* [PATCH v2 1/4] blk-mq: release crypto keyslot before reporting I/O complete [not found] <20230308193645.114069-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> @ 2023-03-08 19:36 ` Eric Biggers 2023-03-13 21:26 ` Nathan Huckleberry 2023-03-15 16:19 ` Christoph Hellwig 2023-03-08 19:36 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust Eric Biggers 1 sibling, 2 replies; 8+ messages in thread From: Eric Biggers @ 2023-03-08 19:36 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-block, Jens Axboe; +Cc: linux-fscrypt, Nathan Huckleberry, stable From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Once all I/O using a blk_crypto_key has completed, filesystems can call blk_crypto_evict_key(). However, the block layer currently doesn't call blk_crypto_put_keyslot() until the request is being freed, which happens after upper layers have been told (via bio_endio()) the I/O has completed. This causes a race condition where blk_crypto_evict_key() can see 'slot_refs != 0' without there being an actual bug. This makes __blk_crypto_evict_key() hit the 'WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&slot->slot_refs) != 0)' and return without doing anything, eventually causing a use-after-free in blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys(). (This is a very rare bug and has only been seen when per-file keys are being used with fscrypt.) There are two options to fix this: either release the keyslot before bio_endio() is called on the request's last bio, or make __blk_crypto_evict_key() ignore slot_refs. Let's go with the first solution, since it preserves the ability to report bugs (via WARN_ON_ONCE) where a key is evicted while still in-use. Fixes: a892c8d52c02 ("block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> --- block/blk-crypto-internal.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++---- block/blk-crypto.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ block/blk-merge.c | 2 ++ block/blk-mq.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-crypto-internal.h b/block/blk-crypto-internal.h index a8cdaf26851e..4f1de2495f0c 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto-internal.h +++ b/block/blk-crypto-internal.h @@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ static inline bool blk_crypto_rq_is_encrypted(struct request *rq) return rq->crypt_ctx; } +static inline bool blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(struct request *rq) +{ + return rq->crypt_keyslot; +} + blk_status_t blk_crypto_get_keyslot(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, const struct blk_crypto_key *key, struct blk_crypto_keyslot **slot_ptr); @@ -119,6 +124,11 @@ static inline bool blk_crypto_rq_is_encrypted(struct request *rq) return false; } +static inline bool blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(struct request *rq) +{ + return false; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */ void __bio_crypt_advance(struct bio *bio, unsigned int bytes); @@ -153,14 +163,21 @@ static inline bool blk_crypto_bio_prep(struct bio **bio_ptr) return true; } -blk_status_t __blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq); -static inline blk_status_t blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq) +blk_status_t __blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(struct request *rq); +static inline blk_status_t blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(struct request *rq) { if (blk_crypto_rq_is_encrypted(rq)) - return __blk_crypto_init_request(rq); + return __blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(rq); return BLK_STS_OK; } +void __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(struct request *rq); +static inline void blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(struct request *rq) +{ + if (blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(rq)) + __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(rq); +} + void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq); static inline void blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq) { @@ -199,7 +216,7 @@ static inline blk_status_t blk_crypto_insert_cloned_request(struct request *rq) { if (blk_crypto_rq_is_encrypted(rq)) - return blk_crypto_init_request(rq); + return blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(rq); return BLK_STS_OK; } diff --git a/block/blk-crypto.c b/block/blk-crypto.c index 45378586151f..d0c7feb447e9 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto.c +++ b/block/blk-crypto.c @@ -224,27 +224,27 @@ static bool bio_crypt_check_alignment(struct bio *bio) return true; } -blk_status_t __blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq) +blk_status_t __blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(struct request *rq) { return blk_crypto_get_keyslot(rq->q->crypto_profile, rq->crypt_ctx->bc_key, &rq->crypt_keyslot); } -/** - * __blk_crypto_free_request - Uninitialize the crypto fields of a request. - * - * @rq: The request