* FAILED: patch "[PATCH] netfilter: nf_reject: initialize IPCB at inet ingress" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree
@ 2026-11-07 11:08 Sasha Levin
2026-11-10 21:19 ` [PATCH 5.15.y 1/2] netfilter: conntrack: skip verification of zero UDP checksum Sasha Levin
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-11-07 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kylebot, david.lee, pablo; +Cc: stable
The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 73a73d442f9986353fe284bd1b504d0313d0f153
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '20261107060821-failed-5.15-73a73d442f99@kernel.org' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' 'HEAD^..'
Thanks,
Sasha
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From 73a73d442f9986353fe284bd1b504d0313d0f153 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2026 23:01:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] netfilter: nf_reject: initialize IPCB at inet ingress
The inet ingress hook runs before ip_rcv_core() and ip6_rcv_core(), so
neither IPCB nor IP6CB has been initialized when nft_reject_inet passes
a packet to nf_send_unreach() or nf_send_unreach6(). skb->cb can
therefore retain metadata from an earlier protocol layer.
For IPv4, icmp_send() treats IPCB(skb)->opt as parsed IPv4 options.
Stale option offsets can make __ip_options_echo() copy an
attacker-controlled length into its 40-byte reply option buffer and
overflow the stack. On an unpatched v7.2-rc5 kernel, the IPv4
reproducer produced:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo()
Write of size 255
For IPv6, icmpv6_send() consumes IP6CB(skb) as parsed IPv6 metadata. It
always uses iif for source selection and, when MIP6 is enabled, uses
dsthao as an extension-header offset. These fields must not be stale.
For NF_INET_INGRESS, clear the address-family-specific control block and
restore its input interface before constructing the ICMP error. This
matches similar initialization normally performed by ip_rcv_core() and
ip6_rcv_core().
Fixes: 117ca1f8920c ("netfilter: nft_reject_inet: allow to use reject from inet ingress")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol Codex:gpt-5.5-cyber
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Co-developed-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Signed-off-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 5 +++++
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c
index 59ec465a9df98..7cb33af671e26 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c
@@ -357,6 +357,11 @@ void nf_send_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int code, int hook)
if (!skb_valid_dst(skb_in) && nf_reject_fill_skb_dst(skb_in) < 0)
return;
+ if (hook == NF_INET_INGRESS) {
+ memset(IPCB(skb_in), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb_in)));
+ IPCB(skb_in)->iif = skb_in->skb_iif;
+ }
+
if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb_in) ||
!nf_reject_verify_csum(skb_in, dataoff, proto)) {
icmp_send(skb_in, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, code, 0);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c
index 07cdaa10da0d0..5e08d8529cc88 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c
@@ -444,6 +444,11 @@ void nf_send_unreach6(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb_in,
if (hooknum == NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT && skb_in->dev == NULL)
skb_in->dev = net->loopback_dev;
+ if (hooknum == NF_INET_INGRESS) {
+ memset(IP6CB(skb_in), 0, sizeof(*IP6CB(skb_in)));
+ IP6CB(skb_in)->iif = skb_in->skb_iif;
+ }
+
if (!skb_valid_dst(skb_in) && nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst(skb_in) < 0)
