FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: fix integer overflows on 32 bit systems" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: fix integer overflows on 32 bit systems" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

[gregkh]

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x aab98e2dbd648510f8f51b83fbf4721206ccae45
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025021018-blurry-lukewarm-5d5d@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..

Possible dependencies:



thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From aab98e2dbd648510f8f51b83fbf4721206ccae45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 09:28:35 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] ksmbd: fix integer overflows on 32 bit systems

On 32bit systems the addition operations in ipc_msg_alloc() can
potentially overflow leading to memory corruption.
Add bounds checking using KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD to avoid overflow.

Fixes: 0626e6641f6b ("cifsd: add server handler for central processing and tranport layers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>

diff --git a/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c b/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c
index c0bb8c7722d7..0460ebea6ff0 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c
@@ -627,6 +627,9 @@ ksmbd_ipc_spnego_authen_request(const char *spnego_blob, int blob_len)
 	struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_request *req;
 	struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_response *resp;
 
+	if (blob_len > KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD)
+		return NULL;
+
 	msg = ipc_msg_alloc(sizeof(struct ksmbd_spnego_authen_request) +
 			blob_len + 1);
 	if (!msg)
@@ -806,6 +809,9 @@ struct ksmbd_rpc_command *ksmbd_rpc_write(struct ksmbd_session *sess, int handle
 	struct ksmbd_rpc_command *req;
 	struct ksmbd_rpc_command *resp;
 
+	if (payload_sz > KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD)
+		return NULL;
+
 	msg = ipc_msg_alloc(sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + payload_sz + 1);
 	if (!msg)
 		return NULL;
@@ -854,6 +860,9 @@ struct ksmbd_rpc_command *ksmbd_rpc_ioctl(struct ksmbd_session *sess, int handle
 	struct ksmbd_rpc_command *req;
 	struct ksmbd_rpc_command *resp;
 
+	if (payload_sz > KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD)
+		return NULL;
+
 	msg = ipc_msg_alloc(sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + payload_sz + 1);
 	if (!msg)
 		return NULL;