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* FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/sev: Make vTPM SVSM calls preemption-safe" failed to apply to 6.18-stable tree
@ 2026-09-29  6:40 gregkh
  2026-09-29 13:31 ` [PATCH 6.18.y 1/5] x86/sev: Move the internal header Sasha Levin
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: gregkh @ 2026-09-29  6:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: huibo.wang, bp, sgarzare; +Cc: stable


The patch below does not apply to the 6.18-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.18.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 6c43c72748fffd29dec15cd1f31e9a32949bc437
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026092939-ecard-twirl-6094@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.18.y' 'HEAD^..'

Possible dependencies:



thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 6c43c72748fffd29dec15cd1f31e9a32949bc437 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Melody Wang <huibo.wang@amd.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 00:57:17 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev: Make vTPM SVSM calls preemption-safe

Two functions in the SVSM vTPM guest implementation do not disable
preemption when fetching the SVSM Calling Area Address (CAA).

The SVSM CAA is a per-CPU structure. When a thread is preempted and migrated
to a different CPU after fetching the per-CPU CAA, the SVSM call will execute
on the new CPU with the original CPU's CAA. Which is wrong.

Move the CAA fetching operation inside svsm_perform_call_protocol() which
disables interrupts around the SVSM call and thus runs preemption-safe.

Fixes: 770de678bc28 ("x86/sev: Add SVSM vTPM probe/send_command functions")
Signed-off-by: Melody Wang <huibo.wang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/a5bc0d4a2c462a0089109e145c21626b244b2ff0.1789345277.git.huibo.wang@amd.com

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c
index 916d62cd17dc..2d493d55ff2e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c
@@ -74,6 +74,14 @@ int svsm_perform_call_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
 
 	flags = native_local_irq_save();
 
+	/*
+	 * 'caa' is a per-CPU variable. To avoid using a stale or incorrect
+	 * 'caa' if the task is preempted or migrated to another CPU after it
+	 * is fetched, always fetch 'caa' and then issue the SVSM call with
+	 * interrupts disabled. This ensures the correct 'caa' is used.
+	 */
+	call->caa = svsm_get_caa();
+
 	ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
 
 	do {
@@ -321,7 +329,6 @@ int snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command(u8 *buffer)
 {
 	struct svsm_call call = {};
 
-	call.caa = svsm_get_caa();
 	call.rax = SVSM_VTPM_CALL(SVSM_VTPM_CMD);
 	call.rcx = __pa(buffer);
 
@@ -345,7 +352,6 @@ bool snp_svsm_vtpm_probe(void)
 	if (!snp_vmpl)
 		return false;
 
-	call.caa = svsm_get_caa();
 	call.rax = SVSM_VTPM_CALL(SVSM_VTPM_QUERY);
 
 	if (svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call))


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 6.18.y 1/5] x86/sev: Move the internal header
  2026-09-29  6:40 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/sev: Make vTPM SVSM calls preemption-safe" failed to apply to 6.18-stable tree gregkh
@ 2026-09-29 13:31 ` Sasha Levin
  2026-09-29 13:31   ` [PATCH 6.18.y 2/5] x86/sev: Add internal header guards Sasha Levin
                     ` (3 more replies)
  0 siblings, 4 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-09-29 13:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: stable; +Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD), Tom Lendacky, Sasha Levin

From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>

[ Upstream commit c1e8980fabf5d0106992a430284fac28bba053a6 ]

Move the internal header out of the usual include/asm/ include path
because having an "internal" header there doesn't really make it
internal - quite the opposite - that's the normal arch include path.

So move where it belongs and make it really internal.

No functional changes.

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251204145716.GDaTGhTEHNOtSdTkEe@fat_crate.local
Stable-dep-of: 6c43c72748ff ("x86/sev: Make vTPM SVSM calls preemption-safe")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c                          | 3 ++-
 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c                                     | 3 ++-
 arch/x86/{include/asm/sev-internal.h => coco/sev/internal.h} | 0
 arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c                                  | 3 ++-
 arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c                                | 3 ++-
 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 rename arch/x86/{include/asm/sev-internal.h => coco/sev/internal.h} (100%)

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
index 09725428d3e65..789e99d38d17b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
 #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>
 #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
 #include <asm/sev.h>
-#include <asm/sev-internal.h>
 #include <asm/insn-eval.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -41,6 +40,8 @@
 #include <asm/cpuid/api.h>
 #include <asm/cmdline.h>
 
+#include "../../coco/sev/internal.h"
+
 /* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
 #include "sev-shared.c"
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index d20e9cc065a87..19adb17bd09d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@
 #include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>
 #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
 #include <asm/sev.h>
-#include <asm/sev-internal.h>
 #include <asm/insn-eval.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -46,6 +45,8 @@
 #include <asm/cmdline.h>
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 
+#include "internal.h"
+
 /* Bitmap of SEV features supported by the hypervisor */
 u64 sev_hv_features __ro_after_init;
 SYM_PIC_ALIAS(sev_hv_features);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-internal.h b/arch/x86/coco/sev/internal.h
similarity index 100%
rename from arch/x86/include/asm/sev-internal.h
rename to arch/x86/coco/sev/internal.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c
index 422ce72f51d58..5afd663a1c217 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
 #include <asm/sev.h>
-#include <asm/sev-internal.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
 
 static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
index 7fc136a353347..c54f2a032e392 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/vc-handle.c
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
 #include <asm/init.h>
 #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
 #include <asm/sev.h>
-#include <asm/sev-internal.h>
 #include <asm/insn-eval.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -35,6 +34,8 @@
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/cpuid/api.h>
 
