the user-space buffer. As if the device was to transfer into
   it. Since commit a45b599ad808 ("scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in
   sg_build_indirect()") we make sure this first bounce buffer is
   allocated with GFP_ZERO.
3) For the rest of the story we keep ignoring that we have a TUR, so the
   device won't touch the buffer we prepare as if the we had a
   DMA_FROM_DEVICE type of situation. My setup uses a virtio-scsi device
   and the  buffer allocated by SG is mapped by the function
   virtqueue_add_split() which uses DMA_FROM_DEVICE for the "in" sgs (here
   scatter-gather and not scsi generics). This mapping involves bouncing
   via the swiotlb (we need swiotlb to do virtio in protected guest like
   s390 Secure Execution, or AMD SEV).
4) When the SCSI TUR is done, we first copy back the content of the second
   (that is swiotlb) bounce buffer (which most likely contains some
   previous IO data), to the first bounce buffer, which contains all
   zeros.  Then we copy back the content of the first bounce buffer to
   the user-space buffer.
5) The test case detects that the buffer, which it zero-initialized,
  ain't all zeros and fails.

One can argue that this is an swiotlb problem, because without swiotlb
we leak all zeros, and the swiotlb should be transparent in a sense that
it does not affect the outcome (if all other participants are well
behaved).

Copying the content of the original buffer into the swiotlb buffer is
the only way I can think of to make swiotlb transparent in such
scenarios. So let's do just that if in doubt, but allow the driver
to tell us that the whole mapped buffer is going to be overwritten,
in which case we can preserve the old behavior and avoid the performance
impact of the extra bounce.

Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[pasic@linux.ibm.com: resolved merge conflicts]
---
 Documentation/core-api/dma-attributes.rst | 8 ++++++++
 include/linux/dma-mapping.h               | 8 ++++++++
 kernel/dma/swiotlb.c                      | 3 ++-
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/core-api/dma-attributes.rst b/Documentation/core-api/dma-attributes.rst
index 1887d92e8e92..17706dc91ec9 100644
--- a/Documentation/core-api/dma-attributes.rst
+++ b/Documentation/core-api/dma-attributes.rst
@@ -130,3 +130,11 @@ accesses to DMA buffers in both privileged "supervisor" and unprivileged
 subsystem that the buffer is fully accessible at the elevated privilege
 level (and ideally inaccessible or at least read-only at the
 lesser-privileged levels).
+
+DMA_ATTR_OVERWRITE
+------------------
+
+This is a hint to the DMA-mapping subsystem that the device is expected to
+overwrite the entire mapped size, thus the caller does not require any of the
+previous buffer contents to be preserved. This allows bounce-buffering
+implementations to optimise DMA_FROM_DEVICE transfers.
diff --git a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
index a7d70cdee25e..a9361178c5db 100644
--- a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
+++ b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
@@ -61,6 +61,14 @@
  */
 #define DMA_ATTR_PRIVILEGED		(1UL << 9)
 
+/*
+ * This is a hint to the DMA-mapping subsystem that the device is expected
+ * to overwrite the entire mapped size, thus the caller does not require any
+ * of the previous buffer contents to be preserved. This allows
+ * bounce-buffering implementations to optimise DMA_FROM_DEVICE transfers.
+ */
+#define DMA_ATTR_OVERWRITE		(1UL << 10)
+
 /*
  * A dma_addr_t can hold any valid DMA or bus address for the platform.  It can
  * be given to a device to use as a DMA source or target.  It is specific to a
diff --git a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
index 0ed0e1f215c7..62b1e5fa8673 100644
--- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
+++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
@@ -598,7 +598,8 @@ phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t orig_addr,
 
 	tlb_addr = slot_addr(io_tlb_start, index) + offset;
 	if (!(attrs & DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC) &&
-	    (dir == DMA_TO_DEVICE || dir == DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL))
+	    (!(attrs & DMA_ATTR_OVERWRITE) || dir == DMA_TO_DEVICE ||
+	    dir == DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL))
 		swiotlb_bounce(orig_addr, tlb_addr, mapping_size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
 	return tlb_addr;
 }
-- 
2.32.0

Re: [PATCH for 5.10.x 1/2] swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE

[Greg KH]

