* [PATCH net v3 2/4] crypto/krb5, rxrpc: Fix lack of pre-decrypt/pre-verify length checks
[not found] <20260514155304.2249591-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
2026-05-14 15:52 ` [PATCH net v3 1/4] rxrpc: Also unshare DATA/RESPONSE packets when paged frags are present David Howells
@ 2026-05-14 15:53 ` David Howells
2026-05-14 15:53 ` [PATCH net v3 3/4] rxrpc: Fix DATA decrypt vs splice() by copying data to buffer in recvmsg David Howells
2 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2026-05-14 15:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: David Howells, Hyunwoo Kim, Marc Dionne, Jakub Kicinski,
David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman,
linux-afs, linux-kernel, Jeffrey Altman, Herbert Xu, Chuck Lever,
linux-nfs, linux-crypto, stable
Change the krb5 crypto library to provide facilities to precheck the length
of the message about to be decrypted or verified.
Fix AF_RXRPC to make use of this to validate DATA packets secured with
RxGK.
Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260511160753.607296-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
Documentation/crypto/krb5.rst | 17 ++++++++---
crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
include/crypto/krb5.h | 9 ++++--
include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 1 +
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c | 15 ++++++++--
5 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/krb5.rst b/Documentation/crypto/krb5.rst
index beffa0133446..f62e07ac6811 100644
--- a/Documentation/crypto/krb5.rst
+++ b/Documentation/crypto/krb5.rst
@@ -158,13 +158,22 @@ returned.
When a message has been received, the location and size of the data with the
message can be determined by calling::
- void crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
- enum krb5_crypto_mode mode,
- size_t *_offset, size_t *_len);
+ int crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
+ enum krb5_crypto_mode mode,
+ size_t *_offset, size_t *_len);
The caller provides the offset and length of the message to the function, which
then alters those values to indicate the region containing the data (plus any
-padding). It is up to the caller to determine how much padding there is.
+padding). It is up to the caller to determine how much padding there is. The
+function returns an error if the length is too small or if the mode is
+unsupported. An additional function::
+
+ int crypto_krb5_check_data_len(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
+ enum krb5_crypto_mode mode,
+ size_t len, size_t min_content);
+
+is provided to just do a basic check that the decrypted/verified message would
+have a sufficient minimum payload.
Preparation Functions
---------------------
diff --git a/crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c b/crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c
index 23026d4206c8..c7ea40f900a7 100644
--- a/crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c
+++ b/crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c
@@ -134,27 +134,69 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_krb5_how_much_data);
* Find the offset and size of the data in a secure message so that this
* information can be used in the metadata buffer which will get added to the
* digest by crypto_krb5_verify_mic().
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if successful, -EBADMSG if the message is too short or -EINVAL if
+ * the mode is unsupported.
*/
-void crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
- enum krb5_crypto_mode mode,
- size_t *_offset, size_t *_len)
+int crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
+ enum krb5_crypto_mode mode,
+ size_t *_offset, size_t *_len)
{
switch (mode) {
case KRB5_CHECKSUM_MODE:
+ if (*_len < krb5->cksum_len)
+ return -EBADMSG;
*_offset += krb5->cksum_len;
*_len -= krb5->cksum_len;
- return;
+ return 0;
case KRB5_ENCRYPT_MODE:
+ if (*_len < krb5->conf_len + krb5->cksum_len)
+ return -EBADMSG;
*_offset += krb5->conf_len;
*_len -= krb5->conf_len + krb5->cksum_len;
- return;
+ return 0;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
- return;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data);
+/**
+ * crypto_krb5_check_data_len - Check a message is big enough
+ * @krb5: The encoding to use.
+ * @mode: Mode of operation.
+ * @len: The length of the secure blob.
+ * @min_content: Minimum length of the content inside the blob.
+ *
+ * Check that a message is large enough to hold whatever bits the encryption
+ * type wants to glue on (nonce, checksum) plus a minimum amount of content.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if successful, -EBADMSG if the message is too short or -EINVAL if
+ * the mode is unsupported.