+#include "internal.h"
+
 static enum es_result vc_slow_virt_to_phys(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
 					   unsigned long vaddr, phys_addr_t *paddr)
 {
-- 
2.53.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 6.18.y 2/5] x86/sev: Add internal header guards
  2026-09-29 13:31 ` [PATCH 6.18.y 1/5] x86/sev: Move the internal header Sasha Levin
@ 2026-09-29 13:31   ` Sasha Levin
  2026-09-29 13:31   ` [PATCH 6.18.y 3/5] x86/sev: Carve out the SVSM code into a separate compilation unit Sasha Levin
                     ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-09-29 13:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: stable; +Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD), Tom Lendacky, Sasha Levin

From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>

[ Upstream commit f01c6489ad6ceb8d06eae0c5123fc6cf39276ff1 ]

All headers need guards ifdeffery.

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251204124809.31783-3-bp@kernel.org
Stable-dep-of: 6c43c72748ff ("x86/sev: Make vTPM SVSM calls preemption-safe")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/coco/sev/internal.h | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/internal.h b/arch/x86/coco/sev/internal.h
index c58c47c68ab6f..af991f1da0957 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/internal.h
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __X86_COCO_SEV_INTERNAL_H__
+#define __X86_COCO_SEV_INTERNAL_H__
 
 #define DR7_RESET_VALUE        0x400
 
@@ -85,3 +87,4 @@ enum es_result sev_es_ghcb_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt
 u64 get_hv_features(void);
 
 const struct snp_cpuid_table *snp_cpuid_get_table(void);
+#endif /* __X86_COCO_SEV_INTERNAL_H__ */
-- 
2.53.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 6.18.y 3/5] x86/sev: Carve out the SVSM code into a separate compilation unit
  2026-09-29 13:31 ` [PATCH 6.18.y 1/5] x86/sev: Move the internal header Sasha Levin
  2026-09-29 13:31   ` [PATCH 6.18.y 2/5] x86/sev: Add internal header guards Sasha Levin
@ 2026-09-29 13:31   ` Sasha Levin
  2026-09-29 13:31   ` [PATCH 6.18.y 4/5] x86/sev: Remove redundant ghcbs_initialized checks around __sev_{get,put}_ghcb() Sasha Levin
  2026-09-29 13:31   ` [PATCH 6.18.y 5/5] x86/sev: Make vTPM SVSM calls preemption-safe Sasha Levin
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-09-29 13:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: stable; +Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD), Tom Lendacky, Sasha Levin

From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>

[ Upstream commit e21279b73ef6c7d27237912c914f2db0c5a74786 ]

Move the SVSM-related machinery into a separate compilation unit in
order to keep sev/core.c slim and "on-topic".

No functional changes.

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251204124809.31783-4-bp@kernel.org
Stable-dep-of: 6c43c72748ff ("x86/sev: Make vTPM SVSM calls preemption-safe")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile   |   2 +-
 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c     | 377 -----------------------------------
 arch/x86/coco/sev/internal.h |  29 +++
 arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c     | 362 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 392 insertions(+), 378 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile b/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
index b2e9ec2f69014..3111a2ee67221 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 
-obj-y += core.o noinstr.o vc-handle.o
+obj-y += core.o noinstr.o vc-handle.o svsm.o
 
 # Clang 14 and older may fail to respect __no_sanitize_undefined when inlining
 UBSAN_SANITIZE_noinstr.o	:= n
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index 19adb17bd09d1..2415410e898ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -55,40 +55,6 @@ SYM_PIC_ALIAS(sev_hv_features);
 u64 sev_secrets_pa __ro_after_init;
 SYM_PIC_ALIAS(sev_secrets_pa);
 
-/* For early boot SVSM communication */
-struct svsm_ca boot_svsm_ca_page __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
-SYM_PIC_ALIAS(boot_svsm_ca_page);
-
-/*
- * SVSM related information:
- *   During boot, the page tables are set up as identity mapped and later
- *   changed to use kernel virtual addresses. Maintain separate virtual and
- *   physical addresses for the CAA to allow SVSM functions to be used during
- *   early boot, both with identity mapped virtual addresses and proper kernel
- *   virtual addresses.
- */
-u64 boot_svsm_caa_pa __ro_after_init;
-SYM_PIC_ALIAS(boot_svsm_caa_pa);
-
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svsm_ca *, svsm_caa);
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, svsm_caa_pa);
-
-static inline struct svsm_ca *svsm_get_caa(void)
-{
-	if (sev_cfg.use_cas)
-		return this_cpu_read(svsm_caa);
-	else
-		return rip_rel_ptr(&boot_svsm_ca_page);
-}
-
-static inline u64 svsm_get_caa_pa(void)
-{
-	if (sev_cfg.use_cas)
-		return this_cpu_read(svsm_caa_pa);
-	else
-		return boot_svsm_caa_pa;
-}
-
 /* AP INIT values as documented in the APM2  section "Processor Initialization State" */
 #define AP_INIT_CS_LIMIT		0xffff
 #define AP_INIT_DS_LIMIT		0xffff
@@ -219,95 +185,6 @@ static u64 __init get_jump_table_addr(void)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int svsm_perform_ghcb_protocol(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct svsm_call *call)
-{
-	struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
-	u8 pending = 0;
-
-	vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
-
-	/*
-	 * Fill in protocol and format specifiers. This can be called very early
-	 * in the boot, so use rip-relative references as needed.
-	 */
-	ghcb->protocol_version = ghcb_version;
-	ghcb->ghcb_usage       = GHCB_DEFAULT_USAGE;
-
-	ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_SNP_RUN_VMPL);
-	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
-	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
-
-	sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(ghcb));
-
-	svsm_issue_call(call, &pending);
-
-	if (pending)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	switch (verify_exception_info(ghcb, &ctxt)) {
-	case ES_OK:
-		break;
-	case ES_EXCEPTION:
-		vc_forward_exception(&ctxt);
-		fallthrough;
-	default:
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	return svsm_process_result_codes(call);
-}
-
-static int svsm_perform_call_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
-{
-	struct ghcb_state state;
-	unsigned long flags;
-	struct ghcb *ghcb;
-	int ret;
-
-	flags = native_local_irq_save();
-
-	if (sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
-		ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
-	else if (boot_ghcb)
-		ghcb = boot_ghcb;
-	else
-		ghcb = NULL;
-
-	do {
-		ret = ghcb ? svsm_perform_ghcb_protocol(ghcb, call)
-			   : __pi_svsm_perform_msr_protocol(call);
-	} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
-
-	if (sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
-		__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
-
-	native_local_irq_restore(flags);
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static inline void __pval_terminate(u64 pfn, bool action, unsigned int page_size,
-				    int ret, u64 svsm_ret)
-{
-	WARN(1, "PVALIDATE failure: pfn: 0x%llx, action: %u, size: %u, ret: %d, svsm_ret: 0x%llx\n",
-	     pfn, action, page_size, ret, svsm_ret);
-
-	sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
-}
-
-static void svsm_pval_terminate(struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc, int ret, u64 svsm_ret)
-{
-	unsigned int page_size;
-	bool action;
-	u64 pfn;
-
-	pfn = pc->entry[pc->cur_index].pfn;
-	action = pc->entry[pc->cur_index].action;
-	page_size = pc->entry[pc->cur_index].page_size;
-
-	__pval_terminate(pfn, action, page_size, ret, svsm_ret);
-}
-
 static void pval_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
 {
 	struct psc_entry *e;
@@ -344,152 +221,6 @@ static void pval_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
 	}
 }
 
