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* [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 1/9] hfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_bnode_read()
@ 2025-08-03 21:23 Sasha Levin
  2025-08-03 21:23 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 2/9] hfsplus: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfsplus_bnode_read() Sasha Levin
                   ` (7 more replies)
  0 siblings, 8 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2025-08-03 21:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: patches, stable; +Cc: Viacheslav Dubeyko, Sasha Levin, frank.li, linux-fsdevel

From: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>

[ Upstream commit a431930c9bac518bf99d6b1da526a7f37ddee8d8 ]

This patch introduces is_bnode_offset_valid() method that checks
the requested offset value. Also, it introduces
check_and_correct_requested_length() method that checks and
correct the requested length (if it is necessary). These methods
are used in hfs_bnode_read(), hfs_bnode_write(), hfs_bnode_clear(),
hfs_bnode_copy(), and hfs_bnode_move() with the goal to prevent
the access out of allocated memory and triggering the crash.

Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703214912.244138-1-slava@dubeyko.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---

LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus:

**Backport Status: YES**

This commit should definitely be backported to stable kernel trees.
Here's my detailed analysis:

## Critical Security Fix

This patch fixes a **critical security vulnerability** - a slab-out-of-
bounds access that can lead to memory corruption and potentially local
privilege escalation. The vulnerability exists in multiple HFS bnode
operations:

1. **Affected Functions**: The patch adds bounds checking to
   `hfs_bnode_read()`, `hfs_bnode_write()`, `hfs_bnode_clear()`,
   `hfs_bnode_copy()`, and `hfs_bnode_move()` - all core operations for
   HFS B-tree node handling.

2. **Root Cause**: These functions previously accepted offset and length
   parameters without any validation, allowing reads/writes beyond
   allocated memory when processing malformed HFS filesystems.

## Nature of the Fix

The fix is well-designed and minimal:

1. **Two validation functions added**:
   - `is_bnode_offset_valid()`: Ensures offset is within node boundaries
   - `check_and_correct_requested_length()`: Adjusts length to prevent
     out-of-bounds access

2. **Defensive programming**: The functions log errors but continue
   safely rather than crashing, which is appropriate for filesystem
   code.

## Backporting Criteria Met

1. **Fixes a real bug affecting users**: Yes - security vulnerability
   with CVE assignments
2. **Small and contained**: Yes - adds ~56 lines of validation code, no
   architectural changes
3. **Clear side effects**: Minimal - only adds safety checks, no
   functional changes
4. **No major architectural changes**: Correct - just adds input
   validation
5. **Critical subsystem**: Yes - filesystem security vulnerability
6. **Risk assessment**: Low risk - purely defensive checks that prevent
   invalid operations

## Additional Context

- This is a **long-standing issue** (not a recent regression), making it
  even more important to backport
- Similar fixes have been applied to HFS+ filesystem, showing this is a
  systematic issue
- The vulnerability allows mounting malformed filesystems to trigger
  heap corruption
- HFS is legacy but still supported for compatibility with older Mac
  systems

The patch perfectly fits stable tree criteria: it's a critical security
fix that's minimal, well-contained, and has very low risk of introducing
regressions while addressing a serious vulnerability.

 fs/hfs/bnode.c | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/hfs/bnode.c b/fs/hfs/bnode.c
index 2251286cd83f..2039cb6d5f66 100644
--- a/fs/hfs/bnode.c
+++ b/fs/hfs/bnode.c
@@ -15,6 +15,48 @@
 
 #include "btree.h"
 
+static inline
+bool is_bnode_offset_valid(struct hfs_bnode *node, int off)
+{
+	bool is_valid = off < node->tree->node_size;
+
+	if (!is_valid) {
+		pr_err("requested invalid offset: "
+		       "NODE: id %u, type %#x, height %u, "
+		       "node_size %u, offset %d\n",
+		       node->this, node->type, node->height,
+		       node->tree->node_size, off);
+	}
+
+	return is_valid;
+}
+
+static inline
+int check_and_correct_requested_length(struct hfs_bnode *node, int off, int len)
+{
+	unsigned int node_size;
+
+	if (!is_bnode_offset_valid(node, off))
+		return 0;
+
+	node_size = node->tree->node_size;
+
+	if ((off + len) > node_size) {
+		int new_len = (int)node_size - off;
+
+		pr_err("requested length has been corrected: "
+		       "NODE: id %u, type %#x, height %u, "
+		       "node_size %u, offset %d, "
+		       "requested_len %d, corrected_len %d\n",
+		       node->this, node->type, node->height,
+		       node->tree->node_size, off, len, new_len);
+
+		return new_len;
+	}
+
+	return len;
+}
+
 void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf, int off, int len)
 {
 	struct page *page;
@@ -23,6 +65,20 @@ void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf, int off, int len)
 	int bytes_to_read;
 	void *vaddr;
 
