* [PATCH v2 1/6] KEYS: Expand key->{datalen,quotalen} to unsigned int
[not found] <20261023120953.1206778-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
@ 2026-10-23 12:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-23 12:09 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] KEYS: Reject descriptions larger than KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-23 12:09 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] KEYS: Verify the key identity in __key_unlink_begin Jarkko Sakkinen
2 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-10-23 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells
Cc: keyrings, Linus Torvalds, Jarkko Sakkinen, stable, Eric Biggers,
Paulo Alcantara, Namjae Jeon, Ronnie Sahlberg, Shyam Prasad N,
Tom Talpey, Bharath SM, Andrew Morton,
open list:COMMON INTERNET FILE SYSTEM CLIENT (CIFS and SMB3),
moderated list:COMMON INTERNET FILE SYSTEM CLIENT (CIFS and SMB3),
open list
In key_alloc() and key_payload_reserve(), key->quotalen and key->datalen
can receive values larger than USHRT_MAX.
Example:
keyctl new_session >/dev/null
owner=$(keyctl newring owner @s)
keeper=$(keyctl newring keeper @s)
for ((i=0; i<16384; i++)); do
key=$(keyctl add user "k$i" x "$keeper")
keyctl link "$key" "$owner"
done
awk -v uid="$(id -u):" '$1 == uid {print $NF}' /proc/key-users
keyctl clear "$owner"
awk -v uid="$(id -u):" '$1 == uid {print $NF}' /proc/key-users
Because key->datalen wraps around 65535, the quota refunded upon clearing
is truncated, causing quota bytes to leak in /proc/key-users.
Change the types of key->datalen and key->quotalen from unsigned short to
unsigned int so that they can carry the full payload length without
truncation.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261020174325.2229448-2-jarkko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c | 6 +++---
include/linux/key.h | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c b/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c
index d1a92bb4d9a5..e7f7ccf2a158 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ id_to_sid(unsigned int cid, uint sidtype, struct smb_sid *ssid)
goto out_revert_creds;
} else if (sidkey->datalen < CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE) {
rc = smb_EIO1(smb_eio_trace_malformed_sid_key, sidkey->datalen);
- cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%hu)\n",
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%u)\n",
__func__, sidkey->datalen);
goto invalidate_key;
}
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ id_to_sid(unsigned int cid, uint sidtype, struct smb_sid *ssid)
if (ksid_size > sidkey->datalen) {
rc = smb_EIO2(smb_eio_trace_malformed_ksid_key,
ksid_size, sidkey->datalen);
- cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%hu, ksid_size=%u)\n",
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%u, ksid_size=%u)\n",
__func__, sidkey->datalen, ksid_size);
goto invalidate_key;
}
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ sid_to_id(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, struct smb_sid *psid,
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(uid_t) != sizeof(gid_t));
if (sidkey->datalen != sizeof(uid_t)) {
- cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%hu)\n",
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%u)\n",
__func__, sidkey->datalen);
key_invalidate(sidkey);
goto out_key_put;
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index e40b5267658f..26139c3adf62 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -216,8 +216,8 @@ struct key {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
key_perm_t perm; /* access permissions */
- unsigned short quotalen; /* length added to quota */
- unsigned short datalen; /* payload data length
+ unsigned int quotalen; /* length added to quota */
+ unsigned int datalen; /* payload data length
* - may not match RCU dereferenced payload
* - payload should contain own length
*/
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 2/6] KEYS: Reject descriptions larger than KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE
[not found] <20261023120953.1206778-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
2026-10-23 12:09 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] KEYS: Expand key->{datalen,quotalen} to unsigned int Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2026-10-23 12:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-23 12:09 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] KEYS: Verify the key identity in __key_unlink_begin Jarkko Sakkinen
2 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-10-23 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells
Cc: keyrings, Linus Torvalds, Jarkko Sakkinen, stable, Eric Biggers,
Andrew Morton, Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
open list, open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM
KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE includes the trailing NULL character. Descriptions
generated from payloads and in-kernel paths bypass the userspace limit.
Reject descriptions at or above KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE with -EINVAL at the
following sites:
- key_alloc(): before quota calculation
- __key_create_or_update(): before key_set_index_key()
- keyring_search(): before match_preparse
- request_key_and_link(): before match_preparse
- request_key_rcu(): before check_cached_key()
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Fixes: f771fde82051 ("keys: Simplify key description management")
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261020174325.2229448-3-jarkko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/key.h | 3 +++
security/keys/key.c | 10 +++++++++-
security/keys/keyctl.c | 2 --
security/keys/keyring.c | 7 ++++++-
security/keys/request_key.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 26139c3adf62..3b8af14fb323 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ struct net;
#undef KEY_DEBUGGING
+/* Maximum length of a key description, including the trailing NUL */
+#define KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE 4096
+
#define KEY_POS_VIEW 0x01000000 /* possessor can view a key's attributes */
#define KEY_POS_READ 0x02000000 /* possessor can read key payload / view keyring */
#define KEY_POS_WRITE 0x04000000 /* possessor can update key payload / add link to keyring */
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 6ebb8691551f..e88548f1a704 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -245,6 +245,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
}
desclen = strlen(desc);
+ if (desclen >= KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE)
+ goto error;
quotalen = desclen + 1 + type->def_datalen;
/* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
@@ -829,6 +831,7 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
key_ref_t key_ref;
int ret;
struct key_restriction *restrict_link = NULL;
+ size_t desclen;
/* look up the key type to see if it's one of the registered kernel
* types */
@@ -869,7 +872,12 @@ static key_ref_t __key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
if (!index_key.description)
goto error_free_prep;
}
- index_key.desc_len = strlen(index_key.description);
+ desclen = strlen(index_key.description);
+ if (desclen >= KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE) {
+ key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ goto error_free_prep;
+ }
+ index_key.desc_len = desclen;
key_set_index_key(&index_key);
ret = __key_link_lock(keyring, &index_key);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 36ffba0ebba6..d6b10fd67627 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@
#include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h>
#include "internal.h"
-#define KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE 4096
-
static const unsigned char keyrings_capabilities[2] = {
[0] = (KEYCTL_CAPS0_CAPABILITIES |
(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS) ? KEYCTL_CAPS0_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS : 0) |
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 7143f3079d20..2c54f7f84c55 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -957,7 +957,6 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = type,
.index_key.description = description,
- .index_key.desc_len = strlen(description),
.cred = current_cred(),
.match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
@@ -965,8 +964,14 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
.flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK,
};
key_ref_t key;
+ size_t desclen;
int ret;
+ desclen = strlen(description);
+ if (desclen >= KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ ctx.index_key.desc_len = desclen;
+
if (recurse)
ctx.flags |= KEYRING_SEARCH_RECURSE;
if (type->match_preparse) {
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index fa2bb9f2f538..ef00c2b08fe0 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -584,7 +584,6 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
.index_key.type = type,
.index_key.domain_tag = domain_tag,
.index_key.description = description,
- .index_key.desc_len = strlen(description),
.cred = current_cred(),
.match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
@@ -595,8 +594,14 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
};
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
+ size_t desclen;
int ret;
+ desclen = strlen(description);
+ if (desclen >= KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ ctx.index_key.desc_len = desclen;
+
kenter("%s,%s,%p,%zu,%p,%p,%lx",
ctx.index_key.type->name, ctx.index_key.description,
callout_info, callout_len, aux, dest_keyring, flags);
@@ -787,7 +792,6 @@ struct key *request_key_rcu(struct key_type *type,
.index_key.type = type,
.index_key.domain_tag = domain_tag,
.index_key.description = description,
- .index_key.desc_len = strlen(description),
.cred = current_cred(),
.match_data.cmp = key_default_cmp,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
@@ -797,6 +801,12 @@ struct key *request_key_rcu(struct key_type *type,
};
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
+ size_t desclen;
+
+ desclen = strlen(description);
+ if (desclen >= KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ ctx.index_key.desc_len = desclen;
kenter("%s,%s", type->name, description);
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 3/6] KEYS: Verify the key identity in __key_unlink_begin
[not found] <20261023120953.1206778-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
2026-10-23 12:09 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] KEYS: Expand key->{datalen,quotalen} to unsigned int Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-23 12:09 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] KEYS: Reject descriptions larger than KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE Jarkko Sakkinen
@ 2026-10-23 12:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-10-23 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells
Cc: keyrings, Linus Torvalds, Jarkko Sakkinen, stable, Eric Biggers,
Andrew Morton, Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
open list:LIBRARY CODE, open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM
When two keys have identical type and description, linking the second key
replaces the first in a keyring. However, attempting to unlink the first
key (no longer in the keyring) unlinks the second key.
This happens because __key_unlink_begin() calls assoc_array_delete() with
&key->index_key, matching only on type and description rather than the
key's identity.
Example:
keyctl new_session >/dev/null
keyctl newring ring_a @s
keyctl newring ring_b @s
A=$(keyctl add user A ss %:ring_a)
B=$(keyctl add user A qq %:ring_b)
keyctl newring R @s
keyctl link $A %:R
keyctl link $B %:R
keyctl unlink $A %:R
keyctl show
Verify the key identity before unlinking, and return -ENOENT on mismatch,
instead of unlinking the key with the wrong identity.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261020174325.2229448-4-jarkko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
security/keys/keyring.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 2c54f7f84c55..5281da9d5bf7 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1506,9 +1506,15 @@ static int __key_unlink_begin(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
struct assoc_array_edit **_edit)
{
struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
+ const void *object;
BUG_ON(*_edit != NULL);
+ object = assoc_array_find(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
+ &key->index_key);
+ if (!object || keyring_ptr_to_key(object) != key)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
edit = assoc_array_delete(&keyring->keys, &keyring_assoc_array_ops,
&key->index_key);
if (IS_ERR(edit))
--
2.47.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread