* [PATCH] smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path
@ 2026-04-16 21:37 Michael Bommarito
2026-04-19 23:35 ` [PATCH v2] " Michael Bommarito
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Michael Bommarito @ 2026-04-16 21:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steve French, Namjae Jeon, linux-cifs
Cc: Paulo Alcantara, Ronnie Sahlberg, Shyam Prasad N, Tom Talpey,
Bharath SM, stable
Another client side from my clanker. smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two
response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL and the default QUERY_INFO path.
The FSCTL branch validates that the server-reported output length fits
within the response iov:
if (qi.input_buffer_length > 0 &&
le32_to_cpu(io_rsp->OutputOffset) + qi.input_buffer_length
> rsp_iov[1].iov_len)
The QUERY_INFO branch has no equivalent check:
qi_rsp = (struct smb2_query_info_rsp *)rsp_iov[1].iov_base;
if (le32_to_cpu(qi_rsp->OutputBufferLength) < qi.input_buffer_length)
qi.input_buffer_length = le32_to_cpu(qi_rsp->OutputBufferLength);
...
copy_to_user(pqi + 1, qi_rsp->Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length)
A malicious server can set OutputBufferLength larger than the actual
response, causing copy_to_user to read past the slab allocation into
adjacent kernel heap.
Reproduced under UML + KASAN by constructing a 73-byte response
(sizeof(struct smb2_query_info_rsp) + 1) with OutputBufferLength=2,
forcing a read 1 byte past the allocation:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _nfs4_do_fsinfo
Read of size 1 at addr ... by task mount.nfs4/219
Confirmed rejection without splat after patch applied.
Add the same bounds check used by the FSCTL branch.
Fixes: 5242fcb706cb ("cifs: fix bi-directional fsctl passthrough calls")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
---
fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
index 509fcea28a42..de10077320e1 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
@@ -1783,6 +1783,12 @@ smb2_ioctl_query_info(const unsigned int xid,
qi_rsp = (struct smb2_query_info_rsp *)rsp_iov[1].iov_base;
if (le32_to_cpu(qi_rsp->OutputBufferLength) < qi.input_buffer_length)
qi.input_buffer_length = le32_to_cpu(qi_rsp->OutputBufferLength);
+ if (qi.input_buffer_length > 0 &&
+ sizeof(struct smb2_query_info_rsp) + qi.input_buffer_length
+ > rsp_iov[1].iov_len) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
if (copy_to_user(&pqi->input_buffer_length,
&qi.input_buffer_length,
sizeof(qi.input_buffer_length))) {
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2] smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path
2026-04-16 21:37 [PATCH] smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path Michael Bommarito
@ 2026-04-19 23:35 ` Michael Bommarito
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Michael Bommarito @ 2026-04-19 23:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steve French, Namjae Jeon, linux-cifs
Cc: Paulo Alcantara, Ronnie Sahlberg, Shyam Prasad N, Tom Talpey,
Bharath SM, stable
smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL
and the default QUERY_INFO path. The QUERY_INFO branch clamps
qi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then
copies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp->Buffer to userspace, but
it never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within
rsp_iov[1].iov_len.
A malicious server can return OutputBufferLength larger than the actual
QUERY_INFO response, causing copy_to_user() to walk past the response
buffer and expose adjacent kernel heap to userspace.
Guard the QUERY_INFO copy with a bounds check on the actual Buffer
payload. Use struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length)
rather than an open-coded addition so the guard cannot overflow on
32-bit builds.
Fixes: f5778c398713 ("SMB3: Allow SMB3 FSCTL queries to be sent to server from tools")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-6
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-4
---
Changes in v2:
Use struct_size() for the new QUERY_INFO bound so the guard cannot wrap
on 32-bit builds.
Keep the check anchored to qi_rsp->Buffer, since that is what the
current copy_to_user() actually reads; OutputBufferOffset would only
matter if the copy site changed too.
Also reran the synthetic 73-byte post-fix case under UML and confirmed
the new guard still rejects it cleanly.
fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
index 509fcea28a42..3600705255f8 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
@@ -1783,6 +1783,12 @@ smb2_ioctl_query_info(const unsigned int xid,
qi_rsp = (struct smb2_query_info_rsp *)rsp_iov[1].iov_base;
if (le32_to_cpu(qi_rsp->OutputBufferLength) < qi.input_buffer_length)
qi.input_buffer_length = le32_to_cpu(qi_rsp->OutputBufferLength);
+ if (qi.input_buffer_length > 0 &&
+ struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length) >
+ rsp_iov[1].iov_len) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
if (copy_to_user(&pqi->input_buffer_length,
&qi.input_buffer_length,
sizeof(qi.input_buffer_length))) {
--
2.53.0
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