On Tue, Mar 22, 2022 at 11:02:17AM +0100, Halil Pasic wrote:
> The problem I'm addressing was discovered by the LTP test covering
> cve-2018-1000204.
> 
> A short description of what happens follows:
> 1) The test case issues a command code 00 (TEST UNIT READY) via the SG_IO
>    interface with: dxfer_len == 524288, dxdfer_dir == SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV
>    and a corresponding dxferp. The peculiar thing about this is that TUR
>    is not reading from the device.
> 2) In sg_start_req() the invocation of blk_rq_map_user() effectively
>    bounces the user-space buffer. As if the device was to transfer into
>    it. Since commit a45b599ad808 ("scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in
>    sg_build_indirect()") we make sure this first bounce buffer is
>    allocated with GFP_ZERO.
> 3) For the rest of the story we keep ignoring that we have a TUR, so the
>    device won't touch the buffer we prepare as if the we had a
>    DMA_FROM_DEVICE type of situation. My setup uses a virtio-scsi device
>    and the  buffer allocated by SG is mapped by the function
>    virtqueue_add_split() which uses DMA_FROM_DEVICE for the "in" sgs (here
>    scatter-gather and not scsi generics). This mapping involves bouncing
>    via the swiotlb (we need swiotlb to do virtio in protected guest like
>    s390 Secure Execution, or AMD SEV).
> 4) When the SCSI TUR is done, we first copy back the content of the second
>    (that is swiotlb) bounce buffer (which most likely contains some
>    previous IO data), to the first bounce buffer, which contains all
>    zeros.  Then we copy back the content of the first bounce buffer to
>    the user-space buffer.
> 5) The test case detects that the buffer, which it zero-initialized,
>   ain't all zeros and fails.
> 
> One can argue that this is an swiotlb problem, because without swiotlb
> we leak all zeros, and the swiotlb should be transparent in a sense that
> it does not affect the outcome (if all other participants are well
> behaved).
> 
> Copying the content of the original buffer into the swiotlb buffer is
> the only way I can think of to make swiotlb transparent in such
> scenarios. So let's do just that if in doubt, but allow the driver
> to tell us that the whole mapped buffer is going to be overwritten,
> in which case we can preserve the old behavior and avoid the performance
> impact of the extra bounce.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> [pasic@linux.ibm.com: resolved merge conflicts]
> ---
>  Documentation/core-api/dma-attributes.rst | 8 ++++++++
>  include/linux/dma-mapping.h               | 8 ++++++++
>  kernel/dma/swiotlb.c                      | 3 ++-
>  3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

What is the git commit id of this patch in Linus's tree?

Re: [PATCH for 5.10.x 1/2] swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE

[Halil Pasic]

On Tue, 22 Mar 2022 11:10:01 +0100
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 22, 2022 at 11:02:17AM +0100, Halil Pasic wrote:
> > The problem I'm addressing was discovered by the LTP test covering
> > cve-2018-1000204.
> > 
> > A short description of what happens follows:
> > 1) The test case issues a command code 00 (TEST UNIT READY) via the SG_IO
> >    interface with: dxfer_len == 524288, dxdfer_dir == SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV
> >    and a corresponding dxferp. The peculiar thing about this is that TUR
> >    is not reading from the device.
> > 2) In sg_start_req() the invocation of blk_rq_map_user() effectively
> >    bounces the user-space buffer. As if the device was to transfer into
> >    it. Since commit a45b599ad808 ("scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in
> >    sg_build_indirect()") we make sure this first bounce buffer is
> >    allocated with GFP_ZERO.
> > 3) For the rest of the story we keep ignoring that we have a TUR, so the
> >    device won't touch the buffer we prepare as if the we had a
> >    DMA_FROM_DEVICE type of situation. My setup uses a virtio-scsi device
> >    and the  buffer allocated by SG is mapped by the function
> >    virtqueue_add_split() which uses DMA_FROM_DEVICE for the "in" sgs (here
> >    scatter-gather and not scsi generics). This mapping involves bouncing
> >    via the swiotlb (we need swiotlb to do virtio in protected guest like
> >    s390 Secure Execution, or AMD SEV).
> > 4) When the SCSI TUR is done, we first copy back the content of the second
> >    (that is swiotlb) bounce buffer (which most likely contains some
> >    previous IO data), to the first bounce buffer, which contains all
> >    zeros.  Then we copy back the content of the first bounce buffer to
> >    the user-space buffer.
> > 5) The test case detects that the buffer, which it zero-initialized,
> >   ain't all zeros and fails.
> > 
> > One can argue that this is an swiotlb problem, because without swiotlb
> > we leak all zeros, and the swiotlb should be transparent in a sense that
> > it does not affect the outcome (if all other participants are well
> > behaved).
> > 
> > Copying the content of the original buffer into the swiotlb buffer is
> > the only way I can think of to make swiotlb transparent in such
> > scenarios. So let's do just that if in doubt, but allow the driver
> > to tell us that the whole mapped buffer is going to be overwritten,
> > in which case we can preserve the old behavior and avoid the performance
> > impact of the extra bounce.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > [pasic@linux.ibm.com: resolved merge conflicts]
> > ---
> >  Documentation/core-api/dma-attributes.rst | 8 ++++++++
> >  include/linux/dma-mapping.h               | 8 ++++++++
> >  kernel/dma/swiotlb.c                      | 3 ++-
> >  3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)  
> 
> What is the git commit id of this patch in Linus's tree?