return;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5.15.y 1/2] netfilter: conntrack: skip verification of zero UDP checksum 2026-11-07 11:08 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] netfilter: nf_reject: initialize IPCB at inet ingress" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree Sasha Levin @ 2026-11-10 21:19 ` Sasha Levin 2026-11-10 21:19 ` [PATCH 5.15.y 2/2] netfilter: nf_reject: initialize IPCB at inet ingress Sasha Levin 0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-11-10 21:19 UTC (permalink / raw) To: stable; +Cc: Kevin Mitchell, Pablo Neira Ayuso, Sasha Levin From: Kevin Mitchell <kevmitch@arista.com> [ Upstream commit 4f9bd53084d18c2f9f1ec68fa56587b99a2cef00 ] The checksum is optional for UDP packets. However nf_reject would previously require a valid checksum to elicit a response such as ICMP_DEST_UNREACH. Add some logic to nf_reject_verify_csum to determine if a UDP packet has a zero checksum and should therefore not be verified. Signed-off-by: Kevin Mitchell <kevmitch@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Stable-dep-of: 73a73d442f99 ("netfilter: nf_reject: initialize IPCB at inet ingress") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> --- include/net/netfilter/nf_reject.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++---- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 10 +++++++--- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_reject.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_reject.h index 9051c3a0c8e77..7c669792fb9ce 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_reject.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_reject.h @@ -5,12 +5,28 @@ #include <linux/types.h> #include <uapi/linux/in.h> -static inline bool nf_reject_verify_csum(__u8 proto) +static inline bool nf_reject_verify_csum(struct sk_buff *skb, int dataoff, + __u8 proto) { /* Skip protocols that don't use 16-bit one's complement checksum * of the entire payload. */ switch (proto) { + /* Protocols with optional checksums. */ + case IPPROTO_UDP: { + const struct udphdr *udp_hdr; + struct udphdr _udp_hdr; + + udp_hdr = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, + sizeof(_udp_hdr), + &_udp_hdr); + if (!udp_hdr || udp_hdr->check) + return true; + + return false; + } + case IPPROTO_GRE: + /* Protocols with other integrity checks. */ case IPPROTO_AH: case IPPROTO_ESP: @@ -19,9 +35,6 @@ static inline bool nf_reject_verify_csum(__u8 proto) /* Protocols with partial checksums. */ case IPPROTO_UDPLITE: case IPPROTO_DCCP: - - /* Protocols with optional checksums. */ - case IPPROTO_GRE: return false; } return true; diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c index ddfb4e2b779d6..89f52751355bf 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c @@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ struct sk_buff *nf_reject_skb_v4_unreach(struct net *net, struct iphdr *niph; struct icmphdr *icmph; unsigned int len; + int dataoff; __wsum csum; u8 proto; @@ -125,10 +126,11 @@ struct sk_buff *nf_reject_skb_v4_unreach(struct net *net, if (pskb_trim_rcsum(oldskb, ntohs(ip_hdr(oldskb)->tot_len))) return NULL; + dataoff = ip_hdrlen(oldskb); proto = ip_hdr(oldskb)->protocol; if (!skb_csum_unnecessary(oldskb) && - nf_reject_verify_csum(proto) && + nf_reject_verify_csum(oldskb, dataoff, proto) && nf_ip_checksum(oldskb, hook, ip_hdrlen(oldskb), proto)) return NULL; @@ -338,6 +340,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_send_reset); void nf_send_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int code, int hook) { struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb_in); + int dataoff = ip_hdrlen(skb_in); u8 proto = iph->protocol; if (iph->frag_off & htons(IP_OFFSET)) @@ -346,12 +349,13 @@ void nf_send_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int code, int hook) if (!skb_valid_dst(skb_in) && nf_reject_fill_skb_dst(skb_in) < 0) return; - if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb_in) || !nf_reject_verify_csum(proto)) { + if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb_in) || + !nf_reject_verify_csum(skb_in, dataoff, proto)) { icmp_send(skb_in, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, code, 0); return; } - if (nf_ip_checksum(skb_in, hook, ip_hdrlen(skb_in), proto) == 0) + if (nf_ip_checksum(skb_in, hook, dataoff, proto) == 0) icmp_send(skb_in, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, code, 0); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_send_unreach); diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c index 099740342f70f..c5c8962088f2c 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static bool nf_reject_v6_csum_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, int hook) if (thoff < 0 || thoff >= skb->len || (fo & htons(~0x7)) != 0) return false; - if (!nf_reject_verify_csum(proto)) + if (!nf_reject_verify_csum(skb, thoff, proto)) return true; return nf_ip6_checksum(skb, hook, thoff, proto) == 