FAILED: patch "[PATCH] smb: client: fix fiemap wild read on empty truncated response" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] smb: client: fix fiemap wild read on empty truncated response" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree

[gregkh]

The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x f5baa17a0f316c235d61623ac8e8fb32c2b3c0cc
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026110448-clunky-cupped-464c@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' 'HEAD^..'

Possible dependencies:



thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From f5baa17a0f316c235d61623ac8e8fb32c2b3c0cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Abdifatah Suruur <suruurism@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 14:52:46 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] smb: client: fix fiemap wild read on empty truncated response

smb3_fiemap() treats -E2BIG from SMB2_ioctl() as a truncated range blob
and loops for the next chunk. If the server reports
STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW with OutputCount == 0, SMB2_ioctl() returns
-E2BIG with out_data == NULL and out_data_len == 0, and the existing
length checks accept the empty result. The loop then evaluates

	next = out_data[num - 1].file_offset + ...

with num == 0, reading 16 bytes before NULL.

Reject a truncated range blob that contains no range, so the resume
offset is never computed from an empty response. Also require the last
range in a truncated blob to advance the resume offset without
overflowing, and to stay within the requested range; a malicious or
broken server could otherwise make no progress or underflow len and loop
forever. Free the previous response buffer before retrying.

Reproduced on 6.6.87.2 with a malicious SMB2 server that answers
FSCTL_QUERY_ALLOCATED_RANGES with STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW and
OutputCount == 0; an FS_IOC_FIEMAP ioctl on the mount oopses in
cifs_fiemap() with CR2 = fffffffffffffff8. The code path is unchanged
on mainline.

Fixes: 2f3ebaba13ce ("cifs: add fiemap support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Abdifatah Suruur <suruurism@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>

diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
index 20624f5dff9b..dc55cd512616 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c
@@ -4360,6 +4360,15 @@ static int smb3_fiemap(struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * A truncated range blob must contain at least one range, otherwise
+	 * there is no offset to resume from and out_data is NULL.
+	 */
+	if (!last_blob && out_data_len == 0) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	num = out_data_len / sizeof(struct file_allocated_range_buffer);
 	for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
 		flags = 0;
@@ -4380,10 +4389,25 @@ static int smb3_fiemap(struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
 	}
 
 	if (!last_blob) {
-		next = le64_to_cpu(out_data[num - 1].file_offset) +
-		  le64_to_cpu(out_data[num - 1].length);
-		len = len - (next - start);
+		u64 last_start, last_len;
+
+		last_start = le64_to_cpu(out_data[num - 1].file_offset);
+		last_len = le64_to_cpu(out_data[num - 1].length);
+
+		if (check_add_overflow(last_start, last_len, &next) ||
+		    next <= start) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (next - start >= len) {
+			rc = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		len -= next - start;
 		start = next;
+		kfree(out_data);
+		out_data = NULL;
 		goto again;
 	}
 

[PATCH 5.15.y] smb: client: fix fiemap wild read on empty truncated response

[Sasha Levin]

From: Abdifatah Suruur <suruurism@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit f5baa17a0f316c235d61623ac8e8fb32c2b3c0cc ]

smb3_fiemap() treats -E2BIG from SMB2_ioctl() as a truncated range blob
and loops for the next chunk. If the server reports
STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW with OutputCount == 0, SMB2_ioctl() returns
-E2BIG with out_data == NULL and out_data_len == 0, and the existing
length checks accept the empty result. The loop then evaluates

	next = out_data[num - 1].file_offset + ...

with num == 0, reading 16 bytes before NULL.

Reject a truncated range blob that contains no range, so the resume
offset is never computed from an empty response. Also require the last
range in a truncated blob to advance the resume offset without
overflowing, and to stay within the requested range; a malicious or
broken server could otherwise make no progress or underflow len and loop
forever. Free the previous response buffer before retrying.

Reproduced on 6.6.87.2 with a malicious SMB2 server that answers
FSCTL_QUERY_ALLOCATED_RANGES with STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW and
OutputCount == 0; an FS_IOC_FIEMAP ioctl on the mount oopses in
cifs_fiemap() with CR2 = fffffffffffffff8. The code path is unchanged
on mainline.

Fixes: 2f3ebaba13ce ("cifs: add fiemap support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Abdifatah Suruur <suruurism@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
index 781fe599dda7e..f829a1a7291b3 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
@@ -4167,6 +4167,15 @@ static int smb3_fiemap(struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * A truncated range blob must contain at least one range, otherwise
+	 * there is no offset to resume from and out_data is NULL.
+	 */
+	if (!last_blob && out_data_len == 0) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	num = out_data_len / sizeof(struct file_allocated_range_buffer);
 	for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
 		flags = 0;
@@ -4187,10 +4196,25 @@ static int smb3_fiemap(struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
 	}
 
 	if (!last_blob) {
-		next = le64_to_cpu(out_data[num - 1].file_offset) +
-		  le64_to_cpu(out_data[num - 1].length);
-		len = len - (next - start);
+		u64 last_start, last_len;
+
+		last_start = le64_to_cpu(out_data[num - 1].file_offset);
+		last_len = le64_to_cpu(out_data[num - 1].length);
+
+		if (check_add_overflow(last_start, last_len, &next) ||
+		    next <= start) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (next - start >= len) {
+			rc = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		len -= next - start;
 		start = next;
+		kfree(out_data);
+		out_data = NULL;
 		goto again;
 	}
 
-- 
2.53.0