whose crypto fields to uninitialize. - * - * Completely uninitializes the crypto fields of a request. If a keyslot has - * been programmed into some inline encryption hardware, that keyslot is - * released. The rq->crypt_ctx is also freed. - */ -void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq) +void __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(struct request *rq) { blk_crypto_put_keyslot(rq->crypt_keyslot); + rq->crypt_keyslot = NULL; +} + +void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq) +{ + /* The keyslot, if one was needed, should have been released earlier. */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rq->crypt_keyslot)) + __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(rq); + mempool_free(rq->crypt_ctx, bio_crypt_ctx_pool); - blk_crypto_rq_set_defaults(rq); + rq->crypt_ctx = NULL; } /** diff --git a/block/blk-merge.c b/block/blk-merge.c index 6460abdb2426..65e75efa9bd3 100644 --- a/block/blk-merge.c +++ b/block/blk-merge.c @@ -867,6 +867,8 @@ static struct request *attempt_merge(struct request_queue *q, if (!blk_discard_mergable(req)) elv_merge_requests(q, req, next); + blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(next); + /* * 'next' is going away, so update stats accordingly */ diff --git a/block/blk-mq.c b/block/blk-mq.c index d0cb2ef18fe2..49825538d932 100644 --- a/block/blk-mq.c +++ b/block/blk-mq.c @@ -840,6 +840,12 @@ static void blk_complete_request(struct request *req) req->q->integrity.profile->complete_fn(req, total_bytes); #endif + /* + * Upper layers may call blk_crypto_evict_key() anytime after the last + * bio_endio(). Therefore, the keyslot must be released before that. + */ + blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(req); + blk_account_io_completion(req, total_bytes); do { @@ -905,6 +911,13 @@ bool blk_update_request(struct request *req, blk_status_t error, req->q->integrity.profile->complete_fn(req, nr_bytes); #endif + /* + * Upper layers may call blk_crypto_evict_key() anytime after the last + * bio_endio(). Therefore, the keyslot must be released before that. + */ + if (blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(req) && nr_bytes >= blk_rq_bytes(req)) + __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(req); + if (unlikely(error && !blk_rq_is_passthrough(req) && !(req->rq_flags & RQF_QUIET)) && !test_bit(GD_DEAD, &req->q->disk->state)) { @@ -2967,7 +2980,7 @@ void blk_mq_submit_bio(struct bio *bio) blk_mq_bio_to_request(rq, bio, nr_segs); - ret = blk_crypto_init_request(rq); + ret = blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(rq); if (ret != BLK_STS_OK) { bio->bi_status = ret; bio_endio(bio); -- 2.39.2 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] blk-mq: release crypto keyslot before reporting I/O complete 2023-03-08 19:36 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] blk-mq: release crypto keyslot before reporting I/O complete Eric Biggers @ 2023-03-13 21:26 ` Nathan Huckleberry 2023-03-14 18:20 ` Eric Biggers 2023-03-15 16:19 ` Christoph Hellwig 1 sibling, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread From: Nathan Huckleberry @ 2023-03-13 21:26 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Eric Biggers; +Cc: linux-block, Jens Axboe, linux-fscrypt, stable On Wed, Mar 8, 2023 at 11:39 AM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote: > > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > Once all I/O using a blk_crypto_key has completed, filesystems can call > blk_crypto_evict_key(). However, the block layer currently doesn't call > blk_crypto_put_keyslot() until the request is being freed, which happens > after upper layers have been told (via bio_endio()) the I/O has > completed. This causes a race condition where blk_crypto_evict_key() > can see 'slot_refs != 0' without there being an actual bug. > > This makes __blk_crypto_evict_key() hit the > 'WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&slot->slot_refs) != 0)' and return without > doing anything, eventually causing a use-after-free in > blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys(). (This is a very rare bug and has only > been seen when per-file keys are being used with fscrypt.) > > There are two options to fix this: either release the keyslot before > bio_endio() is called on the request's last bio, or make > __blk_crypto_evict_key() ignore slot_refs. Let's go with the first > solution, since it preserves the ability to report bugs (via > WARN_ON_ONCE) where a key is evicted while still in-use. > > Fixes: a892c8d52c02 ("block: Inline encryption support for blk-mq") > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > --- > block/blk-crypto-internal.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++---- > block/blk-crypto.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ > block/blk-merge.c | 2 ++ > block/blk-mq.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- > 4 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/block/blk-crypto-internal.h b/block/blk-crypto-internal.h > index a8cdaf26851e..4f1de2495f0c 100644 > --- a/block/blk-crypto-internal.h > +++ b/block/blk-crypto-internal.h > @@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ static inline bool blk_crypto_rq_is_encrypted(struct request *rq) > return rq->crypt_ctx; > } > > +static inline bool blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(struct request *rq) > +{ > + return rq->crypt_keyslot; > +} > + > blk_status_t blk_crypto_get_keyslot(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, > const struct blk_crypto_key *key, > struct blk_crypto_keyslot **slot_ptr); > @@ -119,6 +124,11 @@ static inline bool blk_crypto_rq_is_encrypted(struct request *rq) > return false; > } > > +static inline bool blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(struct request *rq) > +{ > + return false; > +} > + > #endif /* CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION */ > > void __bio_crypt_advance(struct bio *bio, unsigned int bytes); > @@ -153,14 +163,21 @@ static inline bool blk_crypto_bio_prep(struct bio **bio_ptr) > return true; > } > > -blk_status_t __blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq); > -static inline blk_status_t blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq) > +blk_status_t __blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(struct request *rq); > +static inline blk_status_t blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(struct request *rq) > { > if (blk_crypto_rq_is_encrypted(rq)) > - return __blk_crypto_init_request(rq); > + return __blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(rq); > return BLK_STS_OK; > } > > +void __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(struct request *rq); > +static inline void blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(struct request *rq) > +{ > + if (blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(rq)) > + __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(rq); > +} > + > void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq); > static inline void blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq) > { > @@ -199,7 +216,7 @@ static inline blk_status_t blk_crypto_insert_cloned_request(struct request *rq) > { > > if (blk_crypto_rq_is_encrypted(rq)) > - return blk_crypto_init_request(rq); > + return blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(rq); > return BLK_STS_OK; > } > > diff --git a/block/blk-crypto.c b/block/blk-crypto.c > index 45378586151f..d0c7feb447e9 100644 > --- a/block/blk-crypto.c > +++ b/block/blk-crypto.c > @@ -224,27 +224,27 @@ static bool bio_crypt_check_alignment(struct bio *bio) > return true; > } > > -blk_status_t __blk_crypto_init_request(struct request *rq) > +blk_status_t __blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(struct request *rq) > { > return blk_crypto_get_keyslot(rq->q->crypto_profile, > rq->crypt_ctx->bc_key, > &rq->crypt_keyslot); > } > > -/** > - * __blk_crypto_free_request - Uninitialize the crypto fields of a request. > - * > - * @rq: The request whose crypto fields to uninitialize. > - * > - * Completely uninitializes the crypto fields of a request. If a keyslot has > - * been programmed into some inline encryption hardware, that keyslot is > - * released. The rq->crypt_ctx is also freed. > - */ > -void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq) > +void __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(struct request *rq) > { > blk_crypto_put_keyslot(rq->crypt_keyslot); > + rq->crypt_keyslot = NULL; > +} > + > +void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq) > +{ > + /* The keyslot, if one was needed, should have been released earlier. */ > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rq->crypt_keyslot)) > + __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(rq); > + > mempool_free(rq->crypt_ctx, bio_crypt_ctx_pool); > - blk_crypto_rq_set_defaults(rq); > + rq->crypt_ctx = NULL; > } > > /** > diff --git a/block/blk-merge.c b/block/blk-merge.c > index 6460abdb2426..65e75efa9bd3 100644 > --- a/block/blk-merge.c > +++ b/block/blk-merge.c > @@ -867,6 +867,8 @@ static struct request *attempt_merge(struct request_queue *q, > if (!blk_discard_mergable(req)) > elv_merge_requests(q, req, next); > > + blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(next); > + This looks good to me, but it looks like there was a pre-existing bug in the blk-merge code. The elv_merged_request function is only called when the request does not merge. Does anyone know if that behavior is correct? > /* > * 'next' is going away, so update stats accordingly > */ > diff --git a/block/blk-mq.c b/block/blk-mq.c > index d0cb2ef18fe2..49825538d932 100644 > --- a/block/blk-mq.c > +++ b/block/blk-mq.c > @@ -840,6 +840,12 @@ static void blk_complete_request(struct request *req) > req->q->integrity.profile->complete_fn(req, total_bytes); > #endif > > + /* > + * Upper layers may call blk_crypto_evict_key() anytime after the last > + * bio_endio(). Therefore, the keyslot must be released before that. > + */ > + blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(req); > + > blk_account_io_completion(req, total_bytes); > > do { > @@ -905,6 +911,13 @@ bool blk_update_request(struct request *req, blk_status_t error, > req->q->integrity.profile->complete_fn(req, nr_bytes); > #endif > > + /* > + * Upper layers may call blk_crypto_evict_key() anytime after the last > + * bio_endio(). Therefore, the keyslot must be released before that. > + */ > + if (blk_crypto_rq_has_keyslot(req) && nr_bytes >= blk_rq_bytes(req)) > + __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(req); > + > if (unlikely(error && !blk_rq_is_passthrough(req) && > !(req->rq_flags & RQF_QUIET)) && > !test_bit(GD_DEAD, &req->q->disk->state)) { > @@ -2967,7 +2980,7 @@ void blk_mq_submit_bio(struct bio *bio) > > blk_mq_bio_to_request(rq, bio, nr_segs); > > - ret = blk_crypto_init_request(rq); > + ret = blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(rq); > if (ret != BLK_STS_OK) { > bio->bi_status = ret; > bio_endio(bio); > -- > 2.39.2 > This patch itself looks good to me. Reviewed-by: Nathan Huckleberry <nhuck@google.com> ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] blk-mq: release crypto keyslot before reporting I/O complete 2023-03-13 21:26 ` Nathan Huckleberry @ 2023-03-14 18:20 ` Eric Biggers 2023-03-15 16:18 ` Christoph Hellwig 0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread From: Eric Biggers @ 2023-03-14 18:20 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Nathan Huckleberry Cc: linux-block, Jens Axboe, linux-fscrypt, stable, Christoph Hellwig On Mon, Mar 13, 2023 at 02:26:00PM -0700, Nathan Huckleberry wrote: > > diff --git a/block/blk-merge.c b/block/blk-merge.c > > index 6460abdb2426..65e75efa9bd3 100644 > > --- a/block/blk-merge.c > > +++ b/block/blk-merge.c > > @@ -867,6 +867,8 @@ static struct request *attempt_merge(struct request_queue *q, > > if (!blk_discard_mergable(req)) > > elv_merge_requests(q, req, next); > > > > + blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(next); > > + > > This looks good to me, but it looks like there was a pre-existing bug > in the blk-merge code. The elv_merged_request function is only called > when the request does not merge. Does anyone know if that behavior is > correct? That's very confusing to me too! I did notice that attempt_merge() calls elv_merge_requests() (not to be confused with elv_merged_request()) if it merges the requests. So it seems there is elv_merge_requests() which means the request was merged, and elv_merged_request() which means the request was *not* merged... I have no idea what is going on there :-( > This patch itself looks good to me. > > Reviewed-by: Nathan Huckleberry <nhuck@google.com> Thanks. Jens, Christoph, etc., anyone else want to take a look too? - Eric ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] blk-mq: release crypto keyslot before reporting I/O complete 2023-03-14 18:20 ` Eric Biggers @ 2023-03-15 16:18 ` Christoph Hellwig 0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread From: Christoph Hellwig @ 2023-03-15 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Eric Biggers Cc: Nathan Huckleberry, linux-block, Jens Axboe, linux-fscrypt, stable On Tue, Mar 14, 2023 at 11:20:14AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > I did notice that attempt_merge() calls elv_merge_requests() (not to be confused > with elv_merged_request()) if it merges the requests. > > So it seems there is elv_merge_requests() which means the request was merged, > and elv_merged_request() which means the request was *not* merged... I have no > idea what is going on there :-( The naming looks very confusing, but that is indeed what the code does. The elevator code is in massive need of a cleanup, as it often is that confusing. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 1/4] blk-mq: release crypto keyslot before reporting I/O complete 2023-03-08 19:36 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] blk-mq: release crypto keyslot before reporting I/O complete Eric Biggers 2023-03-13 21:26 ` Nathan Huckleberry @ 2023-03-15 16:19 ` Christoph Hellwig 1 sibling, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread From: Christoph Hellwig @ 2023-03-15 16:19 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Eric Biggers Cc: linux-block, Jens Axboe, linux-fscrypt, Nathan Huckleberry, stable Looks good: Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 2/4] blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust [not found] <20230308193645.114069-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> 2023-03-08 19:36 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] blk-mq: release crypto keyslot before reporting I/O complete Eric Biggers @ 2023-03-08 19:36 ` Eric Biggers 2023-03-15 16:23 ` Christoph Hellwig 1 sibling, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread From: Eric Biggers @ 2023-03-08 19:36 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-block, Jens Axboe; +Cc: linux-fscrypt, Nathan Huckleberry, stable From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> If blk_crypto_evict_key() sees that the key is still in-use (due to a bug) or that ->keyslot_evict failed, it currently just returns an error while leaving the key linked into the keyslot management structures. However, blk_crypto_evict_key() is only called in contexts such as inode eviction where failure is not an option. So actually the caller proceeds with freeing the blk_crypto_key regardless of the return value of blk_crypto_evict_key(). These two assumptions don't match, and the result is that there can be a use-after-free in blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys() after one of these errors occurs. (Note, these errors *shouldn't* happen; we're just talking about what happens if they do anyway.) Fix this by making blk_crypto_evict_key() unlink the key from the keyslot management structures even on failure. Fixes: 1b2628397058 ("block: Keyslot Manager for Inline Encryption") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Nathan Huckleberry <nhuck@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> --- block/blk-crypto-profile.c | 50 +++++++++++++++----------------------- block/blk-crypto.c | 23 +++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-crypto-profile.c b/block/blk-crypto-profile.c index 0307fb0d95d3..1b20ead59f39 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto-profile.c +++ b/block/blk-crypto-profile.c @@ -354,22 +354,10 @@ bool __blk_crypto_cfg_supported(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, return true; } -/** - * __blk_crypto_evict_key() - Evict a key from a device. - * @profile: the crypto profile of the device - * @key: the key to evict. It must not still be used in any I/O. - * - * If the device has keyslots, this finds the keyslot (if any) that contains the - * specified key and calls the driver's keyslot_evict function to evict it. - * - * Otherwise, this just calls the driver's keyslot_evict function if it is - * implemented, passing just the key (without any particular keyslot). This - * allows layered devices to evict the key from their underlying devices. - * - * Context: Process context. Takes and releases profile->lock. - * Return: 0 on success or if there's no keyslot with the specified key, -EBUSY - * if the keyslot is still in use, or another -errno value on other - * error. +/* + * This is an internal function that evicts a key from an inline encryption + * device that can be either a real device or the blk-crypto-fallback "device". + * It is used only by blk_crypto_evict_key(); see that function for details. */ int __blk_crypto_evict_key(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, const struct blk_crypto_key *key) @@ -389,22 +377,22 @@ int __blk_crypto_evict_key(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, blk_crypto_hw_enter(profile); slot = blk_crypto_find_keyslot(profile, key); - if (!slot) - goto out_unlock; - - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&slot->slot_refs) != 0)) { - err = -EBUSY; - goto out_unlock; + if (slot) { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&slot->slot_refs) != 0)) { + /* BUG: key is still in use by I/O */ + err = -EBUSY; + } else { + err = profile->ll_ops.keyslot_evict( + profile, key, + blk_crypto_keyslot_index(slot)); + } + /* + * Callers may free the key even on error, so unlink the key + * from the hash table and clear slot->key even on error. + */ + hlist_del(&slot->hash_node); + slot->key = NULL; } - err = profile->ll_ops.keyslot_evict(profile, key, - blk_crypto_keyslot_index(slot)); - if (err) - goto out_unlock; - - hlist_del(&slot->hash_node); - slot->key = NULL; - err = 0; -out_unlock: blk_crypto_hw_exit(profile); return err; } diff --git a/block/blk-crypto.c b/block/blk-crypto.c index d0c7feb447e9..4e26fac64199 100644 --- a/block/blk-crypto.c +++ b/block/blk-crypto.c @@ -399,17 +399,22 @@ int blk_crypto_start_using_key(struct block_device *bdev, } /** - * blk_crypto_evict_key() - Evict a key from any inline encryption hardware - * it may have been programmed into - * @bdev: The block_device who's associated inline encryption hardware this key - * might have been programmed into - * @key: The key to evict + * blk_crypto_evict_key() - Evict a blk_crypto_key from a block_device + * @bdev: a block_device on which I/O using the key may have been done + * @key: the key to evict * - * Upper layers (filesystems) must call this function to ensure that a key is - * evicted from any hardware that it might have been programmed into. The key - * must not be in use by any in-flight IO when this function is called. + * For a given block_device, this function removes the given blk_crypto_key from + * the keyslot management structures and evicts it from any underlying hardware + * keyslot(s) or