0; @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static bool reject6_csum_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, int hook) if (thoff < 0 || thoff >= skb->len || (fo & htons(~0x7)) != 0) return false; - if (!nf_reject_verify_csum(proto)) + if (!nf_reject_verify_csum(skb, thoff, proto)) return true; return nf_ip6_checksum(skb, hook, thoff, proto) == 0; -- 2.53.0 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 5.15.y 2/2] netfilter: nf_reject: initialize IPCB at inet ingress 2026-11-10 21:19 ` [PATCH 5.15.y 1/2] netfilter: conntrack: skip verification of zero UDP checksum Sasha Levin @ 2026-11-10 21:19 ` Sasha Levin 0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread From: Sasha Levin @ 2026-11-10 21:19 UTC (permalink / raw) To: stable; +Cc: Kyle Zeng, David Lee, Pablo Neira Ayuso, Sasha Levin From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com> [ Upstream commit 73a73d442f9986353fe284bd1b504d0313d0f153 ] The inet ingress hook runs before ip_rcv_core() and ip6_rcv_core(), so neither IPCB nor IP6CB has been initialized when nft_reject_inet passes a packet to nf_send_unreach() or nf_send_unreach6(). skb->cb can therefore retain metadata from an earlier protocol layer. For IPv4, icmp_send() treats IPCB(skb)->opt as parsed IPv4 options. Stale option offsets can make __ip_options_echo() copy an attacker-controlled length into its 40-byte reply option buffer and overflow the stack. On an unpatched v7.2-rc5 kernel, the IPv4 reproducer produced: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo() Write of size 255 For IPv6, icmpv6_send() consumes IP6CB(skb) as parsed IPv6 metadata. It always uses iif for source selection and, when MIP6 is enabled, uses dsthao as an extension-header offset. These fields must not be stale. For NF_INET_INGRESS, clear the address-family-specific control block and restore its input interface before constructing the ICMP error. This matches similar initialization normally performed by ip_rcv_core() and ip6_rcv_core(). Fixes: 117ca1f8920c ("netfilter: nft_reject_inet: allow to use reject from inet ingress") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol Codex:gpt-5.5-cyber Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com> Co-developed-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com> Signed-off-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> --- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 5 +++++ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c index 89f52751355bf..ba5b6cb42e70b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c @@ -349,6 +349,11 @@ void nf_send_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int code, int hook) if (!skb_valid_dst(skb_in) && nf_reject_fill_skb_dst(skb_in) < 0) return; + if (hook == NF_INET_INGRESS) { + memset(IPCB(skb_in), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb_in))); + IPCB(skb_in)->iif = skb_in->skb_iif; + } + if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb_in) || !nf_reject_verify_csum(skb_in, dataoff, proto)) { icmp_send(skb_in, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, code, 0); diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c index c5c8962088f2c..3372658e6d125 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c @@ -428,6 +428,11 @@ void nf_send_unreach6(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb_in, if (hooknum == NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT && skb_in->dev == NULL) skb_in->dev = net->loopback_dev; + if (hooknum == NF_INET_INGRESS) { + memset(IP6CB(skb_in), 0, sizeof(*IP6CB(skb_in))); + IP6CB(skb_in)->iif = skb_in->skb_iif; + } + if (!skb_valid_dst(skb_in) && nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst(skb_in) < 0) return; -- 2.53.0 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-10 21:19 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2026-11-07 11:08 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] netfilter: nf_reject: initialize IPCB at inet ingress" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree Sasha Levin 2026-11-10 21:19 ` [PATCH 5.15.y 1/2] netfilter: conntrack: skip verification of zero UDP checksum Sasha Levin 2026-11-10 21:19 ` [PATCH 5.15.y 2/2] netfilter: nf_reject: initialize IPCB at inet ingress Sasha Levin
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