+ */
+int crypto_krb5_check_data_len(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
+ enum krb5_crypto_mode mode,
+ size_t len, size_t min_content)
+{
+ switch (mode) {
+ case KRB5_CHECKSUM_MODE:
+ if (len < krb5->cksum_len ||
+ len - krb5->cksum_len < min_content)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ return 0;
+ case KRB5_ENCRYPT_MODE:
+ if (len < krb5->conf_len + krb5->cksum_len ||
+ len - (krb5->conf_len + krb5->cksum_len) < min_content)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_krb5_check_data_len);
+
/*
* Prepare the encryption with derived key data.
*/
diff --git a/include/crypto/krb5.h b/include/crypto/krb5.h
index 71dd38f59be1..aac3ecf88467 100644
--- a/include/crypto/krb5.h
+++ b/include/crypto/krb5.h
@@ -121,9 +121,12 @@ size_t crypto_krb5_how_much_buffer(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
size_t crypto_krb5_how_much_data(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
enum krb5_crypto_mode mode,
size_t *_buffer_size, size_t *_offset);
-void crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
- enum krb5_crypto_mode mode,
- size_t *_offset, size_t *_len);
+int crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
+ enum krb5_crypto_mode mode,
+ size_t *_offset, size_t *_len);
+int crypto_krb5_check_data_len(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
+ enum krb5_crypto_mode mode,
+ size_t len, size_t min_content);
struct crypto_aead *crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
const struct krb5_buffer *TK,
u32 usage, gfp_t gfp);
diff --git a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h
index 573f2df3a2c9..704a10de6670 100644
--- a/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/rxrpc.h
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
EM(rxkad_abort_resp_unknown_tkt, "rxkad-resp-unknown-tkt") \
EM(rxkad_abort_resp_version, "rxkad-resp-version") \
/* RxGK security errors */ \
+ EM(rxgk_abort_1_short_header, "rxgk1-short-hdr") \
EM(rxgk_abort_1_verify_mic_eproto, "rxgk1-vfy-mic-eproto") \
EM(rxgk_abort_2_decrypt_eproto, "rxgk2-dec-eproto") \
EM(rxgk_abort_2_short_data, "rxgk2-short-data") \
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c b/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c
index 0d5e654da918..26e723052a37 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c
@@ -480,8 +480,12 @@ static int rxgk_verify_packet_integrity(struct rxrpc_call *call,
_enter("");
- crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(gk->krb5, KRB5_CHECKSUM_MODE,
- &data_offset, &data_len);
+ if (crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(gk->krb5, KRB5_CHECKSUM_MODE,
+ &data_offset, &data_len) < 0) {
+ ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT,
+ rxgk_abort_1_short_header);
+ goto put_gk;
+ }
hdr = kzalloc_obj(*hdr, GFP_NOFS);
if (!hdr)
@@ -529,6 +533,13 @@ static int rxgk_verify_packet_encrypted(struct rxrpc_call *call,
_enter("");
+ if (crypto_krb5_check_data_len(gk->krb5, KRB5_ENCRYPT_MODE,
+ len, sizeof(hdr)) < 0) {
+ ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT,
+ rxgk_abort_2_short_header);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
ret = rxgk_decrypt_skb(gk->krb5, gk->rx_enc, skb, &offset, &len, &ac);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret != -ENOMEM)
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* [PATCH net v3 3/4] rxrpc: Fix DATA decrypt vs splice() by copying data to buffer in recvmsg
[not found] <20260514155304.2249591-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
2026-05-14 15:52 ` [PATCH net v3 1/4] rxrpc: Also unshare DATA/RESPONSE packets when paged frags are present David Howells
2026-05-14 15:53 ` [PATCH net v3 2/4] crypto/krb5, rxrpc: Fix lack of pre-decrypt/pre-verify length checks David Howells
@ 2026-05-14 15:53 ` David Howells
2 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2026-05-14 15:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: David Howells, Hyunwoo Kim, Marc Dionne, Jakub Kicinski,
David S. Miller, Eric Dumazet, Paolo Abeni, Simon Horman,
linux-afs, linux-kernel, Jeffrey Altman, Jiayuan Chen, stable
This improves the fix for CVE-2026-43500.
Fix the pagecache corruption from in-place decryption of a DATA packet
transmitted locally by splice() by getting rid of the packet sharing in the
I/O thread and unconditionally extracting the packet content into a bounce
buffer in which the buffer is decrypted. recvmsg() (or the kernel
equivalent) then copies the data from the bounce buffer to the destination
buffer. The sk_buff then remains unmodified.
This has an additional advantage in that the packet is then arranged in the
buffer with the correct alignment required for the crypto algorithms to
process directly. The performance of the crypto does seem to be a little
faster and, surprisingly, the unencrypted performance doesn't seem to
change much - possibly due to removing complexity from the I/O thread.
Yet another advantage is that the I/O thread doesn't have to copy packets
which would slow down packet distribution, ACK generation, etc..
The buffer belongs to the call and is allocated initially at 2K,
sufficiently large to hold a whole jumbo subpacket, but the buffer will be
increased in size if needed. However, to take this work, MSG_PEEK is now
limited to reading only from the current packet as it would need to replace
the contents of the buffer to read a different packet; for the moment, I
think this is acceptible as the programs I have that use AF_RXRPC directly
only really use MSG_PEEK to get the call info for the next read.
Note that rx_pkt_offset may legitimately see 0 as a valid offset now, so
switch to using USHRT_MAX to indicate an invalid offset.
Note also that I would generally prefer to replace the buffers of the
current sk_buff with a new kmalloc'd buffer of the right size, ditching the
old data and frags as this makes the handling of MSG_PEEK easier and
removes the double-decryption issue, but this looks like quite a
complicated thing to achieve. skb_morph() looks half way to what I want,
but I don't want to have to allocate a new sk_buff.
Fixes: d0d5c0cd1e71 ("rxrpc: Use skb_unshare() rather than skb_cow_data()")
Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/afKV2zGR6rrelPC7@v4bel/
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 7 +++-
net/rxrpc/call_event.c | 22 +----------
net/rxrpc/call_object.c | 2 +
net/rxrpc/insecure.c | 3 --
net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c | 51 ++++++++++++------------
net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 86 +++++++++++++++--------------------------
8 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 121 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
index 27c2aa2dd023..783367eea798 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
+++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h
@@ -213,8 +213,6 @@ struct rxrpc_skb_priv {
struct {
u16 offset; /* Offset of data */
u16 len; /* Length of data */
- u8 flags;
-#define RXRPC_RX_VERIFIED 0x01
};
struct {
rxrpc_seq_t first_ack; /* First packet in acks table */
@@ -774,6 +772,11 @@ struct rxrpc_call {
struct sk_buff_head recvmsg_queue; /* Queue of packets ready for recvmsg() */
struct sk_buff_head rx_queue; /* Queue of packets for this call to receive */
struct sk_buff_head rx_oos_queue; /* Queue of out of sequence packets */
+ void *rx_dec_buffer; /* Decryption buffer */
+ unsigned short rx_dec_bsize; /* rx_dec_buffer size */
+ unsigned short rx_dec_offset; /* Decrypted packet data offset */
+ unsigned short rx_dec_len; /* Decrypted packet data len */
+ rxrpc_seq_t rx_dec_seq; /* Packet in decryption buffer */
rxrpc_seq_t rx_highest_seq; /* Higest sequence number received */
rxrpc_seq_t rx_consumed; /* Highest packet consumed */
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c
index 2b19b252225e..fec59d9338b9 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c
@@ -332,27 +332,7 @@ bool rxrpc_input_call_event(struct rxrpc_call *call)
saw_ack |= sp->hdr.type == RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_ACK;
- if (sp->hdr.type == RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_DATA &&
- sp->hdr.securityIndex != 0 &&
- (skb_cloned(skb) ||
- skb_has_frag_list(skb) ||
- skb_has_shared_frag(skb))) {
- /* Unshare the packet so that it can be
- * modified by in-place decryption.
- */
- struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_copy(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
-
- if (nskb) {
- rxrpc_new_skb(nskb, rxrpc_skb_new_unshared);
- rxrpc_input_call_packet(call, nskb);
- rxrpc_free_skb(nskb, rxrpc_skb_put_call_rx);
- } else {
- /* OOM - Drop the packet. */
- rxrpc_see_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_see_unshare_nomem);
- }
- } else {
- rxrpc_input_call_packet(call, skb);
- }
+ rxrpc_input_call_packet(call, skb);
rxrpc_free_skb(skb, rxrpc_skb_put_call_rx);
did_receive = true;
}
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c
index f035f486c139..fcb9d38bb521 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c
@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_alloc_call(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, gfp_t gfp,
spin_lock_init(&call->notify_lock);
refcount_set(&call->ref, 1);
call->debug_id = debug_id;
+ call->rx_pkt_offset = USHRT_MAX;
call->tx_total_len = -1;
call->tx_jumbo_max = 1;
call->next_rx_timo = 20 * HZ;
@@ -553,6 +554,7 @@ static void rxrpc_cleanup_rx_buffers(struct rxrpc_call *call)
rxrpc_purge_queue(&call->recvmsg_queue);
rxrpc_purge_queue(&call->rx_queue);
rxrpc_purge_queue(&call->rx_oos_queue);
+ kfree(call->rx_dec_buffer);
}
/*
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/insecure.c b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c
index 0a260df45d25..7a26c6097d03 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/insecure.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c
@@ -32,9 +32,6 @@ static int none_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb)
static int none_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
-
- sp->flags |= RXRPC_RX_VERIFIED;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
index e1f7513a46db..0802f12cbbfc 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
@@ -147,15 +147,55 @@ static void rxrpc_rotate_rx_window(struct rxrpc_call *call)
}
/*
- * Decrypt and verify a DATA packet.
+ * Decrypt and verify a DATA packet. The content of the packet is pulled out
+ * into a flat buffer rather than decrypting in place in the skbuff. This also
+ * has the advantage of aligning the buffer correctly for the crypto routines.
+ *
+ * We keep track of the sequence number of the packet currently decrypted into
+ * the buffer in ->rx_dec_seq. Unfortunately, this means that a MSG_PEEK of
+ * more than one byte may cause a later packet to be decrypted into the buffer,
+ * requiring the original to be re-decrypted when recvmsg() is called again.
*/
static int rxrpc_verify_data(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
+ int ret;
- if (sp->flags & RXRPC_RX_VERIFIED)
+ if (call->rx_dec_seq == sp->hdr.seq && call->rx_dec_buffer)
return 0;
- return call->security->verify_packet(call, skb);
+
+ if (sp->len > call->rx_dec_bsize) {
+ /* Make sure we can hold a 1412-byte jumbo subpacket and make
+ * sure that the buffer size is aligned to a crypto blocksize.
+ */
+ size_t size = max(round_up(sp->len, 32), 2048);
+ void *buffer = krealloc(call->rx_dec_buffer, size, GFP_NOFS);
+
+ if (!buffer)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ call->rx_dec_buffer = buffer;
+ call->rx_dec_bsize = size;
+ }
+
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sp->offset, call->rx_dec_buffer, sp->len) < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ call->rx_dec_offset = 0;
+ call->rx_dec_len = sp->len;
+ call->rx_dec_seq = sp->hdr.seq;
+ ret = call->security->verify_packet(call, skb);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err;
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ kfree(call->rx_dec_buffer);
+ call->rx_dec_buffer = NULL;
+ call->rx_dec_bsize = 0;
+ call->rx_dec_offset = 0;
+ call->rx_dec_len = 0;
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -283,16 +323,19 @@ static int rxrpc_recvmsg_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call,
if (msg)
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sock->sk, skb);
- if (rx_pkt_offset == 0) {
+ if (rx_pkt_offset == USHRT_MAX) {
ret2 = rxrpc_verify_data(call, skb);
trace_rxrpc_recvdata(call, rxrpc_recvmsg_next, seq,
- sp->offset, sp->len, ret2);