-static u64 svsm_build_ca_from_pfn_range(u64 pfn, u64 pfn_end, bool action,
-					struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc)
-{
-	struct svsm_pvalidate_entry *pe;
-
-	/* Nothing in the CA yet */
-	pc->num_entries = 0;
-	pc->cur_index   = 0;
-
-	pe = &pc->entry[0];
-
-	while (pfn < pfn_end) {
-		pe->page_size = RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
-		pe->action    = action;
-		pe->ignore_cf = 0;
-		pe->rsvd      = 0;
-		pe->pfn       = pfn;
-
-		pe++;
-		pfn++;
-
-		pc->num_entries++;
-		if (pc->num_entries == SVSM_PVALIDATE_MAX_COUNT)
-			break;
-	}
-
-	return pfn;
-}
-
-static int svsm_build_ca_from_psc_desc(struct snp_psc_desc *desc, unsigned int desc_entry,
-				       struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc)
-{
-	struct svsm_pvalidate_entry *pe;
-	struct psc_entry *e;
-
-	/* Nothing in the CA yet */
-	pc->num_entries = 0;
-	pc->cur_index   = 0;
-
-	pe = &pc->entry[0];
-	e  = &desc->entries[desc_entry];
-
-	while (desc_entry <= desc->hdr.end_entry) {
-		pe->page_size = e->pagesize ? RMP_PG_SIZE_2M : RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
-		pe->action    = e->operation == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE;
-		pe->ignore_cf = 0;
-		pe->rsvd      = 0;
-		pe->pfn       = e->gfn;
-
-		pe++;
-		e++;
-
-		desc_entry++;
-		pc->num_entries++;
-		if (pc->num_entries == SVSM_PVALIDATE_MAX_COUNT)
-			break;
-	}
-
-	return desc_entry;
-}
-
-static void svsm_pval_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
-{
-	struct svsm_pvalidate_entry pv_4k[VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_ENTRY];
-	unsigned int i, pv_4k_count = 0;
-	struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc;
-	struct svsm_call call = {};
-	unsigned long flags;
-	bool action;
-	u64 pc_pa;
-	int ret;
-
-	/*
-	 * This can be called very early in the boot, use native functions in
-	 * order to avoid paravirt issues.
-	 */
-	flags = native_local_irq_save();
-
-	/*
-	 * The SVSM calling area (CA) can support processing 510 entries at a
-	 * time. Loop through the Page State Change descriptor until the CA is
-	 * full or the last entry in the descriptor is reached, at which time
-	 * the SVSM is invoked. This repeats until all entries in the descriptor
-	 * are processed.
-	 */
-	call.caa = svsm_get_caa();
-
-	pc = (struct svsm_pvalidate_call *)call.caa->svsm_buffer;
-	pc_pa = svsm_get_caa_pa() + offsetof(struct svsm_ca, svsm_buffer);
-
-	/* Protocol 0, Call ID 1 */
-	call.rax = SVSM_CORE_CALL(SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE);
-	call.rcx = pc_pa;
-
-	for (i = 0; i <= desc->hdr.end_entry;) {
-		i = svsm_build_ca_from_psc_desc(desc, i, pc);
-
-		do {
-			ret = svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call);
-			if (!ret)
-				continue;
-
-			/*
-			 * Check if the entry failed because of an RMP mismatch (a
-			 * PVALIDATE at 2M was requested, but the page is mapped in
-			 * the RMP as 4K).
-			 */
-
-			if (call.rax_out == SVSM_PVALIDATE_FAIL_SIZEMISMATCH &&
-			    pc->entry[pc->cur_index].page_size == RMP_PG_SIZE_2M) {
-				/* Save this entry for post-processing at 4K */
-				pv_4k[pv_4k_count++] = pc->entry[pc->cur_index];
-
-				/* Skip to the next one unless at the end of the list */
-				pc->cur_index++;
-				if (pc->cur_index < pc->num_entries)
-					ret = -EAGAIN;
-				else
-					ret = 0;
-			}
-		} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
-
-		if (ret)
-			svsm_pval_terminate(pc, ret, call.rax_out);
-	}
-
-	/* Process any entries that failed to be validated at 2M and validate them at 4K */
-	for (i = 0; i < pv_4k_count; i++) {
-		u64 pfn, pfn_end;
-
-		action  = pv_4k[i].action;
-		pfn     = pv_4k[i].pfn;
-		pfn_end = pfn + 512;
-
-		while (pfn < pfn_end) {
-			pfn = svsm_build_ca_from_pfn_range(pfn, pfn_end, action, pc);
-
-			ret = svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call);
-			if (ret)
-				svsm_pval_terminate(pc, ret, call.rax_out);
-		}
-	}
-
-	native_local_irq_restore(flags);
-}
-
