* Re: mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() [not found] <2026102711371963416812@amlogic.com> @ 2026-10-27 5:50 ` gregkh 2026-10-27 6:44 ` yao.zhang1 2026-10-27 6:00 ` yao.zhang1 1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: gregkh @ 2026-10-27 5:50 UTC (permalink / raw) To: yao.zhang1@amlogic.com; +Cc: stable, tuan.zhang, jianxin.pan On Tue, Oct 27, 2026 at 11:37:21AM +0800, yao.zhang1@amlogic.com wrote: > Dear 5.15.y maintainers, > > An mm patch should be backported from upstream mainline to the stable > 5.15.y branch. The patch's information is shown as below: > > [Subject] > mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() > > [Upstream commit ID] > 0f910dbf2f2a4a7820ba4bac7b280f7108aa05b1 > > [Kernel version] > 5.15.y > > [Why] > The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which > doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called > personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for > RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, > bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. > So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the > remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it > potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by > SELinux. Please provide a working backport that you have tested for this, as it does not apply cleanly on its own. Also note that 5.15.y will only be alive for one more month, so why aren't you moving off of this kernel version already instead of wanting to add a new bugfix to it when there are already 2000+ unfixed CVEs in that tree? thanks, greg k-h ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() 2026-10-27 5:50 ` mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() gregkh @ 2026-10-27 6:44 ` yao.zhang1 2026-10-27 6:50 ` gregkh 0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: yao.zhang1 @ 2026-10-27 6:44 UTC (permalink / raw) To: gregkh; +Cc: stable, tuan.zhang, jianxin.pan Hi gregkh I have verified the following: 1. The patch can be applied to the `linux-5.15.y` branch. The commit applies cleanly on top of v5.15.223 (using `git cherry-pick -x`, with no conflicts): git cherry-pick -x 0f910dbf2f2a4a7820ba4bac7b280f7108aa05b1 with no conflicts git log --oneline it can view the commit history. 2. Our customer is using the `5.15.y` branch The customer has requested the inclusion of these CVEs. and is unwilling to upgrade to version 6.x or higher. Furthermore, as they are using GKI 2.0, they cannot apply "autopatch." the only way to incorporate fixes for CVEs is by updating the LTS. ------------------------------------- From: gregkh Date: 2026-10-27 13:50 To: yao.zhang1@amlogic.com CC: stable; tuan.zhang; jianxin.pan Subject: Re: mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() [ EXTERNAL EMAIL ] On Tue, Oct 27, 2026 at 11:37:21AM +0800, yao.zhang1@amlogic.com wrote: > Dear 5.15.y maintainers, > > An mm patch should be backported from upstream mainline to the stable > 5.15.y branch. The patch's information is shown as below: > > [Subject] > mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() > > [Upstream commit ID] > 0f910dbf2f2a4a7820ba4bac7b280f7108aa05b1 > > [Kernel version] > 5.15.y > > [Why] > The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which > doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called > personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for > RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, > bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. > So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the > remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it > potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by > SELinux. Please provide a working backport that you have tested for this, as it does not apply cleanly on its own. Also note that 5.15.y will only be alive for one more month, so why aren't you moving off of this kernel version already instead of wanting to add a new bugfix to it when there are already 2000+ unfixed CVEs in that tree? thanks, greg k-h ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() 2026-10-27 6:44 ` yao.zhang1 @ 2026-10-27 6:50 ` gregkh 2026-10-27 8:56 ` yao.zhang1 0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: gregkh @ 2026-10-27 6:50 UTC (permalink / raw) To: yao.zhang1@amlogic.com; +Cc: stable, tuan.zhang, jianxin.pan On Tue, Oct 27, 2026 at 02:44:41PM +0800, yao.zhang1@amlogic.com wrote: > Hi gregkh > > I have verified the following: > > 1. The patch can be applied to the `linux-5.15.y` branch. > The commit applies cleanly on top of v5.15.223 > (using `git cherry-pick -x`, with no conflicts): > > git cherry-pick -x 0f910dbf2f2a4a7820ba4bac7b280f7108aa05b1 > with no conflicts But that is not the original commit, please do this on the original. And again, please provide a tested backport and we will be glad to include it. > 2. Our customer is using the `5.15.y` branch > The customer has requested the inclusion of these CVEs. > and is unwilling to upgrade to version 6.x or higher. Then you have tested this already? Also what will they do in December? > Furthermore, as they are using GKI 2.0, they cannot apply "autopatch." > the only way to incorporate fixes for CVEs is by updating the LTS. I have no idea what this means at all, sorry. greg k-h ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() 2026-10-27 6:50 ` gregkh @ 2026-10-27 8:56 ` yao.zhang1 2026-10-27 19:10 ` Sasha Levin 0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: yao.zhang1 @ 2026-10-27 8:56 UTC (permalink / raw) To: gregkh; +Cc: stable, tuan.zhang, jianxin.pan Hi gregkh > original commit: ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 If use the original commit, there will be conflicts that need to be resolved manually. > Then you have tested this already? Also what will they do in December? The customer currently plans to use only 5.15. I`d like to ask a few questions: 1, What is a "tested backport"? Is this for verifying code BUILD and kernel bootup? or Reproduce the issue and verify that the patch is effective? 2, How should I provide the "tested backport" to you? As a patch file? or as a link? Thanks, ------------------------------- From: gregkh Date: 2026-10-27 14:50 To: yao.zhang1@amlogic.com CC: stable; tuan.zhang; jianxin.pan Subject: Re: mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() [ EXTERNAL EMAIL ] On Tue, Oct 27, 2026 at 02:44:41PM +0800, yao.zhang1@amlogic.com wrote: > Hi gregkh > > I have verified the following: > > 1. The patch can be applied to the `linux-5.15.y` branch. > The commit applies cleanly on top of v5.15.223 > (using `git cherry-pick -x`, with no conflicts): > > git cherry-pick -x 0f910dbf2f2a4a7820ba4bac7b280f7108aa05b1 > with no conflicts But that is not the original commit, please do this on the original. And again, please provide a tested backport and we will be glad to include it. > 2. Our customer is using the `5.15.y` branch > The customer has requested the inclusion of these CVEs. > and is unwilling to upgrade to version 6.x or higher. Then you have tested this already? Also what will they do in December? > Furthermore, as they are using GKI 2.0, they cannot apply "autopatch." > the only way to incorporate fixes for CVEs is by updating the LTS. I have no idea what this means at all, sorry. greg k-h ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() 2026-10-27 8:56 ` yao.zhang1 @ 2026-10-27 19:10 ` Sasha Levin 2026-10-28 8:31 ` yao.zhang1 0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-10-27 19:10 UTC (permalink / raw) To: gregkh; +Cc: Sasha Levin, stable, tuan.zhang, jianxin.pan, yao.zhang1@amlogic.com > If use the original commit, there will be conflicts > that need to be resolved manually. The original can't go to 5.15 on its own. ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()") calls security_mmap_file() under the mmap write lock, which creates a lock inversion with IMA. That is fixed by 58a039e679fe ("mm: split critical region in remap_file_pages() and invoke LSMs in between"). Greg dropped the earlier 5.15 and 5.10 backports in February 2025 for leaving it out, and 6.1.y has carried the original without it since 6.1.120. I've queued 58a039e679fe for 6.1. For 5.15 the backport has to be the two commits as a pair: the original, then 58a039e679fe. > 1, What is a "tested backport"? > Is this for verifying code BUILD and kernel bootup? > or > Reproduce the issue and verify that the patch is effective? At minimum, build and boot 5.15.y with both patches applied. If you can reproduce the original problem, please also confirm it is gone. > 2, How should I provide the "tested backport" to you? > As a patch file? > or > as a link? Send them inline with git send-email to stable@vger.kernel.org, one mail per patch, with [PATCH 5.15.y] in the subject. Each commit message needs the upstream commit ID, and a note on anything you changed from it. See Option 3 in Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst. -- Thanks, Sasha ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() 2026-10-27 19:10 ` Sasha Levin @ 2026-10-28 8:31 ` yao.zhang1 0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: yao.zhang1 @ 2026-10-28 8:31 UTC (permalink / raw) To: sashal, gregkh; +Cc: stable, tuan.zhang, jianxin.pan Hi sashal , gregkh 1, Based on 5.15.y, I tested these two patches; the kernel BUILD successfully and kernel bootup without any issues. 2, Submitted two patches via `git send-email`. ea7e2d5e49c0: Message-ID: <20261028080719.1821-1-yao.zhang1@amlogic.com> 58a039e679fe: Message-ID: <20261028080835.1852-1-yao.zhang1@amlogic.com> Submit to https://lore.kernel.org/stable/ Thanks, -------------- >[ EXTERNAL EMAIL ] > >> If use the original commit, there will be conflicts >> that need to be resolved manually. > >The original can't go to 5.15 on its own. ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the >security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()") calls >security_mmap_file() under the mmap write lock, which creates a lock inversion >with IMA. That is fixed by 58a039e679fe ("mm: split critical region in >remap_file_pages() and invoke LSMs in between"). Greg dropped the earlier 5.15 >and 5.10 backports in February 2025 for leaving it out, and 6.1.y has carried >the original without it since 6.1.120. > >I've queued 58a039e679fe for 6.1. For 5.15 the backport has to be the two >commits as a pair: the original, then 58a039e679fe. > >> 1, What is a "tested backport"? >> Is this for verifying code BUILD and kernel bootup? >> or >> Reproduce the issue and verify that the patch is effective? > >At minimum, build and boot 5.15.y with both patches applied. If you can >reproduce the original problem, please also confirm it is gone. > >> 2, How should I provide the "tested backport" to you? >> As a patch file? >> or >> as a link? > >Send them inline with git send-email to stable@vger.kernel.org, one mail per >patch, with [PATCH 5.15.y] in the subject. Each commit message needs the >upstream commit ID and a note on anything you changed from it. See Option 3 in >Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst. > >-- >Thanks, >Sasha ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() [not found] <2026102711371963416812@amlogic.com> 2026-10-27 5:50 ` mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() gregkh @ 2026-10-27 6:00 ` yao.zhang1 1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread From: yao.zhang1 @ 2026-10-27 6:00 UTC (permalink / raw) To: stable, gregkh; +Cc: tuan.zhang, jianxin.pan Dear 5.15.y maintainers, An mm patch should be backported from upstream mainline to the stable 5.15.y branch. The patch's information is shown as below: [Subject] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() [Upstream commit ID] 0f910dbf2f2a4a7820ba4bac7b280f7108aa05b1 [Kernel version] 5.15.y [Why] The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. Thanks, yao.zhang1 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
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2026-10-27 5:50 ` mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() gregkh
2026-10-27 6:44 ` yao.zhang1
2026-10-27 6:50 ` gregkh
2026-10-27 8:56 ` yao.zhang1
2026-10-27 19:10 ` Sasha Levin
2026-10-28 8:31 ` yao.zhang1
2026-10-27 6:00 ` yao.zhang1
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