+ call->rx_dec_offset,
+ call->rx_dec_len, ret2);
if (ret2 < 0) {
ret = ret2;
goto out;
}
- rx_pkt_offset = sp->offset;
- rx_pkt_len = sp->len;
+ sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
+ seq = sp->hdr.seq;
+ rx_pkt_offset = call->rx_dec_offset;
+ rx_pkt_len = call->rx_dec_len;
} else {
trace_rxrpc_recvdata(call, rxrpc_recvmsg_cont, seq,
rx_pkt_offset, rx_pkt_len, 0);
@@ -304,10 +347,10 @@ static int rxrpc_recvmsg_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call,
if (copy > remain)
copy = remain;
if (copy > 0) {
- ret2 = skb_copy_datagram_iter(skb, rx_pkt_offset, iter,
- copy);
- if (ret2 < 0) {
- ret = ret2;
+ ret2 = copy_to_iter(call->rx_dec_buffer + rx_pkt_offset,
+ copy, iter);
+ if (ret2 != copy) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
@@ -328,13 +371,18 @@ static int rxrpc_recvmsg_data(struct socket *sock, struct rxrpc_call *call,
/* The whole packet has been transferred. */
if (sp->hdr.flags & RXRPC_LAST_PACKET)
ret = 1;
- rx_pkt_offset = 0;
+ rx_pkt_offset = USHRT_MAX;
rx_pkt_len = 0;
+ /* Terminate the receive here for MSG_PEEK otherwise we'd have
+ * to replace the contents of ->rx_dec_buffer.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(flags & MSG_PEEK))
+ break;
+
skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &call->recvmsg_queue);
- if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
- rxrpc_rotate_rx_window(call);
+ rxrpc_rotate_rx_window(call);
if (!rx->app_ops &&
!skb_queue_empty_lockless(&rx->recvmsg_oobq)) {
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c b/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c
index 26e723052a37..f81703ee7ac3 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/rxgk.c
@@ -473,8 +473,9 @@ static int rxgk_verify_packet_integrity(struct rxrpc_call *call,
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
struct rxgk_header *hdr;
struct krb5_buffer metadata;
- unsigned int offset = sp->offset, len = sp->len;
+ unsigned int len = call->rx_dec_len;
size_t data_offset = 0, data_len = len;
+ void *data = call->rx_dec_buffer, *p = data;
u32 ac = 0;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -500,16 +501,15 @@ static int rxgk_verify_packet_integrity(struct rxrpc_call *call,
metadata.len = sizeof(*hdr);
metadata.data = hdr;
- ret = rxgk_verify_mic_skb(gk->krb5, gk->rx_Kc, &metadata,
- skb, &offset, &len, &ac);
+ ret = rxgk_verify_mic(gk->krb5, gk->rx_Kc, &metadata, &p, &len, &ac);
kfree(hdr);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret != -ENOMEM)
rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, ac,
rxgk_abort_1_verify_mic_eproto);
} else {
- sp->offset = offset;
- sp->len = len;
+ call->rx_dec_offset = p - data;
+ call->rx_dec_len = len;
}
put_gk:
@@ -526,56 +526,53 @@ static int rxgk_verify_packet_encrypted(struct rxrpc_call *call,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
- struct rxgk_header hdr;
- unsigned int offset = sp->offset, len = sp->len;
+ struct rxgk_header *hdr;
+ unsigned int offset = 0, len = call->rx_dec_len;
+ void *data = call->rx_dec_buffer, *p = data;
int ret;
u32 ac = 0;
_enter("");
if (crypto_krb5_check_data_len(gk->krb5, KRB5_ENCRYPT_MODE,
- len, sizeof(hdr)) < 0) {
+ len, sizeof(*hdr)) < 0) {
ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT,
rxgk_abort_2_short_header);
goto error;
}
- ret = rxgk_decrypt_skb(gk->krb5, gk->rx_enc, skb, &offset, &len, &ac);
+ ret = rxgk_decrypt(gk->krb5, gk->rx_enc, &p, &len, &ac);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret != -ENOMEM)
rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, ac, rxgk_abort_2_decrypt_eproto);
goto error;
}
+ offset = p - data;
- if (len < sizeof(hdr)) {
+ if (len < sizeof(*hdr)) {
ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT,
rxgk_abort_2_short_header);
goto error;
}
/* Extract the header from the skb */
- ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
- if (ret < 0) {
- ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_PACKETSHORT,
- rxgk_abort_2_short_encdata);
- goto error;
- }
- offset += sizeof(hdr);
- len -= sizeof(hdr);
-
- if (ntohl(hdr.epoch) != call->conn->proto.epoch ||
- ntohl(hdr.cid) != call->cid ||