 static void pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
 {
 	struct psc_entry *e;
@@ -1590,56 +1321,6 @@ static int __init report_snp_info(void)
 }
 arch_initcall(report_snp_info);
 
-static void update_attest_input(struct svsm_call *call, struct svsm_attest_call *input)
-{
-	/* If (new) lengths have been returned, propagate them up */
-	if (call->rcx_out != call->rcx)
-		input->manifest_buf.len = call->rcx_out;
-
-	if (call->rdx_out != call->rdx)
-		input->certificates_buf.len = call->rdx_out;
-
-	if (call->r8_out != call->r8)
-		input->report_buf.len = call->r8_out;
-}
-
-int snp_issue_svsm_attest_req(u64 call_id, struct svsm_call *call,
-			      struct svsm_attest_call *input)
-{
-	struct svsm_attest_call *ac;
-	unsigned long flags;
-	u64 attest_call_pa;
-	int ret;
-
-	if (!snp_vmpl)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	local_irq_save(flags);
-
-	call->caa = svsm_get_caa();
-
-	ac = (struct svsm_attest_call *)call->caa->svsm_buffer;
-	attest_call_pa = svsm_get_caa_pa() + offsetof(struct svsm_ca, svsm_buffer);
-
-	*ac = *input;
-
-	/*
-	 * Set input registers for the request and set RDX and R8 to known
-	 * values in order to detect length values being returned in them.
-	 */
-	call->rax = call_id;
-	call->rcx = attest_call_pa;
-	call->rdx = -1;
-	call->r8 = -1;
-	ret = svsm_perform_call_protocol(call);
-	update_attest_input(call, input);
-
-	local_irq_restore(flags);
-
-	return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_issue_svsm_attest_req);
-
 static int snp_issue_guest_request(struct snp_guest_req *req)
 {
 	struct snp_req_data *input = &req->input;
@@ -1704,64 +1385,6 @@ static int snp_issue_guest_request(struct snp_guest_req *req)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-/**
- * snp_svsm_vtpm_probe() - Probe if SVSM provides a vTPM device
- *
- * Check that there is SVSM and that it supports at least TPM_SEND_COMMAND
- * which is the only request used so far.
- *
- * Return: true if the platform provides a vTPM SVSM device, false otherwise.
- */
-static bool snp_svsm_vtpm_probe(void)
-{
-	struct svsm_call call = {};
-
-	/* The vTPM device is available only if a SVSM is present */
-	if (!snp_vmpl)
-		return false;
-
-	call.caa = svsm_get_caa();
-	call.rax = SVSM_VTPM_CALL(SVSM_VTPM_QUERY);
-
-	if (svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call))
-		return false;
-
-	/* Check platform commands contains TPM_SEND_COMMAND - platform command 8 */
-	return call.rcx_out & BIT_ULL(8);
-}
-
-/**
- * snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command() - Execute a vTPM operation on SVSM
- * @buffer: A buffer used to both send the command and receive the response.
- *
- * Execute a SVSM_VTPM_CMD call as defined by
- * "Secure VM Service Module for SEV-SNP Guests" Publication # 58019 Revision: 1.00
- *
- * All command request/response buffers have a common structure as specified by
- * the following table:
- *     Byte      Size       In/Out    Description
- *     Offset    (Bytes)
- *     0x000     4          In        Platform command
- *                          Out       Platform command response size
- *
- * Each command can build upon this common request/response structure to create
- * a structure specific to the command. See include/linux/tpm_svsm.h for more
- * details.
- *
- * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
- */
-int snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command(u8 *buffer)
-{
-	struct svsm_call call = {};
-
-	call.caa = svsm_get_caa();
-	call.rax = SVSM_VTPM_CALL(SVSM_VTPM_CMD);
-	call.rcx = __pa(buffer);
-
-	return svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command);
-
 static struct platform_device sev_guest_device = {
 	.name		= "sev-guest",
 	.id		= -1,
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/internal.h b/arch/x86/coco/sev/internal.h
index af991f1da0957..039326b5c799e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/internal.h
@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ extern u64 boot_svsm_caa_pa;
 
