* [PATCH 1/2] x86/mm: Allow guest.enc_status_change_prepare() to fail
[not found] <20230525225847.28592-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
@ 2023-05-25 22:58 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-05-25 23:28 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2023-05-26 2:17 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-25 22:58 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/tdx: Fix race between set_memory_encrypted() and load_unaligned_zeropad() Kirill A. Shutemov
1 sibling, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-05-25 22:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: dave.hansen, tglx, mingo, bp
Cc: decui, rick.p.edgecombe, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy, seanjc,
thomas.lendacky, x86, linux-kernel, Kirill A. Shutemov, stable
TDX code is going to provide guest.enc_status_change_prepare() that is
able to fail.
Add a way to return an error from the callback.
While there, fix enc_status_change_finish_noop(). It is defined as
always-fail now which doesn't make sense for noop.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 4 +++-
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 3 ++-
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
index 88085f369ff6..1ca9701917c5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ struct x86_init_acpi {
* @enc_cache_flush_required Returns true if a cache flush is needed before changing page encryption status
*/
struct x86_guest {
- void (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
+ bool (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
bool (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);
bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
index d82f4fa2f1bf..64664311ac2b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
@@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ struct x86_cpuinit_ops x86_cpuinit = {
static void default_nmi_init(void) { };
-static void enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { }
-static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return false; }
+static bool enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return true; }
+static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return true; }
static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop(bool enc) { return false; }
static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop(void) { return false; }
static bool is_private_mmio_noop(u64 addr) {return false; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
index e0b51c09109f..4f95c449a406 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
#endif
}
-static void amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
+static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
{
/*
* To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guests, make sure
@@ -327,6 +327,8 @@ static void amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool
*/
if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) && !enc)
snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, npages);
+
+ return true;
}
/* Return true unconditionally: return value doesn't matter for the SEV side */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index 7159cf787613..b8f48ebe753c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -2151,7 +2151,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
cpa_flush(&cpa, x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required());
/* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */
- x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc);
+ if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc))
+ return -EIO;
ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
--
2.39.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/2] x86/tdx: Fix race between set_memory_encrypted() and load_unaligned_zeropad()
[not found] <20230525225847.28592-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
2023-05-25 22:58 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/mm: Allow guest.enc_status_change_prepare() to fail Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-05-25 22:58 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-05-25 23:40 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-05-25 22:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: dave.hansen, tglx, mingo, bp
Cc: decui, rick.p.edgecombe, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy, seanjc,
thomas.lendacky, x86, linux-kernel, Kirill A. Shutemov, stable
Touching privately mapped GPA that is not properly converted to private
with MapGPA and accepted leads to unrecoverable exit to VMM.
load_unaligned_zeropad() can touch memory that is not owned by the
caller, but just happened to next after the owned memory.
This load_unaligned_zeropad() behaviour makes it important when kernel
asks VMM to convert a GPA from shared to private or back. Kernel must
never have a page mapped into direct mapping (and aliases) as private
when the GPA is already converted to shared or when GPA is not yet
converted to private.
guest.enc_status_change_prepare() called before adjusting direct mapping
and therefore it is responsible for converting the memory to private.
guest.enc_tlb_flush_required() called after adjusting direct mapping and
it converts the memory to shared.
It is okay to have a shared mapping of memory that is not converted
properly. handle_mmio() knows how to deal with load_unaligned_zeropad()
stepping on it.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Fixes: 7dbde7631629 ("x86/mm/cpa: Add support for TDX shared memory")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
index e146b599260f..84525df750d4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -840,6 +840,30 @@ static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc)
return true;
}
+static bool tdx_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
+ bool enc)
+{
+ /*
+ * Only handle shared->private conversion here.
+ * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
+ */
+ if (enc)
+ return tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
+ bool enc)
+{
+ /*
+ * Only handle private->shared conversion here.
+ * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
+ */
+ if (!enc)
+ return tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc);
+ return true;
+}
+
void __init tdx_early_init(void)
{
u64 cc_mask;
@@ -867,9 +891,35 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)
*/
physical_mask &= cc_mask - 1;
- x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required = tdx_cache_flush_required;
- x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = tdx_tlb_flush_required;
- x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish = tdx_enc_status_changed;
+ /*
+ * Touching privately mapped GPA that is not properly converted to
+ * private with MapGPA and accepted leads to unrecoverable exit
+ * to VMM.