- ntohl(hdr.call_number) != call->call_id ||
- ntohl(hdr.seq) != sp->hdr.seq ||
- ntohl(hdr.sec_index) != call->security_ix ||
- ntohl(hdr.data_len) > len) {
+ hdr = data + offset;
+ offset += sizeof(*hdr);
+ len -= sizeof(*hdr);
+
+ if (ntohl(hdr->epoch) != call->conn->proto.epoch ||
+ ntohl(hdr->cid) != call->cid ||
+ ntohl(hdr->call_number) != call->call_id ||
+ ntohl(hdr->seq) != sp->hdr.seq ||
+ ntohl(hdr->sec_index) != call->security_ix ||
+ ntohl(hdr->data_len) > len) {
ret = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXGK_SEALEDINCON,
rxgk_abort_2_short_data);
goto error;
}
- sp->offset = offset;
- sp->len = ntohl(hdr.data_len);
+ call->rx_dec_offset = offset;
+ call->rx_dec_len = ntohl(hdr->data_len);
ret = 0;
error:
rxgk_put(gk);
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h b/net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h
index 1e257d7ab8ec..112b5366ce11 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h
+++ b/net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h
@@ -105,6 +105,49 @@ int rxgk_decrypt_skb(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * Apply decryption and checksumming functions a flat data buffer. The data
+ * point and length are updated to reflect the actual content of the encrypted
+ * region.
+ */
+static inline int rxgk_decrypt(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
+ struct crypto_aead *aead,
+ void **_data, unsigned int *_len,
+ int *_error_code)
+{
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ size_t offset = 0, len = *_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ sg_init_one(sg, *_data, len);
+
+ ret = crypto_krb5_decrypt(krb5, aead, sg, 1, &offset, &len);
+ switch (ret) {
+ case 0:
+ if (offset & 3) {
+ *_error_code = RXGK_INCONSISTENCY;
+ ret = -EPROTO;
+ break;
+ }
+ *_data += offset;
+ *_len = len;
+ break;
+ case -EBADMSG: /* Checksum mismatch. */
+ case -EPROTO:
+ *_error_code = RXGK_SEALEDINCON;
+ break;
+ case -EMSGSIZE:
+ *_error_code = RXGK_PACKETSHORT;
+ break;
+ case -ENOPKG: /* Would prefer RXGK_BADETYPE, but not available for YFS. */
+ default:
+ *_error_code = RXGK_INCONSISTENCY;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Check the MIC on a region of an skbuff. The offset and length are updated
* to reflect the actual content of the secure region.
@@ -148,3 +191,42 @@ int rxgk_verify_mic_skb(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
return ret;
}
+
+/*
+ * Check the MIC on a flat buffer. The data pointer and length are updated to
+ * reflect the actual content of the secure region.
+ */
+static inline
+int rxgk_verify_mic(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
+ struct crypto_shash *shash,
+ const struct krb5_buffer *metadata,
+ void **_data, unsigned int *_len,
+ u32 *_error_code)
+{
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ size_t offset = 0, len = *_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ sg_init_one(sg, *_data, len);
+
+ ret = crypto_krb5_verify_mic(krb5, shash, metadata, sg, 1, &offset, &len);
+ switch (ret) {
+ case 0:
+ *_data += offset;
+ *_len = len;
+ break;
+ case -EBADMSG: /* Checksum mismatch */
+ case -EPROTO:
+ *_error_code = RXGK_SEALEDINCON;
+ break;
+ case -EMSGSIZE:
+ *_error_code = RXGK_PACKETSHORT;
+ break;
+ case -ENOPKG: /* Would prefer RXGK_BADETYPE, but not available for YFS. */
+ default:
+ *_error_code = RXGK_INCONSISTENCY;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
index cba7935977f0..075936337836 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
@@ -430,27 +430,25 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
rxrpc_seq_t seq,
struct skcipher_request *req)
{
- struct rxkad_level1_hdr sechdr;
+ struct rxkad_level1_hdr *sechdr;
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
- struct scatterlist sg[16];
- u32 data_size, buf;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ void *data = call->rx_dec_buffer;
+ u32 len = sp->len, data_size, buf;
u16 check;
int ret;
_enter("");
- if (sp->len < 8)
+ if (len < 8)
return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON,
rxkad_abort_1_short_header);
/* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt
* directly into the target buffer.
