* FAILED: patch "[PATCH] rxrpc: only handle RESPONSE during service challenge" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree
@ 2026-04-13 12:37 gregkh
2026-04-14 11:25 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 1/2] rxrpc: Don't need barrier for ->tx_bottom and ->acks_hard_ack Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: gregkh @ 2026-04-13 12:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jiewang2024, bird, dhowells, horms, jaltman, kuba, marc.dionne,
n05ec, tomapufckgml, yifanwucs, yuantan098
Cc: stable
The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x c43ffdcfdbb5567b1f143556df8a04b4eeea041c
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026041311-bullion-gave-bf22@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From c43ffdcfdbb5567b1f143556df8a04b4eeea041c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wang Jie <jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn>
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 13:12:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] rxrpc: only handle RESPONSE during service challenge
Only process RESPONSE packets while the service connection is still in
RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING. Check that state under state_lock before
running response verification and security initialization, then use a local
secured flag to decide whether to queue the secured-connection work after
the state transition. This keeps duplicate or late RESPONSE packets from
re-running the setup path and removes the unlocked post-transition state
test.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jie Wang <jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-21-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c
index c50cbfc5a313..9a41ec708aeb 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c
@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
+ bool secured = false;
int ret;
if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_ABORTED)
@@ -262,6 +263,13 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
return ret;
case RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_RESPONSE:
+ spin_lock_irq(&conn->state_lock);
+ if (conn->state != RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING) {
+ spin_unlock_irq(&conn->state_lock);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irq(&conn->state_lock);
+
ret = conn->security->verify_response(conn, skb);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -272,11 +280,13 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
return ret;
spin_lock_irq(&conn->state_lock);
- if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING)
+ if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING) {
conn->state = RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE;
+ secured = true;
+ }
spin_unlock_irq(&conn->state_lock);
- if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE) {
+ if (secured) {
/* Offload call state flipping to the I/O thread. As
* we've already received the packet, put it on the
* front of the queue.
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 6.6.y 1/2] rxrpc: Don't need barrier for ->tx_bottom and ->acks_hard_ack
2026-04-13 12:37 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] rxrpc: only handle RESPONSE during service challenge" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree gregkh
@ 2026-04-14 11:25 ` Sasha Levin
2026-04-14 11:25 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 2/2] rxrpc: only handle RESPONSE during service challenge Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-04-14 11:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: David Howells, Marc Dionne, linux-afs, Jakub Kicinski,
Sasha Levin
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 6396b48ac0a77165f9c2c40ab03d6c8188c89739 ]
We don't need a barrier for the ->tx_bottom value (which indicates the
lowest sequence still in the transmission queue) and the ->acks_hard_ack
value (which tracks the DATA packets hard-ack'd by the latest ACK packet
received and thus indicates which DATA packets can now be discarded) as the
app thread doesn't use either value as a reference to memory to access.
Rather, the app thread merely uses these as a guide to how much space is
available in the transmission queue
Change the code to use READ/WRITE_ONCE() instead.
Also, change rxrpc_check_tx_space() to use the same value for tx_bottom
throughout.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241204074710.990092-18-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: c43ffdcfdbb5 ("rxrpc: only handle RESPONSE during service challenge")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c | 8 +++++---
net/rxrpc/txbuf.c | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c
index b9f2f12281b33..3feace069cd20 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c
@@ -93,9 +93,11 @@ static int rxrpc_wait_to_be_connected(struct rxrpc_call *call, long *timeo)
*/
static bool rxrpc_check_tx_space(struct rxrpc_call *call, rxrpc_seq_t *_tx_win)
{
+ rxrpc_seq_t tx_bottom = READ_ONCE(call->tx_bottom);
+
if (_tx_win)
- *_tx_win = call->tx_bottom;
- return call->tx_prepared - call->tx_bottom < 256;
+ *_tx_win = tx_bottom;
+ return call->tx_prepared - tx_bottom < 256;
}
/*
@@ -137,7 +139,7 @@ static int rxrpc_wait_for_tx_window_waitall(struct rxrpc_sock *rx,
rtt = 2;
timeout = rtt;
- tx_start = smp_load_acquire(&call->acks_hard_ack);
+ tx_start = READ_ONCE(call->acks_hard_ack);
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c b/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c
index d43be85123864..84d067fbc2fd1 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c
@@ -112,14 +112,14 @@ void rxrpc_shrink_call_tx_buffer(struct rxrpc_call *call)
while ((txb = list_first_entry_or_null(&call->tx_buffer,
struct rxrpc_txbuf, call_link))) {
- hard_ack = smp_load_acquire(&call->acks_hard_ack);
+ hard_ack = call->acks_hard_ack;
if (before(hard_ack, txb->seq))
break;
if (txb->seq != call->tx_bottom + 1)
rxrpc_see_txbuf(txb, rxrpc_txbuf_see_out_of_step);
ASSERTCMP(txb->seq, ==, call->tx_bottom + 1);
- smp_store_release(&call->tx_bottom, call->tx_bottom + 1);
+ WRITE_ONCE(call->tx_bottom, call->tx_bottom + 1);
list_del_rcu(&txb->call_link);
