* + memfd-deny-writeable-mappings-when-implying-seal_write.patch added to mm-hotfixes-unstable branch
@ 2026-05-09 0:32 Andrew Morton
0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: Andrew Morton @ 2026-05-09 0:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mm-commits, stable, pasha.tatashin, kees, jeffxu, jackmanb, hughd,
gthelen, david, baolin.wang, pratyush, akpm
The patch titled
Subject: memfd: deny writeable mappings when implying SEAL_WRITE
has been added to the -mm mm-hotfixes-unstable branch. Its filename is
memfd-deny-writeable-mappings-when-implying-seal_write.patch
This patch will shortly appear at
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/25-new.git/tree/patches/memfd-deny-writeable-mappings-when-implying-seal_write.patch
This patch will later appear in the mm-hotfixes-unstable branch at
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
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------------------------------------------------------
From: "Pratyush Yadav (Google)" <pratyush@kernel.org>
Subject: memfd: deny writeable mappings when implying SEAL_WRITE
Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 15:39:20 +0200
When SEAL_EXEC is added, SEAL_WRITE is implied to make W^X. But the
implied seal is set after the check that makes sure the memfd can not have
any writable mappings. This means one can use SEAL_EXEC to apply
SEAL_WRITE while having writeable mappings.
This breaks the contract that SEAL_WRITE provides and can be used by an
attacker to pass a memfd that appears to be write sealed but can still be
modified arbitrarily.
Fix this by adding the implied seals before the call for
mapping_deny_writable() is done.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260505133922.797635-1-pratyush@kernel.org
Fixes: c4f75bc8bd6b ("mm/memfd: add write seals when apply SEAL_EXEC to executable memfd")
Signed-off-by: Pratyush Yadav (Google) <pratyush@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/memfd.c | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/memfd.c~memfd-deny-writeable-mappings-when-implying-seal_write
+++ a/mm/memfd.c
@@ -283,6 +283,12 @@ int memfd_add_seals(struct file *file, u
goto unlock;
}
+ /*
+ * SEAL_EXEC implies SEAL_WRITE, making W^X from the start.
+ */
+ if (seals & F_SEAL_EXEC && inode->i_mode & 0111)
+ seals |= F_SEAL_SHRINK|F_SEAL_GROW|F_SEAL_WRITE|F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE;
+
if ((seals & F_SEAL_WRITE) && !(*file_seals & F_SEAL_WRITE)) {
error = mapping_deny_writable(file->f_mapping);
if (error)
@@ -295,12 +301,6 @@ int memfd_add_seals(struct file *file, u
}
}
- /*
- * SEAL_EXEC implies SEAL_WRITE, making W^X from the start.
- */
- if (seals & F_SEAL_EXEC && inode->i_mode & 0111)
- seals |= F_SEAL_SHRINK|F_SEAL_GROW|F_SEAL_WRITE|F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE;
-
*file_seals |= seals;
error = 0;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from pratyush@kernel.org are
memfd-deny-writeable-mappings-when-implying-seal_write.patch
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