 enum es_result verify_exception_info(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt);
 void vc_forward_exception(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt);
+void svsm_pval_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc);
+int svsm_perform_call_protocol(struct svsm_call *call);
+bool snp_svsm_vtpm_probe(void);
 
 static inline u64 sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(void)
 {
@@ -87,4 +90,30 @@ enum es_result sev_es_ghcb_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt
 u64 get_hv_features(void);
 
 const struct snp_cpuid_table *snp_cpuid_get_table(void);
+
+static inline struct svsm_ca *svsm_get_caa(void)
+{
+	if (sev_cfg.use_cas)
+		return this_cpu_read(svsm_caa);
+	else
+		return rip_rel_ptr(&boot_svsm_ca_page);
+}
+
+static inline u64 svsm_get_caa_pa(void)
+{
+	if (sev_cfg.use_cas)
+		return this_cpu_read(svsm_caa_pa);
+	else
+		return boot_svsm_caa_pa;
+}
+
+static inline void __pval_terminate(u64 pfn, bool action, unsigned int page_size,
+				    int ret, u64 svsm_ret)
+{
+	WARN(1, "PVALIDATE failure: pfn: 0x%llx, action: %u, size: %u, ret: %d, svsm_ret: 0x%llx\n",
+	     pfn, action, page_size, ret, svsm_ret);
+
+	sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
+}
+
 #endif /* __X86_COCO_SEV_INTERNAL_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..2acf4a76afe7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,362 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * SVSM support code
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include <asm/sev.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/* For early boot SVSM communication */
+struct svsm_ca boot_svsm_ca_page __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+SYM_PIC_ALIAS(boot_svsm_ca_page);
+
+/*
+ * SVSM related information:
+ *   During boot, the page tables are set up as identity mapped and later
+ *   changed to use kernel virtual addresses. Maintain separate virtual and
+ *   physical addresses for the CAA to allow SVSM functions to be used during
+ *   early boot, both with identity mapped virtual addresses and proper kernel
+ *   virtual addresses.
+ */
+u64 boot_svsm_caa_pa __ro_after_init;
+SYM_PIC_ALIAS(boot_svsm_caa_pa);
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svsm_ca *, svsm_caa);
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, svsm_caa_pa);
+
+static int svsm_perform_ghcb_protocol(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct svsm_call *call)
+{
+	struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
+	u8 pending = 0;
+
+	vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+
+	/*
+	 * Fill in protocol and format specifiers. This can be called very early
+	 * in the boot, so use rip-relative references as needed.
+	 */
+	ghcb->protocol_version = ghcb_version;
+	ghcb->ghcb_usage       = GHCB_DEFAULT_USAGE;
+
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_SNP_RUN_VMPL);
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
+
+	sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(ghcb));
+
+	svsm_issue_call(call, &pending);
+
+	if (pending)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	switch (verify_exception_info(ghcb, &ctxt)) {
+	case ES_OK:
+		break;
+	case ES_EXCEPTION:
+		vc_forward_exception(&ctxt);
+		fallthrough;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return svsm_process_result_codes(call);
+}
+
+int svsm_perform_call_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
+{
+	struct ghcb_state state;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct ghcb *ghcb;
+	int ret;
+
+	flags = native_local_irq_save();
+
+	if (sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
+		ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
+	else if (boot_ghcb)
+		ghcb = boot_ghcb;
+	else
+		ghcb = NULL;
+
+	do {
+		ret = ghcb ? svsm_perform_ghcb_protocol(ghcb, call)
+			   : __pi_svsm_perform_msr_protocol(call);
+	} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
+
+	if (sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
+		__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
+
+	native_local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static u64 svsm_build_ca_from_pfn_range(u64 pfn, u64 pfn_end, bool action,
+					struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc)
+{
+	struct svsm_pvalidate_entry *pe;
+
+	/* Nothing in the CA yet */
+	pc->num_entries = 0;
+	pc->cur_index   = 0;
+
+	pe = &pc->entry[0];
+
+	while (pfn < pfn_end) {
+		pe->page_size = RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
+		pe->action    = action;
+		pe->ignore_cf = 0;
+		pe->rsvd      = 0;
+		pe->pfn       = pfn;
+
+		pe++;
+		pfn++;
+
+		pc->num_entries++;
+		if (pc->num_entries == SVSM_PVALIDATE_MAX_COUNT)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return pfn;
+}
+
+static int svsm_build_ca_from_psc_desc(struct snp_psc_desc *desc, unsigned int desc_entry,
+				       struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc)
+{
+	struct svsm_pvalidate_entry *pe;
+	struct psc_entry *e;
+
+	/* Nothing in the CA yet */
+	pc->num_entries = 0;
+	pc->cur_index   = 0;
+
+	pe = &pc->entry[0];
+	e  = &desc->entries[desc_entry];
+
+	while (desc_entry <= desc->hdr.end_entry) {
+		pe->page_size = e->pagesize ? RMP_PG_SIZE_2M : RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
+		pe->action    = e->operation == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE;
+		pe->ignore_cf = 0;
+		pe->rsvd      = 0;
+		pe->pfn       = e->gfn;
+
+		pe++;
+		e++;
+
+		desc_entry++;
+		pc->num_entries++;
+		if (pc->num_entries == SVSM_PVALIDATE_MAX_COUNT)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return desc_entry;
+}
+
+static void svsm_pval_terminate(struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc, int ret, u64 svsm_ret)
+{
+	unsigned int page_size;
+	bool action;
+	u64 pfn;
+
+	pfn = pc->entry[pc->cur_index].pfn;
+	action = pc->entry[pc->cur_index].action;
+	page_size = pc->entry[pc->cur_index].page_size;
+
+	__pval_terminate(pfn, action, page_size, ret, svsm_ret);
+}
+
+void svsm_pval_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
+{
+	struct svsm_pvalidate_entry pv_4k[VMGEXIT_PSC_MAX_ENTRY];
+	unsigned int i, pv_4k_count = 0;
+	struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc;
+	struct svsm_call call = {};
+	unsigned long flags;
+	bool action;
+	u64 pc_pa;
