* [PATCH v2] x86: use fixed read-only IDT
@ 2013-04-09 16:39 Kees Cook
2013-04-10 0:14 ` H. Peter Anvin
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2013-04-09 16:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Alexander Duyck, Alex Shi, Jeremy Fitzhardinge, Will Drewry,
Kees Cook, Julien Tinnes, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk,
Frederic Weisbecker, Dan Rosenberg, x86, Steven Rostedt,
virtualization, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin, kernel-hardening,
Thomas Gleixner, Paul E. McKenney, xen-devel
Make a copy of the IDT (as seen via the "sidt" instruction) read-only.
This primarily removes the IDT from being a target for arbitrary memory
write attacks, and has the added benefit of also not leaking the kernel
base offset, if it has been relocated.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
---
v2:
- clarify commit and comments
---
arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h | 4 +---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 18 +-----------------
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/xen/mmu.c | 4 +---
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
index a09c285..51b9e32 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
@@ -104,9 +104,7 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
FIX_LI_PCIA, /* Lithium PCI Bridge A */
FIX_LI_PCIB, /* Lithium PCI Bridge B */
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG
- FIX_F00F_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for IDT */
-#endif
+ FIX_RO_IDT, /* Virtual mapping for read-only IDT */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CYCLONE_TIMER
FIX_CYCLONE_TIMER, /*cyclone timer register*/
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index 1905ce9..7170024 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -164,20 +164,6 @@ int __cpuinit ppro_with_ram_bug(void)
return 0;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG
-static void __cpuinit trap_init_f00f_bug(void)
-{
- __set_fixmap(FIX_F00F_IDT, __pa_symbol(idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
-
- /*
- * Update the IDT descriptor and reload the IDT so that
- * it uses the read-only mapped virtual address.
- */
- idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_F00F_IDT);
- load_idt(&idt_descr);
-}
-#endif
-
static void __cpuinit intel_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
/* calling is from identify_secondary_cpu() ? */
@@ -206,8 +192,7 @@ static void __cpuinit intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/*
* All current models of Pentium and Pentium with MMX technology CPUs
* have the F0 0F bug, which lets nonprivileged users lock up the
- * system.
- * Note that the workaround only should be initialized once...
+ * system. Announce that the fault handler will be checking for it.
*/
c->f00f_bug = 0;
if (!paravirt_enabled() && c->x86 == 5) {
@@ -215,7 +200,6 @@ static void __cpuinit intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
c->f00f_bug = 1;
if (!f00f_workaround_enabled) {
- trap_init_f00f_bug();
printk(KERN_NOTICE "Intel Pentium with F0 0F bug - workaround enabled.\n");
f00f_workaround_enabled = 1;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 68bda7a..a2a9b78 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -753,6 +753,14 @@ void __init trap_init(void)
#endif
/*
+ * Set the IDT descriptor to a fixed read-only location, so that the
+ * "sidt" instruction will not leak the location of the kernel, and
+ * to defend the IDT against arbitrary memory write vulnerabilities.
+ * It will be reloaded in cpu_init() */
+ __set_fixmap(FIX_RO_IDT, __pa_symbol(idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+ idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_IDT);
+
+ /*
* Should be a barrier for any external CPU state:
*/
cpu_init();
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
index 6afbb2c..8bc4dec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
@@ -2039,9 +2039,7 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot)
switch (idx) {
case FIX_BTMAP_END ... FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN:
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG
- case FIX_F00F_IDT:
-#endif
+ case FIX_RO_IDT:
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
case FIX_WP_TEST:
case FIX_VDSO:
--
1.7.9.5
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2] x86: use fixed read-only IDT
2013-04-09 16:39 [PATCH v2] x86: use fixed read-only IDT Kees Cook
@ 2013-04-10 0:14 ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-10 0:29 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: H. Peter Anvin @ 2013-04-10 0:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Alexander Duyck, Alex Shi, Jeremy Fitzhardinge, Will Drewry,
Julien Tinnes, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Frederic Weisbecker,
Dan Rosenberg, x86, linux-kernel, Steven Rostedt, virtualization,
Ingo Molnar, kernel-hardening, Thomas Gleixner, Paul E. McKenney,
xen-devel
On 04/09/2013 09:39 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> -
> static void __cpuinit intel_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> {
> /* calling is from identify_secondary_cpu() ? */
> @@ -206,8 +192,7 @@ static void __cpuinit intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> /*
> * All current models of Pentium and Pentium with MMX technology CPUs
> * have the F0 0F bug, which lets nonprivileged users lock up the
> - * system.
> - * Note that the workaround only should be initialized once...
> + * system. Announce that the fault handler will be checking for it.
> */
> c->f00f_bug = 0;
> if (!paravirt_enabled() && c->x86 == 5) {
> @@ -215,7 +200,6 @@ static void __cpuinit intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>
> c->f00f_bug = 1;
> if (!f00f_workaround_enabled) {
> - trap_init_f00f_bug();
> printk(KERN_NOTICE "Intel Pentium with F0 0F bug - workaround enabled.\n");
> f00f_workaround_enabled = 1;
> }
Why do we care about this message anymore? It provides no relevant user
information, the flag itself is already in /proc/cpuinfo, and the
message is likely to be wrong since all it does is look for an Intel CPU
with family == 5.
-hpa
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v2] x86: use fixed read-only IDT
2013-04-10 0:14 ` H. Peter Anvin
@ 2013-04-10 0:29 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2013-04-10 0:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: H. Peter Anvin
Cc: Alexander Duyck, Alex Shi, Jeremy Fitzhardinge, Will Drewry,
Julien Tinnes, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, Frederic Weisbecker,
Dan Rosenberg, x86@kernel.org, LKML, Steven Rostedt,
virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, Ingo Molnar,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Thomas Gleixner,
Paul E. McKenney, xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 5:14 PM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> wrote:
> On 04/09/2013 09:39 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> -
>> static void __cpuinit intel_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>> {
>> /* calling is from identify_secondary_cpu() ? */
>> @@ -206,8 +192,7 @@ static void __cpuinit intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>> /*
>> * All current models of Pentium and Pentium with MMX technology CPUs
>> * have the F0 0F bug, which lets nonprivileged users lock up the
>> - * system.
>> - * Note that the workaround only should be initialized once...
>> + * system. Announce that the fault handler will be checking for it.
>> */
>> c->f00f_bug = 0;
>> if (!paravirt_enabled() && c->x86 == 5) {
>> @@ -215,7 +200,6 @@ static void __cpuinit intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>>
>> c->f00f_bug = 1;
>> if (!f00f_workaround_enabled) {
>> - trap_init_f00f_bug();
>> printk(KERN_NOTICE "Intel Pentium with F0 0F bug - workaround enabled.\n");
>> f00f_workaround_enabled = 1;
>> }
>
> Why do we care about this message anymore? It provides no relevant user
> information, the flag itself is already in /proc/cpuinfo, and the
> message is likely to be wrong since all it does is look for an Intel CPU
> with family == 5.
I have no objection to removing it, but with CONFIG_F00F_BUG, the trap
handler does still do some checking, and I figured this message was
there to notify people about it.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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