* FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tools/bootconfig: Fix integer overflow and truncation in size" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree
@ 2026-09-16 14:16 gregkh
2026-09-16 17:11 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 1/2] tools/bootconfig: Cleanup bootconfig footer size calculations Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: gregkh @ 2026-09-16 14:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mhiramat, ekffu200098, sashiko-bot; +Cc: stable
The patch below does not apply to the 6.6-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.6.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 462d0b066b613103f579793031429db2ca23abc0
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026091615-buddhist-decimal-7a0a@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.6.y' 'HEAD^..'
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 462d0b066b613103f579793031429db2ca23abc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 00:15:24 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] tools/bootconfig: Fix integer overflow and truncation in size
checks
Sashiko reported that on 32-bit systems, if an attacker crafts size in
the bootconfig footer such that adding BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE wraps around
(for instance, if size is 0xFFFFFFFF), the size check in
load_xbc_from_initrd() can be bypassed:
if (stat.st_size < size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) {
pr_err("bootconfig size is too big\n");
return -E2BIG;
}
Furthermore, on 64-bit systems with an initrd > 4.29 GB, comparing a
corrupted 32-bit size (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF) against
stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE can also bypass the check if
size is not bounded. Similarly, load_xbc_file() passes 64-bit stat.st_size
directly into the 32-bit int size parameter of load_xbc_fd(), truncating
large standalone files (>= 2GB).
In both cases, passing 0xFFFFFFFF to load_xbc_fd() truncates to -1,
resulting in malloc(0), an integer overflow in read(), and an
out-of-bounds null-byte write.
Fix this by:
1. Rejecting size > XBC_DATA_MAX or
size > stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE in load_xbc_from_initrd().
2. Rejecting stat.st_size > XBC_DATA_MAX in load_xbc_file() before passing
it to load_xbc_fd().
3. Checking size < 0 || size > XBC_DATA_MAX defensively in load_xbc_fd().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/178905332413.213925.3179977110281463499.stgit@devnote2/
Fixes: 950313ebf79c ("tools: bootconfig: Add bootconfig command")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260909161113.16C691F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260910010137.EE0431F000FF@smtp.kernel.org/
Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.8-flash
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Sang-Heon Jeon <ekffu200098@gmail.com>
diff --git a/tools/bootconfig/main.c b/tools/bootconfig/main.c
index 7dc9fff9b637..17d971d47f87 100644
--- a/tools/bootconfig/main.c
+++ b/tools/bootconfig/main.c
@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ static int load_xbc_fd(int fd, char **buf, int size)
{
int ret;
+ if (size < 0 || size > XBC_DATA_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
*buf = malloc(size + 1);
if (!*buf)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -168,6 +171,13 @@ static int load_xbc_file(const char *path, char **buf)
return ret;
}
+ if (stat.st_size > XBC_DATA_MAX) {
+ pr_err("%s size is too big\n", path);
+ ret = -E2BIG;
+ close(fd);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
ret = load_xbc_fd(fd, buf, stat.st_size);
close(fd);
@@ -218,7 +228,8 @@ static int load_xbc_from_initrd(int fd, char **buf)
csum = le32toh(csum);
/* Wrong size error */
- if (stat.st_size < size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) {
+ if (size > XBC_DATA_MAX ||
+ size > stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) {
pr_err("bootconfig size is too big\n");
return -E2BIG;
}
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6.6.y 1/2] tools/bootconfig: Cleanup bootconfig footer size calculations 2026-09-16 14:16 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tools/bootconfig: Fix integer overflow and truncation in size" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree gregkh @ 2026-09-16 17:11 ` Sasha Levin 2026-09-16 17:11 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 2/2] tools/bootconfig: Fix integer overflow and truncation in size checks Sasha Levin 0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-09-16 17:11 UTC (permalink / raw) To: stable; +Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google), Sasha Levin From: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> [ Upstream commit 26dda57695090e05c1a99c3e8f802f862d1ac474 ] There are many same pattern of 8 + BOOTCONFIG_MAGIC_LEN for calculating the size of bootconfig footer. Use BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE macro to clean up those magic numbers. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/175211425693.2591046.16029516706923643510.stgit@mhiramat.tok.corp.google.com/ Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Stable-dep-of: 462d0b066b61 ("tools/bootconfig: Fix integer overflow and truncation in size checks") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> --- tools/bootconfig/main.c | 19 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/bootconfig/main.c b/tools/bootconfig/main.c index 32cf48f2da9a1..d302235f6b974 100644 --- a/tools/bootconfig/main.c +++ b/tools/bootconfig/main.c @@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ #define pr_err(fmt, ...) fprintf(stderr, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__) +/* Bootconfig footer is [size][csum][BOOTCONFIG_MAGIC]. */ +#define BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE \ + (sizeof(uint32_t) * 2 + BOOTCONFIG_MAGIC_LEN) + static int xbc_show_value(struct xbc_node *node, bool semicolon) { const char *val, *eol; @@ -188,7 +192,7 @@ static int load_xbc_from_initrd(int fd, char **buf) if (ret < 0) return -errno; - if (stat.st_size < 8 + BOOTCONFIG_MAGIC_LEN) + if (stat.st_size < BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) return 0; if (lseek(fd, -BOOTCONFIG_MAGIC_LEN, SEEK_END) < 0) @@ -201,7 +205,7 @@ static int load_xbc_from_initrd(int fd, char **buf) if (memcmp(magic, BOOTCONFIG_MAGIC, BOOTCONFIG_MAGIC_LEN) != 0) return 0; - if (lseek(fd, -(8 + BOOTCONFIG_MAGIC_LEN), SEEK_END) < 0) + if (lseek(fd, -BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE, SEEK_END) < 0) return pr_errno("Failed to lseek for size", -errno); if (read(fd, &size, sizeof(uint32_t)) < 0) @@ -213,12 +217,12 @@ static int load_xbc_from_initrd(int fd, char **buf) csum = le32toh(csum); /* Wrong size error */ - if (stat.st_size < size + 8 + BOOTCONFIG_MAGIC_LEN) { + if (stat.st_size < size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) { pr_err("bootconfig size is too big\n"); return -E2BIG; } - if (lseek(fd, stat.st_size - (size + 8 + BOOTCONFIG_MAGIC_LEN), + if (lseek(fd, stat.st_size - (size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE), SEEK_SET) < 0) return pr_errno("Failed to lseek", -errno); @@ -349,7 +353,7 @@ static int delete_xbc(const char *path) ret = fstat(fd, &stat); if (!ret) ret = ftruncate(fd, stat.st_size - - size - 8 - BOOTCONFIG_MAGIC_LEN); + - size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE); if (ret) ret = -errno; } /* Ignore if there is no boot config in initrd */ @@ -379,8 +383,7 @@ static int apply_xbc(const char *path, const char *xbc_path) csum = xbc_calc_checksum(buf, size); /* Backup the bootconfig data */ - data = calloc(size + BOOTCONFIG_ALIGN + - sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + BOOTCONFIG_MAGIC_LEN, 1); + data = calloc(size + BOOTCONFIG_ALIGN + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE, 1); if (!data) return -ENOMEM; memcpy(data, buf, size); @@ -428,7 +431,7 @@ static int apply_xbc(const char *path, const char *xbc_path) } /* To align up the total size to BOOTCONFIG_ALIGN, get padding size */ - total_size = stat.st_size + size + sizeof(uint32_t) * 2 + BOOTCONFIG_MAGIC_LEN; + total_size = stat.st_size + size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE; pad = ((total_size + BOOTCONFIG_ALIGN - 1) & (~BOOTCONFIG_ALIGN_MASK)) - total_size; size += pad; -- 2.53.0 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 6.6.y 2/2] tools/bootconfig: Fix integer overflow and truncation in size checks 2026-09-16 17:11 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 1/2] tools/bootconfig: Cleanup bootconfig footer size calculations Sasha Levin @ 2026-09-16 17:11 ` Sasha Levin 0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-09-16 17:11 UTC (permalink / raw) To: stable; +Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google), Sashiko, Sang-Heon Jeon, Sasha Levin From: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> [ Upstream commit 462d0b066b613103f579793031429db2ca23abc0 ] Sashiko reported that on 32-bit systems, if an attacker crafts size in the bootconfig footer such that adding BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE wraps around (for instance, if size is 0xFFFFFFFF), the size check in load_xbc_from_initrd() can be bypassed: if (stat.st_size < size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) { pr_err("bootconfig size is too big\n"); return -E2BIG; } Furthermore, on 64-bit systems with an initrd > 4.29 GB, comparing a corrupted 32-bit size (e.g. 0xFFFFFFFF) against stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE can also bypass the check if size is not bounded. Similarly, load_xbc_file() passes 64-bit stat.st_size directly into the 32-bit int size parameter of load_xbc_fd(), truncating large standalone files (>= 2GB). In both cases, passing 0xFFFFFFFF to load_xbc_fd() truncates to -1, resulting in malloc(0), an integer overflow in read(), and an out-of-bounds null-byte write. Fix this by: 1. Rejecting size > XBC_DATA_MAX or size > stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE in load_xbc_from_initrd(). 2. Rejecting stat.st_size > XBC_DATA_MAX in load_xbc_file() before passing it to load_xbc_fd(). 3. Checking size < 0 || size > XBC_DATA_MAX defensively in load_xbc_fd(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/178905332413.213925.3179977110281463499.stgit@devnote2/ Fixes: 950313ebf79c ("tools: bootconfig: Add bootconfig command") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260909161113.16C691F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org/ Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260910010137.EE0431F000FF@smtp.kernel.org/ Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.8-flash Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Sang-Heon Jeon <ekffu200098@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> --- tools/bootconfig/main.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/bootconfig/main.c b/tools/bootconfig/main.c index d302235f6b974..655ca7da4b843 100644 --- a/tools/bootconfig/main.c +++ b/tools/bootconfig/main.c @@ -139,6 +139,9 @@ static int load_xbc_fd(int fd, char **buf, int size) { int ret; + if (size < 0 || size > XBC_DATA_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + *buf = malloc(size + 1); if (!*buf) return -ENOMEM; @@ -167,6 +170,13 @@ static int load_xbc_file(const char *path, char **buf) return ret; } + if (stat.st_size > XBC_DATA_MAX) { + pr_err("%s size is too big\n", path); + ret = -E2BIG; + close(fd); + return ret; + } + ret = load_xbc_fd(fd, buf, stat.st_size); close(fd); @@ -217,7 +227,8 @@ static int load_xbc_from_initrd(int fd, char **buf) csum = le32toh(csum); /* Wrong size error */ - if (stat.st_size < size + BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) { + if (size > XBC_DATA_MAX || + size > stat.st_size - BOOTCONFIG_FOOTER_SIZE) { pr_err("bootconfig size is too big\n"); return -E2BIG; } -- 2.53.0 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-09-16 17:11 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2026-09-16 14:16 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] tools/bootconfig: Fix integer overflow and truncation in size" failed to apply to 6.6-stable tree gregkh 2026-09-16 17:11 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 1/2] tools/bootconfig: Cleanup bootconfig footer size calculations Sasha Levin 2026-09-16 17:11 ` [PATCH 6.6.y 2/2] tools/bootconfig: Fix integer overflow and truncation in size checks Sasha Levin
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