+	if (!is_bnode_offset_valid(node, off))
+		return;
+
+	if (len == 0) {
+		pr_err("requested zero length: "
+		       "NODE: id %u, type %#x, height %u, "
+		       "node_size %u, offset %d, len %d\n",
+		       node->this, node->type, node->height,
+		       node->tree->node_size, off, len);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	len = check_and_correct_requested_length(node, off, len);
+
 	off += node->page_offset;
 	pagenum = off >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	off &= ~PAGE_MASK; /* compute page offset for the first page */
@@ -83,6 +139,20 @@ void hfs_bnode_write(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf, int off, int len)
 {
 	struct page *page;
 
+	if (!is_bnode_offset_valid(node, off))
+		return;
+
+	if (len == 0) {
+		pr_err("requested zero length: "
+		       "NODE: id %u, type %#x, height %u, "
+		       "node_size %u, offset %d, len %d\n",
+		       node->this, node->type, node->height,
+		       node->tree->node_size, off, len);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	len = check_and_correct_requested_length(node, off, len);
+
 	off += node->page_offset;
 	page = node->page[0];
 
@@ -108,6 +178,20 @@ void hfs_bnode_clear(struct hfs_bnode *node, int off, int len)
 {
 	struct page *page;
 
+	if (!is_bnode_offset_valid(node, off))
+		return;
+
+	if (len == 0) {
+		pr_err("requested zero length: "
+		       "NODE: id %u, type %#x, height %u, "
+		       "node_size %u, offset %d, len %d\n",
+		       node->this, node->type, node->height,
+		       node->tree->node_size, off, len);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	len = check_and_correct_requested_length(node, off, len);
+
 	off += node->page_offset;
 	page = node->page[0];
 
@@ -124,6 +208,10 @@ void hfs_bnode_copy(struct hfs_bnode *dst_node, int dst,
 	hfs_dbg(BNODE_MOD, "copybytes: %u,%u,%u\n", dst, src, len);
 	if (!len)
 		return;
+
+	len = check_and_correct_requested_length(src_node, src, len);
+	len = check_and_correct_requested_length(dst_node, dst, len);
+
 	src += src_node->page_offset;
 	dst += dst_node->page_offset;
 	src_page = src_node->page[0];
@@ -143,6 +231,10 @@ void hfs_bnode_move(struct hfs_bnode *node, int dst, int src, int len)
 	hfs_dbg(BNODE_MOD, "movebytes: %u,%u,%u\n", dst, src, len);
 	if (!len)
 		return;
+
+	len = check_and_correct_requested_length(node, src, len);
+	len = check_and_correct_requested_length(node, dst, len);
+
 	src += node->page_offset;
 	dst += node->page_offset;
 	page = node->page[0];
-- 
2.39.5


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
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Thread overview: 9+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2025-08-03 21:23 [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 1/9] hfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_bnode_read() Sasha Levin
2025-08-03 21:23 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 2/9] hfsplus: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfsplus_bnode_read() Sasha Levin
2025-08-03 21:23 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 3/9] hfsplus: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in hfsplus_uni2asc() Sasha Levin
2025-08-03 21:23 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 4/9] hfsplus: don't use BUG_ON() in hfsplus_create_attributes_file() Sasha Levin
2025-08-03 21:23 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 5/9] arm64: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches Sasha Levin
2025-08-03 21:23 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 6/9] udf: Verify partition map count Sasha Levin
2025-08-03 21:23 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 7/9] drbd: add missing kref_get in handle_write_conflicts Sasha Levin
2025-08-03 21:23 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 8/9] hfs: fix not erasing deleted b-tree node issue Sasha Levin
2025-08-03 21:23 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 9/9] securityfs: don't pin dentries twice, once is enough Sasha Levin

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