*/
- sg_init_table(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg));
- ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sp->offset, 8);
- if (unlikely(ret < 0))
- return ret;
+ sg_init_one(sg, data, len);
/* start the decryption afresh */
memset(&iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
@@ -464,13 +462,11 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
return ret;
/* Extract the decrypted packet length */
- if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sp->offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0)
- return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADDATALEN,
- rxkad_abort_1_short_encdata);
- sp->offset += sizeof(sechdr);
- sp->len -= sizeof(sechdr);
+ sechdr = data;
+ call->rx_dec_offset = sizeof(*sechdr);
+ len -= sizeof(*sechdr);
- buf = ntohl(sechdr.data_size);
+ buf = ntohl(sechdr->data_size);
data_size = buf & 0xffff;
check = buf >> 16;
@@ -479,10 +475,10 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (check != 0)
return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON,
rxkad_abort_1_short_check);
- if (data_size > sp->len)
+ if (data_size > len)
return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADDATALEN,
rxkad_abort_1_short_data);
- sp->len = data_size;
+ call->rx_dec_len = data_size;
_leave(" = 0 [dlen=%x]", data_size);
return 0;
@@ -496,43 +492,28 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct skcipher_request *req)
{
const struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
- struct rxkad_level2_hdr sechdr;
+ struct rxkad_level2_hdr *sechdr;
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
- struct scatterlist _sg[4], *sg;
- u32 data_size, buf;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ void *data = call->rx_dec_buffer;
+ u32 len = sp->len, data_size, buf;
u16 check;
- int nsg, ret;
+ int ret;
- _enter(",{%d}", sp->len);
+ _enter(",{%d}", len);
- if (sp->len < 8)
+ if (len < 8)
return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON,
rxkad_abort_2_short_header);
/* Don't let the crypto algo see a misaligned length. */
- sp->len = round_down(sp->len, 8);
+ len = round_down(len, 8);
- /* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt
- * directly into the target buffer.
+ /* Decrypt in place in the call's decryption buffer. TODO: We really
+ * want to decrypt directly into the target buffer.
*/
- sg = _sg;
- nsg = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags + 1;
- if (nsg <= 4) {
- nsg = 4;
- } else {
- sg = kmalloc_objs(*sg, nsg, GFP_NOIO);
- if (!sg)
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
- ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, sp->offset, sp->len);
- if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
- if (sg != _sg)
- kfree(sg);
- return ret;
- }
+ sg_init_one(sg, data, len);
/* decrypt from the session key */
token = call->conn->key->payload.data[0];
@@ -540,11 +521,9 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
- skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, sp->len, iv.x);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, len, iv.x);
ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
- if (sg != _sg)
- kfree(sg);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == -ENOMEM)
return ret;
@@ -553,13 +532,11 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
}
/* Extract the decrypted packet length */
- if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sp->offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0)
- return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADDATALEN,
- rxkad_abort_2_short_len);
- sp->offset += sizeof(sechdr);
- sp->len -= sizeof(sechdr);
+ sechdr = data;
+ call->rx_dec_offset = sizeof(*sechdr);
+ len -= sizeof(*sechdr);
- buf = ntohl(sechdr.data_size);
+ buf = ntohl(sechdr->data_size);
data_size = buf & 0xffff;
check = buf >> 16;
@@ -569,17 +546,18 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON,
rxkad_abort_2_short_check);
- if (data_size > sp->len)
+ if (data_size > len)
return rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, RXKADDATALEN,
rxkad_abort_2_short_data);
- sp->len = data_size;
+ call->rx_dec_len = data_size;
_leave(" = 0 [dlen=%x]", data_size);
return 0;
}
/*
- * Verify the security on a received packet and the subpackets therein.
+ * Verify the security on a received (sub)packet. If the packet needs
+ * modifying (e.g. decrypting), it must be copied.
*/
static int rxkad_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread