From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: wangzhaolong@huaweicloud.com,pc@manguebit.org,stfrench@microsoft.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] smb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree
Date: Mon, 21 Jul 2025 13:13:41 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2025072141-jujitsu-ebay-6dbf@gregkh> (raw)
The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x b220bed63330c0e1733dc06ea8e75d5b9962b6b6
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2025072141-jujitsu-ebay-6dbf@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From b220bed63330c0e1733dc06ea8e75d5b9962b6b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong@huaweicloud.com>
Date: Sat, 5 Jul 2025 10:51:18 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] smb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using
async crypto
The CVE-2024-50047 fix removed asynchronous crypto handling from
crypt_message(), assuming all crypto operations are synchronous.
However, when hardware crypto accelerators are used, this can cause
use-after-free crashes:
crypt_message()
// Allocate the creq buffer containing the req
creq = smb2_get_aead_req(..., &req);
// Async encryption returns -EINPROGRESS immediately
rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
// Free creq while async operation is still in progress
kvfree_sensitive(creq, ...);
Hardware crypto modules often implement async AEAD operations for
performance. When crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt() returns -EINPROGRESS,
the operation completes asynchronously. Without crypto_wait_req(),
the function immediately frees the request buffer, leading to crashes
when the driver later accesses the freed memory.
This results in a use-after-free condition when the hardware crypto
driver later accesses the freed request structure, leading to kernel
crashes with NULL pointer dereferences.
The issue occurs because crypto_alloc_aead() with mask=0 doesn't
guarantee synchronous operation. Even without CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC in
the mask, async implementations can be selected.
Fix by restoring the async crypto handling:
- DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait) for completion tracking
- aead_request_set_callback() for async completion notification
- crypto_wait_req() to wait for operation completion
This ensures the request buffer isn't freed until the crypto operation
completes, whether synchronous or asynchronous, while preserving the
CVE-2024-50047 fix.
Fixes: b0abcd65ec54 ("smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8b784a13-87b0-4131-9ff9-7a8993538749@huaweicloud.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.org>
Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
index 1468c16ea9b8..cb659256d219 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
@@ -4316,6 +4316,7 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst,
u8 key[SMB3_ENC_DEC_KEY_SIZE];
struct aead_request *req;
u8 *iv;
+ DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
unsigned int crypt_len = le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize);
void *creq;
size_t sensitive_size;
@@ -4366,7 +4367,11 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst,
aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, crypt_len, iv);
aead_request_set_ad(req, assoc_data_len);
- rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
+ aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+ rc = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req)
+ : crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait);
if (!rc && enc)
memcpy(&tr_hdr->Signature, sign, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
next reply other threads:[~2025-07-21 11:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-21 11:13 gregkh [this message]
2025-07-22 14:19 ` [PATCH 5.10.y] smb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using async crypto Sasha Levin
2025-07-22 21:59 ` Sasha Levin
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=2025072141-jujitsu-ebay-6dbf@gregkh \
--to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=pc@manguebit.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stfrench@microsoft.com \
--cc=wangzhaolong@huaweicloud.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox