[PATCH 0/3] boot: fit: authenticate the dm-verity roothash

[PATCH 0/3] boot: fit: authenticate the dm-verity roothash

[Daniel Golle]

A signed FIT configuration can delegate the integrity of a (potentially
large) root filesystem image to the kernel's dm-verity instead of having
U-Boot hash the whole payload at boot: the FIT carries a "dm-verity"
subnode with the roothash, salt and block parameters, U-Boot passes the
roothash to Linux through the dm-mod.create bootargs, and dm-verity then
validates the filesystem block by block against it.

For that to be safe the roothash has to be trusted, and in a signed
configuration the only thing that establishes trust is the configuration
signature. The roothash was not covered by it. fit_config_add_hash()
collected the image node, its hash subnodes and its cipher subnode into
the signed region, but not the dm-verity subnode, so the roothash, the
sole integrity anchor for the filesystem, was left unsigned.

The result is a verified-boot bypass for the root filesystem: an
attacker who can rewrite the boot medium can replace the filesystem,
recompute a matching dm-verity tree, write the new roothash into the
unsigned dm-verity subnode, and the configuration signature still
verifies. dm-verity then faithfully validates the malicious filesystem
against the attacker's roothash.

This series closes the gap.

Daniel Golle (3):
  boot: fit: factor out node-path collection in fit_config_add_hash()
  boot: fit: cover the dm-verity roothash with the config signature
  test: fit: verify dm-verity roothash is covered by the config
    signature

 boot/image-fit-sig.c                  | 119 ++++++++++------
 include/image.h                       |  25 ++++
 test/boot/fit_verity.c                | 194 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py | 162 +++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/image-host.c                    |  22 +++
 5 files changed, 483 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py


base-commit: 6741b0dfb41dc82a284ab1cff4c58af6ef2f3f9c
-- 
2.55.0

[PATCH 1/3] boot: fit: factor out node-path collection in fit_config_add_hash()

[Daniel Golle]

fit_config_add_hash() repeats the same sequence to append a node's path
to the hashed-node list three times: for the image node, for each hash
subnode and for the cipher subnode. Extract it into a helper,
fit_config_add_node(), with no functional change.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
---
 boot/image-fit-sig.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/boot/image-fit-sig.c b/boot/image-fit-sig.c
index 9b5ab754561..513ee9cc16a 100644
--- a/boot/image-fit-sig.c
+++ b/boot/image-fit-sig.c
@@ -230,6 +230,37 @@ int fit_image_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * fit_config_add_node() - Append one node's path to the hashed-node list
+ *
+ * @fit:		FIT blob
+ * @noffset:		Offset of the node whose path should be added
+ * @node_inc:		Array of path pointers to fill
+ * @count:		Pointer to current count (updated on return)
+ * @max_nodes:		Maximum entries in @node_inc
+ * @buf:		Buffer for packed path strings
+ * @buf_used:		Pointer to bytes used in @buf (updated on return)
+ * @buf_len:		Total size of @buf
+ * Return: 0 on success, -ve on error
+ */
+static int fit_config_add_node(const void *fit, int noffset, char **node_inc,
+			       int *count, int max_nodes, char *buf,
+			       int *buf_used, int buf_len)
+{
+	int ret, len;
+
+	if (*count >= max_nodes)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used, buf_len - *buf_used);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return -ENOENT;
+	len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
+	node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
+	*buf_used += len;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * fit_config_add_hash() - Add hash nodes for one image to the node list
  *
@@ -250,18 +281,12 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 			       char **node_inc, int *count, int max_nodes,
 			       char *buf, int *buf_used, int buf_len)
 {
-	int noffset, hash_count, ret, len;
+	int noffset, hash_count, ret;
 
-	if (*count >= max_nodes)
-		return -ENOSPC;
-
-	ret = fdt_get_path(fit, image_noffset, buf + *buf_used,
-			   buf_len - *buf_used);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		return -ENOENT;
-	len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
-	node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
-	*buf_used += len;
+	ret = fit_config_add_node(fit, image_noffset, node_inc, count,
+				  max_nodes, buf, buf_used, buf_len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	/* Add all this image's hash subnodes */
 	hash_count = 0;
@@ -273,15 +298,10 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 		if (strncmp(name, FIT_HASH_NODENAME,
 			    strlen(FIT_HASH_NODENAME)))
 			continue;
-		if (*count >= max_nodes)
-			return -ENOSPC;
-		ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used,
-				   buf_len - *buf_used);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return -ENOENT;
-		len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
-		node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
-		*buf_used += len;
+		ret = fit_config_add_node(fit, noffset, node_inc, count,
+					  max_nodes, buf, buf_used, buf_len);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
 		hash_count++;
 	}
 
@@ -296,15 +316,10 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 	if (noffset != -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
 		if (noffset < 0)
 			return -EIO;
-		if (*count >= max_nodes)
-			return -ENOSPC;
-		ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used,
-				   buf_len - *buf_used);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			return -ENOENT;
-		len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1;
-		node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used;
-		*buf_used += len;
+		ret = fit_config_add_node(fit, noffset, node_inc, count,
+					  max_nodes, buf, buf_used, buf_len);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
-- 
2.55.0

Re: [PATCH 1/3] boot: fit: factor out node-path collection in fit_config_add_hash()

[Tom Rini]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 449 bytes --]

On Sun, Jul 12, 2026 at 01:33:13AM +0100, Daniel Golle wrote:

> fit_config_add_hash() repeats the same sequence to append a node's path
> to the hashed-node list three times: for the image node, for each hash
> subnode and for the cipher subnode. Extract it into a helper,
> fit_config_add_node(), with no functional change.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>

Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

-- 
Tom

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Re: [PATCH 1/3] boot: fit: factor out node-path collection in fit_config_add_hash()

[Simon Glass]

On 2026-07-12T00:33:05, Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org> wrote:
> boot: fit: factor out node-path collection in fit_config_add_hash()
>
> fit_config_add_hash() repeats the same sequence to append a node's path
> to the hashed-node list three times: for the image node, for each hash
> subnode and for the cipher subnode. Extract it into a helper,
> fit_config_add_node(), with no functional change.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
>
> boot/image-fit-sig.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
>  1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

[PATCH 2/3] boot: fit: cover the dm-verity roothash with the config signature

[Daniel Golle]

A dm-verity protected filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot when it
is loaded; its integrity is delegated to the kernel, which validates the
filesystem on the fly against the roothash taken from the FIT dm-verity
subnode. The roothash is therefore the sole integrity anchor for the
filesystem, yet fit_config_add_hash() only added the image node, its
hash subnodes and its cipher subnode to the signed region, leaving the
dm-verity subnode (roothash, salt and block parameters) unsigned.

An attacker able to rewrite the boot medium could then replace both the
filesystem and the roothash, recompute a matching dm-verity tree and
keep the configuration signature valid, defeating verified boot for the
root filesystem.

Add the dm-verity subnode to the list of nodes covered by the
configuration signature, both when signing (tools/image-host.c) and when
verifying (boot/image-fit-sig.c), so the roothash and salt are
authenticated together with the rest of the configuration.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
---
 boot/image-fit-sig.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
 tools/image-host.c   | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/boot/image-fit-sig.c b/boot/image-fit-sig.c
index 513ee9cc16a..c2f09885492 100644
--- a/boot/image-fit-sig.c
+++ b/boot/image-fit-sig.c
@@ -264,8 +264,8 @@ static int fit_config_add_node(const void *fit, int noffset, char **node_inc,
 /**
  * fit_config_add_hash() - Add hash nodes for one image to the node list
  *
- * Adds the image path, all its hash-* subnode paths, and its cipher
- * subnode path (if present) to the packed buffer.
+ * Adds the image path, all its hash-* subnode paths, and its cipher and
+ * dm-verity subnode paths (each if present) to the packed buffer.
  *
  * @fit:		FIT blob
  * @image_noffset:	Image node offset (e.g. /images/kernel-1)
@@ -322,6 +322,21 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 			return ret;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Add this image's dm-verity node if present. Its roothash is the
+	 * only integrity anchor for a dm-verity filesystem image, so it must
+	 * be covered by the configuration signature.
+	 */
+	noffset = fdt_subnode_offset(fit, image_noffset, FIT_VERITY_NODENAME);
+	if (noffset != -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
+		if (noffset < 0)
+			return -EIO;
+		ret = fit_config_add_node(fit, noffset, node_inc, count,
+					  max_nodes, buf, buf_used, buf_len);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -329,8 +344,8 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
  * fit_config_get_hash_list() - Build the list of nodes to hash
  *
  * Works through every image referenced by the configuration and collects the
- * node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash and
- * cipher subnodes.
+ * node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash,
+ * cipher and dm-verity subnodes.
  *
  * Properties known not to be image references (description, compatible,
  * default, load-only) are skipped, so any new image type is covered by default.
diff --git a/tools/image-host.c b/tools/image-host.c
index 8f1e7be4066..235f7643d08 100644
--- a/tools/image-host.c
+++ b/tools/image-host.c
@@ -1256,6 +1256,28 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 			goto err_mem;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Add this image's dm-verity node if present. Its roothash is the
+	 * only integrity anchor for a dm-verity filesystem image, so it must
+	 * be covered by the configuration signature.
+	 */
+	noffset = fdt_subnode_offset(fit, image_noffset,
+				     FIT_VERITY_NODENAME);
+	if (noffset != -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
+		if (noffset < 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+				"Failed to get dm-verity node in configuration '%s/%s' image '%s': %s\n",
+				conf_name, sig_name, iname,
+				fdt_strerror(noffset));
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+		ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, path, sizeof(path));
+		if (ret < 0)
+			goto err_path;
+		if (strlist_add(node_inc, path))
+			goto err_mem;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 
 err_mem:
-- 
2.55.0

Re: [PATCH 2/3] boot: fit: cover the dm-verity roothash with the config signature

[Tom Rini]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1213 bytes --]

On Sun, Jul 12, 2026 at 01:33:21AM +0100, Daniel Golle wrote:

> A dm-verity protected filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot when it
> is loaded; its integrity is delegated to the kernel, which validates the
> filesystem on the fly against the roothash taken from the FIT dm-verity
> subnode. The roothash is therefore the sole integrity anchor for the
> filesystem, yet fit_config_add_hash() only added the image node, its
> hash subnodes and its cipher subnode to the signed region, leaving the
> dm-verity subnode (roothash, salt and block parameters) unsigned.
> 
> An attacker able to rewrite the boot medium could then replace both the
> filesystem and the roothash, recompute a matching dm-verity tree and
> keep the configuration signature valid, defeating verified boot for the
> root filesystem.
> 
> Add the dm-verity subnode to the list of nodes covered by the
> configuration signature, both when signing (tools/image-host.c) and when
> verifying (boot/image-fit-sig.c), so the roothash and salt are
> authenticated together with the rest of the configuration.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>

Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

-- 
Tom

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Re: [PATCH 2/3] boot: fit: cover the dm-verity roothash with the config signature

[Simon Glass]

Hi Daniel,

On 2026-07-12T00:33:05, Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org> wrote:
> boot: fit: cover the dm-verity roothash with the config signature
>
> A dm-verity protected filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot when it
> is loaded; its integrity is delegated to the kernel, which validates the
> filesystem on the fly against the roothash taken from the FIT dm-verity
> subnode. The roothash is therefore the sole integrity anchor for the
> filesystem, yet fit_config_add_hash() only added the image node, its
> hash subnodes and its cipher subnode to the signed region, leaving the
> dm-verity subnode (roothash, salt and block parameters) unsigned.
>
> An attacker able to rewrite the boot medium could then replace both the
> filesystem and the roothash, recompute a matching dm-verity tree and
> keep the configuration signature valid, defeating verified boot for the
> root filesystem.
>
> Add the dm-verity subnode to the list of nodes covered by the
> configuration signature, both when signing (tools/image-host.c) and when
> verifying (boot/image-fit-sig.c), so the roothash and salt are
> authenticated together with the rest of the configuration.
>
> [...]
>
> boot/image-fit-sig.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
>  tools/image-host.c   | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

> A dm-verity protected filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot when it
> is loaded; its integrity is delegated to the kernel, which validates the
> filesystem on the fly against the roothash taken from the FIT dm-verity
> subnode. The roothash is therefore the sole integrity anchor for the
> filesystem, yet fit_config_add_hash() only added the image node, its

Please use present tense when describing the code before this patch
('only adds ... leaving'), since the code is still in that state when
the commit is applied.

> diff --git a/boot/image-fit-sig.c b/boot/image-fit-sig.c
> @@ -329,8 +344,8 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
> - * node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash and
> - * cipher subnodes.
> + * node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash,
> + * cipher and dm-verity subnodes.

You update the comments here, but doc/usage/fit/signature.rst (in the
'Details' section) still says the rebuilt node list "always includes
the root node, the configuration node, each referenced image node and
its hash/cipher subnodes". Please can you update that to mention the
dm-verity subnode as well? It would also be worth a sentence in
doc/usage/fit/dm-verity.rst noting that the roothash and salt are
covered by the configuration signature, since that is the security
property people will rely on.

> diff --git a/tools/image-host.c b/tools/image-host.c
> @@ -1256,6 +1256,28 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
> +     noffset = fdt_subnode_offset(fit, image_noffset,
> +                                  FIT_VERITY_NODENAME);
> +     if (noffset != -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) {
> +             if (noffset < 0) {
> +                     fprintf(stderr,
> +                             "Failed to get dm-verity node in configuration '%s/%s' image '%s': %s\n",
> +                             conf_name, sig_name, iname,
> +                             fdt_strerror(noffset));
> +                     return -EIO;
> +             }
> +             ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, path, sizeof(path));
> +             if (ret < 0)
> +                     goto err_path;
> +             if (strlist_add(node_inc, path))
> +                     goto err_mem;
> +     }

This follows the existing cipher pattern, but with this addition the
host-side fit_config_add_hash() has three copies of the same
get-path-and-add sequence - exactly the duplication patch 1 removes on
the boot side. Please can you add a similar factoring patch for
tools/image-host.c, or fold it into patch 1? The two implementations
must produce the same node list for verification to succeed, so keeping
them easy to compare seems better.

Regards,
Simon

[PATCH 3/3] test: fit: verify dm-verity roothash is covered by the config signature

[Daniel Golle]

A dm-verity protected filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot; its
integrity is delegated to the kernel, which trusts the roothash taken
from the FIT dm-verity subnode. For that chain of trust to hold, the
roothash (and salt) must be part of the region covered by the
configuration signature, otherwise an attacker can replace both the
filesystem and the roothash while keeping the signature valid.

Add two independent checks of this property:

 - test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py signs a configuration that
   references a filesystem image carrying a dm-verity subnode, then
   confirms that tampering the roothash or the salt is rejected by
   fit_check_sign. A control that tampers a byte known to be signed
   proves the check can fail.

 - test/boot/fit_verity.c gains a runtime unit test that builds the
   exact node list the configuration signature is computed over,
   turns it into hashed regions and checks both that the roothash
   bytes fall inside a signed region and that tampering them changes
   the hash. It needs no private key, so it also runs on real devices
   and uses the same hash path a device would.

To let the unit test build the signed-region node list, rename the
config node-list helper to fit_config_get_signed_nodes() and expose it
only when unit tests are built (VISIBLE_IF_UT), keeping it static in
normal builds.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
---
 boot/image-fit-sig.c                  |  25 +++-
 include/image.h                       |  25 ++++
 test/boot/fit_verity.c                | 194 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py | 162 +++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 399 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py

diff --git a/boot/image-fit-sig.c b/boot/image-fit-sig.c
index c2f09885492..1181fefb55f 100644
--- a/boot/image-fit-sig.c
+++ b/boot/image-fit-sig.c
@@ -340,8 +340,19 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * fit_config_get_signed_nodes() is internal, but the fit_verity unit test
+ * needs to build the same signed-region node list. Make it visible when unit
+ * tests are built and keep it static otherwise.
+ */
+#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(UNIT_TEST)
+#define VISIBLE_IF_UT
+#else
+#define VISIBLE_IF_UT static
+#endif
+
 /**
- * fit_config_get_hash_list() - Build the list of nodes to hash
+ * fit_config_get_signed_nodes() - Build the list of nodes to hash
  *
  * Works through every image referenced by the configuration and collects the
  * node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash,
@@ -358,9 +369,9 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
  * @buf_len:	Size of @buf
  * Return: number of entries in @node_inc, or -ve on error
  */
-static int fit_config_get_hash_list(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
-				    char **node_inc, int max_nodes,
-				    char *buf, int buf_len)
+VISIBLE_IF_UT int fit_config_get_signed_nodes(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
+					      char **node_inc, int max_nodes,
+					      char *buf, int buf_len)
 {
 	const char *conf_name;
 	int image_count;
@@ -500,9 +511,9 @@ static int fit_config_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, int conf_noffset,
 	}
 
 	/* Build the node list from the config, ignoring hashed-nodes */
-	count = fit_config_get_hash_list(fit, conf_noffset,
-					 node_inc, IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES,
-					 hash_buf, sizeof(hash_buf));
+	count = fit_config_get_signed_nodes(fit, conf_noffset,
+					    node_inc, IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES,
+					    hash_buf, sizeof(hash_buf));
 	if (count < 0) {
 		*err_msgp = "Failed to build hash node list";
 		return -1;
diff --git a/include/image.h b/include/image.h
index 9c8a746d576..35d6b217596 100644
--- a/include/image.h
+++ b/include/image.h
@@ -1884,6 +1884,31 @@ struct image_region *fit_region_make_list(const void *fit,
 		struct fdt_region *fdt_regions, int count,
 		struct image_region *region);
 
+/**
+ * fit_config_get_signed_nodes() - Build the list of nodes covered by a config
+ *				   signature
+ *
+ * Collects the paths of the nodes that the configuration signature is
+ * computed over: the root node, the configuration node, and for each image
+ * referenced by the configuration its node, its hash subnodes and its cipher
+ * and dm-verity subnodes. The result is the same node list used when creating
+ * and verifying the signature, and is suitable for passing to
+ * fdt_find_regions().
+ *
+ * @fit:	FIT blob
+ * @conf_noffset: Configuration node offset
+ * @node_inc:	Array to fill with pointers to packed path strings
+ * @max_nodes:	Number of entries in @node_inc
+ * @buf:	Buffer for the packed null-terminated path strings
+ * @buf_len:	Size of @buf
+ * Return: number of entries written to @node_inc, or -ve on error
+ */
+#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(UNIT_TEST)
+int fit_config_get_signed_nodes(const void *fit, int conf_noffset,
+				char **node_inc, int max_nodes,
+				char *buf, int buf_len);
+#endif
+
 static inline int fit_image_check_target_arch(const void *fdt, int node)
 {
 #ifndef USE_HOSTCC
diff --git a/test/boot/fit_verity.c b/test/boot/fit_verity.c
index 7459a9d6f81..a0a423f6666 100644
--- a/test/boot/fit_verity.c
+++ b/test/boot/fit_verity.c
@@ -6,6 +6,11 @@
  */
 
 #include <image.h>
+#include <fdt_region.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/libfdt.h>
+#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
 #include <test/test.h>
 #include <test/ut.h>
 
@@ -304,3 +309,192 @@ static int fit_verity_test_bad_blocksize(struct unit_test_state *uts)
 	return 0;
 }
 FIT_VERITY_TEST(fit_verity_test_bad_blocksize, 0);
+
+#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(FIT_SIGNATURE)
+/**
+ * build_signed_verity_fit() - build a FIT with a signable verity config
+ * @buf:	output buffer (at least FIT_BUF_SIZE bytes)
+ *
+ * Like build_verity_fit(), but the filesystem image also carries a hash
+ * subnode (required for a configuration to be signable) so the config's
+ * signed-region node list can be built with fit_config_get_signed_nodes().
+ *
+ * Return: configuration node offset, or -ve on error
+ */
+static int build_signed_verity_fit(void *buf)
+{
+	int images_node, confs_node, conf_node, img_node, hash_node, verity_node;
+	fdt32_t val;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = fdt_create_empty_tree(buf, FIT_BUF_SIZE);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	images_node = fdt_add_subnode(buf, 0, "images");
+	if (images_node < 0)
+		return images_node;
+
+	img_node = fdt_add_subnode(buf, images_node, "rootfs");
+	if (img_node < 0)
+		return img_node;
+	ret = fdt_setprop_string(buf, img_node, FIT_TYPE_PROP, "filesystem");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	hash_node = fdt_add_subnode(buf, img_node, "hash-1");
+	if (hash_node < 0)
+		return hash_node;
+	ret = fdt_setprop_string(buf, hash_node, FIT_ALGO_PROP, "sha256");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	ret = fdt_setprop(buf, hash_node, FIT_VALUE_PROP, test_digest,
+			  sizeof(test_digest));
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	verity_node = fdt_add_subnode(buf, img_node, FIT_VERITY_NODENAME);
+	if (verity_node < 0)
+		return verity_node;
+	ret = fdt_setprop_string(buf, verity_node, FIT_VERITY_ALGO_PROP,
+				 "sha256");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	val = cpu_to_fdt32(4096);
+	ret = fdt_setprop(buf, verity_node, FIT_VERITY_DBS_PROP, &val,
+			  sizeof(val));
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	ret = fdt_setprop(buf, verity_node, FIT_VERITY_HBS_PROP, &val,
+			  sizeof(val));
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	val = cpu_to_fdt32(100);
+	ret = fdt_setprop(buf, verity_node, FIT_VERITY_NBLK_PROP, &val,
+			  sizeof(val));
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	ret = fdt_setprop(buf, verity_node, FIT_VERITY_HBLK_PROP, &val,
+			  sizeof(val));
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	ret = fdt_setprop(buf, verity_node, FIT_VERITY_DIGEST_PROP, test_digest,
+			  sizeof(test_digest));
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	ret = fdt_setprop(buf, verity_node, FIT_VERITY_SALT_PROP, test_salt,
+			  sizeof(test_salt));
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	confs_node = fdt_add_subnode(buf, 0, "configurations");
+	if (confs_node < 0)
+		return confs_node;
+	conf_node = fdt_add_subnode(buf, confs_node, "conf-1");
+	if (conf_node < 0)
+		return conf_node;
+	ret = fdt_setprop_string(buf, conf_node, FIT_LOADABLE_PROP, "rootfs");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	return conf_node;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test: the dm-verity roothash and salt are inside the region covered by the
+ * configuration signature.
+ *
+ * A dm-verity filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot; its integrity is
+ * delegated to the kernel, which trusts the roothash from the FIT dm-verity
+ * subnode. That roothash must therefore be part of the signed region, so that
+ * an attacker cannot swap both the filesystem and the roothash while keeping
+ * the configuration signature valid.
+ *
+ * This checks the property without a private key, so it also runs on real
+ * devices: it builds the exact node list the signature is computed over
+ * (fit_config_get_signed_nodes), turns it into hashed regions, and verifies both
+ * that the roothash bytes fall inside a region and that tampering them changes
+ * the hash. It uses the same hash path a device would (crypto accelerated where
+ * available).
+ */
+static int fit_verity_test_roothash_signed(struct unit_test_state *uts)
+{
+	char buf[FIT_BUF_SIZE];
+	char *node_inc[32];
+	char path_buf[256];
+	char region_path[256];
+	struct fdt_region fdt_regions[64];
+	struct image_region *region = NULL;
+	int conf_node, verity_node;
+	int count, i, digest_len;
+	const void *digest;
+	ulong digest_off, region_off;
+	bool covered = false;
+	u8 hash_clean[32], hash_tampered[32], hash_control[32];
+
+	conf_node = build_signed_verity_fit(buf);
+	ut_assert(conf_node >= 0);
+
+	verity_node = fdt_path_offset(buf, "/images/rootfs/dm-verity");
+	ut_assert(verity_node >= 0);
+
+	/* Build the node list the configuration signature is computed over. */
+	count = fit_config_get_signed_nodes(buf, conf_node, node_inc,
+					    ARRAY_SIZE(node_inc), path_buf,
+					    sizeof(path_buf));
+	ut_assert(count > 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Turn the node list into hashed regions. No exclude list is needed:
+	 * the excluded properties (data, data-size, data-offset,
+	 * data-position) never include the dm-verity digest or salt, so the
+	 * coverage answer is the same with or without it.
+	 */
+	count = fdt_find_regions(buf, node_inc, count, NULL, 0, fdt_regions,
+				 ARRAY_SIZE(fdt_regions) - 1, region_path,
+				 sizeof(region_path), 0);
+	ut_assert(count > 0);
+
+	region = fit_region_make_list(buf, fdt_regions, count, NULL);
+	ut_assertnonnull(region);
+
+	digest = fdt_getprop(buf, verity_node, FIT_VERITY_DIGEST_PROP,
+			     &digest_len);
+	ut_assertnonnull(digest);
+	ut_assert(digest_len > 0);
+	digest_off = (ulong)((const char *)digest - (const char *)buf);
+
+	/*
+	 * Control: the hash covers a non-empty region and reacts to a change
+	 * inside it. Flip a byte of the (signed) image hash value and confirm
+	 * the computed hash differs, proving the region set and hash work.
+	 */
+	ut_assertok(hash_calculate("sha256", region, count, hash_clean));
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		region_off = (ulong)((const char *)region[i].data -
+				     (const char *)buf);
+		if (digest_off >= region_off &&
+		    digest_off + digest_len <= region_off + region[i].size) {
+			covered = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* The roothash must be covered by the configuration signature. */
+	ut_assert(covered);
+
+	/* Tampering the roothash must change the signed hash. */
+	((u8 *)digest)[0] ^= 0xff;
+	ut_assertok(hash_calculate("sha256", region, count, hash_tampered));
+	((u8 *)digest)[0] ^= 0xff;
+	ut_assert(memcmp(hash_clean, hash_tampered, sizeof(hash_clean)) != 0);
+
+	/* Sanity: with the byte restored the hash matches the clean value. */
+	ut_assertok(hash_calculate("sha256", region, count, hash_control));
+	ut_asserteq_mem(hash_clean, hash_control, sizeof(hash_clean));
+
+	free(region);
+	return 0;
+}
+FIT_VERITY_TEST(fit_verity_test_roothash_signed, 0);
+#endif /* FIT_SIGNATURE */
diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py b/test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..ae737626217
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+# Copyright 2026 Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
+#
+# Verify that the dm-verity roothash is covered by the FIT configuration
+# signature.
+#
+# A dm-verity protected filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot; its integrity
+# is delegated to the kernel, which trusts the roothash taken from the FIT
+# ``dm-verity`` subnode. That roothash must therefore be part of the signed
+# region of the configuration, otherwise an attacker can replace both the
+# filesystem and the roothash while keeping the configuration signature valid.
+#
+# This test signs a configuration referencing a filesystem image that carries a
+# ``dm-verity`` subnode, then flips one byte of the roothash and of the salt and
+# checks that verification rejects the image. A control tampering a byte that is
+# known to be signed confirms that the check is able to detect a broken region.
+
+import os
+import pytest
+import utils
+
+# 16 blocks of 4096 bytes, matching num-data-blocks/data-block-size below.
+ROOTFS_SIZE = 16 * 4096
+
+ITS = '''
+/dts-v1/;
+/ {
+    description = "verity roothash signing coverage test";
+    #address-cells = <1>;
+
+    images {
+        kernel-1 {
+            description = "kernel";
+            data = /incbin/("%(tmpdir)skernel.bin");
+            type = "kernel";
+            arch = "arm64";
+            os = "linux";
+            compression = "none";
+            load = <0x40000000>;
+            entry = <0x40000000>;
+            hash-1 { algo = "sha256"; };
+        };
+        rootfs-1 {
+            description = "rootfs";
+            data = /incbin/("%(tmpdir)srootfs.bin");
+            type = "filesystem";
+            arch = "arm64";
+            compression = "none";
+            hash-1 { algo = "sha256"; };
+            dm-verity {
+                algo = "sha256";
+                data-block-size = <4096>;
+                hash-block-size = <4096>;
+                num-data-blocks = <16>;
+                hash-start-block = <16>;
+            };
+        };
+    };
+
+    configurations {
+        default = "conf-1";
+        conf-1 {
+            description = "signed config";
+            kernel = "kernel-1";
+            loadables = "rootfs-1";
+            signature-1 {
+                algo = "sha256,rsa2048";
+                key-name-hint = "dev";
+                sign-images = "kernel", "loadables";
+            };
+        };
+    };
+};
+'''
+
+VERITY_NODE = '/images/rootfs-1/dm-verity'
+ROOTFS_HASH_NODE = '/images/rootfs-1/hash-1'
+
+
+def flip_prop_byte(ubman, fit, node, prop):
+    """Flip the first byte of a byte-array property in a FIT, in place.
+
+    The property is rewritten with the same length so that no node is
+    relaid out and the signed regions keep their offsets.
+    """
+    val = utils.run_and_log(ubman, 'fdtget -t bx %s %s %s' % (fit, node, prop))
+    bytelist = val.split()
+    bytelist[0] = '%x' % (int(bytelist[0], 16) ^ 0xff)
+    utils.run_and_log(ubman, 'fdtput -t bx %s %s %s %s' %
+                      (fit, node, prop, ' '.join(bytelist)))
+
+
+@pytest.mark.boardspec('sandbox')
+@pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('fit_signature')
+@pytest.mark.requiredtool('dtc')
+@pytest.mark.requiredtool('fdtget')
+@pytest.mark.requiredtool('fdtput')
+@pytest.mark.requiredtool('openssl')
+def test_fit_verity_roothash_signed(ubman):
+    """The dm-verity roothash must be inside the signed configuration region."""
+    tmpdir = os.path.join(ubman.config.result_dir, 'verity-sign') + '/'
+    if not os.path.exists(tmpdir):
+        os.makedirs(tmpdir)
+    mkimage = ubman.config.build_dir + '/tools/mkimage'
+    fit_check_sign = ubman.config.build_dir + '/tools/fit_check_sign'
+    dtc_args = '-I dts -O dtb -i %s' % tmpdir
+    its = tmpdir + 'verity.its'
+    fit = tmpdir + 'verity.itb'
+    dtb = tmpdir + 'control.dtb'
+
+    # Signing key and empty control dtb to receive the public key.
+    utils.run_and_log(ubman, 'openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out %sdev.key '
+                      '-pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 '
+                      '-pkeyopt rsa_keygen_pubexp:65537' % tmpdir)
+    utils.run_and_log(ubman, 'openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key %sdev.key '
+                      '-out %sdev.crt' % (tmpdir, tmpdir))
+    with open(tmpdir + 'control.dts', 'w') as f:
+        f.write('/dts-v1/; / { model = "verity-test"; };\n')
+    utils.run_and_log(ubman, 'dtc -O dtb -o %s %scontrol.dts' % (dtb, tmpdir))
+
+    # Payloads. The rootfs must be a whole number of data blocks so mkimage can
+    # build the dm-verity hash tree and compute the roothash.
+    with open(tmpdir + 'rootfs.bin', 'wb') as f:
+        f.write(b'R' * ROOTFS_SIZE)
+    with open(tmpdir + 'kernel.bin', 'wb') as f:
+        f.write(b'KERNEL')
+
+    with open(its, 'w') as f:
+        f.write(ITS % {'tmpdir': tmpdir})
+
+    # Build and sign. -E keeps the (large) rootfs external, as on a real device.
+    utils.run_and_log(ubman, [mkimage, '-D', dtc_args, '-E', '-f', its,
+                              '-k', tmpdir, '-K', dtb, '-r', fit])
+
+    # Baseline: the freshly signed image must verify.
+    utils.run_and_log(ubman, [fit_check_sign, '-f', fit, '-k', dtb])
+
+    # Control: tampering a byte that is signed (the filesystem image hash value)
+    # must be detected. This proves the check can fail.
+    control = tmpdir + 'control.itb'
+    utils.run_and_log(ubman, 'cp %s %s' % (fit, control))
+    flip_prop_byte(ubman, control, ROOTFS_HASH_NODE, 'value')
+    utils.run_and_log_expect_exception(
+        ubman, [fit_check_sign, '-f', control, '-k', dtb],
+        1, 'Failed to verify required signature')
+
+    # Roothash: tampering the dm-verity digest must be rejected. If the digest
+    # is outside the signed region this check passes and boot is compromised.
+    tampered = tmpdir + 'tamper-digest.itb'
+    utils.run_and_log(ubman, 'cp %s %s' % (fit, tampered))
+    flip_prop_byte(ubman, tampered, VERITY_NODE, 'digest')
+    utils.run_and_log_expect_exception(
+        ubman, [fit_check_sign, '-f', tampered, '-k', dtb],
+        1, 'Failed to verify required signature')
+
+    # Salt: likewise, the salt feeds the dm-verity target and must be signed.
+    tampered = tmpdir + 'tamper-salt.itb'
+    utils.run_and_log(ubman, 'cp %s %s' % (fit, tampered))
+    flip_prop_byte(ubman, tampered, VERITY_NODE, 'salt')
+    utils.run_and_log_expect_exception(
+        ubman, [fit_check_sign, '-f', tampered, '-k', dtb],
+        1, 'Failed to verify required signature')
-- 
2.55.0

Re: [PATCH 3/3] test: fit: verify dm-verity roothash is covered by the config signature

[Tom Rini]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3338 bytes --]

On Sun, Jul 12, 2026 at 01:33:46AM +0100, Daniel Golle wrote:

> A dm-verity protected filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot; its
> integrity is delegated to the kernel, which trusts the roothash taken
> from the FIT dm-verity subnode. For that chain of trust to hold, the
> roothash (and salt) must be part of the region covered by the
> configuration signature, otherwise an attacker can replace both the
> filesystem and the roothash while keeping the signature valid.
> 
> Add two independent checks of this property:
> 
>  - test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py signs a configuration that
>    references a filesystem image carrying a dm-verity subnode, then
>    confirms that tampering the roothash or the salt is rejected by
>    fit_check_sign. A control that tampers a byte known to be signed
>    proves the check can fail.
> 
>  - test/boot/fit_verity.c gains a runtime unit test that builds the
>    exact node list the configuration signature is computed over,
>    turns it into hashed regions and checks both that the roothash
>    bytes fall inside a signed region and that tampering them changes
>    the hash. It needs no private key, so it also runs on real devices
>    and uses the same hash path a device would.
> 
> To let the unit test build the signed-region node list, rename the
> config node-list helper to fit_config_get_signed_nodes() and expose it
> only when unit tests are built (VISIBLE_IF_UT), keeping it static in
> normal builds.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
> ---
>  boot/image-fit-sig.c                  |  25 +++-
>  include/image.h                       |  25 ++++
>  test/boot/fit_verity.c                | 194 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py | 162 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 399 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py
> 
> diff --git a/boot/image-fit-sig.c b/boot/image-fit-sig.c
> index c2f09885492..1181fefb55f 100644
> --- a/boot/image-fit-sig.c
> +++ b/boot/image-fit-sig.c
> @@ -340,8 +340,19 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * fit_config_get_signed_nodes() is internal, but the fit_verity unit test
> + * needs to build the same signed-region node list. Make it visible when unit
> + * tests are built and keep it static otherwise.
> + */
> +#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(UNIT_TEST)
> +#define VISIBLE_IF_UT
> +#else
> +#define VISIBLE_IF_UT static
> +#endif

I don't like this kind of "game", and I think it's why we generally just
don't mark functions as static that could be, if not for UNIT_TEST.
Finding a more general way to handle this would be good and an unrelated
clean-up (after verifying that for example, marking a ton of stuff as
now static results in a more compact binary or provides some obvious
gain).

My other comment would be that we should be doing like 
doc/develop/pytest//test_fit.rst for example and making sure we have
good and usable generated documentation (so using pydoc comments, not
"#" style). And FYI that usually means building and viewing the docs
locally, not just making sure CI passes, it can be tricky I've found to
get examples annotated correctly to render usefully.

-- 
Tom

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Re: [PATCH 3/3] test: fit: verify dm-verity roothash is covered by the config signature

[Simon Glass]

Hi Daniel,

On 2026-07-12T00:33:05, Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org> wrote:
> test: fit: verify dm-verity roothash is covered by the config signature
>
> A dm-verity protected filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot; its
> integrity is delegated to the kernel, which trusts the roothash taken
> from the FIT dm-verity subnode. For that chain of trust to hold, the
> roothash (and salt) must be part of the region covered by the
> configuration signature, otherwise an attacker can replace both the
> filesystem and the roothash while keeping the signature valid.
>
> Add two independent checks of this property:
>
>  - test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py signs a configuration that
>    references a filesystem image carrying a dm-verity subnode, then
>    confirms that tampering the roothash or the salt is rejected by
>    fit_check_sign. A control that tampers a byte known to be signed
>    proves the check can fail.
>
>  - test/boot/fit_verity.c gains a runtime unit test that builds the
>    exact node list the configuration signature is computed over,
>    turns it into hashed regions and checks both that the roothash
> [...]
>
> boot/image-fit-sig.c                  |  25 +++--
>  include/image.h                       |  25 +++++
>  test/boot/fit_verity.c                | 194 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py | 162 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 399 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

Somehow I didn't get this email, but I'll try to reply here.

> diff --git a/boot/image-fit-sig.c b/boot/image-fit-sig.c
> @@ -340,8 +340,19 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
> +#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(UNIT_TEST)
> +#define VISIBLE_IF_UT
> +#else
> +#define VISIBLE_IF_UT static
> +#endif

Tom commented on this, but I'll just add this. Linux has
VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT but in U-Boot so far we just stop the static when the
function is needed elsewhere. LTO can be used to avoid the code-size
increase, for platforms that want it.


> diff --git a/test/boot/fit_verity.c b/test/boot/fit_verity.c
> @@ -304,3 +309,192 @@ static int fit_verity_test_bad_blocksize(struct unit_test_state *uts)
> + count = fdt_find_regions(buf, node_inc, count, NULL, 0, fdt_regions,
> + ARRAY_SIZE(fdt_regions) - 1, region_path,
> + sizeof(region_path), 0);
> + ut_assert(count > 0);

fdt_find_regions() can return a count larger than the max passed in,
meaning the region array was exhausted (see the 'count >= max_regions -
1' check in fit_config_check_sig()). If that ever happens here,
fit_region_make_list() reads past the filled entries. Please can you
assert that count is within the array size, matching the real
verification path?

> diff --git a/test/boot/fit_verity.c b/test/boot/fit_verity.c
> @@ -304,3 +309,192 @@ static int fit_verity_test_bad_blocksize(struct unit_test_state *uts)
> + /* Tampering the roothash must change the signed hash. */
> + ((u8 *)digest)[0] ^= 0xff;

You already have digest_off, so you could write to buf[digest_off]
instead of casting away the const from fdt_getprop(). Both work since
buf is writable, but avoiding the cast is cleaner.

> diff --git a/test/boot/fit_verity.c b/test/boot/fit_verity.c
> @@ -304,3 +309,192 @@ static int fit_verity_test_bad_blocksize(struct unit_test_state *uts)
> + digest = fdt_getprop(buf, verity_node, FIT_VERITY_DIGEST_PROP,
> +      &digest_len);

The python test also tampers the salt, but the unit test only checks
the digest. Since both properties sit in the same dm-verity node the
coverage result is the same, so I don't feel strongly, but a one-line
comment noting that the digest check stands in for the whole node would
make the asymmetry clearer. What do you think?

Regards,
Simon

Re: [PATCH 3/3] test: fit: verify dm-verity roothash is covered by the config signature

[Tom Rini]

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On Tue, Jul 14, 2026 at 06:17:11AM -0600, Simon Glass wrote:
> Hi Daniel,
> 
> On 2026-07-12T00:33:05, Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org> wrote:
> > test: fit: verify dm-verity roothash is covered by the config signature
> >
> > A dm-verity protected filesystem image is not hashed by U-Boot; its
> > integrity is delegated to the kernel, which trusts the roothash taken
> > from the FIT dm-verity subnode. For that chain of trust to hold, the
> > roothash (and salt) must be part of the region covered by the
> > configuration signature, otherwise an attacker can replace both the
> > filesystem and the roothash while keeping the signature valid.
> >
> > Add two independent checks of this property:
> >
> >  - test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py signs a configuration that
> >    references a filesystem image carrying a dm-verity subnode, then
> >    confirms that tampering the roothash or the salt is rejected by
> >    fit_check_sign. A control that tampers a byte known to be signed
> >    proves the check can fail.
> >
> >  - test/boot/fit_verity.c gains a runtime unit test that builds the
> >    exact node list the configuration signature is computed over,
> >    turns it into hashed regions and checks both that the roothash
> > [...]
> >
> > boot/image-fit-sig.c                  |  25 +++--
> >  include/image.h                       |  25 +++++
> >  test/boot/fit_verity.c                | 194 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  test/py/tests/test_fit_verity_sign.py | 162 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  4 files changed, 399 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> 
> Somehow I didn't get this email, but I'll try to reply here.
> 
> > diff --git a/boot/image-fit-sig.c b/boot/image-fit-sig.c
> > @@ -340,8 +340,19 @@ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset,
> > +#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(UNIT_TEST)
> > +#define VISIBLE_IF_UT
> > +#else
> > +#define VISIBLE_IF_UT static
> > +#endif
> 
> Tom commented on this, but I'll just add this. Linux has
> VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT but in U-Boot so far we just stop the static when the
> function is needed elsewhere. LTO can be used to avoid the code-size
> increase, for platforms that want it.

As part of why this should be its own discussion, a quick look at
VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT in the kernel leads me to think it's not quite the same
set of needs, or if so there's a lot more architectural enforcement
around what is/isn't exposed just for testing, which we lack today.
Talking about LTO isn't relevant here.

-- 
Tom

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