* FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: use check_add_overflow() to prevent u16 DACL size" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree
@ 2026-04-24 9:43 gregkh
2026-04-25 0:37 ` [PATCH 5.15.y] ksmbd: use check_add_overflow() to prevent u16 DACL size overflow Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: gregkh @ 2026-04-24 9:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tristan, linkinjeon, stfrench; +Cc: stable
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 299f962c0b02d048fb45d248b4da493d03f3175d
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026042457-bullfrog-connected-a810@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' HEAD^..
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 299f962c0b02d048fb45d248b4da493d03f3175d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2026 19:54:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] ksmbd: use check_add_overflow() to prevent u16 DACL size
overflow
set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() and set_ntacl_dacl() accumulate ACE sizes
in u16 variables. When a file has many POSIX ACL entries, the
accumulated size can wrap past 65535, causing the pointer arithmetic
(char *)pndace + *size to land within already-written ACEs. Subsequent
writes then overwrite earlier entries, and pndacl->size gets a
truncated value.
Use check_add_overflow() at each accumulation point to detect the
wrap before it corrupts the buffer, consistent with existing
check_mul_overflow() usage elsewhere in smbacl.c.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
index a1de89cc09be..4bbc2c27e680 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
@@ -596,6 +596,7 @@ static void set_posix_acl_entries_dacl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct smb_sid *sid;
struct smb_ace *ntace;
int i, j;
+ u16 ace_sz;
if (!fattr->cf_acls)
goto posix_default_acl;
@@ -640,8 +641,10 @@ static void set_posix_acl_entries_dacl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
flags = 0x03;
ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pndace + *size);
- *size += fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED, flags,
+ ace_sz = fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED, flags,
pace->e_perm, 0777);
+ if (check_add_overflow(*size, ace_sz, size))
+ break;
(*num_aces)++;
if (pace->e_tag == ACL_USER)
ntace->access_req |=
@@ -650,8 +653,10 @@ static void set_posix_acl_entries_dacl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
if (S_ISDIR(fattr->cf_mode) &&
(pace->e_tag == ACL_USER || pace->e_tag == ACL_GROUP)) {
ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pndace + *size);
- *size += fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ ace_sz = fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED,
0x03, pace->e_perm, 0777);
+ if (check_add_overflow(*size, ace_sz, size))
+ break;
(*num_aces)++;
if (pace->e_tag == ACL_USER)
ntace->access_req |=
@@ -691,8 +696,10 @@ static void set_posix_acl_entries_dacl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
}
ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pndace + *size);
- *size += fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED, 0x0b,
+ ace_sz = fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED, 0x0b,
pace->e_perm, 0777);
+ if (check_add_overflow(*size, ace_sz, size))
+ break;
(*num_aces)++;
if (pace->e_tag == ACL_USER)
ntace->access_req |=
@@ -728,7 +735,8 @@ static void set_ntacl_dacl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
break;
memcpy((char *)pndace + size, ntace, nt_ace_size);
- size += nt_ace_size;
+ if (check_add_overflow(size, nt_ace_size, &size))
+ break;
aces_size -= nt_ace_size;
ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)ntace + nt_ace_size);
num_aces++;
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 5.15.y] ksmbd: use check_add_overflow() to prevent u16 DACL size overflow
2026-04-24 9:43 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: use check_add_overflow() to prevent u16 DACL size" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree gregkh
@ 2026-04-25 0:37 ` Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-04-25 0:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: stable; +Cc: Tristan Madani, Namjae Jeon, Steve French, Sasha Levin
From: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
[ Upstream commit 299f962c0b02d048fb45d248b4da493d03f3175d ]
set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() and set_ntacl_dacl() accumulate ACE sizes
in u16 variables. When a file has many POSIX ACL entries, the
accumulated size can wrap past 65535, causing the pointer arithmetic
(char *)pndace + *size to land within already-written ACEs. Subsequent
writes then overwrite earlier entries, and pndacl->size gets a
truncated value.
Use check_add_overflow() at each accumulation point to detect the
wrap before it corrupts the buffer, consistent with existing
check_mul_overflow() usage elsewhere in smbacl.c.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c b/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c
index ecf9db3d69c38..29ef33715e8a4 100644
--- a/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c
+++ b/fs/ksmbd/smbacl.c
@@ -588,6 +588,7 @@ static void set_posix_acl_entries_dacl(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
struct smb_sid *sid;
struct smb_ace *ntace;
int i, j;
+ u16 ace_sz;
if (!fattr->cf_acls)
goto posix_default_acl;
@@ -632,8 +633,10 @@ static void set_posix_acl_entries_dacl(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
flags = 0x03;
ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pndace + *size);
- *size += fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED, flags,
+ ace_sz = fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED, flags,
pace->e_perm, 0777);
+ if (check_add_overflow(*size, ace_sz, size))
+ break;
(*num_aces)++;
if (pace->e_tag == ACL_USER)
ntace->access_req |=
@@ -642,8 +645,10 @@ static void set_posix_acl_entries_dacl(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
if (S_ISDIR(fattr->cf_mode) &&
(pace->e_tag == ACL_USER || pace->e_tag == ACL_GROUP)) {
ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pndace + *size);
- *size += fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ ace_sz = fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED,
0x03, pace->e_perm, 0777);
+ if (check_add_overflow(*size, ace_sz, size))
+ break;
(*num_aces)++;
if (pace->e_tag == ACL_USER)
ntace->access_req |=
@@ -683,8 +688,10 @@ static void set_posix_acl_entries_dacl(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
}
ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)pndace + *size);
- *size += fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED, 0x0b,
+ ace_sz = fill_ace_for_sid(ntace, sid, ACCESS_ALLOWED, 0x0b,
pace->e_perm, 0777);
+ if (check_add_overflow(*size, ace_sz, size))
+ break;
(*num_aces)++;
if (pace->e_tag == ACL_USER)
ntace->access_req |=
@@ -720,7 +727,8 @@ static void set_ntacl_dacl(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
break;
memcpy((char *)pndace + size, ntace, nt_ace_size);
- size += nt_ace_size;
+ if (check_add_overflow(size, nt_ace_size, &size))
+ break;
aces_size -= nt_ace_size;
ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)ntace + nt_ace_size);
num_aces++;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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2026-04-24 9:43 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: use check_add_overflow() to prevent u16 DACL size" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree gregkh
2026-04-25 0:37 ` [PATCH 5.15.y] ksmbd: use check_add_overflow() to prevent u16 DACL size overflow Sasha Levin
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