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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong@huaweicloud.com>,
	Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>,
	Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10.y] smb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using async crypto
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 10:19:11 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250722141911.953243-1-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2025072141-jujitsu-ebay-6dbf@gregkh>

From: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong@huaweicloud.com>

[ Upstream commit b220bed63330c0e1733dc06ea8e75d5b9962b6b6 ]

The CVE-2024-50047 fix removed asynchronous crypto handling from
crypt_message(), assuming all crypto operations are synchronous.
However, when hardware crypto accelerators are used, this can cause
use-after-free crashes:

  crypt_message()
    // Allocate the creq buffer containing the req
    creq = smb2_get_aead_req(..., &req);

    // Async encryption returns -EINPROGRESS immediately
    rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);

    // Free creq while async operation is still in progress
    kvfree_sensitive(creq, ...);

Hardware crypto modules often implement async AEAD operations for
performance. When crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt() returns -EINPROGRESS,
the operation completes asynchronously. Without crypto_wait_req(),
the function immediately frees the request buffer, leading to crashes
when the driver later accesses the freed memory.

This results in a use-after-free condition when the hardware crypto
driver later accesses the freed request structure, leading to kernel
crashes with NULL pointer dereferences.

The issue occurs because crypto_alloc_aead() with mask=0 doesn't
guarantee synchronous operation. Even without CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC in
the mask, async implementations can be selected.

Fix by restoring the async crypto handling:
- DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait) for completion tracking
- aead_request_set_callback() for async completion notification
- crypto_wait_req() to wait for operation completion

This ensures the request buffer isn't freed until the crypto operation
completes, whether synchronous or asynchronous, while preserving the
CVE-2024-50047 fix.

Fixes: b0abcd65ec54 ("smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8b784a13-87b0-4131-9ff9-7a8993538749@huaweicloud.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.org>
Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
index aa1acc698caa2..1297acb5bf8e5 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
@@ -4302,6 +4302,7 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst,
 	u8 key[SMB3_ENC_DEC_KEY_SIZE];
 	struct aead_request *req;
 	u8 *iv;
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
 	unsigned int crypt_len = le32_to_cpu(tr_hdr->OriginalMessageSize);
 	void *creq;
 
@@ -4350,7 +4351,11 @@ crypt_message(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst,
 	aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, crypt_len, iv);
 	aead_request_set_ad(req, assoc_data_len);
 
-	rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
+	aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+				  crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+	rc = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req)
+				: crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait);
 
 	if (!rc && enc)
 		memcpy(&tr_hdr->Signature, sign, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
-- 
2.39.5


  reply	other threads:[~2025-07-22 14:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-07-21 11:13 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] smb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree gregkh
2025-07-22 14:19 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2025-07-22 21:59 ` [PATCH 5.10.y] smb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using async crypto Sasha Levin

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