ddbd89deb7d3 ("swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE")

What is the best way to state the original commit id for backports? I
used the cover letter this time, but it does not seem to be the right
choice.

Re: [PATCH for 5.10.x 1/2] swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE

[Greg KH]

On Tue, Mar 22, 2022 at 11:28:34AM +0100, Halil Pasic wrote:
> On Tue, 22 Mar 2022 11:10:01 +0100
> Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 
> > On Tue, Mar 22, 2022 at 11:02:17AM +0100, Halil Pasic wrote:
> > > The problem I'm addressing was discovered by the LTP test covering
> > > cve-2018-1000204.
> > > 
> > > A short description of what happens follows:
> > > 1) The test case issues a command code 00 (TEST UNIT READY) via the SG_IO
> > >    interface with: dxfer_len == 524288, dxdfer_dir == SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV
> > >    and a corresponding dxferp. The peculiar thing about this is that TUR
> > >    is not reading from the device.
> > > 2) In sg_start_req() the invocation of blk_rq_map_user() effectively
> > >    bounces the user-space buffer. As if the device was to transfer into
> > >    it. Since commit a45b599ad808 ("scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in
> > >    sg_build_indirect()") we make sure this first bounce buffer is
> > >    allocated with GFP_ZERO.
> > > 3) For the rest of the story we keep ignoring that we have a TUR, so the
> > >    device won't touch the buffer we prepare as if the we had a
> > >    DMA_FROM_DEVICE type of situation. My setup uses a virtio-scsi device
> > >    and the  buffer allocated by SG is mapped by the function
> > >    virtqueue_add_split() which uses DMA_FROM_DEVICE for the "in" sgs (here
> > >    scatter-gather and not scsi generics). This mapping involves bouncing
> > >    via the swiotlb (we need swiotlb to do virtio in protected guest like
> > >    s390 Secure Execution, or AMD SEV).
> > > 4) When the SCSI TUR is done, we first copy back the content of the second
> > >    (that is swiotlb) bounce buffer (which most likely contains some
> > >    previous IO data), to the first bounce buffer, which contains all
> > >    zeros.  Then we copy back the content of the first bounce buffer to
> > >    the user-space buffer.
> > > 5) The test case detects that the buffer, which it zero-initialized,
> > >   ain't all zeros and fails.
> > > 
> > > One can argue that this is an swiotlb problem, because without swiotlb
> > > we leak all zeros, and the swiotlb should be transparent in a sense that
> > > it does not affect the outcome (if all other participants are well
> > > behaved).
> > > 
> > > Copying the content of the original buffer into the swiotlb buffer is
> > > the only way I can think of to make swiotlb transparent in such
> > > scenarios. So let's do just that if in doubt, but allow the driver
> > > to tell us that the whole mapped buffer is going to be overwritten,
> > > in which case we can preserve the old behavior and avoid the performance
> > > impact of the extra bounce.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > > [pasic@linux.ibm.com: resolved merge conflicts]
> > > ---
> > >  Documentation/core-api/dma-attributes.rst | 8 ++++++++
> > >  include/linux/dma-mapping.h               | 8 ++++++++
> > >  kernel/dma/swiotlb.c                      | 3 ++-
> > >  3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)  
> > 
> > What is the git commit id of this patch in Linus's tree?
> 
> ddbd89deb7d3 ("swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE")
> 
> What is the best way to state the original commit id for backports? I
> used the cover letter this time, but it does not seem to be the right
> choice.

Below the --- line is fine, or somewhere that I can see it in the patch,
much like we do for the commits in the stable trees is even better.

Trying to dig it out of a cover letter is hard, for obvious reasons.

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH for 5.10.x 1/2] swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE

[Halil Pasic]

On Tue, 22 Mar 2022 11:36:40 +0100
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 22, 2022 at 11:28:34AM +0100, Halil Pasic wrote:
> > On Tue, 22 Mar 2022 11:10:01 +0100
> > Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >   
> > > On Tue, Mar 22, 2022 at 11:02:17AM +0100, Halil Pasic wrote:  
> > > > The problem I'm addressing was discovered by the LTP test covering
> > > > cve-2018-1000204.
> > > > 
> > > > A short description of what happens follows:
> > > > 1) The test case issues a command code 00 (TEST UNIT READY) via the SG_IO
> > > >    interface with: dxfer_len == 524288, dxdfer_dir == SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV
> > > >    and a corresponding dxferp. The peculiar thing about this is that TUR
> > > >    is not reading from the device.
> > > > 2) In sg_start_req() the invocation of blk_rq_map_user() effectively
> > > >    bounces the user-space buffer. As if the device was to transfer into
> > > >    it. Since commit a45b599ad808 ("scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in
> > > >    sg_build_indirect()") we make sure this first bounce buffer is
> > > >    allocated with GFP_ZERO.
> > > > 3) For the rest of the story we keep ignoring that we have a TUR, so the
> > > >    device won't touch the buffer we prepare as if the we had a
> > > >    DMA_FROM_DEVICE type of situation. My setup uses a virtio-scsi device
> > > >    and the  buffer allocated by SG is mapped by the function
> > > >    virtqueue_add_split() which uses DMA_FROM_DEVICE for the "in" sgs (here
> > > >    scatter-gather and not scsi generics). This mapping involves bouncing
> > > >    via the swiotlb (we need swiotlb to do virtio in protected guest like
> > > >    s390 Secure Execution, or AMD SEV).
> > > > 4) When the SCSI TUR is done, we first copy back the content of the second
> > > >    (that is swiotlb) bounce buffer (which most likely contains some
> > > >    previous IO data), to the first bounce buffer, which contains all
> > > >    zeros.  Then we copy back the content of the first bounce buffer to
> > > >    the user-space buffer.
> > > > 5) The test case detects that the buffer, which it zero-initialized,
> > > >   ain't all zeros and fails.
> > > > 
> > > > One can argue that this is an swiotlb problem, because without swiotlb
> > > > we leak all zeros, and the swiotlb should be transparent in a sense that
> > > > it does not affect the outcome (if all other participants are well
> > > > behaved).
> > > > 
> > > > Copying the content of the original buffer into the swiotlb buffer is
> > > > the only way I can think of to make swiotlb transparent in such
> > > > scenarios. So let's do just that if in doubt, but allow the driver
> > > > to tell us that the whole mapped buffer is going to be overwritten,
> > > > in which case we can preserve the old behavior and avoid the performance
> > > > impact of the extra bounce.
> > > > 
> > > > Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
> > > > Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> > > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > > > [pasic@linux.ibm.com: resolved merge conflicts]
> > > > ---
> > > >  Documentation/core-api/dma-attributes.rst | 8 ++++++++
> > > >  include/linux/dma-mapping.h               | 8 ++++++++
> > > >  kernel/dma/swiotlb.c                      | 3 ++-
> > > >  3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)    
> > > 
> > > What is the git commit id of this patch in Linus's tree?  
> > 
> > ddbd89deb7d3 ("swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE")
> > 
> > What is the best way to state the original commit id for backports? I
> > used the cover letter this time, but it does not seem to be the right
> > choice.  
> 
> Below the --- line is fine, or somewhere that I can see it in the patch,
> much like we do for the commits in the stable trees is even better.

Thanks! I will go with
" commit <SHA> upstream."
line after the short description then.

Regards,
Halil

[PATCH for 5.10.x 2/2] swiotlb: rework "fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE"

[Halil Pasic]

Unfortunately, we ended up merging an old version of the patch "fix info
leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE" instead of merging the latest one. Christoph
(the swiotlb maintainer), he asked me to create an incremental fix
(after I have pointed this out the mix up, and asked him for guidance).
So here we go.

The main differences between what we got and what was agreed are:
* swiotlb_sync_single_for_device is also required to do an extra bounce
* We decided not to introduce DMA_ATTR_OVERWRITE until we have exploiters
* The implantation of DMA_ATTR_OVERWRITE is flawed: DMA_ATTR_OVERWRITE
  must take precedence over DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC

Thus this patch removes DMA_ATTR_OVERWRITE, and makes
swiotlb_sync_single_for_device() bounce unconditionally (that is, also
when dir == DMA_TO_DEVICE) in order do avoid synchronising back stale
data from the swiotlb buffer.

Let me note, that if the size used with dma_sync_* API is less than the
size used with dma_[un]map_*, under certain circumstances we may still
end up with swiotlb not being transparent. In that sense, this is no
perfect fix either.

To get this bullet proof, we would have to bounce the entire
mapping/bounce buffer. For that we would have to figure out the starting
address, and the size of the mapping in
swiotlb_sync_single_for_device(). While this does seem possible, there
seems to be no firm consensus on how things are supposed to work.

Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: ddbd89deb7d3 ("swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[pasic@linux.ibm.com: adapted for 5.10]
---
 Documentation/core-api/dma-attributes.rst |  8 --------
 include/linux/dma-mapping.h               |  8 --------
 kernel/dma/swiotlb.c                      | 25 +++++++++++++++--------
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/core-api/dma-attributes.rst b/Documentation/core-api/dma-attributes.rst
index 17706dc91ec9..1887d92e8e92 100644
--- a/Documentation/core-api/dma-attributes.rst
+++ b/Documentation/core-api/dma-attributes.rst
@@ -130,11 +130,3 @@ accesses to DMA buffers in both privileged "supervisor" and unprivileged
 subsystem that the buffer is fully accessible at the elevated privilege
 level (and ideally inaccessible or at least read-only at the
 lesser-privileged levels).
-
-DMA_ATTR_OVERWRITE
-------------------
-
-This is a hint to the DMA-mapping subsystem that the device is expected to
-overwrite the entire mapped size, thus the caller does not require any of the
-previous buffer contents to be preserved. This allows bounce-buffering
-implementations to optimise DMA_FROM_DEVICE transfers.
diff --git a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
index a9361178c5db..a7d70cdee25e 100644
--- a/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
+++ b/include/linux/dma-mapping.h
@@ -61,14 +61,6 @@
  */
 #define DMA_ATTR_PRIVILEGED		(1UL << 9)
 
-/*
- * This is a hint to the DMA-mapping subsystem that the device is expected
- * to overwrite the entire mapped size, thus the caller does not require any
- * of the previous buffer contents to be preserved. This allows
- * bounce-buffering implementations to optimise DMA_FROM_DEVICE transfers.
- */
-#define DMA_ATTR_OVERWRITE		(1UL << 10)
-
 /*
  * A dma_addr_t can hold any valid DMA or bus address for the platform.  It can
  * be given to a device to use as a DMA source or target.  It is specific to a
diff --git a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
index 62b1e5fa8673..efcc275aab0a 100644
--- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
+++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c
@@ -597,10 +597,14 @@ phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t orig_addr,
 		io_tlb_orig_addr[index + i] = slot_addr(orig_addr, i);
 
 	tlb_addr = slot_addr(io_tlb_start, index) + offset;
-	if (!(attrs & DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC) &&
-	    (!(attrs & DMA_ATTR_OVERWRITE) || dir == DMA_TO_DEVICE ||
-	    dir == DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL))
-		swiotlb_bounce(orig_addr, tlb_addr, mapping_size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+	/*
+	 * When dir == DMA_FROM_DEVICE we could omit the copy from the orig
+	 * to the tlb buffer, if we knew for sure the device will
+	 * overwirte the entire current content. But we don't. Thus
+	 * unconditional bounce may prevent leaking swiotlb content (i.e.
+	 * kernel memory) to user-space.
+	 */
+	swiotlb_bounce(orig_addr, tlb_addr, mapping_size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
 	return tlb_addr;
 }
 
@@ -680,11 +684,14 @@ void swiotlb_tbl_sync_single(struct device *hwdev, phys_addr_t tlb_addr,
 			BUG_ON(dir != DMA_TO_DEVICE);
 		break;
 	case SYNC_FOR_DEVICE:
-		if (likely(dir == DMA_TO_DEVICE || dir == DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL))
-			swiotlb_bounce(orig_addr, tlb_addr,
-				       size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
-		else
-			BUG_ON(dir != DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
+		/*
+		 * Unconditional bounce is necessary to avoid corruption on
+		 * sync_*_for_cpu or dma_ummap_* when the device didn't
+		 * overwrite the whole lengt of the bounce buffer.
+		 */
+		swiotlb_bounce(orig_addr, tlb_addr,
+			       size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+		BUG_ON(!valid_dma_direction(dir));
 		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
-- 
2.32.0

Re: [PATCH for 5.10.x 2/2] swiotlb: rework "fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE"

[Greg KH]

On Tue, Mar 22, 2022 at 11:02:18AM +0100, Halil Pasic wrote:
> Unfortunately, we ended up merging an old version of the patch "fix info
> leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE" instead of merging the latest one. Christoph
> (the swiotlb maintainer), he asked me to create an incremental fix
> (after I have pointed this out the mix up, and asked him for guidance).
> So here we go.
> 
> The main differences between what we got and what was agreed are:
> * swiotlb_sync_single_for_device is also required to do an extra bounce
> * We decided not to introduce DMA_ATTR_OVERWRITE until we have exploiters
> * The implantation of DMA_ATTR_OVERWRITE is flawed: DMA_ATTR_OVERWRITE
>   must take precedence over DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC
> 
> Thus this patch removes DMA_ATTR_OVERWRITE, and makes
> swiotlb_sync_single_for_device() bounce unconditionally (that is, also
> when dir == DMA_TO_DEVICE) in order do avoid synchronising back stale
> data from the swiotlb buffer.
> 
> Let me note, that if the size used with dma_sync_* API is less than the
> size used with dma_[un]map_*, under certain circumstances we may still
> end up with swiotlb not being transparent. In that sense, this is no
> perfect fix either.
> 
> To get this bullet proof, we would have to bounce the entire
> mapping/bounce buffer. For that we would have to figure out the starting
> address, and the size of the mapping in
> swiotlb_sync_single_for_device(). While this does seem possible, there
> seems to be no firm consensus on how things are supposed to work.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
> Fixes: ddbd89deb7d3 ("swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> [pasic@linux.ibm.com: adapted for 5.10]
> ---
>  Documentation/core-api/dma-attributes.rst |  8 --------
>  include/linux/dma-mapping.h               |  8 --------
>  kernel/dma/swiotlb.c                      | 25 +++++++++++++++--------
>  3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

What is the git commit id of this commit in Linus's tree?

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH for 5.10.y 0/2] backports of ddbd89deb7d3 and aa6f8dcbab47

[Greg KH]

On Tue, Mar 22, 2022 at 11:02:16AM +0100, Halil Pasic wrote:
> Dear Stable Team,
> 
> This is a backport of ddbd89deb7d3 ("swiotlb: fix info leak with
> DMA_FROM_DEVICE") and aa6f8dcbab47 ("swiotlb: rework "fix info leak with
> DMA_FROM_DEVICE"") to 5.10.y.  
> 
> I had to handle some merge conflicts, and at this point we have
> swiotlb_tbl_sync_single() as opposed to swiotlb_sync_single_for_device()
> so I had to handle that as well.
> 
> Halil Pasic (2):
>   swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE
>   swiotlb: rework "fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE"
> 
>  kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
>  1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

Thanks for these.

What about for kernels older than 5.10?  Do they matter for this issue?

thanks,

greg k-h