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * This can be called very early in the boot, use native functions in
+	 * order to avoid paravirt issues.
+	 */
+	flags = native_local_irq_save();
+
+	/*
+	 * The SVSM calling area (CA) can support processing 510 entries at a
+	 * time. Loop through the Page State Change descriptor until the CA is
+	 * full or the last entry in the descriptor is reached, at which time
+	 * the SVSM is invoked. This repeats until all entries in the descriptor
+	 * are processed.
+	 */
+	call.caa = svsm_get_caa();
+
+	pc = (struct svsm_pvalidate_call *)call.caa->svsm_buffer;
+	pc_pa = svsm_get_caa_pa() + offsetof(struct svsm_ca, svsm_buffer);
+
+	/* Protocol 0, Call ID 1 */
+	call.rax = SVSM_CORE_CALL(SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE);
+	call.rcx = pc_pa;
+
+	for (i = 0; i <= desc->hdr.end_entry;) {
+		i = svsm_build_ca_from_psc_desc(desc, i, pc);
+
+		do {
+			ret = svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call);
+			if (!ret)
+				continue;
+
+			/*
+			 * Check if the entry failed because of an RMP mismatch (a
+			 * PVALIDATE at 2M was requested, but the page is mapped in
+			 * the RMP as 4K).
+			 */
+
+			if (call.rax_out == SVSM_PVALIDATE_FAIL_SIZEMISMATCH &&
+			    pc->entry[pc->cur_index].page_size == RMP_PG_SIZE_2M) {
+				/* Save this entry for post-processing at 4K */
+				pv_4k[pv_4k_count++] = pc->entry[pc->cur_index];
+
+				/* Skip to the next one unless at the end of the list */
+				pc->cur_index++;
+				if (pc->cur_index < pc->num_entries)
+					ret = -EAGAIN;
+				else
+					ret = 0;
+			}
+		} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
+
+		if (ret)
+			svsm_pval_terminate(pc, ret, call.rax_out);
+	}
+
+	/* Process any entries that failed to be validated at 2M and validate them at 4K */
+	for (i = 0; i < pv_4k_count; i++) {
+		u64 pfn, pfn_end;
+
+		action  = pv_4k[i].action;
+		pfn     = pv_4k[i].pfn;
+		pfn_end = pfn + 512;
+
+		while (pfn < pfn_end) {
+			pfn = svsm_build_ca_from_pfn_range(pfn, pfn_end, action, pc);
+
+			ret = svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call);
+			if (ret)
+				svsm_pval_terminate(pc, ret, call.rax_out);
+		}
+	}
+
+	native_local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
+static void update_attest_input(struct svsm_call *call, struct svsm_attest_call *input)
+{
+	/* If (new) lengths have been returned, propagate them up */
+	if (call->rcx_out != call->rcx)
+		input->manifest_buf.len = call->rcx_out;
+
+	if (call->rdx_out != call->rdx)
+		input->certificates_buf.len = call->rdx_out;
+
+	if (call->r8_out != call->r8)
+		input->report_buf.len = call->r8_out;
+}
+
+int snp_issue_svsm_attest_req(u64 call_id, struct svsm_call *call,
+			      struct svsm_attest_call *input)
+{
+	struct svsm_attest_call *ac;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	u64 attest_call_pa;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!snp_vmpl)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+
+	call->caa = svsm_get_caa();
+
+	ac = (struct svsm_attest_call *)call->caa->svsm_buffer;
+	attest_call_pa = svsm_get_caa_pa() + offsetof(struct svsm_ca, svsm_buffer);
+
+	*ac = *input;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set input registers for the request and set RDX and R8 to known
+	 * values in order to detect length values being returned in them.
+	 */
+	call->rax = call_id;
+	call->rcx = attest_call_pa;
+	call->rdx = -1;
+	call->r8 = -1;
+	ret = svsm_perform_call_protocol(call);
+	update_attest_input(call, input);
+
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_issue_svsm_attest_req);
+
+/**
+ * snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command() - Execute a vTPM operation on SVSM
+ * @buffer: A buffer used to both send the command and receive the response.
+ *
+ * Execute a SVSM_VTPM_CMD call as defined by
+ * "Secure VM Service Module for SEV-SNP Guests" Publication # 58019 Revision: 1.00
+ *
+ * All command request/response buffers have a common structure as specified by
+ * the following table:
+ *     Byte      Size       In/Out    Description
+ *     Offset    (Bytes)
+ *     0x000     4          In        Platform command
+ *                          Out       Platform command response size
+ *
+ * Each command can build upon this common request/response structure to create
+ * a structure specific to the command. See include/linux/tpm_svsm.h for more
+ * details.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
+ */
+int snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command(u8 *buffer)
+{
+	struct svsm_call call = {};
+
+	call.caa = svsm_get_caa();
+	call.rax = SVSM_VTPM_CALL(SVSM_VTPM_CMD);
+	call.rcx = __pa(buffer);
+
+	return svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command);
+
+/**
+ * snp_svsm_vtpm_probe() - Probe if SVSM provides a vTPM device
+ *
+ * Check that there is SVSM and that it supports at least TPM_SEND_COMMAND
+ * which is the only request used so far.
+ *
+ * Return: true if the platform provides a vTPM SVSM device, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool snp_svsm_vtpm_probe(void)
+{
+	struct svsm_call call = {};
+
+	/* The vTPM device is available only if a SVSM is present */
+	if (!snp_vmpl)
+		return false;
+
+	call.caa = svsm_get_caa();
+	call.rax = SVSM_VTPM_CALL(SVSM_VTPM_QUERY);
+
+	if (svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call))
+		return false;
+
+	/* Check platform commands contains TPM_SEND_COMMAND - platform command 8 */
+	return call.rcx_out & BIT_ULL(8);
+}
-- 
2.53.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 6.18.y 4/5] x86/sev: Remove redundant ghcbs_initialized checks around __sev_{get,put}_ghcb()
  2026-09-29 13:31 ` [PATCH 6.18.y 1/5] x86/sev: Move the internal header Sasha Levin
  2026-09-29 13:31   ` [PATCH 6.18.y 2/5] x86/sev: Add internal header guards Sasha Levin
  2026-09-29 13:31   ` [PATCH 6.18.y 3/5] x86/sev: Carve out the SVSM code into a separate compilation unit Sasha Levin
@ 2026-09-29 13:31   ` Sasha Levin
  2026-09-29 13:31   ` [PATCH 6.18.y 5/5] x86/sev: Make vTPM SVSM calls preemption-safe Sasha Levin
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-09-29 13:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: stable; +Cc: Nikunj A Dadhania, Tom Lendacky, Borislav Petkov (AMD),
	Sasha Levin