blk-crypto-fallback keyslot it may have been programmed into. * - * Return: 0 on success or if the key wasn't in any keyslot; -errno on error. + * Upper layers must call this before freeing the blk_crypto_key. It must be + * called for every block_device the key may have been used on. The key must no + * longer be in use by any I/O when this function is called. + * + * Context: May sleep. + * Return: 0 on success or if the key wasn't in any keyslot; -errno if the key + * failed to be evicted from a keyslot or is still in-use. Even on + * "failure", the key is removed from the keyslot management structures. */ int blk_crypto_evict_key(struct block_device *bdev, const struct blk_crypto_key *key) -- 2.39.2 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust 2023-03-08 19:36 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust Eric Biggers @ 2023-03-15 16:23 ` Christoph Hellwig 2023-03-15 18:26 ` Eric Biggers 0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread From: Christoph Hellwig @ 2023-03-15 16:23 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Eric Biggers Cc: linux-block, Jens Axboe, linux-fscrypt, Nathan Huckleberry, stable On Wed, Mar 08, 2023 at 11:36:43AM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > const struct blk_crypto_key *key) > @@ -389,22 +377,22 @@ int __blk_crypto_evict_key(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, > > blk_crypto_hw_enter(profile); > slot = blk_crypto_find_keyslot(profile, key); > + if (slot) { Isn't !slot also an error condition that we should warn on? > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&slot->slot_refs) != 0)) { > + /* BUG: key is still in use by I/O */ > + err = -EBUSY; Either way two gotos to jump forward for the error case would improve the readability of the code a fair bit I think. > + } else { > + err = profile->ll_ops.keyslot_evict( > + profile, key, > + blk_crypto_keyslot_index(slot)); > + } > + /* > + * Callers may free the key even on error, so unlink the key > + * from the hash table and clear slot->key even on error. > + */ > + hlist_del(&slot->hash_node); > + slot->key = NULL; > } > blk_crypto_hw_exit(profile); > return err; Also given your above accurate description of the calling context, what is the point of even returning an error here vs just logging an error message? ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust 2023-03-15 16:23 ` Christoph Hellwig @ 2023-03-15 18:26 ` Eric Biggers 0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread From: Eric Biggers @ 2023-03-15 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Christoph Hellwig Cc: linux-block, Jens Axboe, linux-fscrypt, Nathan Huckleberry, stable On Wed, Mar 15, 2023 at 09:23:12AM -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote: > On Wed, Mar 08, 2023 at 11:36:43AM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > > const struct blk_crypto_key *key) > > @@ -389,22 +377,22 @@ int __blk_crypto_evict_key(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile, > > > > blk_crypto_hw_enter(profile); > > slot = blk_crypto_find_keyslot(profile, key); > > + if (slot) { > > Isn't !slot also an error condition that we should warn on? No, definitely not. Keys are not guaranteed to be in a keyslot. I'll add a comment here. > > > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&slot->slot_refs) != 0)) { > > + /* BUG: key is still in use by I/O */ > > + err = -EBUSY; > > Either way two gotos to jump forward for the error case would improve > the readability of the code a fair bit I think. I slightly prefer it without the gotos, but sure I'll do it that way. > > + } else { > > + err = profile->ll_ops.keyslot_evict( > > + profile, key, > > + blk_crypto_keyslot_index(slot)); > > + } > > + /* > > + * Callers may free the key even on error, so unlink the key > > + * from the hash table and clear slot->key even on error. > > + */ > > + hlist_del(&slot->hash_node); > > + slot->key = NULL; > > } > > blk_crypto_hw_exit(profile); > > return err; > > Also given your above accurate description of the calling context, > what is the point of even returning an error here vs just logging > an error message? Yes, I was thinking about that too. I'll add a patch that makes blk_crypto_evict_key() log errors and return void. - Eric ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
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2023-03-08 19:36 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] blk-mq: release crypto keyslot before reporting I/O complete Eric Biggers
2023-03-13 21:26 ` Nathan Huckleberry
2023-03-14 18:20 ` Eric Biggers
2023-03-15 16:18 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-03-15 16:19 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-03-08 19:36 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust Eric Biggers
2023-03-15 16:23 ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-03-15 18:26 ` Eric Biggers
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