+ *
+ * load_unaligned_zeropad() can touch memory that is not owned by
+ * the caller, but just happened to next after the owned memory.
+ * This load_unaligned_zeropad() behaviour makes it important when
+ * kernel asks VMM to convert a GPA from shared to private or back.
+ * Kernel must never have a page mapped into direct mapping (and
+ * aliases) as private when the GPA is already converted to shared or
+ * when GPA is not yet converted to private.
+ *
+ * guest.enc_status_change_prepare() called before adjusting direct
+ * mapping and therefore it is responsible for converting the memory
+ * to private.
+ *
+ * guest.enc_tlb_flush_required() called after adjusting direct mapping
+ * and it converts the memory to shared.
+ *
+ * It is okay to have a shared mapping of memory that is not converted
+ * properly. handle_mmio() knows how to deal with load_unaligned_zeropad()
+ * stepping on it.
+ */
+ x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare = tdx_enc_status_change_prepare;
+ x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish = tdx_enc_status_change_finish;
+
+ x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required = tdx_cache_flush_required;
+ x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = tdx_tlb_flush_required;
pr_info("Guest detected\n");
}
--
2.39.3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/mm: Allow guest.enc_status_change_prepare() to fail
2023-05-25 22:58 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/mm: Allow guest.enc_status_change_prepare() to fail Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-05-25 23:28 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2023-05-26 2:17 ` Huang, Kai
1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy @ 2023-05-25 23:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kirill A. Shutemov, dave.hansen, tglx, mingo, bp
Cc: decui, rick.p.edgecombe, seanjc, thomas.lendacky, x86,
linux-kernel, stable
Hi,
On 5/25/23 3:58 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> TDX code is going to provide guest.enc_status_change_prepare() that is
> able to fail.
You can add some info about why you need this?
>
> Add a way to return an error from the callback.
>
> While there, fix enc_status_change_finish_noop(). It is defined as
> always-fail now which doesn't make sense for noop.
IMO, since the above change is an independent fix, I think it is better to
split this into a separate patch.
Other than above suggestions, the rest of the changes looks fine.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 4 ++--
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 4 +++-
> arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 3 ++-
> 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> index 88085f369ff6..1ca9701917c5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ struct x86_init_acpi {
> * @enc_cache_flush_required Returns true if a cache flush is needed before changing page encryption status
> */
> struct x86_guest {
> - void (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
> + bool (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
> bool (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
> bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);
> bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
> index d82f4fa2f1bf..64664311ac2b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
> @@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ struct x86_cpuinit_ops x86_cpuinit = {
>
> static void default_nmi_init(void) { };
>
> -static void enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { }
> -static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return false; }
> +static bool enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return true; }
> +static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return true; }
> static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop(bool enc) { return false; }
> static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop(void) { return false; }
> static bool is_private_mmio_noop(u64 addr) {return false; }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
> index e0b51c09109f..4f95c449a406 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
> @@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
> #endif
> }
>
> -static void amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
> +static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
> {
> /*
> * To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guests, make sure
> @@ -327,6 +327,8 @@ static void amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool
> */
> if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) && !enc)
> snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, npages);
> +
> + return true;
> }
>
> /* Return true unconditionally: return value doesn't matter for the SEV side */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> index 7159cf787613..b8f48ebe753c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> @@ -2151,7 +2151,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
> cpa_flush(&cpa, x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required());
>
> /* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */
> - x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc);
> + if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc))
> + return -EIO;
>
> ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
>
--
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
Linux Kernel Developer
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/tdx: Fix race between set_memory_encrypted() and load_unaligned_zeropad()
2023-05-25 22:58 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/tdx: Fix race between set_memory_encrypted() and load_unaligned_zeropad() Kirill A. Shutemov
@ 2023-05-25 23:40 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2023-05-26 11:54 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy @ 2023-05-25 23:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kirill A. Shutemov, dave.hansen, tglx, mingo, bp
Cc: decui, rick.p.edgecombe, seanjc, thomas.lendacky, x86,
linux-kernel, stable
Hi,
On 5/25/23 3:58 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> Touching privately mapped GPA that is not properly converted to private
> with MapGPA and accepted leads to unrecoverable exit to VMM.
>
> load_unaligned_zeropad() can touch memory that is not owned by the
> caller, but just happened to next after the owned memory.
> This load_unaligned_zeropad() behaviour makes it important when kernel
> asks VMM to convert a GPA from shared to private or back. Kernel must
> never have a page mapped into direct mapping (and aliases) as private
> when the GPA is already converted to shared or when GPA is not yet
> converted to private.
>
> guest.enc_status_change_prepare() called before adjusting direct mapping
> and therefore it is responsible for converting the memory to private.
>
> guest.enc_tlb_flush_required() called after adjusting direct mapping and
> it converts the memory to shared.
Do you mean .enc_status_change_finish() here? Isn't enc_tlb_flush_required()
called before adjusting the mapping?
>
> It is okay to have a shared mapping of memory that is not converted
> properly. handle_mmio() knows how to deal with load_unaligned_zeropad()
> stepping on it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Fixes: 7dbde7631629 ("x86/mm/cpa: Add support for TDX shared memory")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
> index e146b599260f..84525df750d4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
> @@ -840,6 +840,30 @@ static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc)
> return true;
> }
>
> +static bool tdx_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
> + bool enc)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Only handle shared->private conversion here.
> + * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
> + */
> + if (enc)
> + return tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc);
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +static bool tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
> + bool enc)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Only handle private->shared conversion here.
> + * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
> + */
> + if (!enc)
> + return tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc);
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> void __init tdx_early_init(void)
> {
> u64 cc_mask;
> @@ -867,9 +891,35 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)
> */
> physical_mask &= cc_mask - 1;
>
> - x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required = tdx_cache_flush_required;
> - x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = tdx_tlb_flush_required;
> - x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish = tdx_enc_status_changed;
> + /*
> + * Touching privately mapped GPA that is not properly converted to
> + * private with MapGPA and accepted leads to unrecoverable exit
> + * to VMM.
> + *
> + * load_unaligned_zeropad() can touch memory that is not owned by
> + * the caller, but just happened to next after the owned memory.
> + * This load_unaligned_zeropad() behaviour makes it important when
> + * kernel asks VMM to convert a GPA from shared to private or back.
> + * Kernel must never have a page mapped into direct mapping (and
> + * aliases) as private when the GPA is already converted to shared or
> + * when GPA is not yet converted to private.
> + *
> + * guest.enc_status_change_prepare() called before adjusting direct
> + * mapping and therefore it is responsible for converting the memory
> + * to private.
> + *
> + * guest.enc_tlb_flush_required() called after adjusting direct mapping
> + * and it converts the memory to shared.
Same as above. Is it .enc_status_change_finish() here?
> + *
> + * It is okay to have a shared mapping of memory that is not converted
> + * properly. handle_mmio() knows how to deal with load_unaligned_zeropad()
> + * stepping on it.
> + */
> + x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare = tdx_enc_status_change_prepare;
> + x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish = tdx_enc_status_change_finish;
> +
> + x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required = tdx_cache_flush_required;
> + x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = tdx_tlb_flush_required;
>
> pr_info("Guest detected\n");
> }
--
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
Linux Kernel Developer
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/mm: Allow guest.enc_status_change_prepare() to fail
2023-05-25 22:58 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/mm: Allow guest.enc_status_change_prepare() to fail Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-05-25 23:28 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
@ 2023-05-26 2:17 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-26 11:49 ` kirill.shutemov
1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Huang, Kai @ 2023-05-26 2:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@redhat.com, Hansen, Dave, bp@alien8.de
Cc: Cui, Dexuan, Christopherson,, Sean, x86@kernel.org,
Edgecombe, Rick P, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
stable@vger.kernel.org
On Fri, 2023-05-26 at 01:58 +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> TDX code is going to provide guest.enc_status_change_prepare() that is
> able to fail.
>
> Add a way to return an error from the callback.