From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>

[ Upstream commit 9d8460a1c7a6b0f2dc6302e5d0f31d4e8c2a7913 ]

After

  3645eb7e3915 ("x86/fred: Fix early boot failures on SEV-ES/SNP guests"),

__sev_{get,put}_ghcb() handle the early-boot GHCB fallback internally, making
the ghcbs_initialized guards in __set_pages_state() and
svsm_perform_call_protocol() redundant.

Remove them.

Also initialize state->ghcb to NULL in the early-boot path of
__sev_get_ghcb() so that the ghcb_state is well-defined for all callers,
even though __sev_put_ghcb() currently returns early before reading it.

No functional change intended.

Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260518102230.3394603-1-nikunj@amd.com
Stable-dep-of: 6c43c72748ff ("x86/sev: Make vTPM SVSM calls preemption-safe")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c    |  8 ++------
 arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c |  4 +++-
 arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c    | 10 ++--------
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index 2415410e898ec..fefd7031be020 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -367,17 +367,13 @@ static unsigned long __set_pages_state(struct snp_psc_desc *data, unsigned long
 
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 
-	if (sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
-		ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
-	else
-		ghcb = boot_ghcb;
+	ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
 
 	/* Invoke the hypervisor to perform the page state changes */
 	if (!ghcb || vmgexit_psc(ghcb, data))
 		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PSC);
 
-	if (sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
-		__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
+	__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
 
 	local_irq_restore(flags);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c
index 5afd663a1c217..e1e03f12fc7bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c
@@ -121,8 +121,10 @@ noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
 
 	WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
 
-	if (!sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
+	if (!sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized) {
+		state->ghcb = NULL;
 		return boot_ghcb;
+	}
 
 	data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
 	ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c
index 2acf4a76afe7a..916d62cd17dc7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c
@@ -74,20 +74,14 @@ int svsm_perform_call_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
 
 	flags = native_local_irq_save();
 
-	if (sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
-		ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
-	else if (boot_ghcb)
-		ghcb = boot_ghcb;
-	else
-		ghcb = NULL;
+	ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
 
 	do {
 		ret = ghcb ? svsm_perform_ghcb_protocol(ghcb, call)
 			   : __pi_svsm_perform_msr_protocol(call);
 	} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
 
-	if (sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
-		__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
+	__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
 
 	native_local_irq_restore(flags);
 
-- 
2.53.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* [PATCH 6.18.y 5/5] x86/sev: Make vTPM SVSM calls preemption-safe
  2026-09-29 13:31 ` [PATCH 6.18.y 1/5] x86/sev: Move the internal header Sasha Levin
                     ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2026-09-29 13:31   ` [PATCH 6.18.y 4/5] x86/sev: Remove redundant ghcbs_initialized checks around __sev_{get,put}_ghcb() Sasha Levin
@ 2026-09-29 13:31   ` Sasha Levin
  3 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-09-29 13:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: stable; +Cc: Melody Wang, Borislav Petkov (AMD), Stefano Garzarella,
	Sasha Levin

From: Melody Wang <huibo.wang@amd.com>

[ Upstream commit 6c43c72748fffd29dec15cd1f31e9a32949bc437 ]

Two functions in the SVSM vTPM guest implementation do not disable
preemption when fetching the SVSM Calling Area Address (CAA).

The SVSM CAA is a per-CPU structure. When a thread is preempted and migrated
to a different CPU after fetching the per-CPU CAA, the SVSM call will execute
on the new CPU with the original CPU's CAA. Which is wrong.

Move the CAA fetching operation inside svsm_perform_call_protocol() which
disables interrupts around the SVSM call and thus runs preemption-safe.

Fixes: 770de678bc28 ("x86/sev: Add SVSM vTPM probe/send_command functions")
Signed-off-by: Melody Wang <huibo.wang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/a5bc0d4a2c462a0089109e145c21626b244b2ff0.1789345277.git.huibo.wang@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c
index 916d62cd17dc7..2d493d55ff2e8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/svsm.c
@@ -74,6 +74,14 @@ int svsm_perform_call_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
 
 	flags = native_local_irq_save();
 
+	/*
+	 * 'caa' is a per-CPU variable. To avoid using a stale or incorrect
+	 * 'caa' if the task is preempted or migrated to another CPU after it
+	 * is fetched, always fetch 'caa' and then issue the SVSM call with
+	 * interrupts disabled. This ensures the correct 'caa' is used.
+	 */
+	call->caa = svsm_get_caa();
+
 	ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
 
 	do {
@@ -321,7 +329,6 @@ int snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command(u8 *buffer)
 {
 	struct svsm_call call = {};
 
-	call.caa = svsm_get_caa();
 	call.rax = SVSM_VTPM_CALL(SVSM_VTPM_CMD);
 	call.rcx = __pa(buffer);
 
@@ -345,7 +352,6 @@ bool snp_svsm_vtpm_probe(void)
 	if (!snp_vmpl)
 		return false;
 
-	call.caa = svsm_get_caa();
 	call.rax = SVSM_VTPM_CALL(SVSM_VTPM_QUERY);
 
 	if (svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call))
-- 
2.53.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-09-29 13:31 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-09-29  6:40 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/sev: Make vTPM SVSM calls preemption-safe" failed to apply to 6.18-stable tree gregkh
2026-09-29 13:31 ` [PATCH 6.18.y 1/5] x86/sev: Move the internal header Sasha Levin
2026-09-29 13:31   ` [PATCH 6.18.y 2/5] x86/sev: Add internal header guards Sasha Levin
2026-09-29 13:31   ` [PATCH 6.18.y 3/5] x86/sev: Carve out the SVSM code into a separate compilation unit Sasha Levin
2026-09-29 13:31   ` [PATCH 6.18.y 4/5] x86/sev: Remove redundant ghcbs_initialized checks around __sev_{get,put}_ghcb() Sasha Levin
2026-09-29 13:31   ` [PATCH 6.18.y 5/5] x86/sev: Make vTPM SVSM calls preemption-safe Sasha Levin

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