trace_rxrpc_txqueue(call, rxrpc_txqueue_dequeue);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 6.6.y 2/2] rxrpc: only handle RESPONSE during service challenge
2026-04-14 11:25 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 1/2] rxrpc: Don't need barrier for ->tx_bottom and ->acks_hard_ack Sasha Levin
@ 2026-04-14 11:25 ` Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-04-14 11:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable
Cc: Wang Jie, Yifan Wu, Juefei Pu, Yuan Tan, Xin Liu, Yang Yang,
David Howells, Marc Dionne, Jeffrey Altman, Simon Horman,
linux-afs, stable, Jakub Kicinski, Sasha Levin
From: Wang Jie <jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn>
[ Upstream commit c43ffdcfdbb5567b1f143556df8a04b4eeea041c ]
Only process RESPONSE packets while the service connection is still in
RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING. Check that state under state_lock before
running response verification and security initialization, then use a local
secured flag to decide whether to queue the secured-connection work after
the state transition. This keeps duplicate or late RESPONSE packets from
re-running the setup path and removes the unlocked post-transition state
test.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jie Wang <jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-21-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ adapted spin_lock_irq/spin_unlock_irq calls to spin_lock/spin_unlock ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c
index c8df12d80c7ce..6ef2dc1aa8cc2 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_event.c
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
+ bool secured = false;
int ret;
if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_ABORTED)
@@ -245,6 +246,13 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
return conn->security->respond_to_challenge(conn, skb);
case RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_RESPONSE:
+ spin_lock(&conn->state_lock);
+ if (conn->state != RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING) {
+ spin_unlock(&conn->state_lock);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&conn->state_lock);
+
ret = conn->security->verify_response(conn, skb);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -255,11 +263,13 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
return ret;
spin_lock(&conn->state_lock);
- if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING)
+ if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING) {
conn->state = RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE;
+ secured = true;
+ }
spin_unlock(&conn->state_lock);
- if (conn->state == RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE) {
+ if (secured) {
/* Offload call state flipping to the I/O thread. As
* we've already received the packet, put it on the
* front of the queue.
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 6.6.y 1/2] rxrpc: Don't need barrier for ->tx_bottom and ->acks_hard_ack
2026-04-13 12:37 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree gregkh
@ 2026-04-14 12:05 ` Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-04-14 12:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: David Howells, Marc Dionne, linux-afs, Jakub Kicinski,
Sasha Levin
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 6396b48ac0a77165f9c2c40ab03d6c8188c89739 ]
We don't need a barrier for the ->tx_bottom value (which indicates the
lowest sequence still in the transmission queue) and the ->acks_hard_ack
value (which tracks the DATA packets hard-ack'd by the latest ACK packet
received and thus indicates which DATA packets can now be discarded) as the
app thread doesn't use either value as a reference to memory to access.
Rather, the app thread merely uses these as a guide to how much space is
available in the transmission queue
Change the code to use READ/WRITE_ONCE() instead.
Also, change rxrpc_check_tx_space() to use the same value for tx_bottom
throughout.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241204074710.990092-18-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: a44ce6aa2efb ("rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c | 8 +++++---
net/rxrpc/txbuf.c | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c
index b9f2f12281b33..3feace069cd20 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c
@@ -93,9 +93,11 @@ static int rxrpc_wait_to_be_connected(struct rxrpc_call *call, long *timeo)
*/
static bool rxrpc_check_tx_space(struct rxrpc_call *call, rxrpc_seq_t *_tx_win)
{
+ rxrpc_seq_t tx_bottom = READ_ONCE(call->tx_bottom);
+
if (_tx_win)
- *_tx_win = call->tx_bottom;
- return call->tx_prepared - call->tx_bottom < 256;
+ *_tx_win = tx_bottom;
+ return call->tx_prepared - tx_bottom < 256;
}
/*
@@ -137,7 +139,7 @@ static int rxrpc_wait_for_tx_window_waitall(struct rxrpc_sock *rx,
rtt = 2;
timeout = rtt;
- tx_start = smp_load_acquire(&call->acks_hard_ack);
+ tx_start = READ_ONCE(call->acks_hard_ack);
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c b/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c
index d43be85123864..84d067fbc2fd1 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c
@@ -112,14 +112,14 @@ void rxrpc_shrink_call_tx_buffer(struct rxrpc_call *call)
while ((txb = list_first_entry_or_null(&call->tx_buffer,
struct rxrpc_txbuf, call_link))) {
- hard_ack = smp_load_acquire(&call->acks_hard_ack);
+ hard_ack = call->acks_hard_ack;
if (before(hard_ack, txb->seq))
break;
if (txb->seq != call->tx_bottom + 1)
rxrpc_see_txbuf(txb, rxrpc_txbuf_see_out_of_step);
ASSERTCMP(txb->seq, ==, call->tx_bottom + 1);
- smp_store_release(&call->tx_bottom, call->tx_bottom + 1);
+ WRITE_ONCE(call->tx_bottom, call->tx_bottom + 1);
list_del_rcu(&txb->call_link);
trace_rxrpc_txqueue(call, rxrpc_txqueue_dequeue);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-04-14 12:05 UTC | newest]
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2026-04-14 11:25 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 1/2] rxrpc: Don't need barrier for ->tx_bottom and ->acks_hard_ack Sasha Levin
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2026-04-13 12:37 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree gregkh
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