FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ceph: fix longname buffer overflow in ceph_fname_to_usr()" failed to apply to 6.18-stable tree

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ceph: fix longname buffer overflow in ceph_fname_to_usr()" failed to apply to 6.18-stable tree

[Sasha Levin]

The patch below does not apply to the 6.18-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.18.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 71975d6e0db17646102488cf54480fda9de0f7a7
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '20261107051452-failed-6.18-71975d6e0db1@kernel.org' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.18.y' 'HEAD^..'

Thanks,
Sasha

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 71975d6e0db17646102488cf54480fda9de0f7a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jiangshan Yi <yijiangshan@kylinos.cn>
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2026 11:18:23 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] ceph: fix longname buffer overflow in ceph_fname_to_usr()

Snapshot longname reconstruction formats "_<name>_<inode>" via snprintf()
and memcpy()s the result into oname->name.  Checking the length against
NAME_MAX only protects the LOOKUPNAME/export callers, whose buffer is
allocated with fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(NAME_MAX).  The readdir path
points oname->name straight at the altname in the MDS reply, whose
capacity is altname_len; the reconstructed name can exceed that while
still fitting under NAME_MAX, overflowing the in-place destination.

Save the actual oname->len before the decryption overwrites it, and fail
with -ENAMETOOLONG when the reconstructed name would not fit.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dd66df0053ef ("ceph: add support for encrypted snapshot names")
Suggested-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiangshan Yi <yijiangshan@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
---
 fs/ceph/crypto.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c
index bc0a097a4cea9..845b69ba890c3 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c
@@ -313,6 +313,7 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, unsigned char *tname,
 	struct fscrypt_str iname;
 	char *name = fname->name;
 	int name_len = fname->name_len;
+	int dst_len;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(tname && is_vmalloc_addr(tname)))
@@ -387,6 +388,9 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, unsigned char *tname,
 		iname.len = fname->ctext_len;
 	}
 
+	/* oname->len is overwritten by the decryption below */
+	dst_len = oname->len;
+
 	_oname.name = unlikely(is_vmalloc_addr(oname->name)) ? tname : oname->name;
 	_oname.len = oname->len;
 
@@ -403,6 +407,10 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, unsigned char *tname,
 
 		name_len = snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "_%.*s_%llu",
 				    oname->len, oname->name, dir->i_ino);
+		if (name_len > dst_len) {
+			ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		memcpy(oname->name, tmp_buf, name_len);
 		oname->len = name_len;
 	}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 6.18.y] ceph: fix longname buffer overflow in ceph_fname_to_usr()

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jiangshan Yi <yijiangshan@kylinos.cn>

[ Upstream commit 71975d6e0db17646102488cf54480fda9de0f7a7 ]

Snapshot longname reconstruction formats "_<name>_<inode>" via snprintf()
and memcpy()s the result into oname->name.  Checking the length against
NAME_MAX only protects the LOOKUPNAME/export callers, whose buffer is
allocated with fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(NAME_MAX).  The readdir path
points oname->name straight at the altname in the MDS reply, whose
capacity is altname_len; the reconstructed name can exceed that while
still fitting under NAME_MAX, overflowing the in-place destination.

Save the actual oname->len before the decryption overwrites it, and fail
with -ENAMETOOLONG when the reconstructed name would not fit.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dd66df0053ef ("ceph: add support for encrypted snapshot names")
Suggested-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiangshan Yi <yijiangshan@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
[ sashal: adjusted context to preserve tname->name access because tname is a struct fscrypt_str pointer rather than an unsigned char pointer ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/ceph/crypto.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c
index f23ba5c148780..eaf12c9c86ee5 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c
@@ -370,6 +370,7 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname,
 	struct fscrypt_str iname;
 	char *name = fname->name;
 	int name_len = fname->name_len;
+	int dst_len;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(tname && is_vmalloc_addr(tname->name)))
@@ -445,6 +446,9 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname,
 		iname.len = fname->ctext_len;
 	}
 
+	/* oname->len is overwritten by the decryption below */
+	dst_len = oname->len;
+
 	_oname.name = unlikely(is_vmalloc_addr(oname->name)) ?
 			tname->name : oname->name;
 	_oname.len = oname->len;
@@ -462,6 +466,10 @@ int ceph_fname_to_usr(const struct ceph_fname *fname, struct fscrypt_str *tname,
 
 		name_len = snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf), "_%.*s_%ld",
 				    oname->len, oname->name, dir->i_ino);
+		if (name_len > dst_len) {
+			ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+			goto out;
+		}
 		memcpy(oname->name, tmp_buf, name_len);
 		oname->len = name_len;
 	}
-- 
2.53.0