>
> While there, fix enc_status_change_finish_noop(). It is defined as
> always-fail now which doesn't make sense for noop.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 4 ++--
> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 4 +++-
> arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 3 ++-
> 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> index 88085f369ff6..1ca9701917c5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ struct x86_init_acpi {
> * @enc_cache_flush_required Returns true if a cache flush is needed before changing page encryption status
> */
> struct x86_guest {
> - void (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
> + bool (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
>
[...]
> @@ -2151,7 +2151,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
> cpa_flush(&cpa, x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required());
>
> /* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */
> - x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc);
> + if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc))
> + return -EIO;
The name "enc_status_change_prepare()" sounds like an action, but not some
true/false condition check. I think it's more reasonable to make it return
'int', and returning 0 means successful?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/mm: Allow guest.enc_status_change_prepare() to fail
2023-05-26 2:17 ` Huang, Kai
@ 2023-05-26 11:49 ` kirill.shutemov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: kirill.shutemov @ 2023-05-26 11:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Huang, Kai
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, Hansen, Dave, bp@alien8.de,
Cui, Dexuan, Christopherson,, Sean, x86@kernel.org,
Edgecombe, Rick P, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
stable@vger.kernel.org
On Fri, May 26, 2023 at 02:17:12AM +0000, Huang, Kai wrote:
> On Fri, 2023-05-26 at 01:58 +0300, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > TDX code is going to provide guest.enc_status_change_prepare() that is
> > able to fail.
> >
> > Add a way to return an error from the callback.
> >
> > While there, fix enc_status_change_finish_noop(). It is defined as
> > always-fail now which doesn't make sense for noop.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > ---
> > arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 +-
> > arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 4 ++--
> > arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 4 +++-
> > arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 3 ++-
> > 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> > index 88085f369ff6..1ca9701917c5 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> > @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ struct x86_init_acpi {
> > * @enc_cache_flush_required Returns true if a cache flush is needed before changing page encryption status
> > */
> > struct x86_guest {
> > - void (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
> > + bool (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
> >
>
> [...]
>
> > @@ -2151,7 +2151,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
> > cpa_flush(&cpa, x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required());
> >
> > /* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */
> > - x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc);
> > + if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc))
> > + return -EIO;
>
> The name "enc_status_change_prepare()" sounds like an action, but not some
> true/false condition check. I think it's more reasonable to make it return
> 'int', and returning 0 means successful?
It copies convention of enc_status_change_finish(). I don't think we need
anything more than binary pass/fail. We can change it in the future if
needed.
--
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/tdx: Fix race between set_memory_encrypted() and load_unaligned_zeropad()
2023-05-25 23:40 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
@ 2023-05-26 11:54 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Kirill A. Shutemov @ 2023-05-26 11:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
Cc: dave.hansen, tglx, mingo, bp, decui, rick.p.edgecombe, seanjc,
thomas.lendacky, x86, linux-kernel, stable
On Thu, May 25, 2023 at 04:40:00PM -0700, Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 5/25/23 3:58 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > Touching privately mapped GPA that is not properly converted to private
> > with MapGPA and accepted leads to unrecoverable exit to VMM.
> >
> > load_unaligned_zeropad() can touch memory that is not owned by the
> > caller, but just happened to next after the owned memory.
> > This load_unaligned_zeropad() behaviour makes it important when kernel
> > asks VMM to convert a GPA from shared to private or back. Kernel must
> > never have a page mapped into direct mapping (and aliases) as private
> > when the GPA is already converted to shared or when GPA is not yet
> > converted to private.
> >
> > guest.enc_status_change_prepare() called before adjusting direct mapping
> > and therefore it is responsible for converting the memory to private.
> >
> > guest.enc_tlb_flush_required() called after adjusting direct mapping and
> > it converts the memory to shared.
>
> Do you mean .enc_status_change_finish() here? Isn't enc_tlb_flush_required()
> called before adjusting the mapping?
Yes, I copy-pasted wrong callback :/
--
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
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[not found] <20230525225847.28592-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
2023-05-25 22:58 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/mm: Allow guest.enc_status_change_prepare() to fail Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-05-25 23:28 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2023-05-26 2:17 ` Huang, Kai
2023-05-26 11:49 ` kirill.shutemov
2023-05-25 22:58 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/tdx: Fix race between set_memory_encrypted() and load_unaligned_zeropad() Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-05-25 23:40 ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2023-05-26 11:54 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
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